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Abstract 
The object of this thesis is to assess the legality of the use of force against Iraq in 2003. 
To do so, the study examines the validity of the justifications put forward by the US 
and the UK for their action in light of the existing regulations on the use of force. These 
justifications are as follows: i) the Security Council authorization for the use of force; 
ii) the right of self-defence in pre-emptive action against threats from Iraq; iii) the right 
of pro-democratic intervention in Iraq in order to relieve the Iraqi people of vast and 
continuing human rights violations by the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. 
The thesis begins with an introduction which indicates the scope of the study, the 
approach adopted and the outline of the thesis. The opening chapter reviews the 
regulation of the use of force under the UN Charter. The second chapter examines the 
Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988. The third chapter analyses the Kuwait crisis and its sequels. 
Chapter Four interprets Resolution 678 according to the rules of interpretation in order 
to determine whether the mandate of that resolution was extinguished after Iraq had 
been expelled from Kuwait, or still governed the situation in 2003. Chapter Five 
investigates the rules governing armistice agreements in order to explore whether the 
coalition forces had the right to terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities, without 
new authorization of force, on grounds of Iraq's violations of the conditions established 
in the cease-fire Resolution 687. The sixth chapter scrutinizes the legality of the 
disarmament sanctions imposed upon Iraq in Resolution 687 and Iraq's right to defy the 
implementation of these measures, should their imposition be proved to be an ultra 
vires act by the Security Council. Chapter Seven examines the validity of the argument 
that the invasion was a pre-emptive self-defence against threats from Iraq. Chapter 
Eight inspects whether the invasion can be characterized and justified as a `pro- 
democratic' war. Finally, the conclusion summarises the findings of the research. 
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Introduction 
A. Purpose 
The use of force against Iraq in March 2003 by the US and the UK was extremely controversial 
and its legality was challenged by some States including close NATO allies such as France and 
Germany. In the legal literature, commentators are severely divided between dissentients and 
advocates whose opposing positions have become well-entrenched in the last four years. 
Dissentients consider the 2003 invasion a flagrant violation of the UN Charter; some went as far 
as describing the action as a Crime Against Peace in the Nuremberg sense and a sign of the 
collapse of the UN system. On the other hand, advocates viewed Operation Iraqi Freedom as a 
defining moment for international law and a vindication of the authority of the United Nations. 
This thesis is concerned with the legality of the use of force against Iraq in 2003. The key 
question to be considered is whether the use of force against Iraq in March 2003 was consistent 
with the framework of the use of force under the UN Charter and the contemporary customary 
rules or whether it was in infringement of international norms. Although this topic has been 
discussed frequently since the invasion, however, no comprehensive study of all the legal aspects 
of this conflict or detailed account of the justifications put forward by the US and the UK for 
their action has been undertaken. 
B. Scope 
One of the perplexing issues regarding the 2003 action is its outcomes vis-ä-vis the purposes 
stated by the US and the UK for the invasion. The invading powers claimed that the objectives of 
the war, among others, were to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and to 
relieve Iraqis from the continuous violations of human rights by Saddam Hussein's vicious 
regime. However, at the time of concluding this study, no weapons of mass destruction have yet 
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been discovered and violence on a massive scale, which can fairly be described as a civil wear, 
has broken out between different sects of the Iraqi population, mainly the Sunnis and Shiites, 
since Saddam's regime was toppled. Although these ex post developments have intensified the 
case against the war, however, they do not directly bear on the justification for the use of force 
ex ante. What is important for jus ad bellum purposes is the facts that existed at the time the 
hostilities were commenced, not what transpired afterwards. Accordingly, this study '%vill be 
confined to the facts that existed in March 2003 and will not take into account the consequences 
that unfolded after the invasion. 
C. Approach 
The main concern of the present study is to assess the validity of the justifications put forward by 
the US and the UK for the invasion in light of the contemporary regulations on the use of force. 
These justifications are as follows: i) the Security Council authorization for the use of force; ii) 
the right of self-defence in pre-emptive action against threats from Iraq; iii) the right of pro- 
democratic intervention in Iraq in order to relieve the Iraqi people of vast and continuing human 
rights violations by the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. 
In testing the legal validity of these justifications it has been essential to address in detail some 
doctrines of the use of force, such as the concept of anticipatory self-defence and the nerv 
doctrine of "preventive self-defence" or what is known as the "Bush Doctrine", the use of force 
against non-State actors and States that support and harbour terrorists, and the humanitarian 
doctrine of pro-democratic intervention. Deep analysis will be carried out, throughout the thesis, 
of the pertinent State practice, doctrinal views, statements by States' Representatives in the 
Security Council, and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, it has been deemed essential to dedicate the 
first chapter of the thesis to an overview of the Charter regulations on the use of force and their 
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travaux preparatoires, in an attempt to determine the drafters' true intentions regarding some 
controversial issues which have appeared in practice. 
It should be noted that, whilst the main area of research is the rules governingjus ad bellum, the 
topic under discussion prerequisites investigating other areas of international law such as the 
rules of treaty interpretation, the law of international organizations, the doctrine of estoppel and 
the rules of ius in bello. These subjects will be examined throughout the thesis in connection 
with the relevant context. 
It has also been essential to highlight the background and attitude of Saddam Hussein's regime 
and its record of violence and violation of international norms which led to the deterioration of 
its reputation among the international community and was the raison d'etre behind the decision to 
topple this regime in 2003. From this perspective, it has been deemed appropriate to dedicate the 
second Chapter to a brief examination of the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, in order to demonstrate 
the effects and developments set in motion by this war, long before the Kuwait crisis and its 
consequences which led to the 2003 invasion and the overthrow of the Iraqi government. 
D. Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter reviews the regulation of the use of 
force under the UN Charter including the following points: the historical development of the 
rules of the use of force in international relations; the prohibition of the use of force in 
international relations established by Article 2(4); the powers and authorities conferred upon the 
Security Council under Chapter VII; the right of self-defence under Article 51 and the major 
issues raised in practice regarding the interpretation of this right. 
The second chapter examines the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988. It analyses the origins of this long- 
lasting conflict and the legal justifications put forward by Iraq for its commencing for the 
hostilities. The chapter also underlines the poor showing of the Security Council and the 
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ambiguous reaction of the world major powers towards the war which could be considered 
significant influences on Saddam Hussein's subsequent behaviour. 
The third chapter provides a comprehensive analytical view of the Kuwait crisis and its sequels. 
It examines Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the events following this crisis, up to Operation 
Desert Storm, including the measures taken by the Security Council in response to the Iraqi 
aggression; the "authorization technique" of the use of force invented by the Council in this 
crisis, which set a precedent for subsequent situations in which the Council deemed appropriate 
the use of military force; and the proportionality of the force used by the coalition forces in this 
conflict. 
Chapter Four focuses on the principal legal justification put forward by the US and the UK for 
the 2003 action, namely, the authorization of the use of force established by Security Council 
Resolution 678. The key question to be considered is the whether the mandate of that resolution 
was extinguished after Iraq had been driven out of Kuwait, or still governed the situation irl 
2003. The chapter begins by studying the theories and principles of interpretation, including the 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, and their applicability for interpreting the Security 
Council resolutions. Resolution 678 is then interpreted according to these rules. 
Chapter Five is concerned with the argument advanced by the US and the UK regarding Iraq's 
material breach of the terms of Resolution 687, which laid down the conditions of cease-fire 
between Iraq and the coalition forces in 1991. The Chapter examines the customary rules 
governing armistice agreements and whether these rules have been affected by the law of the UN 
Charter. It also observes the Vienna Convention's rules on the termination or suspension of 
treaties by one party on grounds of violation by the other party and the applicability of these 
rules in case of violation of a cease-fire agreement. 
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The sixth chapter scrutinizes the legality of the disarmament sanctions imposed upon Iraq in 
Resolution 687 and their compatibility with the principles of the UN Charter. The purpose of 
doing so in relation to the general purpose this study is to explore whether Iraq had the right to 
reject or defy the implementation of these measures, should their imposition be proved to be an 
ultra vires or unconstitutional act by the Security Council. To this end, the chapter examines two 
fields of international law: i) the law of international organizations concerning ultra vires acts; ii) 
the doctrine of estoppel and its applicability in regard to Iraq's notification of acceptance of 
Resolution 687 and the sanction imposed therein. 
Chapter Seven is concerned with the second justification given for the invasion by the US and 
the UK, which is their right of self-defence in pre-emptive action against threats from Iraq. This 
claim was of considerable relevance to another major incident that affected the law of the use of 
force and influenced the situation in Iraq, that is, the events of 9/11 and its aftermath, including 
the war on Afghanistan in 2001. Therefore, the chapter starts by examining the rules governing 
the use of force against terrorism before and after the events of 9/11 and State practice in 
response to terrorist attacks. It highlights the significant changes and alteration of the traditional 
right of self-defence brought about by 9/11 and its aftermath and discusses how far the use of 
force against Iraq in 2003 could be justified as a defensive war against terrorism in the light of 
these developments. The chapter also examines the new doctrine of preventive self-defence 
adopted by the US administration after the 9/11 attacks and its legality under the Charter system, 
including State practice as to anticipatory self-defence and to what extent the invasion of Iraq 
would be accepted on the grounds of this doctrine. 
The last chapter looks at the third legal ground for action, which is the humanitarian claim of 
pro-democratic intervention against the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. The chapter 
examines the legal theories that have been said to support a doctrine of unilateral pro-democratic 
5 
intervention and their compatibility with the Charter framework of the use of force. It also 
studies cases that are frequently cited as models for pro-democratic intervention, either unilateral 
actions taken by individual States or multilateral actions taken under the authority of Security 
Council to restore democracy, in order to explore whether these practices signify an emerging 
rule allowing pro-democratic intervention against tyrannical regimes. The chapter finally 
examines the merits of the Iraqi case and whether it can be characterized and justified as a 'pro- 
democratic' war. 
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Chapter 1 
Regulation of the Use of Force under the United Nations Charter 
Introduction 
The impetus behind the creation of a collective security organization, with its ambitious 
assumption that the use of military power by States could be constrained and even outlawed, 
developed from the debacle of World War II. The Charter system was a marked departure from 
that of the League of Nations, and the language of the Charter provides a new terminology and 
the first expression of the basic rules in their modern form. The UN Charter is explicit in its aim 
of bringing in a new global era in which State's recourse to force as an instrument of State's 
policy is abolished, in favour of a system of collective security. This is to be achieved by the use 
of international military police forces, as well as by measures such as diplomatic and economic 
sanctions. Such measures are to be used solely by the UN, acting as a united body. However, the 
Charter does not completely outlaw the unilateral use of force in international relations. If the 
word "prohibition" had been used, it would mean that force could never lawfully be used under 
the provisions of the Charter, and this is not the case. What the Charter does is to regulate rather 
than prohibit the use of force. 
This chapter will examine the Charter regulations of the use of force and the major issues 
regularly associated with their interpretations. The first section briefly reviews the rules of the 
use of force in the period prior to the creation of the UN. The second section focuses on the 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations established by Article 2(4). The third 
section looks at the collective security system created by the Charter, including the powers and 
authorities conferred upon the Security Council by Chapter VII, the model of enforcement action 
envisaged by the drafters of the Charter and restrictions on the Security Council's authority. The 
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fourth section reviews the travaux preparatoires of Article 51 in order to investigate the 
intentions of the drafters regarding the scope of the right of self-defence. The final section 
highlights some vital issues raised among States and writers regarding the interpretation of 
Article 51, including the duration of defensive measures, the definition of "armed attack" and 
whether anticipatory self-defence is permitted under Article 51. The conclusions reached in this 
chapter will be depended upon in the remainder of the thesis. 
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Section A: The use of force prior to the UN Charter 
Prior to the 20th century, no prohibition of the use of force by States existed; States had the right 
to wage was to protect their interests, and at their own sovereign discretion. ' In the absence of 
legal regulation of the use of force or of any powerful international authority for the enforcement 
of the law and the protection of rights of individual States, the only constraint was the ethical 
doctrine of bellum justum, espoused by the Christian theology to distinguish between just and 
unjust wars. However, this doctrine was based only on subjective criteria and, in the absence of 
impartial authorities to decide in an objective way the justice of the causes of the belligerents, it 
was left to the conscience of the acting State. 3 Gradually, however, this doctrine was discredited 
and abandoned in favour of more stable and permanent system. This was the context in which 
the positivist thought on the law of nations evolved and a basic distinction was observed between 
the "necessary law of nature" and the "voluntary law of nations. "4 The adoption of this approach 
eliminated the question of the justice of a war, which was held to be beyond any nation to decide, 
focusing instead on the legality of the war. 5 In this way, the concept of bellum legale was 
replaced by the concept of bellum justum. 6 
With the rejection of the distinction between just and unjust wars, "war became the supreme 
right of sovereign States and the very hall-mark of their sovereignty. "7 To that extent 
See generally Elbe, J "The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International Law", 33 AJIL, 1939; 
Briggs, H. W, The Law of Nations, second edition, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc, New York, 1952, p 976 2 Alexandrov, S. Self-Defence against the Use of Force in International Law, vol. 23, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, Netherlands, 1996, p3 3 Bowett, W. Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester University Press, 1958, p 7-8; see also Kunz, J. 
"Bellum justum et bellum legale", 45 AJIL, 1951, p 531; Waldock, H. The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Hague Recueil, 1952, p 456-7 4 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p9 
s Ibid. 
6 Kunz, note 3 supra, p 532 7 Lauterpacht, H. "The Grotian Tradition in International Law", 23 BYIL, 1946, p 39; see also Briggs, note 1 
supra, p 976 
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international law could not be regarded as law as the term is generally understood! In other 
words, war was recognized as a "circumstance beyond the power of the law to control. s9 From a 
legal perspective, war was considered to serve as: (i) a method of self-help for resolving conflicts 
and enforcing rights originating with the law actually in force, 1° as part of a broader concept of 
defence of legal right and of a remedy against refusal to compensate for violation of legal right; ' I 
(ii) a sanction against those who breached international law; 12 and (iii) a means to challenge the 
international legal status quo. 13 Thus, war was considered as a judicial procedure, involving 
execution and punishment, which could be resorted to in order to obtain redress for wrongs in the 
absence of a system of international justice and sanctions. 14 A State was entitled to defend itself 
and to take retaliatory action on behalf of itself and its subjects to redress wrongs: indeed, it was 
expected to do so, and to be self-sufficient in this respect. 
The scope of self-defence in that period was unclear and extended into the sphere of self-help. ls 
Although both self-defence and self-help depended on a prior injury, received, "' self-defence, 
however, constitutes just one form of use of force among other forms of forcible measures of 
self-help. It operates to protect essential rights from irreparable harm in circumstances in which 
alternative means of protection are not available; it was to preserve or restore the legal status 
quo. Self-help, however, includes various forms of coercion which do not constitute war in the 
formal sense, such as retorsion and reprisals. '? Thus, self-help has a remedial or repressive 
8 Lauterpacht, ibid 
9 Eagleton, "Attempt to Define Aggression", International Council, 1930, p 583. Quoted in Bowett, note 3 
supra, p 119 
10 Kunz, J. "The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic", 27 AJIL, 1933, p 634 
" Bowett, note 3 supra, p 11 
'2 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 11 
13 Kunz, J. "The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic", note 10 supra, p 634 
'4 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 11 
's Simma, B. The Charter of the United Nations; A Commentary, Volume 1, second edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p 789 
16 Bowett, note 3 supra, p 11 
'7 Oppenheim, L. International Law: A Treatise, vol. 2, second edition, Longmans, London, 1912, p 34 
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character in order to enforce legal rights. '8 Under the Charter legal system, this latter function 
has been taken away from individual States and allocated to the central authority of the 
international community. 19 Accordingly, apart from self-defence, any other form of self-help 
became absolutely prohibited. 
Towards the end of the 19th century and in the early years of the 20th century, a new tendency 
towards peaceful settlement of disputes emerged in international relations and the "right of war" 
was eroded 2° Attempts were made to limit the States' freedom to wage war by making war in 
general only a subsidiary means of settling international conflicts. These did not, in fact, abolish 
war an instrument of national policy; war remained as a legal institution in principle21 As the 
report of the Peace Conference Commission on Responsibilities of 1919 admitted, "even a war 
of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can 
be successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to consider under 
its terms of reference. "22 
By 1920, it was realized that the complete elimination of war required the availability of an 
alternative, peaceful way of resolving disputes between nations, a mechanism for enforcing this 
settlement in the name of the community and, if necessary a power to take sanctions against the 
disobedient member of the international community. The method of approach was the creation of 
an international organization which would provide peaceful machinery for the settlement of 
international disputes, as a substitute for the method of self-help by the use of force 23 
Accordingly, like its successor, the United Nations, the League of Nations was founded for the 
maintenance of peace and security. The aim in establishing the League of Nations, in 1920, was 
18 Bowett, note 3 supra, p11 
" Ibid 
20 Simma, note 15 supra, p 789 21 Kunz, "The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic", note 10 supra, p 635 22 
"Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties", Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 19 March 1919, reprinted in 14 AJIL, 1920, p 118 23 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 29 
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to create a new international world order, a new international law, in which war, as a method of 
self-help, was replaced by organized and peaceful methods of settling international disputes. 4 
In this view, the Covenant made war, in general, a last resort. Members of the League were, in 
the event of a dispute, first to exhaust the peaceful procedures provided. 
5 If, however, these 
failed to achieve resolution of the dispute, States concerned remain free to resort to war. 26 Thus, 
although the Covenant clearly restricted the right of States to resort to war, war was still a legal 
institution in principle and as a means of self-help when the peaceful settlement mechanisms 
failed 27 As to the right of self-defence, there was no specific reservation of that right contained 
in the Covenant. This was considered to be unnecessary, since self-defence is an inherent right. 
The decisive turning-point in the trend towards a general prohibition on war was the Kellogg_ 
Briand Pact in 1928.28 The Pact, for the first time in history, absolutely prohibited the right of 
war as a notional policy29 and declared that international disputes should only be resolved by 
pacific means 30 The only exception to this general prohibition of war, although not explicitly 
24 Kunz, "The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic", note 10 supra, p 635 
25 Article 12 of the Covenant stated that "The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise 
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months 
after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. " Article 13 (1) 
declared that "The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which 
they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be 
satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial 
settlement. " Article 15 (1) also stated that "If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute 
likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with 
Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. " 
26 Article 15 (7) explicitly stated that "If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by 
the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members 
of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice. " 
27 Kunz, "The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic", note 10 supra, p 635 
28 See generally Wright, Q. "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris", 27 AJIL, 1933 
29 Article I of the Pact stated that "The high contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their 
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and 
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. " The Kellogg 
-Briand Pact 
available at <bttp: //www. yale. edu/lawweb/avalon/kbpact/kbpact. htm> 
3° Article 2 of the Pact reads: "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among thertl 
shall never be sought except by pacific means. " See in ibid. ' 
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expressed in the Pact, was the right of self-defence 31 Although a significant milestone, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact had its shortcomings, among them, the failure to provide for sanctions 
against violators, beyond a statement in the preamble that they "should be denied the benefits 
furnished by the treaty. "32 A more serious error was that the prohibition was worded solely in 
terms of war, rather than the use of force in general. 33 This left scope for States to disguise their 
military actions by not declaring them as war, thereby claiming that they were not in breach of 
the Pact 34 
Section B: The prohibition of unilateral use of force in Article 2(4) 
Prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States drew up proposals asserting the prohibition of the use of force as a general 
principle of the UN, except for enforcement action carried out by the UN itself. 35 At the 
conference, the prohibition of the use of force as a fundamental principle of the UN was agreed. 
The provisional text was similar in wording to Article 2(4) in its current form. The text of Article 
31 During the travaux preparatoires of the Pact, the French Government maintained that the treaties must be 
construed so as not to bar the right of legitimate defence. Secretary Kellogg (the American Foreign 
Secretary) agreed to this interpretation of the French Government. In his speech of 23 June 1928 to some of 
the original signatories, he stated that "There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which 
restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defence. That right is inherent in every sovereign State and is 
implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its 
territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse 
to war in self-defence.... Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural right of self-defence, it is 
not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defence since it is far too 
easy for the unscrupulous to mould events to accord with an agreed definition. " Dispatch of the American 
Foreign Secretary of April 23,1928, quoted in Miller, D. The Pact of Paris: A Study of the Kellogg-Briand 
Treaty, New York, 1928, p 213-214. Similarly, in the Note of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 
American Ambassador of 14 July 1928, he stated "nothing in the new treaty restrains or compromises in any 
manner whatsoever the right of self-defence. Each nation in this respect will always remain free to defend its 
territory against attack or invasion; it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to 
war in self-defence. " Quoted in Lauterpacht, H. The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933, p 178 at footnotes 32 The Preamble of the Kellogg 
-Briand Pact, note 29 supra 33 Simma, note 15 supra, p 116 34 For example, China and Japan engaged in extensive military operations against each other in 1931 and 1937, after Japan's invasion of Manchuria, while continuingly denying that a state of war existed between 
them. Ibid 
35 Goodrich L, M. and Hambro, E. Charter of the United Nations; Commentary and Documents, second 
edition, Stevens & Sons, London, 1949, p 6-7 
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2(4) was simply rendered as: "All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Organization. "36 
These words were deliberately chosen. In discussion of Paragraph 4, during the preparation 
period of the San Francisco Conference, it was suggested by one of the US delegates to 
strengthen the prohibition in the Paragraph to be read as follows: "All members of the 
organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization and the provisions of 
its Charter. "37 However, objections were raised by representatives to inclusion of the phrase "and 
principles" and "the provisions of the Charter" because they wanted to be sure that, in the event 
of a Russian veto of UN action, action by the organization, the US could take whatever action 
was necessary, consistent with the purpose of the Organization. Therefore, they considered the 
less restrictive obligation implied by the original language was preferable. 38 Thus, the US 
intention was to preserve the right to act unilaterally in case collective security action was 
hindered. 
B. 1 At San Francisco Conference 
One year later, in San Francisco, in Committee I/1 (entrusted with discussion of the provisions 
related to the prohibition of the threat or use of force) many States called for this provision to be 
strengthened with an additional obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political 
independence of States. 9 Australia, for example, proposed adding, after the prohibition of use of 
force, the words "against the territorial integrity and political independence of any member or 
36 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organi_ation (UNCIO), San Francisco 
1945, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Doc. 1, G1, p 3. [ Hereinafter UNCIO Doc. ] 
37 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, vol. 1, United States Govetmellt 
Printing Office, Washington, 1967, p 426 [Hereinafter Foreign Relations] 
38 Ibid. 
39 UNCIO Doc. vol. 3, Proposals submitted by Mexico p 65, Iran p 554, Bolivia p 578 
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State, or in any other manner... "40 This amendment was adopted unanimously by participants. It 
was argued that these principles constitute a part of any system of collective security; and the 
importance of the second principle, in particular, was asserted by drawing attention to "the 
methods of cunning aggression employed by the totalitarian powers in the creation of artificial 
States and of puppet regimes. "41 Unintentionally, however, the amendment created an opening 
for some, later, to argue that the prohibition against force did not cover minor or temporary 
invasions that did not actually threaten the territorial integrity of the victim State or its 
independence 42 Such an interpretation, however, is clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of those who proposed and supported this amendment. 
In an attempt further to strengthen Article 2 (4)'s prohibition against the use of force by States, 
Mexico led a call for insertion of the following principle: "No State has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, and whatever be the reason, in the domestic or foreign affairs of another. "43 
Iran, also, suggested drawing up a paragraph to be read as follows: "All the member States of the 
Organization should refrain from intervening in their international relations, either directly or 
indirectly, in the internal affairs of the other States and from the threat or use of force in any 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization. "44 This amendment was motivated by 
previous instances in which powerful States had coercively used their economic strength to put 
pressure on weaker States, which had been a cause of disturbance in international relations 45 
This amendment was rejected, although the same idea is raised in Article 2 (7) which concerns 
interference in internal affairs of States by the United Nations itself. 46 Thus, the final form of 
Article 2(4) reads as follows: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
40 Ibid. Proposal submitted by Australia, p 543 41 Ibid. Mexico p 65 42 See chapter 8, section B. 1 for arguments made to this effect. 43 UNCIO Doc. vol. 3, Mexico, p 66 
44 Ibid, Iran, p 554 
`s Ibid. Mexico, p 67 
46 See section C. 1.1 below 
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threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. " 
This wording certainly represents a significant advance over the similar article in the Covenantal 
and the Kellogg- Briand Pact, 48 in that it applies to the use of force in general, not only war_ 
Moreover, the threat of force, as well as its actual use, is forbidden. 49 It is significant also that 
Article 2 (4) is to be found in Chapter 1, entitled "Purposes and Principles". This reflects its 
status as one of the fundamental provisions, in the light of which all other provisions of the 
Charter are to be understood and including "the directions which the activities of the 
Organization are to take and the common ends of its members. "S0 Indeed, the article appears to 
set up a model of State behaviour, with an emphasis on peace as the fundamental aim of the UN_ 
Since 1945, any debate on the issue of use of force inevitably centres on Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, which authors have described as "the cornerstone of peace in Charter" or the "heart of 
the UN Charter. " The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case described 
Article 2(4) as "a peremptory norm of International Law, which States cannot derogate. "$' 
B. 2 Article 2 (4) and internal conflicts 
The wording of Article 2 (4) indicates that the prohibition on the use of force applies to the 
international relations of States, not to their internal situations S2 The questions arise now, did 
Article 2(4) really intend to eliminate the right of humanitarian intervention? Or to immunize 
against foreign intervention a State whose government massively violates the basic human rights 
47 Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads: "The Members of the League undertake tc 
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such 
aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. " 
49 See note 29 supra 
49 Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 104 
50 Ibid. p 22 
s' Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 14, para. 190 
52 Simma, note 15 supra, p 608 
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against its own population? 53 Detailed answers to these questions are beyond the scope of the 
present study; however, it clearly appears from the drafting history that the drafters' intention 
was to prohibit States from interfering in the internal affairs of one another. Internal struggles, 
even on the scale of civil war, have always been viewed as an internal matter. Indeed, in many 
States they have been a typical method of regime change. 54 It was not the drafters' intention to 
enable individual States or the Organization to interfere in such situations. 55 
Although this principle is not clear in the text of Article 2 (4) and the proposals by Mexico and 
Iran 56 to include an explicit clause to this effect were rejected, the principle of non-interference 
in domestic affairs was clearly stated in Article 2(7) in regard to the UN itself; a fortiori, then, 
this principle applies for individual States. Furthermore, any lingering ambiguity surrounding the 
UN Charter's prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs of States was clarified by 
the UN General Assembly in its 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 
Domestic Affairs of States. The declaration, passed without any dissenting votes and only one 
abstention (Great Britain), asserts that "l. No State has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural element, are 
condemned; 2..... Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate 
53 Franck, T. Recourse to Force, State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2002, p2 34 Connell, M. "Regulating the Use of Force in the 21's Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy", 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1997, p 481 ss Henkin, L. International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 1990, p 165-7; see also Chapter 8 for 
examination of the alleged `right' of pro-democratic intervention 56 Notes 43 and 44 supra 
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subversive, terrorist, or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of 
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State"" 
These principles were given legal force in the 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations. The 
Declaration, which has the status of a unanimous agreement, having been passed without a 
vote, 58 can be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter's Principle of non_ 
intervention. 
Section C: The Charter's collective security system 
As mentioned earlier, the Charter does not absolutely prohibit or outlaw the use of force, but it 
provides rules for the use of force under the new world system. Therefore, although the 
prohibition of the use of force in Article 2 (4) is a basic principle, however, it is qualified by two 
exceptions: i) action taken for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security 
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII; and ii) the inherent right of individual and 
collective self defence, preserved by Article 51. However, these two exceptions are not 
equivalent; self-defence under Article 51 is only meant to be subsidiary in nature and in no way a 
substitute for the collective action of the organization-59 Therefore, the rules binding the United 
Nations differ from those applied to individual States. The Security Council was given broader 
authority to use force in response to threats of aggression as well as to breaches of international 
peace. 
57 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
or Their Independence and Sovereignty, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2131(XX) of 21 December 1965 
58 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Amon? 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, see also Chapter 7, section B. 2.2 
51 See section E. 1 infra 
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Cl The Security Council' powers and authorities under Article 39 
The UN's primary goal, as set out in Article 1 (1) is the maintenance of international peace and 
security. These matters are addressed specifically in Chapter VII, beginning with Article 39, 
which constitutes the basic provision of the whole Charter system for the enforcement of peace. 
It provides that "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain international peace and 
security. " Thus, Article 39 contains the legal basis for the application of measures according to 
Articles 41 and 42. This means that economic sanctions under Article 41 or military sanctions 
under Article 42 always require the determination of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, 
or an act of aggression in the sense of Article 39.60 It therefore appears mistaken to draw a 
distinction between Articles 39 and Article 42 with respect to the prerequisites for application. 61 
In other words, Article 39, as it stands, cannot alone be considered as the basis for such 
enforcement action because the Article itself refers to Article 42 as the basis for use of force. 
It is clear from the travaux preparatoires for this article that the drafters intended to assign 
exclusively to the Security Council the responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals entrusted the Security Council with competence to take 
measures to maintain world peace and international security. At San Francisco, it was proposed 
that the General Assembly should join with the Security Council in the performance of functions 
specified in this Article. 62 Smaller and middle-sized States favoured the idea of giving the 
General Assembly, as the main organ of the UN, a more important role in maintaining world 
peace. They hoped they would thereby gain more influence in the decision about enforcement 
60 Simma, note 15 supra, p 612-13 61 Ibid, p 631 62 Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 156 
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measures. 
63 The Sponsoring Powers, however, viewed these proposals as weakening the 
organization and rejected them in favour of the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 64 
Another concern raised at San Francisco was the absence of any precisely defined principles or 
standards to control the Security Council's interventions. A number of States called for stronger 
regulation in this respect. The need was highlighted for the Security Council in the performance 
of its function to be guided by the basic purposes and principles of the organization as set jr, 
Articles 1 and 2.65 This general guidance for the Security Council in performing its functions was 
not inserted in the text of Article 39; instead, it is to be found in Article 24(2) of Chapter V 
regarding "Functions and Powers. "66 Thus, the Charter Principles and the purposes related to 
them could be considered as boundaries for the Council's authority in imposing sanctions. 
Some delegates, however, considered this inadequate and called for a definition of aggression to 
be incorporated in the text of the Charter and made binding on the Security Counci167 The Us 
and the UK, however, were among those who asserted the impossibility of an exhaustive 
63 New Zealand proposed that "the General Assembly shall have the right to consider any matter within the 
sphere of international relations. " UNCIO Doc. vol. 3, p 487. Bolivia similarly demanded the common action 
of the GA and the SC: "The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of 
cooperation in the maintainace of international peace, security and justice. " Ibid, Bolivia, p 583. Egypt 
proposed that all decisions of the Security Ccouncil should be presented to the General Assembly, which 
would be authorized to suspend or rescind them by a three-quarters majority. Ibid, p 459-60. Of significance 
Iran proposed that the General Assembly should be able to intervene should the Security Council fail to reach 
a decision within a certain time-limit. Iran's proposal reads: "The General Assembly can always draw the 
attention of the Council to a dispute or to all situations capable of endangering peace, and fix an adequate 
delay within which the Council should pronouns its decision on the question submitted to it. It, at the 
expiration of this period, the Council is unable to reach a decision, the Assembly can intervene and take the 
necessary measures. " UNCIO Doc. vol. 3, Amendments proposed by Iran, p 555. Although this proposal also 
was rejected at the time, in November 1950, the Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution, which 
gave it power to discuss and make recommendations on matters of peace and security if the Council found 
itself deadlocked. Members were also to hold armed forces ready in the event that the Council failed to act. 
The Uniting for Peace resolution was first used in 1954 when the U. K. and France vetoed Security Council 
resolutions during the Suez crisis. Following a General Assembly demand to do so, those two countries 
withdrew their troops. 
64 Simma, note 15 supra, p 607; see also Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 156 
65 Goodrich and Hambro, ibid, p 157 
66 Article 24(2) states that "in discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. "
67 See proposal submitted by Bolivia. UNCIO Doc. vol. 3, p 579. This proposal received the support of 
numerous States. Simma, note 15 supra, p 608 
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definition and argued that too rigid a rule could result in premature imposition of sanctions. 8 
Ultimately, at the San Francisco Conference it was decided to not to attempt a detailed definition 
of aggression for the guidance of the Security Council. 69 
Turning back to the text of Article 39, under this article, the Security Council, in the first place, 
has to determine "the existence of any threat of the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression. " 
The Security Council has an unfettered discretionary power to decide in each case whether a 
particular act constitutes any of these specified acts. 70 Once the determination that one of these 
acts has been found has been made, the Council can either "make recommendations, or decide 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42" Thus, a clear distinction is 
made between recommendations on the one hand and decisions on measures under Articles 41 
and 42 on the other. It is generally assumed in the legal literature that "recommendations" under 
Article 39 are understood to refer to Chapter VI provisions calling for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes, to be pursued either alone or in tandem with economic and/or military 
decisions taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42.71 According to this view, it is not possible 
to justify enforcement measures, which would interfere with the international legal rights of the 
affected State, on the basis of a recommendation. 72 In other words, non-binding 
recommendations according to Article 39 cannot encompass enforcement measures under 
Articles 41 and 42. However, occasionally it has been suggested that enforcement measures 
according to Articles 41 and 42 may also be based on recommendations. 73 The first view seems 
68 Simma, ibid 
69 See Report of Rapporteur of Committee 11113 to Commission III on Chapter VIII, section E. 2 infra 70 Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 156; see also Foreign Relations, 1945, p 700 71 Goodrich and Hambro, ibid, p 158 72 Simma, note 15 supra, p 614-5 
" Recommendation under Article 39 was held by some writers to be the basis for the Council's response to North Korea's attack on South Korea in 1950. This view was based on the language of SC Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950 where the Council "recommend[ed] that the Members of the United Nations furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international 
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more appropriate and compatible with the historical background of Article 39 which indicates 
that the binding character of enforcement against the State subject to the measures; this is more 
likely to be achieved through binding decisions, not recommendations. The final report of 
Committee 111/3 at San Francisco voted unanimously that: 
" (I) In using the word "recommendations" in Section B, as already found in paragraph ,, 
Section A, (Article 36, paragraph 1) the Committee has intended to show that the action of the 
Council so far as it relates to the peaceful settlement of a dispute or to situations giving rise to a 
threat of war, a breach of the peace, or aggression, should be considered as governed by the 
provisions contained in Section A. (Chapter VI) Under such an hypothesis, the Council would in 
reality pursue simultaneously two distinct actions, one having for its object the settlement of the 
dispute or the difficulty, and the other, the enforcement or provisional measures, each of which is 
governed by an appropriate section in Chapter VIII. 
(II) It is the Committee's view that the power given to the Council under paragraphs 1 and 
(Articles 39 and 40) not to resort to the measures contemplated in paragraphs 3 and 4, (Articles 
41 and 42) or to resort to them only after having sought to maintain or restore peace by inviting 
the parties to consent to certain conservatory measures, refers above all to the presumption of a 
threat of war. The Committee is unanimous in the belief that, on the contrary, in the case of 
flagrant aggression imperiling the existence of a Member of the Organization, enforcement 
measures should be taken without delay, and to the full extent required by circumstances, except 
that the Council should at the same time endeavour to persuade the aggressor to abandon its 
venture, by the means contemplated in Section A and by prescribing conservatory measures. "74 
From this report the following observations can be made: 
peace and security in the area. " See, for example, Higgins, R. The Development of International Lc Through the Political Origins of the United Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963,197-210 
74 Report of Rapporteur on Chapter VIII, Section B, UNCIO Documents, Doc, 881,111/3/46, p6 
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(1) The recommendations of the Security Council are intended to be made in connection with its 
efforts to achieve a pacific settlement under Chapter VI. 
(2) Within the framework of Article 39, recommendations can be a preliminary to further 
measures, in particular enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42. 
(3) Binding decisions of the Security Council are to be taken only with regard to measures under 
Articles 41 and 42 necessary to restore international peace and security. 
(4) The Security Council is not required to attempt peaceful settlement before resorting to 
enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42; in case of flagrant violation of international 
peace and security, the Council can take these enforcement measures promptly from the outset. 73 
(5) Efforts at peaceful settlement will presumably continue even during the period when 
enforcement action is being taken. 
Despite the apparent intention of the drafters that enforcement measures are to be achieved 
through binding decisions, however, nothing in the text of Article 39 definitely excludes the 
possibility that "recommendations" may encompass enforcement action under Articles 41 and 
42, although such an interpretation is highly doubtful. 
C. l. 1 Qualifications on the Council's authority and the concept of "threat of peace" 
The Charter rests on the requirement of an assessment by the Security Council, of the existence 
of a threat to or breach of the peace. A determination to that effect triggers the Council's power 
under Chapter VII to take measures "to maintain or restore international peace and security. " By 
using the words "international peace", Article 39 confines the Council's right to take measures to 
threats to or breaches of international peace; it does not refer to the use of force in States' 
internal affairs, such as civil war. Hence, it is understood that the drafters of the Charter meant to 
restrict the Council's authority to intervene in such situations, breaches of "peace" 
's See Chapter 3, section A. 3 for an arguments to the contrary by the Representative of Yemen in the Security Council 
23 
notwithstanding. This restriction upon the Council to intervene in response to violent conflict 
within States is explicitly stated in Article 2(7) 76 This article plainly states that the internal 
affairs of members are out-of-bounds for the Organization. This limitation is consistent with the 
Charter's preservation of the "autonomy" value. 77 
In the early years after the creation of the UN, the organization showed no sign of ability or 
willingness so to intervene. For example, in April 1946, Poland brought the circumstances in 
Spain before the Security Council under Article 35, and requested that it decide on measures 
according to Articles 39 and 41. However, the sub-committee appointed to investigate the 
question concluded that neither a breach of the peace nor a threat to the peace existed. 78 Over the 
years, however, the Council changed its position and repeatedly shown a tendency to include the 
internal situation of a State in the concept of peace, above all with respect to the violation of 
human rights. 
The closest the U. N. has come to intervening in a civil war was in the Congo in 1960. On 14th 
July 1960, the Security Council adopted Resolution 143, in which it called upon Belgium to 
remove its troops from Congo and authorized the Secretary-General to provide "militar y 
assistance" to the Congolese forces to counter Belgian intervention. 79 The UN reacted quickly 
and established United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), although France and the Soviet 
Union objected to this action, claiming it contravened the Charter and refused to contribute to the 
cost of the action. 
In 1965, when Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence from the UK, the Council 
condemned the illegal racist minority regime by the "illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia', 
76 Article 2(7) reads "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 
o t application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" 
7 Connell, note 54 supra, p 481 
78 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question, UN Doc. S/75 (31 May 1946) 
79 Security Council Resolution 143 of 14 July, 1960 
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and called upon the UK to "put an end to it "80 In 1966, the Council adopted Resolution 221 
which expressly characterized the situation in Rhodesia as a "threat to the peace" and specifically 
authorized the UK to block vessels believed to be transporting oil to Southern Rhodesia, contrary 
to a Security Council embargo by using force if necessary-81 With regard to South Africa, in 
1977, the Council adopted Resolution 418 in which it condemned the apartheid in South Africa 
and determined that this regime constitutes a "threat to international peace and security. "82 
Accordingly, acting under Chapter VII, the Council determined to impose an armed embargo on 
the South African Government. 
Despite these episodes, the greatest impediment to Security Council intervention in civil 
conflicts was not so much the legal restrictions on intervention in internal affairs, but the Cold 
War between the United States and the Soviet Union, whereby a Council decision to use force 
was generally viewed as favouring or disfavouring one side or another. Consequently, a veto was 
inevitable. 83 After the Cold War, however, the scope of action of the Security Council in relation 
to such interventions under Article 39 was widened; the Council has subsequently intervened in 
several internal conflicts and paid greater attention to regimes that violate human rights. 
In Resolution 688 of 1991 the Council viewed the savage repression against dissident minorities 
in Iraq and the exodus of a large numbers of Kurdish and Shiite opponents into neighbouring 
Turkey and Iran as a threat to international peace and security. 84 Accordingly, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, set up no-fly zones or enclaves, in order to protect Iraqi Kurds 
from repression by Iraqi troops. They argued that Resolution 688 implicitly authorized the use of 
80 Security Council Resolution 217 of 20 November 1965 8' Security Council Resolution 221 of 9 April 1966 92 Security Council Resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 83 Connell, note 54 supra, p 482 84 Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991 
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force for patrolling these zones and to provide safe havens to the Kurdish refugees. 85 Similarly, 
after the outbreak in Yugoslavia in 1991 of violence between forces of the Federal Government 
and the two States of Slovenia and Croatia, which had declared themselves independent, the 
Security Council invoked Chapter VII and characterized the situation as a "threat to international 
peace and security. , 86 In 1992, the Council determined that the situation in Somalia constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. Therefore it decided under Chapter VII that all States 
should, "for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a 
general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to 
Somalia. "87 Likewise, after deciding that "the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, particularly in West Africa as a whole, "88 it imposed an 
embargo on all deliveries of weapons to Liberia. 89 In 1993 the Council invoked Chapter VII 
against Haiti, determining the existence of a threat to international peace since the legitimate 
Government, which had been overthrown by a military government was not reinstated. The 
Security Council referred expressly to the refugee problem. 0 
Thus, despite the apparent restriction on the Council's authority to intervene in internal 
situations, it is clear that the Council views internal conditions within a State as a threat to peace 
that necessitates its interference. The tendency of the Council to involve itself in matters 
traditionally supposed to belong to States' domestic jurisdiction reflects the rising consciousness 
of despotic regimes that violate human rights. In addition, even if a civil war or a massive 
violation of human rights within a State is not in itself a breach of international peace; however, 
it can certainly have international implications and lead to a threat to international peace. Indeed, 
95 See Chapter 4, section C. 4.1 part III 
86 Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 September, 1991 
87 Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 January, 1992 
88 Security Council Resolution 788 of 19 November, 1992 
89 Ibid. See also Chapter 4, section C. 3.1 
90 Security Council Resolution 841 of 16 June, 1993. See also Chapter 8, section C. 2.1 
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fighting on a considerable scale resulting in exodus of refugees with the possibility of outside 
intervention can always be considered to be a threat to the peace. Therefore, it seems now to be 
accepted that extreme violence within a State can generally be qualified as a threat to the peace 
that justifies Council intervention. 
The Council, however, did not restrict its interference only to violent internal situations; it 
extended its authority to limit the States' freedom of armament. Notably, the ICJ expressly 
referred in its Nicaragua decision to the freedom of States to decide on their armament 91 
Nevertheless, the Security Council has in some circumstances considered measures with respect 
to armament as a threat to the peace. In 1991, the Council imposed a disarmament regime on Iraq 
in Resolution 687.92 This decision under Chapter VII was unprecedented in the UN history and 
triggered intense debate regarding Iraq's sovereign rights. 93 Recently, the Council expressed its 
concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear programme and "call[ed] upon Iran without further delay" 
to comply with the regulations of the IAEA and to "suspend all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities, including research and development. " Following Iran's failure to comply 
with these demands, the Council adopted Resolution 1737 of 2006 in which it imposed an 
embargo on supplying Iran with any "items, materials, equipment, goods and technology" which 
could contribute to Iran's nuclear programme. 4 In that resolution, the Council expressly stated 
that it was acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII. Surprisingly enough, however, the Council did 
not mention, in that resolution or any other related resolution, 95 that the Iranian nuclear 
programme constitutes a threat to the international peace and security. Nevertheless, while a 
determination of the Council is a prerequisite for a decision on further measures under Chapter 
91 Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 135, para. 269 92 Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 93 See Chapter 6 for examination of the legality of the Council disarmament obligations on Iraq 94 Security Council Resolution 1737 of 23 December 2006 93 Security Council Resolutions 1686 of 31 July, 2006 and 1747 of 24 March 2007 
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VII and the practice of the Council was consistent in citing such determination before proceedin, 
to take measures under Chapter VII, in fact, there is nothing in the text of Article 39 requiring the 
Council to state such a determination explicitly in its resolution. Therefore, it could be argued 
that the omission of such expression from the text of the resolution does not affect its legality. 
To conclude, it seems that, in reality, the concept of "threat to the peace" has an endless 
flexibility which allows the Security Council to take whatever action it deems necessary to 
maintain international peace and security regardless, whether this action may be considered 
interference in the State's domestic jurisdiction. In other words, when international peace and 
security and the sovereign rights of a State are at odds, the former prevails. Furthermore, the 
term "threat to international peace and security", as Henk-in rightly observed, "is not capable of 
legal definition, but only of political determination by a political body. "96 
C. 2 Articles 41and 42 
According to Article 39, once a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" is 
found, the Security Council shall "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. " This implies that 
measures decided by the Council should fall under one or other of these provisions: Article 41 In 
the case of non-forcible measures, and Article 42 otherwise. Article 41 em powers the Council to 
take non-forcible measures such as "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and (3f, 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the seve rance of 
diplomatic relations. " If these non-forcible measures "would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, " the Council can proceed to take forcible measures under Article 42, such as "action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international Peace 
-arid 
security. " Thus, a prerequisite for the application of Article 42 is the judgment of the Security 
96 Henkin, L. "Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law- 
Alabama Law Review, 1997, p 575 , 
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Council as to the actual or likely inadequacy of measures provided for in Article 4197 However, 
neither the drafting history of Article 39, discussed above, nor the language of Article 42, 
indicates a requirement that Article 41' measures have previously been ordered and 
implemented; the Council may opt immediately for Article 42 on the basis of its opinion that 
measures under Article 41 would be ineffective. In practice, however, the Council has never 
taken this option. Even in the most egregious violations, such as the Kuwait crisis, peaceful and 
non-forcible measures have been attempted first. Measures pursuant to Article 42 are a final 
recourse against a State which refuses to comply with the orders of the Council 98 
A widely held view is that the Council's authority to have recourse to military action under 
Chapter VII can only be found in Article 42.99 Article 42 explicitly authorizes the Security 
Council to "take action by air, sea, or land forces" as appropriate. No other article contains such 
an express provision. In fact, the historical background of Article 42 indicates clearly that the 
intention of the drafters was that forcible action is to be decided upon and implemented by the 
Security Council under Article 42 first and foremost, but not exclusively. During the preparatory 
work on the UN Charter, the Sponsoring Powers agreed that the new organization should be 
given authority to enforce international peace and security by military means if necessary. '°° 
They intended to introduce a fundamental innovation in comparison to the League of Nations 
Covenant, where the League Council could only "recommend to several Governments 
concerned" to take military action against an aggressor State. '°' In contrast, Article 42 allows the 
97 Simma, note 15 supra, p 631 98 See Chapter 3, section A. 1 & A. 2 
99 See, for example, Kelsen, H. The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, Stevens & Sons, London, 1951, p 756 100 Chapter VIII, section B, sub-section 4 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals corresponds almost verbatim to 
what later became Article 42 of the UN Charter. UNCIO Documents, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Doc. 1, G 1, 
p15 01 Article 16 of the Covenant allowed the League Council to "recommend to several Governments concerned 
what effective military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally that States apply armed force against an aggressor. " 
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Security Council to take the necessary forcible action itself 102 albeit through the armed forces of 
the organization's members. To this end, Article 43 provides for that the Security Council is to 
have at its disposal troops designated by member States to be on the ready to maintain 
international peace, pursuant to agreements between the Council and individual member States. 
These forces, according to Article 47, will be placed under the command of a Military Stat 
Committee, 103 which will coordinate the activities of these troops and direct military operation 
under the control of the Security Council. 104 Thus, the Article 42 power of the Security council 
to apply armed force cannot be read alone; it should be read in conjunction with the following 
articles, in particular, Article 43. 
C. 3 Article 42 dependency on Article 43 
Article 42 has a dependent relationship with Article 43, pursuant to which the UN members 
consent to provide the Security Council, "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement 
or agreements, " with armed forces, assistance, and facilities to effectuate Article 42. Thus, it Evas 
envisaged that arguments would be made to establish a procedure through which the Security 
Council could call on the members for military forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights 
of passage. On the other hand, the reference to special agreements implies that such assistance is 
voluntary; the Security Council cannot oblige member States to provide military forces or 
facilities without agreements according to Article 43.105 Overall, Article 43 seems to provide the 
essential mechanism for carrying out such military operations. 
102 Kelsen, note 99 supra, p 763 
103 Article 47 (1) reads: "There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advice and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenýee 
of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the 
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. " 
104 Article 47 (3) reads: "The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. " 
'05 Kelsen, note 99 supra, p 759; see also Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 166-7 
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Article 42's dependent relationship with Article 43 is explicitly acknowledged in Article 106 of 
the Charter, delineating post-World War II transitional security arrangements "pending the 
coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the 
Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42. " Ergo, 
Article 106 clearly suggests that special agreements with member States, for the provision of 
armed forces and facilities to be on call for Security Council action, are a condition precedent to 
collective military measures by the Council. This would mean that action could not be taken 
under Article 42 in the absence of a special agreement concluded under the terms of Article 43. 
This view was held by governments at the San Francisco Conference and has often been 
expressed by commentators on the Charter. 106 
This formula for forcible action, however, is not exclusive. Inference can be made from Article 
106 that armed force may be applied under Chapter VII even without the special agreements 
provided for in Article 43.107 The article went on to state that the Five Permanent Members shall 
"consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations 
with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. " In this respect, the view is correct that 
Article 42 does not require troops to have been placed at the disposal of the Security Council 
according to Article 43. This was the view held by the ICJ in the Certain Expenses Advisory 
Opinion. In that case, the Court rejected the argument that the Security Council could not take 
action in a situation threatening the peace without agreements having been concluded according 
to Article 43. Although the ICJ did not expressly invoke Article 42, it appears that the Court 
106 Kelsen, for example, argued that "It seems that according to the intention of the framers of the Charter, the Security Council is authorized to take enforcement action involving the use of armed force only through the 
armed forces made available to it by the special agreements concluded in conformity with Article 43. " Kelsen, ibid, p 756 107 Simma, note 15 supra, p 127 
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accepted the view that the Security Council can authorize or call upon a particular State or group 
of States to take specific measures on its behalf. 108 In other words, it can give them an assig_ 
ment and powers with respect to a particular mission when it deems appropriate to do so. This 
proposition is enhanced further by the wording of Article 48. 
C. 4 Article 48 
Article 48 is another salient provision in Chapter VII of the Charter. 109 This provision clearly 
imposes an obligation on Members of the United Nations to take action necessary to implement a 
decision taken by the Council, which may likewise relate to military measures. Any mandatory 
decision by the Council therefore falls within the scope of Article 48, even if it is not expressly 
cited. ' 10 Significantly, Article 48 particularly applies to situations in which the Council requires 
action by a particular State 'or group of States, "as the Council may determine. " Accordingly, 
Article 48 endorses the proposition that enforcement action is not necessarily be taken by 
Security Council standing forces; instead, it indicates that the Council is entitled to assign the 
mission it has decided upon to a particular State, a group of States or a regional organization. 
Section D: The inherent right of individual and collective self-defence 
The law on self-defence and use of force by States is the subject of the most fundamental 
disagreement between States and writers. This section reviews the drafting history of Article Si 
in order to clarify the intention of the drafters of the Charter regarding the scope and extent of 
this right. The major disputes regarding the interpretation of Article 51 will be examined in the 
following section in light of the travaux preparatoires highlighted here. 
108 Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 167; see also Chapter 3, section C. 2 
109 Article 48 states that "The action required carrying out the decisions of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Member States of the United 
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international aC 
es of which they are members. " 
enci 
110 Simma, note 15 supra, p 633; see also Kelsen, note 99 supra, p 763 
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D. 1 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 
In the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, surprisingly, the right of self-defence was not mentioned. "' 
At the conference, the ban on the threat or use of force "in any manner inconsistent with 
purposes of the organization" was not seen as ruling out the exercise of the right of self-defence, 
which was thought to be implicit in the Proposals. ' 12 The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, in a sense, 
followed the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris; since the prohibition of 
recourse to war under those previous treaties had never precluded the use of force in self- 
defence, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals similarly contained no express reservation of the right of 
self-defence. This interpretation is supported by the response to a question raised by the Chinese 
delegate, whether it would be possible under the document for either member or non-member 
States to use force unilaterally under the claim that such action was not inconsistent with 
purposes of the Organization. He accepted the explanation that, except in cases of self-defence, 
no unilateral use of force could be undertaken without the approval of the Council. 113 It was 
made clear that the right of self-defence was not abolished or limited by anything in the 
Dumbarton Oaks text. In addition, a State using force in self-defence would not be held to act in 
a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization. 
This issue of self-defence was raised again by the American delegation during the preparation for 
the San Francisco Conference. The question was raised whether a provision should be included 
in the Charter, explicitly reserving the right of self-defence, especially, since there was nothing 
in the Proposals. "4 The concern was the potential risk arising from the obligation contained in 
Section A, Paragraph 3, which describes the measures that parties to a dispute are expected to 
apply in an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement. If, despite being willing to seek a resolution 
111 UNCIO Documents, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Doc. 1, G1 12 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 78 113 Foreign Relations, 1944, p 862 1141bid, 1945, p 426-29 
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by peaceful means, a State suffered military attack, it would clearly 
be entitled to defend itself. I Is 
The question was what would happen if a State party rejected efforts of pacific settlement, and 
whether, if the Council failed to act immediately, a country was free to act. Furthermore 
questions were raised about the situation in the period between the failure of peaceful means of 
settlement and a decision by the Security Council to adopt military measures. 
116 
The general view was that if a dispute was not settled by peaceful means, and an innocent State 
was attacked, it was justified in making use of its own forces. It was asserted that the right of 
self-defence existed implicitly in the document. It was assumed that this right was inhererit, 
provided it was not expressly precluded by the language of the Charter. " Furthermore, the 
criterion of legitimacy could still be the compatibility of the action taken with the purposes of the 
Organization. In other words, under the proposed Charter, member States pledged to refrain from 
the use of force in a manner inconsistent with purpose of the Organization. Since the prevention 
of aggression was a purpose of the Organization, action to prevent aggression in the absence of 
action by the Security Council would be consistent with the purpose of the Organization. In 
addition, there might be circumstances when the individual use of armed forces by a State might 
be viewed as serving the purposes of the Organization. Whilst accepting the logic of this 
interpretation, the US delegation thought the inclusion of an authoritative pronouncement wou a 
be useful. "8 
Thus, it seems from these discussions that the majority of delegations were convinced that the 
proposed Charter should include a provision that a State might have the right to act in 
115 Ibid, p 427 
116 Ibid 
 Ibid, p 592-94 
118 One Representative, however, questioned the use of all the provisions of the organization, if the right 
af 
self-defence under all circumstances remained fundamental; was taken as inherent and inalienable. If, othe intention was that each State would still be entitled to use military force whenever saw hit, as long as it cothe 
claim the motive of self-defence, the Organization's machinery appeared redundant. Ibid, p 428 
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emergency, however, the State availing itself of that right should notify the Council. ' 19 In the 
event of any challenge regarding the compatibility of the action with the purposes of the 
Organization, the Security Council might review it. 120 Regarding the wording of that right in the 
Charter, it was remarked that no effort should be made to define the right of self-defence since to 
define it simply raised the question as to what constitutes self-defence. 12 1 Therefore, the 
statement about self-defence in the proposed Charter should be made in general language. 122 
D. 2 San Francisco Conference 
At San Francisco, Committee 1/1 took the stance that the "use of arms in legitimate self-defence 
remains admitted and unimpaired. " 123 Nevertheless, none of the amendments proposed at San 
Francisco on the provision that subsequently became Article 2(4), explicitly mentioned the right 
of self-defence, 124 except for an amendment proposed by the delegate of Panama, which stated 
that "Each State has a legal duty to refrain from any use of force and from any threat to use force 
in its relations with another State except as authorized by this Charter; but subject to immediate 
reference to and approval by the competent agency of the (here the name of the organization), a 
State may oppose by force an unauthorized use of force made against it by another State. "125 
Article 51, however, has its origins elsewhere. Committee 111/4, which addressed the issue of 
how to harmonize the existing regional arrangements with the proposed UN Charter, confronted 
the issue of freedom of action in self-defence. 126 Initially, the issue in question was whether 
regional organizations were free to take enforcement action. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had 
119 lbid, p 594 
120 Ibid, p 429 121 Ibid, p 593 
122 Ibid, p 428 
'23 Report of Rapporteur of Committee Ito Commission I, UNCIO Documents, vol. 6, p 459 124 See Proposals of Australia, UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, p 557; Bolivia, p 558; Brazil, 558; Costa Rica, p 560; Iran, p 563. A proposed amendment submitted by New Zealand provided that "All members of the Organization undertake collectively to resist every act of aggression against any member. " Ibid, p 564 123 Proposal submitted by Panama, ibid, p 565 126 Bowett, note 3 supra, p182 
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provided for the use by the Security Council of regional arrangements or agencies as vehicles for 
enforcement action, but precluded enforcement actions under such arrangements without the 
authorization of the Council. 127 However, such authorization would depend on a voting system 
derived from the statement of the Four Sponsoring Powers, under which the agreement of all the 
permanent members would be needed. 128 In effect, however, any such member could veto the 
conduct of forceful action by a regional organization. This provision worried the Latin American 
countries, which had recently (at Mexico City Conference, 21 February -8 March, 1945) dra,, i-n 
up a regional arrangement: the Act of Chapultepec. They argued that "to give European and 
Asian Powers a veto over action within the Western Hemisphere would be a violation of the 
sacrosanct Monroe Doctrine. "129 The US delegate, Senator Vandenberg, shared their concern. He 
proposed an addition to the amendment, which would expand the exception to allow forcible 
measures taken under the inter-American system without Security Council authorization. 130 
Others, however, objected to Vandenberg' proposal on the ground that removal of the inter- 
American system from Security Council control would mean also the loss of US power to veto 
military action under a European or a Western Pacific regional arrangement; the acceptance of 
general exceptions for regional arrangements would undermine the organization. 13' In addition, a 
purely defensive regional action would not necessarily be blocked by the Security Council, be- 
cause the reserved rights of States individually and collectively would still be available. In other 
words, the view was expressed that since the right of self-defence, including collective self- 
defence, was implicit, the United States could take defensive action on behalf of an Ame ca ri 
taken 
7 Chapter VIII (C) (2) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provided that "no enforcement action should be 12 
the Sec, under 
UNCIODocumen s, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Doc. ], G1, Chapter VIII, Section C Council. " 
128 Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p 270 129 Quoted in Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 83-4 
130 Foreign Relations, 1945, p 695; see also Vandenberg, A. The Private Papers of Senator ; anden'b e Gollancz, Westport, 1952, p 189 
131 Foreign Relations, ibid, p 619 
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country, such action being then subject to Security Council review. 132 Thus, the need was 
perceived to permit the Security Council to authorize enforcement action, since otherwise there 
would be nothing more than a regional system. On the other hand, States should retain the 
essential right of self-defence and could act if attacked but should then immediately report such 
action to the Security Council. 133 
The idea that regional arrangements "providing for automatic action" could be accepted "as 
constituent elements of collective security, on condition that they should be conceived for the 
exclusive purpose of defence" and any emergency measures should be reported "within the 
shortest possible time" to the Security Council along with the "justification of the urgency of the 
action" had already been put forward by Turkey. 134 The Turkish delegate stated that "the 
Proposals do not contain any provision on the subject of legitimate defence. Although this right 
is of an obvious nature, it would be useful to insert in the Charter a provision justifying 
legitimate defence against a surprise attack by another State. Nevertheless, even in such a case 
the Council should have an entirely free hand to judge the circumstances under which legitimate 
defence has occurred, as well as the justification for the measures taken by the party which has 
been compelled to defend itself. "135 
Following discussion of the issue by the Sponsoring Powers, it was agreed that (I) an expansion 
of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to allow for collective regional enforcement action would 
undermine the whole purpose and nature of the organization; (ii) on the other hand, if an armed 
attack occurred in case of failure to act on the part of the Security Council, action could be taken 
in self-defence, either individually or under a regional arrangement; (iii) action to prevent 
132 Ibid, p 592 
133 Ibid, p 592-3 134 UNCIO Documents, vol. 3, Suggestions of the Turkish Government, p 483 135 Ibid 
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aggression, if no action was taken by the Security Council, was compatible with the purposes of 
the organization. 136 
Subsequent to this discussion, the advisers of the United States delegation drafted a new 
paragraph to be added to Chapter VIII, Section B of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (on action 
against aggression), rather than to Section C (on regional arrangements). The amendment 
referred to regional arrangements as an example of self-defence against armed attack, rather than 
as an exception to the general rule that regional enforcement action was subject to Council 
authorization, thereby distinguishing between regional enforcement action (which «was not 
encompassed in the amendment) and regional action in self-defence. 137 The American proposal 
read: "In the event of an attack by any State against any member State, such Member State 
possesses the inherent right to take measures of self-defence. The inherent right to take measures 
of self-defence against armed attack shall apply to arrangements, like those embodied in the Act 
of Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of States agree to consider an attack against 
any one of them as an attack against all of them. The taking of such measures shall be reported 
immediately to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at any time such action as it may 
deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security: °t38 
The favoured approach of France seemed to be that, if the Council failed to act, members would 
have the reserved right to take individual action. The French proposal read: "Should the Council 
not succeed in reaching a decision the members of the organization reserve to themselves the 
right to act as they may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and justice. "139 The 
American delegation was of the opinion that the French proposed amendment was "unduly, 
136 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 85 
137 Ibid. p 85-6 
138 Foreign Relations, 1945, p 674 
139 Ibid. p 677 
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restrictive, involving a negative concept. "4° Moreover, it raised the question of how to 
determine that the Security Council had failed to act. 141 Despite these concerns, however, the 
United States agreed with the French proposal and reworded its proposal to make clear that the 
independent operation of regional arrangements would be applicable only in self-defence and 
only in the event of failure of the Council to act. The amended US proposal read: "Should the 
Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and should aggression occur by any State 
against any member State, such Member State possesses the inherent right to take necessary 
measures for self-defence. The right to take such measures for self-defence against armed attack 
shall also apply to understandings or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of 
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of States agree to consider an attack against 
..: 
'142 any one of them as an attack against all of them...... 
This proposal was, however, still not satisfactory to the United Kingdom and Soviet delegates, 
who objected that it would lead to a series of regional organizations acting independently of the 
world institution. Objecting to the specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec, the United 
Kingdom also pointed out that this would precipitate additional pressure for the inclusion of 
references to the Arab League, etc. 143 The United Kingdom proposed a revised text: "Nothing in 
this Charter should invalidate the right of self-defence against armed attack, either individual or 
collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary measures to maintain 
or restore international peace and security 
..... 
144 
An alternative proposal was offered by the Soviet Union delegate, beginning, "Nothing in this 
Charter impairs the inherent right of self-defence, either individual or collective, if prior to 
140 Ibid. p 665 
141 Ibid 
142 Ibid, p 685-86 143 Ibid, p 704 144 Ibid 
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undertaking the measures for the maintenance of international peace and security by the Security 
Council an armed attack against a member State occurs. 99145 The United States delegate was also 
of the view that countries were entitled to act in self-defence "if an armed attack occurs against a 
member State before the Security Council has taken adequate measures to maintain international 
peace and security" and reworded the proposal accordingly. 
146 
The final proposal, submitted and approved by the five permanent members, took this fotnh.. 
"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self 
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. "147 
The change of the wording from "in the event of the Security Council failing to take the 
necessary steps to maintain or restore international peace and security" to "until the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" 
-, ti-as to 
emphasize that the inherent right of self-defence would remain, in the event that the Council 
failed to maintain peace and security and a member State suffered an armed attack. 148 It also 
seems that the later language was preferable in order to avoid the negative impression of fe 
former phrase and to evade the definition of when the Council can be considered to have failed, 
Furthermore, to emphasize that the measures taken were based on a reserved right of Memb em 
las Ibid, p 812 
146 Ibid. p 817 
'a7 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee II1/4 to Commission III, UNCIO Documents, vol. 12, pp 68ý $ 737 
148 Alexandrov, note 2 supra, p 89 
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and not by virtue of a special exemption from Security Council authority over regional 
arrangements, it was also agreed, as proposed by the Soviet delegate, that the new paragraph 
should be inserted in the chapter on threats and breaches of peace and acts of aggression, rather 
than that on regional arrangements. 149 
Section E: Major disputes regarding the interpretation of Article 51 
Despite the extreme carefulness observed by the drafters of the Charter in the choosing the words 
and formulation of Article 51, still there are divisions among States and writers regarding its 
interpretation. These divisions are chiefly concentrated on three main questions. The first 
concerns interpretation of the phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary" 
which determines when the defensive measures should be ceased: what measures taken by the 
Security Council could be considered sufficient to end the right of self-defence and who is 
competent to judge the efficacy of these measures. The second concerns the definition of the 
notion of "armed attack": what act of aggression may be viewed as to amount to an armed attack 
justifying the use of force in self-defence. The most controversial question is whether the right 
of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence is lawful under the formula of self-defence envisaged 
in Article 51. This section highlights these questions and attempts to clarify the intention of the 
drafters in light of the drafting history examined in the preceding section. 
E. 1 "Until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain... " 
The drafting history and wording of Article 51 leave no doubt that the right of self-defence under 
Article 51 is intended to be subsidiary to and not a substitute for collective action by the Security 
Council. '50 It is to be a temporary right; a State under armed attack retains the inherent right to 
use force in order to defend itself until the Security Council is able to take action. The phrase 
149 Brownlie, note 128 supra, p 274 150 Tucker, "The Interpretation of War Under Present International Law", 4 ILQ, 1951, p 29; Bowett, note 3 
supra, p 195; Simma, note 15 supra, p 804; Kelsen, note 99 supra, p 800 
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"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security" illustrates this essentially provisional nature of action in self-defence under the Charter 
system; such a system presupposes that the right is necessary as an interim measure of 
protection, but that it should cease when the machinery of the centralized system itself operates 
as an effective protection of the individual members' rights. '5' This view is further endorsed by 
the fact that all members, in Article 24 (1), have conferred primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council. '52 
Although it is clear that the right of self-defence should cease when "the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary, " however, the questions arise, what measures taken by the Council 
can be considered sufficient enough to remove or suspend the right of self-defence and who is 
competent to judge the efficacy of these measures. Neither the language of Article 51 nor it_s 
travaux preparatoires gives a forthright answer to these questions. However, the unequivocal 
intention of the drafters was that the right of self-defence comes into operation only if the 
Security Council fails to take measures necessary to maintain peace and security. As shown 
above, this posture was stated in the draft proposals submitted by the Sponsoring Powers, l53 
Furthermore, in discussion of the Soviet's proposed text, the Soviet delegate explained that this 
phrase means that "if the Security Council did not maintain peace and security, countries would 
have the inherent right, individually or collectively, to take measures of self-defence up to the 
time the necessary measures by the Security Council [were] being taken"154 One American 
delegate questioned whether, if the Security Council took inadequate action such as merely 
151 Bowett, ibid 
'52 Article 24 (1) outlines the Council mandate: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 
Council acts on their behaV 
153 See the French Proposal, note 139 supra, the US Proposal, note 142 supra, the British Proposal, note 144 
supra. 
is Foreign Relations, 1945, p 812 
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calling for the severing of diplomatic relations, the right of self-defence would be justified. '" 
The Soviet delegate replied that measures of self-defence "would be taken only after the Council 
had failed. "' 56 As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that the inclusion of the word 
"necessary" or a similar word like "adequate" would be useful in clarifying the statement. '57 
Furthermore, during the debate over the regional arrangements, Senator Vandenberg, the Chief 
of the US Delegation, stated that "As soon as the world Organization proves its effectiveness in 
guaranteeing security, we would accept the jurisdiction of the Security Council as exclusive. "58 
Although, no conclusive answer can be drawn from this discussion as to what constitutes 
"necessary measures, " however, two elements can be inferred: i) not every action taken by the 
Security Council may be considered sufficient to remove or suspend the right of self-defence but 
such an action should be effective; ii) the right of self-defence is permissible only when the 
Council is unable to act or the measures taken by it have patently failed to maintain international 
peace and security. In other words, unless it is evident that the Council has failed to address the 
seriousness of the situation-either by taking measures inadequate to maintain international 
peace and security or by being unable to deal with situation-the right of self-defence cannot be 
activated. Thus, the phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary... " was not 
intended to mean that the Security Council has successfully reached the desired result, but rather 
that it has begun to take serious and effective measures to end the aggression. Even from a 
logical point of view, the effect of the measures taken by the Council should not be expected to 
prove fruitful immediately; time will be needed to achieve the goal. During this period, the right 
of self-defence should be halted and give way to the collective security system. In other words, 
the collective security system, the supreme technique for the use of force under the Charter, 
155 Ibid 
's6 Ibid 
157 Ibid. p 813 
158 Ibid. p 695 
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should be given full opportunity to operate; only when this system fails does the right of 
individual action emerge. 
As to the question of who is competent to judge the effectiveness-or the failure-of "measures 
necessary", although it is not expressly stated in any of the provisions of the Charter, a cautious 
reading of the interlocking provisions of Chapter VII indicates that the critical phrase, "measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security, " which carries the same meaning in all 
other articles, inevitably leads to the conclusion that the judgment of the efficacy and adequacy 
of "measures necessary" rests only with the Council. 
159 Ideally, of course, "both the SC and the 
defending State are able to reach their own decision on this. "160 However, in case of 
disagreement, if the defending State decided that the measures taken are ineffective or 
inadequate and decided to take its own forces, it "admittedly runs the risk of its continued action 
being characterized as a "threat to the peace, breach of peace, of act of aggression" under Article 
39. , 161 
E2 The notion of armed attack and the Definition of Auression 
Another problem with the language of Article 51 is the term "armed attack. " Article 51 perr ts 
the use of force in self-defence "if an armed attack occurs"; however, the term "armed attack,, 
has not been precisely defined in the UN Charter or any subsequent legal document. 162 
According to the language of Article 51, the right of self-defence is only legitimate if Article 
2(4) is breached in a way that takes the form of an armed attack. 163 Conversely, if the violation of 
the State's interests is not in the form of an armed attack, the victim State will not be permitted t. 
159 Chayes, A. "The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf' in Damrosch LF. and Scheffer, D. J [eds. ], Lat, Qnvi Force in the New International Order, Westview Press, UK. 1991, p 3-4 
160 Bowett, note 3 supra, p196 
161 ibid. See also Chapter 3, section B. 2 for the academic debate on this point in the case of Kuwait crisis 162 It was noted by one American delegate that the idea of attack in the proposed Charter was "too vague, ' 
recalled that Germany had entered Poland at the beginning of the Second World War on the pretext t1l 
e 
Poland attacked her. See Foreign Relations, 1945, p 665 
163 Bowett, note 3 supra, p 188 
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exercise the right of self-defence. Comparing the terminology used in the two provisions, it can 
be seen that armed attack is a much narrower notion than "threat or use of force. IM Thus, there 
are differences of scope between Articles 51 and 2(4) which mean that self-defence may not be 
applicable in the case of every use of force contrary to Article 2(4). Until an actual armed attack 
takes place, States are expected to refrain from forcible self-defence. Since the Security Council 
is given the supreme role within the Charter system of collective security and could respond to 
any degree of aggression, whether or not it reached the threshold of armed attack, all the affected 
State can do in that situation to ask the Council to rule that the violation of Article 2(4) is a 
breach of the peace and to decide measures under Articles 41 or 42. Not unless or until the 
prohibited use of force reaches the level of an armed attack can the affected State resort to the 
use of force in its defence. 165 This view is supported by the ICJ, which has explicitly pronounced 
that not every use of force is at once to be considered an armed attack justifying self-defence. 
The Court in the Nicaragua case stated that "[the Court] has primarily to consider whether a 
State has a right to respond to intervention with intervention going so far as to justify a use of 
force in reaction to measures which do not constitute an armed attack but may nevertheless 
involve the use of force. "166 
Since the term "armed attack" represents the key notion of the concept of self-defence pursuant 
to the exact words of Article 51, the pivotal question is what constitutes an "armed attack"? 
Defining this term decides how far unilateral force is still admissible. As mentioned above, 167 the 
drafters of the Charter decided not to attempt a detailed definition of aggression for the guidance 
of the Security Council and Members of the UN, 168 given the impossibility of an exhaustive 
164 Simma, note 15 supra, p 790 165 Ibid 
'66 Nicaragua Judgement, (ICJ Reports 1986), p 110, pars 210 167 Note 69 supra 
168 Goodrich and Hambro, note 35 supra, p 104 
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definition, since any omissions might be exploited by an aggressor or might delay action by the 
Council. Conversely, in the other cases listed, automatic action by the Council might bring about 
a premature application of enforcement measures. The Committee therefore left the entire 
decision as to determination of "a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression" to 
the judgment of the Security Council. 169 
It is also difficult to find any clear answer to the question what constitutes "armed attack" in the 
drafting history of Article 51. Perhaps, the only constructive explanation was regarding the 
distinction between "attack" and "armed attack. " The word "armed" was inserted deliberately 
because the word "attack" alone was considered very broad and could be used to cover any kind 
of attack such as propaganda or non-military political efforts to overthrow the political 
institutions of one State. Therefore, the word "armed attack" was preferred as it confines the 
right of self-defence to the case of overt armed attack. 170 
Accordingly, the UN Charter uses the terms "armed attack" and "aggression" in Articles 1(1), 
39,51 and 53, albeit without defining them anywhere. 171 After many failed attempts by the UN 
to define these terms, on 1974, this undertaking came to an end when the General Assembly of 
the UN adopted the "Definition of Aggression" Resolution 3314 (XXIX). However, the 
"Definition of Aggression" determines the notion of "act of aggression" embodied in Article 39 
of the Charter, rather than that of an "armed attack" as used in Article 51. This follows from 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Preamble, as well as from Article 6, under which the Definition does 
not contain any regulation of the right of self-defence in response to an armed attack. 
Furthermore, the travaux preparatoires of the Definition illustrate that a definition of armed 
attack was not intended. In the special committee that drafted the Definition, the United States, 
169 Report of Rapporteur of Committee 111/3 to Commission III on Chapter VIII, Section B, UNCI0 
Documents, vol. 12, p 502-5 
1 70 Foreign Relations, 1945, p 667 
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supported by other western States strongly opposed tendencies to include "armed attack. "172 
Like the Soviet Union, they also expressed the view that the notions of act of aggression and 
armed attack are not identical. 173 
While an armed attack necessarily constitutes an aggression, the converse is not necessarily true; 
hence, the uncertainties regarding the scope and content of both terms. As noted previously, the 
concept of an armed attack has a narrower meaning than the phrase "use or threat of force" 
within the meaning of Article 2 (4). Whereas an armed attack always presupposes a violation of 
Article 2 (4), not all such violation constitutes an armed attack. The latter implies force on a 
relatively large scale and with substantial effect. For instance, mere frontier incidents, such as the 
incursion of an armed border patrol in another State's territory, may well be characterized as a 
use of force contrary to Article 2(4), but hardly as an armed attack. This concept has been 
confirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 174 Thus, the adoption of the definition of 
Aggression by the General Assembly did not constitute decisive progress in defining armed 
attack. 175Furthermore, the Nicaragua Judgment by the ICJ did not produce any clarification in 
this respect. On the term `armed attack', the ICJ simply remarked that "there appears now to be 
general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed 
attacks. "176 Rather than offer a definition of the term, the Court contented itself with giving an 
illustrative example and stating that the notion not only comprises unspecified cross-border 
actions by regular forces, but also the participation of a State in the use of force by unofficial 
armed bands, as described in Article 3(g) of the Definition of aggression. 177 
172 Statement made by the American Representative, in UN Doc. A/AC. 134/SC. 113, SC. 105, p. 17 173 Statement made by the Soviet Representative, in UN Doc. A/AC. 134/SC. 113, SC. 105, p 16 
'74 Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports (1986), p 110, para 210 175 Gray, C. International law and the Use of Force, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, 
p110 
76 Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports (1986), p 103, pars 195 177 Ibid, see also Simma, note 15 supra, p 795 
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Despite this apparent ambiguity regarding the concept of armed attack, some guidelines can be 
drawn from the Definition of Aggression and the Nicaragua judgement as to what may constitute 
an "armed attack" for the purpose of Article 51 as follows; 
(1) The Definition clearly distinguishes between direct and indirect application of the use of 
force. Acts of aggression described in Article 3(a) to (e) of the Definition of Aggression 
including "invasion or attack..., bombardment 
..., 
blockade of the ports by a State against the 
territory of another State", although not conclusive, involving direct and severe use of force, can 
be construed as armed attack, which would, prima facie, justify the victim in taking measures in 
self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. 178 
(2) Acts falling under Article 3(f) and (g) dealing with indirect force do not readily fall into the 
category of armed attack. 179 Nevertheless, the ICJ, in the Nicaragua Judgment, did not reject the 
view that the prohibition of armed attacks could apply to the sending by the State of armed bands 
to the territory of another State, if the scale and effects of that action were such that it would 
have been classified as an armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident, had it been carried 
out by regular armed forces. 180 Therefore, a State that is the victim of indirect aggression will be 
required to show that the acts it claims to have suffered from the attacker's armed bands were 
sufficiently serious to amount to an armed attack. 
(3) Some types of assistance to the private use of force such as the provision of weapons or 
logistical can be viewed as acts of aggression, but, according to the Nicaragua Judgement, it is 
not, per se, an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 and so cannot give rise to a right to 
"$ For similar view see Kaikobad, K. H, "Jus Ad Bellum: Legal Implications of the Iran-Iraq War, , jr, 
Dekker, I, F. and Harry, H. G. [eds] The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The Iran-Iraq War in International Legal 
Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Hague, the Netherlands, 1992, p 59 
19 Ibid 
180 Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, p 103, para 195; see also Chapter 7, section A. 1 
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take action in self-defence! 81 Thus, although for a State to assist rebels active in another State is 
unlawful use of force, however, the victim State cannot reply by using force in self-defence. 182 
This view was strongly criticized by commentators and seems to have been changed after the 
events of September 11 and the adoption of the legislative Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001. )183 
Apart from the notion of armed attack, it should be noted that the Definition is not binding on the 
Security Council for the purpose of enforcement action under Chapter VII. Article 39 gives the 
Security Council discretion, such that the Council may, in a given situation, identify acts, not 
listed in this Definition, as aggression, although it may take guidance from the Definition in its 
determination. 
E. 3 The right of anticipatory self-defence 
The chief division with respect to the right of self-defence is regarding the right of anticipatory 
self-defence. On the one hand, some scholars argue the use of force in self-defence under the 
Charter system is limited to where an "armed attack occurs", which in turn abolishes the right of 
States to anticipatory self-defence. '84 This view supports a strict interpretation of Article 51 and 
strongly rejects the notion of anticipatory self-defence, on the ground that it is a dangerous 
concept to imbue with legality, because it gives the victim State a wide discretion in initiation of 
force and encourages the disproportionate use of force. Moreover, the concept involves delicate 
and precise calculations of the movements of the opponent. For instance, a pre-emptive strike 
undertaken too early might constitute an act of aggression. 185 From this point of view, the 
18' Nicaragua Judgement, (ICJ Reports 1986), p 104, para. 195 ; see also Briggs, H. W., "The International Court of Justice Lives Up to its Name", 81 AJIL, 1987, p 83-4 
'82 Kaikobad, note 178 supra, p 60 183 See Chapter 7, section A. 1 
184 See, for example, Kelsen, note 99 supra, p 797; Brownlie, note 128 supra, p 275; Goodrich and Hambro, 
note 35 supra, p 107; Tucker, note 150 supra, p 29; Kunz, J. "Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations", 41 AJIL, 1947, p 878 185 Shaw, M. International Law, fourth edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p 790 
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following arguments have been put forward. First, the right of self defence is an exception from 
the general prohibition of threat or use of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 
Article 51 grants States the right of self-defence, individually or collectively, only if an armed 
attack occurs against a member State of the United Nations. Hence, the meaning of Article 51 is 
clear; the right of self defence is only permitted to States that are victims of an actual armed 
attack. 186 Second, the limits imposed on self defence in Article 51 would be meaningless if a 
wider customary international law right of self defence were to survive unfettered by these 
restrictions. In other words, Article 51 prohibits "preventive war", since the "threat of 
aggression" does not justify self defence under Art. 51.187 
The opposing view calls for a wide right of self-defence that goes beyond the right to respond to 
an armed attack on a State's territory. The major argument put forward by proponents of this 
view can be summarized as follows: first, Article 51 of the UN Charter, through its reference to 
the "inherent" right of self defence, preserves the earlier customary international law right of self 
defence which has been always anticipatory. Nevertheless, it was not embodied in the UN 
Charter. 188 The Charter, however, does not take away pre-existing rights of States without 
express provision. 189 Second, at the time of the conclusion of the Charter there was a wide 
customary international law right of self-defence, allowing anticipatory self-defence. 190 Thirdly, 
to deny a State the right of taking pre-emptive action when there is an imminent danger of an 
attack appears to be equivalent to an acceptance that the victim may be destroyed, in whole or in 
part, before it can exercise its right to self defence. 19' Thus, Article 51 protects "the aggressor's 
186 Brownlie, note 128 supra, p 275 
187 Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations", note 184 supra, p 878 
188 Bowett, note 3 supra, p 188-89 
189 Gray, note 175 supra, p 98 
190 McCoubrey, H. and. White, N. International Law and Armed Conflict, Dartmouth, England, 1992, p 91 
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right to the first stroke. "192 Fourthly, Article 51 is subject to the customary law, which permits 
anticipatory self-defence. Consequently, there is no necessity to consider the interpretation of the 
exact words of Article 51, because the customary right still exists for member States of the 
UN. 193 Holders of this wide interpretation point to modern weaponry, such as weapons of mass 
destruction, which can be fired from very long distances with tremendous speed and may not 
allow the target State enough time to act in response to the attack, especially if the target State is 
geographically small. 194 Therefore, they argue that States must be authorized to launch pre- 
emptive strikes against imminent threat; otherwise they would be destroyed before they can 
exercise their right to self-defence. 195 
Indeed, the natural and ordinary meaning of the word "occurs" in Article 51 indicates that the 
right of self-defence is only permissible after the victim State has been subjected to an "armed 
attack. " Thus, the plain language of this article the right of self-defence may not be anticipatory 
but must be in response to an actual armed attack. However, this wording of Article 51 is 
inconsistent with the intention of the drafters of the Charter. The drafting history of this article 
clearly indicates that the drafters' intention was to preserve the inherent right of self-defence as it 
was before the adoption of the Charter, including the right of anticipatory self defence. The 
course of debate signifies that there was no intention to alter or limit the substance of this right, 
except for the procedural obligations such as the reporting duty and the cessation of defensive 
measures once the Council has taken the "necessary measures. " This presupposes that the right 
of self-defence includes the right of anticipatory self-defence in case of imminent danger. The 
word "inherent" enhances this proposition. It indicates that the right of self-defence envisaged 
under Article 51 is the same natural right of self-defence as under the naturalist doctrine, which 
192 Brownlie, note 128 supra, p 276 
'93 Ibid 
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permits forestalling an act of violence threatening a State from a distance. 
196 Indeed, as the ICJ 
noted in Nicaragua case: "Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a 
"natural" or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it is hard to see how this can be other than of a 
customary nature, even if its present content has been confirmed and influenced by the 
Charter. "' 97 
Furthermore, there was no discussion over the term "occurs" in the records of San Francisco 
Conference and nothing is said in any of drafting documents to suggest that this term has been 
deliberately chosen. On the contrary, the drafting history shows that this word was of a little, if 
any, significance. Indeed, the final proposals of Article 51 submitted by France and the UK and 
some of the US proposals, did not contain such a word. This would mean that the word "occurs- 
was accidentally inserted in the final text and, hence, there was no premeditated intention to limit 
the right of self-defence to the case of actual attack. Significantly, the major concern of the U. S 
was to preserve its right to take defensive measures under the inter-American system established 
by the Act of Chapultepec without Security Council authorization. The course of debate clearly 
demonstrates that the pattern of the right of self-defence the US had in mind was the one 
established by this treaty and considerable efforts was made by the US to mention the Act ()f 
1"6 Under the `just war' doctrine, self-defence was viewed as permissible against immanent danger, just as it is against an assault already perpetrated. Forestalling an act of violence threatening a State from a distance 
was not only acceptable but also a duty upon the State. Grotius, for example, pointed out that just actions lie 
"either for wrongs not yet committed, or for wrongs already done. An action lies for wrong not yet 
committed in cases where a guarantee is sought against a threatened wrong, or security against anticipated 
injury, or an interdict of different sort against the use of violence. " And "it is permissible to forestall an act of 
violence which is not immediate, but which is seen to be threatening from a distance; not directly,,, but 
indirectly, by inflecting punishment for a wrong action commenced but not yet carried through. " Grotius, H, 
De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri, Book II, (translation by Francis W. Kelsey) and Introduction by James Brown 
Scott, Wildy & Sons LTD. London, reprinted 1964, pp 171 and 184. Similarly, Wolff stated that "[al just 
cause of war between nations arises only when a wrong has been done or is likely to be done. " Wolff 
, Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, vol II, (translation by Joseph Drake), Classics 
C. J 
of Internatio, 
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Chapultepec as an example of the right of collective self-defence. Therefore, it is worth looking 
at the right of self-defence under the Act of Chapultepec. 
Article 4 of this treaty expressly allows defensive measures against predictable aggression. It 
states that "in case acts of aggression occur or there may be reasons to believe that an aggression 
is being prepared by any other State against the integrity and inviolability of the territory, or 
against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, the States signatory to 
this Act will consult amongst themselves in order to agree upon the measures it may be advisable 
to take. "198 Article 5 also set forth that "the signatories of this Act recognize that such threats and 
acts of aggression" may necessitate defensive action including the "use of armed force to prevent 
or repel aggression. "199 Thus, under this Act the US and the Latin American States are allowed to 
take pre-emptive action against imminent threats. If there was any intention to abolish this right 
under the UN Charter, certainly, the US would have opposed such a proposal because there 
would be contradiction between the Act and the proposed Charter, the former permitting actions 
that were prohibited by the latter. On the contrary, it is perfectly clear that the US and the Latin 
American States intended to include in the Charter a provision of the right of self-defence, 
similar to the one under this Act. 
This understanding is enhanced by the opinion expressed by some American delegates in the 
preparation work. During the discussion, Representative Mcloy asked "supposing Germany sent 
a fleet into the waters off Argentina, would it be illegal if we shot across the German bows when 
they attempt to land in Argentina? " Representative Pasvolsky replied, "We could act, and the 
Security Council would then be in position to review our action, asking us what we were trying 
198 Article 4 of the Act of Chapultepec, 3 March, 1945, available at 
<http: //www. ibiblio. org/pha/policy/1945/450303a. html> 1" Ibid 
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to do. "200 This answer seemed satisfactory for all other delegates. It can be inferred from this 
discussion that the pattern of the right of self-defence the American delegation had in mind was 
not only that defensive action should be taken after the attack had occurred but also that it could 
be taken to prevent imminent attack. 
As to the argument that anticipatory self-defence is not permissible because the "threat of 
aggression" does not justify self defence under Article 51,201 this argument is misleading. A mere 
threat of using force is much less serious than a situation where a State has decidedly committed 
itself to launch a large-scale armed attack and earnestly taken the final steps to do so. This latter 
certainly comes under the notion of self-defence, as Waldock rightly argued "where there is 
convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually 
mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the 
frontier. , 202 To conclude, despite the word "occurs", a strong argument can be made that the 
right of self-defence permitted under Article 51 is the same right that exists under customary law, 
including the right of anticipatory self-defence in case of imminent danger. This interpretation is 
also compatible with State practice. 203 
Conclusion 
The concept of self- preservation is recognized in every legal system, although the purpose and 
scope of that right may vary from one system to another. In the absence of any powerful central 
authority for the enforcement of the law and the protection of the rights of individuals, or where 
the central authority is unable speedily and effectively to secure individuals' rights, it is clearly 
200 Foreign Relations, 1945, p 592 
201 Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations", note 
184 supra, p 878 
202 Waldock, note 3 supra, p 498. Similarly, McCoubrey argued that "It can safely be said that the armed 
attack has occurred right after the attacker State has obviously committed itself to launch the attack; the 
condition is the subsistent of the launch of the missiles not revealed by just the preparations for war, in other 
words, once the firing of the missiles has been irretrievably begun. " McCoubrey and White, note 190 supra 
91 
03 See Chapter 7, section C for discussion on the criteria of anticipatory self-defence and State practice. 
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necessary to allow individuals whose rights are threatened, to take action in their own defence. In 
more mature and effective legal systems, however, the duty of protection tends to entrusted to a 
centralized authority and constraints are imposed on the right of unilateral action by 
individuals. 204 The same concept applies to the world community. When there is no powerful and 
effective international authority for the enforcement of the law and the protection of the rights of 
individual States, the right of a State to protect its self-interest cannot be denied. 
Prior to the creation of the UN Charter this powerful central authority did not exist. As a 
corollary, no prohibition of the use of force by States existed; States had the right to wage war to 
protect their interests, and at their own sovereign discretion. The attempts were made to limit the 
States' freedom to wage war by making war in general only a subsidiary means of settling 
international conflicts did not, in fact, abolish war as an instrument of national policy; war 
remained as a legal institution in principle. 
With the adoption of the Charter, this framework has been permanently changed. The Charter 
has created a new international world order, a new international law, in which war, as a method 
of self-help, was replaced by organized and peaceful methods of settling international disputes 
and a mechanism for enforcing this settlement in the name of the community and, if necessary, a 
power to take sanctions against the disobedient member of the international community. The 
only exception to the general ban on the unilateral use force in international relations is the right 
of individual or collective self-defence. Apart from this right, all forms of unilateral use of force 
in self-help such as reprisal or redress, which were permitted previously, are absolutely 
prohibited under the Charter system. Even the right of self-defence has been regulated under the 
Charter system. Article 51 permits self-defence only in case of armed attack-not any other form 
of aggression short to an armed attack. It also limited the duration of this right by establishing 
204 Bowett, note 3 supra, p3 
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that defensive measures should be ceased once the Security Council "has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. " Furthermore, Article 51 imposed an 
obligation on the defending State to report its defensive measures immediately to the Council. 
It is interesting, however, that some modern writers are attempting to escape this new world 
order by calling for the revival of the doctrine of just war, arguing that it is needed nowadays to 
face tyrannical regimes that violate human rights and threaten international peace and security. 
They argue that intervention against authoritarian regimes to endorse human values and to 
eliminate the threats these regimes pose to the world's peace is just, legitimate and consistent 
with contemporary international law requirements regarding the legitimate use of force. 205 This 
trend acquired momentum in the context of the Iraq war in 2003. According to this school of 
thought, the reasons forwarded by the US and the UK for the war were "just causes" and 
therefore the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime were "just". 
This view, however, cannot be accepted under positive international law. The bellum justu, n 
doctrine has been discredited and replaced by bellum legale, which narrows the justification for 
the use of force in international relations to several legally recognized and more precisely 
defined notions. Therefore, whether or not the use of force against Iraq in 2003 was "just", is 
immaterial from the legal point of view. In other words, the question of the justice of the 
. tim 
falls outside the pale of positive law. Today, it is not enough to describe use of force as "just" for 
it to be legally acceptable and justifiable under positive international law. 
zos See generally Wingfield, T. "The Convergence of Traditional Theory and Modem Reality: Just War 
Doctrine and Tyrannical Regimes", 2 Ave Maria Law Review, 2004, p 93; Falvey, J. "Our Cause Is Just" An Analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom Under International Law and the Just War Doctrine, 2 Ave Maria Law 
Review, 2004, p 65; Weigel, G. "Pope John XXIII Lecture: The Just War Tradition and the World q fter September 11, " 51 Cath. U. L. Review, 2002, p 689; Raines, J. "Osama, Augustine, and Assassination. the Just War Doctrine and Targeted Killings, 12 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 2002, p217 
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Chapter 2 
Iran-Iraq War: A War of Azwession 
Introduction 
Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad revealed itself as an aggressive regime that violates 
international law and displays a distorted attitude towards the international world order, only a 
little more than one year after it came to power on July 16,1979. The invasion of Iran on 
September 1980 was a clear example of a war of aggression motivated by territorial ambitions. 
Indeed, by attacking Iran on such a large scale, Iraq violated the general ban on the use of force. 
Significantly, during the course of hostilities, Iraq's frequent deployment of chemical weapons 
agents against Iranian military personnel and civilians constituted a flagrant breach of the 
fundamental principles of humanitarian law. 
The effects of these violations were not transitory, but had long term implications. The Iran-Iraq 
war, in fact, permanently altered the course of Iraqi political and legal history and led to severe 
deterioration of the reputation of the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. It also raised concerns 
among the world community regarding the dangerous consequences of allowing such a rogue 
regime to possess WMDs, especially in light of its pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the Iran-Iraq 
war was the precursor of developments that eventually led to the U. S. 
-led coalition against Iraq 
in March 2003 and the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. From another perspective, the mediatory 
approach to the war taken by the Council, coupled with third-States' ambiguous attitude and 
their clear bias to the Iraqi side during the Tanker War, significantly contributed to Saddam's 
expectation that he could invade Kuwait with impunity. Therefore, the Iraqi experience and 
attitude in the war with Iran need to be understood, for full understanding of the invasion of 
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Kuwait in August 1990 and the consequences trigged by that crisis, up until the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 by the American-led coalition. 
This chapter, therefore, examines the Iran-Iraq war. The first section analyses the origins of the 
conflict and the legal justifications put forward by Iraq for the invasion. These justifications 
include Iraq's accusation for Iran of breaches of the Algiers Treaty concluded between the two 
States in 1975, the allegations of Iranian direct and indirect attacks against Iraq and the right of 
self-defence against imminent Iranian attack. The second section underlines the poor showing of 
the Security Council and its failure to take "measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security". Finally it highlights the ambiguous reaction of the world community to the war, in 
general, and to the Tanker War, in particular. 
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Section A: Dimensions and legal justifications for the Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran-Iraq war had several dimensions, including border disputes, religious differences and 
political tensions. However, two main factors were ostensibly the trigger for hostilities. The first 
was the historic territorial disputes over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The second was the 
frequent attempts by the Islamic leaders of Iran to incite revolts by adherents of the majority 
Shiite sect throughout Iraq against Saddam and the Sunni-dominated Ba'ath government of Iraq. 
Consequently, in the Iraqi perception, Iran's Islamic agenda threatened its regime, as well as 
Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shiite balance. Other contributory factors which exacerbated the situation 
included the ancient Sunni versus-Shiite and Arab-versus-Persian religious and ethnic disputes, 
and the personal animosity between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. ' Thus, from one 
perspective, the Iran-Iraq War could be seen as just another episode in the ancient Persian-Arab 
conflict, given a new dimension by twentieth-century border disputes. 
In light of these concerns, the war, initiated by Iraq on 22 September, 1980, was intended to 
address a series of interrelated objectives. Iraq's war aims were to regain control of the whole of 
the Shatt al Arab, although Iraq had agreed to abandon this claim beforehand in the 1975 Algiers 
Treaty. 2 But, most importantly, the war was intended to ease the threat to its internal security 
posed by the Iranian regime, more precisely, to secure Saddam Hussein's regime and the 
Ba'ath's control over Iraq. This latter factor also touched Iraq both in its claim to be the protector 
of the other Arab states in the area and to increase Iraqi power and prestige in the Arab-World, 
especially in the light of Egypt's isolation subsequent to the Camp David peace accord with 
1 See generally Wright, C. "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War", 59 Foreign Affairs, 1980-81; Amin, S. H, 
"The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Legal Implications", 31 ICLQ, 1982; Mottale, M. The Origins of the Gulf Wars, 
University Press of America, Oxford, 2001, p118-22; Weisburd, M. Use of Force: The Practice of States 
Since World War II, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997, p 47-52; Marr, P. "The Iran- 
Iraq War: The View from Iraq", in Christopher Joyner [ed. ], The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, 
Law, and Diplomacy, Greenwood Press, London, 1990, p 59-64. See also History of Iran-Iraq War 1980- 
1988, available at <http: //www. iranchamber, com/history/iran_iraq_warl. php> 2 Weisburd, ibid, p 47 
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Israel. Additionally, it has been reported that Iraq also hoped to seize the western Iranian region 
of Khuzestan, an area known for its extensive oil fields. 
To justify its invasion of Iranian territory, Iraq claimed that Iran was in violation of the 1975 
Algiers agreement, having failed to hand over certain territory as stipulated in that agreement. 
Iraq's contention was that it was using force in order to regain sovereignty over the whole of its 
territory, that is, over the portion of the Shatt conceded to Iran in 1975. Iraq also accused Iran of 
carrying out a sabotage campaign against it which constituted a threat to the Iraqi national 
security. 5 Soon after, Iraq added to its justifications the claim that Iran had commenced hostilities 
and undertaken substantial military actions against Iraq prior to the Iraqi invasion to Iran on 22 
September. 6 The following parts of this section will examine each of Iraq's justifications. 
A. 1 Claims of self-defence for the restoration of the territorial status Quo as a sequence of 
Iran's violation of the Baghdad Treaty 
The Algiers Accord, 7 concluded by the two States in 1975, consisted of the June 1975 Treaty of 
Baghdad and three Protocols concerning the land frontier, the river frontier, and military and 
security matters. Wherein Iran pledged to refrain from providing further assistance to Kurdish 
insurgents then holding sway in the mountains of northern Iraq and to close its border to them in 
return for Iraq's abandonment of its claim to the whole of the Shatt at Arab waterway and agreed 
to set the boundary in the middle of the Shatt. It has been noted that Iraq, although it ratified the 
Treaty, was not fully satisfied with it, since the Shatt is its principal outlet to the sea. 
3 Mottale, note 1 supra, p 119-20 
° Weller, M. "Comments: The Use of Force and Collective Security" in Dekker, I, F. and Harry, H. G. [eds] 
The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The Iran-Iraq War in International Legal Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, the Hague, the Netherlands, 1992, p 72 
s Kaikobad, K. H, "Jus Ad Bellum: Legal Implications of the Iran-Iraq War" in Dekker and Harry, ibid, p 52- 3 
6 Letter annexed to a letter dated 27 of October 1980 from the Representative of Iraq to the United Nations to the Secretary-General. UN Doc. S/14236 
Algiers Accord of 6 March 1975 was the provisional agreement between the two States wherein ' 
pledged to carry out final delineation of their land and river boundaries and restore security along their jo t borders, available at <http: //www. mideastweb. org/algiersaccord. htm> 
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On 17 September 1980- five days before the date that is usually taken as the beginning of the 
Iran-Iraq War 
- 
the Government of Iraq announced that the June 1975 Treaty of Baghdad (and 
its Protocols) and the four additional Treaties of December 1975 were null and void. 8 After the 
outbreak of the hostilities, Iraq, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, stated that "... there is no 
longer any border agreement between the two countries with the exception of the Protocol for the 
Delimitation of the Turco-Persian Frontiers signed in 1913, the views of Iran and Iraq regarding 
that Protocol notwithstanding. "9 Iraq proclaimed that its decision was caused by "... their 
violation by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran by word and deed... "lo 
Iran's alleged violations concerned two of the Protocols annexed to the Baghdad Treaty. First, it 
was alleged that Iran had failed to honour its obligations under the "Land Frontier" Protocol by 
postponing arrangements for the return to Iraq of territory which Iran had occupied unlawfully. 1 1 
Second, Iran had allowed Kurdish leaders and their supporters to enter and had also permitted 
their activity within Iraq, contrary to the intention of the "Security" Protocol. 12 The Iraqi 
Government, however, did not explicitly attribute its denunciation of the Treaty system to these 
supposed breaches. Instead, it accused Iran of general and persistent breaches of essential 
elements of the "Security" Protocol. 13 Iraq took the view that the Algiers agreement and the 
8 On 17 September, 1980, President Saddam Hussein explained his decision to abrogate the Algiers Treaty in 
an address before the Iraq National Assembly; he stated that "Since the rulers of Iran have violated this 
agreement as of the beginning of their reign by blatantly and deliberately intervening in Iraq's domestic 
affairs..., and by refusing to return Iraqi territories, I announce before you that we consider the 6 March 1975 
agreement as abrogated from our side...., Thus, the legal relationship concerning Shatt-al-Arab should return 
to what it was before 6 of March 1975. The Shatt shall again be, as it has been throughout history, Iraqi and 
Arab in name and reality, with all rights of full sovereignty over it. " Foreign Broadcasting Information 
Service, Middle East and North Africa, 5, no 183, September 20,1980 [Hereinafter Saddam Hussein's 
Address] 
9 Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 27 October 1980. UN Doc. S/14236 
'0 A Note dated 17 September 1980 from the Iraqi Minster of Foreign Affairs to the Iranian Embassy in 
Baghdad. UN Doc. S/14272, Annex I 
11 Saddam Hussein'sAddress, note 8 supra 12 Letter from the Iraqi Representative to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 20 June, 1980, 
UNDoc. S/14020; see also Weller, note 4 supra, p 72 13 In a Note dated 16 November 1980 from the Iraqi Minster of Foreign Affairs to the Iranian Embassy in 
Baghdad, Iraq stated that the "escalation of Iranian aggression against Iraq by launching of an undeclared war 
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Baghdad Treaty with its Protocols and Annexes constituted an integrated and indivisible whole, 
such that a breach of any part would render the whole null and void. 
14 This view was based on 
Article 4 of the Baghdad Treaty, which states that the provisions of the Treaty- including the 
three Protocols and the annexes thereto-are an "integral part... [which] shall not be infringed 
under any circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible elements of an over-all settlement. 
Accordingly, a breach of any of the components of this over-all settlement shall clearly be 
incompatible with the spirit of the Algiers Agreement "5 Thus, in Iraq's view, it was sufficient 
to claim that the Iranian activities together constituted a violation of this article which, in turn, 
rendered the whole Treaty null and void. As a consequence of the termination of the boundary 
agreement, Iraq claimed that its invasion of Iran was undertaken "in exercise of self-defence of 
the purpose of restoring Iraq's sovereignty over the totality of its territory. "16 The totality of Iraqi 
territory was defined as all "land and water territories in Shatt-al-Arab, as was the case before the 
Algiers agreement. "17 
Iran, on the other hand, made it quite clear that it never intended to open the door for 
denunciation in the Treaty of Baghdad. In its first communications to the Security Council after 
the outbreak of hostilities, Iran insisted that it had not terminated the Treaty and pointed out that 
the Baghdad Treaty, far from allowing unilateral termination, expressly prohibited it. '8 In Irans 
view, therefore, all the agreements that Iraq claimed were null and void, were still in force and 
binding and any dispute arising regarding their application should be resolved in accordance with 
against frontier posts, the shelling of Iraqi towns and interference in the internal affairs of Iraq is cogent pmof 
of Iran's clear refusal to be bound by the aforementioned treaty. " UN Doc. S/14272, Annex 2 
14 Post, H. "Border Conflicts Between Iran and Iraq: Review and Legal Reflections" in Dekker and Harry 
note 4 supra, p 29 ' 
's Article 4 of the 1975 Baghdad Treaty, available at <http: //www. meij. orjp/text/border/Iran_ 
Iraq/iraqiran 1975. htm> 
16 SCOR, 2251` meeting, 35th Year, pars 60 
17 Ibid, para 59 
18 UNDoc. S/14249 
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Article 6 of the Baghdad Treaty, which contained a conclusive settlement of disputes 
procedure. 19 
Iraq's argument, on the face of it, is fundamentally flawed. However serious Iran's violations 
were, these breaches cannot be invoked to abrogate a treaty establishes boundaries or have a 
territorial nature such as the Baghdad Treaty. This kind of treaty, under the general rules of 
international law and, in particular, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, 20 has a special status 
and is protected against unilateral denunciation, even if there is a fundamental change of 
circumstances. As Post rightly argues, these treaties, under contemporary international law, are 
subject to the so-called "the doctrine of continuity and finality boundaries 
. 
"21 Therefore, the 
justification presented by Iraq that it used force to regain its sovereignty over the whole Shatt-Al- 
Arab waterway cannot be considered as a valid basis for the use of force. In fact, by this 
argument Iraq acknowledged that it was using force to pursue territorial claims, clearly 
contravening the Charter prohibition of the use of force in international relations except in case 
of self-defence against armed attack. In addition, by using force to settle its boundary dispute 
with Iran, Iraq violated the obligation of UN Members to settle their disputes in peaceful means 
as Article 2(3) of the UN Charter requires. 22 
19 Article 6 of the Baghdad Treaty enumerates the detailed procedures to be followed in case of differences 
between the two contracting States over the interpretation and the application of the treaty, namely, direct 
bilateral negotiation between the parties. In case of non-agreement, the parties have to resort within the 
period of three months to the good offices of a third friendly State. If one of the parties refuses to resort to the 
good offices or the good offices fail within a period not exceeding one month beginning from the date of 
refusal or failure, the disagreement will be solved by arbitration. If the parties disagree on the procedure of 
arbitration, any one of them can resort within fifteen days following the date of disagreement to an arbitration 
tribunal. Article 6 of the 1975 Baghdad Treaty, available at <http: //www. meij. or jp/text/border/Iran- 
Iraq/iragiran 1975 
. 
htm> 
20 Article 62 (2) of the Vienna Convention declares that "a fundamental change of circumstance may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty; (a) if the treaty established a boundary... " 21 Post, note 14 supra, p 30 22 Article 2(3) states that "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. " 
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A. 2 Claims of self-defence against Iran's direct and indirect attacks 
In the first letters to the United Nations with regard to the conflict, Iraq characterized its invasion 
of Iran as an exercise of the right of self-defence rendered necessary by circumstance. 23 The 
justifications presented in these letters were centered on the Iranian breaches of the Algiers 
Accord, discussed above. Iraq also accused Iranian agents of bomb attacks, terrorist actions and 
sabotage in Iraqi territory, and of supporting Kurdish rebels, and encouraging instability amongst 
the Kurdish people, in order to instigate an insurgence against the Ba'ath government of Iraq. 4 It 
thereby claimed that the invasion was an exercise of the right of self-defence. One month later, in 
a letter dated 24 October 1980 to the Secretary-General, Iraq added to its previous justifications 
alleged substantial military actions by Iran against Iraq, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 
September. 25 Iran was alleged to have shelled Iraqi towns on 4 September 1980, and the 
beginning of war was now traced to this date. Contradicting this claim, however, Iraq described 
22 September as the day "on which Iraq exercised the right of preventive self-defence to defend 
"26 its people and territories. 
Thus, besides the Iran's violations for the Algiers Treaty, Iraq sought to justify its use of force 
against Iran on three other legal grounds as follows: first, the right of self-defence against Iran's 
indirect use of force; second, the right of self-defence against Iran's direct use of force by 
shelling Iraqi border towns; third, the right of preventive self-defence against Iran's imminent 
attack. 
23 See Letters dated 21 and 24 September 1980 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary- 
General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/14191 and S/14192 
24 Ibid, see also Letter dated 21 September, 1980 from the Iraqi Representative to the Secretary-General, U, 1' 
Doc. S/14020 and UNDoc. S/PV 2250 
25 This letter was annexed to a letter dated 27 of October 1980 from the Representative of Iraq to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General. UN Doc. S/14236 
26 Ibid. See also Dekker, I. "Criminal Responsibility and the Gulf War of 1980-1988: the Crime of Aggression" in Dekker and Harry [eds], note 4 supra, p 256 
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A. 2.1 Self-defence against indirect use of force and assistance of insurgents 
Iraq's claim of self-defence against indirect use of force by Iran consisted of two different 
categories of accusations: i) providing assistance to Kurdish insurgents and fomenting civil strife 
in Iraq; and ii) sending into Iraq armed bands who perpetrated acts of terrorism and sabotage in 
the sense that these bands were nearly that of de facto Iranian State organs. 
As to Iraq's allegation that Iran supported Iraqi rebels and fomented civil strife, while Iran would 
clearly be in breach of Article 2(4), none of these would justify Iraq in taking forcible action in 
self-defence, because the condition of an armed attack as required under Article 51 was not met. 
Such assistance, according to the ICJ, does not amount to an armed attack in the sense of Article 
51; 27 consequently, Article 51 provides no remedy for this situation. Thus, this allegation alone 
cannot be considered as a valid legal justification for the use of force by Iraq. 
Regarding the second line of accusations, as illustrated in the preceding chapter, acts falling 
under Articles 3(f) and (g) of the Definition of Aggression dealing with indirect force cannot 
readily be classified as armed attack. Nevertheless, according to the ICJ, these acts may amount 
to armed attack if on a sufficiently large scale and having substantial effect. 28 Accordingly, for 
Iraq to claim that it was a victim of indirect aggression it would be required to show that the acts 
it claimed to have suffered from Iran's armed bands were sufficiently substantial in terms of 
scale and effects to amount to an armed attack. In view of Iraq's evidence against Iran, it appears 
likely that Iran at one time or another had been guilty of individual instances of use of force 
against Iraq. 29 Consequently, if these Iranian attacks were sufficiently substantial in terms of 
scale and effects, it seems that the use of force by Iraq in response was legitimate. 
27 See Chapter 1, section E. 2 and Chapter 7, section A. 1 28 Ibid 
29 Kaikobad, note 5 supra, p 59-60; see also note 33 infra 
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In fact, however, most observers and commentators have viewed Iraq's invasion of Iran as 
unlawful and a clear violation of the UN Charter. This view was based mainly on the facts of the 
matter and the proportionality of the Iraqi action 30 From the documentary evidence, it appears 
that Iraq's allegations against Iran of bombings, the poisoning of water supplies, supporting Iraqi 
rebels, fomenting civil strife and other such events were certainly exaggerated. Even if these 
alleged provocations by Iran were true and severe enough to constitute an armed attack, Iraq's 
response by such a large-scale military action, invasion and occupation of the Iranian territory 
was extremely excessive. 31 
Against this view, one may argue that even though the alleged Iranian provocations were of a far 
lesser scale than those mounted by Iraq, however, they did constitute actual aggression on the 
part of Iran and the Iraqi invasion was a genuine response to the danger perceived by Iraq. 
Therefore, Iraq was responding to an "accumulation of events" by countering multiple small- 
scale attacks with a single decisive blow. 32 In this connection, consideration should be given to at 
least fifty-seven alleged Iranian violations of Iraqi airspace between February 1979 and May 
1980; one hundred and eighty-seven border incidents between June and September 1980; and 
fifteen cases of intensive bombardment between August 1979 and June 1980.33 Viewed from that 
perspective, the Iraqi action may not necessarily be excessive. However, the facts show that on 
22 September 1980 Iraq initiated a large scale military action against Iran along a 300 mile front, 
bombing and destructing the Iranian oil instillations, and within a week had occupied a large part 
30 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 256; Weller, note 4 supra, p 72; Kaikobad, note 5 supra, p 65; Kalshoven F. 
"Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Methods or Means of Warfare", in Dekker and Harry [eds], note 4 
supra, p 101; Lagoni, R. "Comments: Methods or Means of Warfare, Reprisals, and the Principle of Proportionality", in Dekker and Harry [eds], ibid, p 121-2; Baktiari, B. "International Law: Observations 
and Violations", in Rajaee, F. [ed. ], The Iran-Iraq War, The Politics of Aggression, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1993, p 159 
31 Kaikobad, ibid, p 60 32 lbid, p 65 
33 UN Doc. S/PV 2250 
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of Iranian territory. 34 Such a large-scale action cannot be seen as proportional to the actions of 
which Iran was accused. Most importantly, Iraq's use of prohibited means of warfare was a 
pivotal aspect of disproportionality. Iraq was reported, on many occasions during the war, to 
have used chemical agents in various sectors of the front, caused the deaths, not only of many 
Iranian military personnel35 but also of civilians 36 Although Iran responded in kind towards the 
end of the war, Iraq was the first, and for a long time the only belligerent to employ such 
weapons37 and, therefore, bears most of the blame for their use. 8 
To conclude, the great disproportion in the action of the two parties invalidates Iraq's claim of 
self-defence against the alleged Iranian sabotage campaign. It seems that Iraq itself was aware of 
this; therefore, it apparently sought to enhance its legal position by adding more justifications for 
the war. 
A. 2.2 Self-defence against direct use of force 
As mentioned above, 39 Iraq, one month after the outbreak of the hostilities, added to its 
justification for the war the claim that Iran was responsible for commencing the hostilities by 
shelling Iraqi border towns on 4 September 1980. Bombardment or shelling as an act of 
34 Amin, note 1 supra, p 179 35 For example, in a Presidential statement of 25 April 1985, the President of the Council specifies that 
chemical weapons have been used "against Iranian soldiers" UN Doc. S/17130. Similarly, on 21 March 1986, 
the President of the Security Council stated that "chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by 
Iraqi forces against Iranian forces. " UN Doc. S/17932 
36 The President of the Council, in Presidential statement on 14 May 1987 stated that "civilians in Iran also 
have been injured by chemical weapons. " UN Doc. S/18863 37 Kalshoven, note 30 supra, p 101 3' During the course of 8 years hostilities, the President of the Security Council and the Council itself 
frequently reminded both belligerents of the need to abide strictly by the provisions of the Gas Protocol of 
1925. See UN Doc. S/16454 of 30 March 1984; UN Doc. S/17130 of 25 April 1985; UN Doc. S/17932 of 21 
March 1986; UN Doc. S/18863 of 14 May 1987; SC Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987; SC Resolution 612 of 9 
May 1988; SC Resolution 620 of 26 August 1988. All these statements and resolutions were based on the 
findings of specialists dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations (mostly by Iran) that 
chemical weapons had been used. See Specialist Reports of 20 June, 1983 and 26 March, 1984, UN Doc. 
S/15834 and UN Doc. S/16433. Both Reports confirmed that tabun and mustard gases had been used. See 
also UN Doc. S/17127 of 24 April, 1985; UN Doc. 17911 of 1 March 1986; UN Doc. S/18852 of 8 May, 
1987; UN Doc. S/19823 of 25 April, 1988. Some of these reports confirmed that both sides had used 
chemical weapons. 
39 Note 25 supra 
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aggression, described in Article 3(b) of the Definition of Aggression, can easily be regarded as 
an armed attack for the purpose of Article 51. However, whether or not the initial act of self. 
defence was carried out in response to an armed attack is essentially a matter of fact, to be 
demonstrated by evidence. In other words, it is not enough for a State to claim that the prevailing 
situation justified action in self-defence. It must provide evidence of the existence of such 
circumstances. 0 This view was held by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg. The 
German Nazi leaders argued before the Tribunal that the violations of which they stood accused 
were actions taken in self-defence and that this was a matter for every State to judge for itself 
according to circumstances. The Tribunal dismissed that argument, insisting that "whether action 
taken under the claim of self-defence was in fact the aggressive or defensive must ultimately be 
subject to investigation or adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced. "41 
Accordingly, if the Iraqi claims of Iranian shelling of its border towns prior to its action were 
true, then, prima facie, Iraq was acting in self-defence and its action was legally justified under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, regardless the delay in response. In this respect, Iraq would have 
merely to prove the occurrence of Iranian attacks before it opened fire in self-defence. The facts, 
however, that the Iraqi claims of Iran's prior shelling of Iraqi towns were 'false A2 and the Iranian 
attacks were in response to the Iraqi invasion on September 22. This can be deduced from the 
Iraqi communications to the Security Council, which certainly up to 24 October 1980 (32 days 
after the beginning of the hostilities) did not claim any such action. The Iraqi justification at the 
time hinged on the breaches by Iran of the Algiers Agreement and the alleged sabotage 
ao Kaikobad, note 5 supra, p 58 
41 Judgement of the International Military Tribunal as Nuremberg, 1946,1 Trial of the German Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal), printed in 41 AJIL, 1947, p 207 [Hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment] 
42 Weisburd, note 1 supra, p 48 
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campaign. 43 It was not until a letter dated 24 October 1980 from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Secretary-General that substantial military actions by Iran were alleged. 44 Nor does 
any other available survey of events makes reference to any Iranian military activities against 
Iraq, of a scale which would justify self-defence by such a large-scale action as was taken on 22 
September 1980.45 Furthermore, Iraq's argument that Iran was first to attack its towns on 4 
September 1980 implies that Iraq waited more than 2 weeks to respond to these attacks. This 
delay in response is illogical in light of the fact that Iraq had nearly 1 million strong army46 
already deployed along its borders with Iran. 
A. 2.3 Claims of anticipatory self-defence 
Iraqi officials used the classic criteria of the Caroline incident as a legal ground to justify the 
invasion. During the debate in the Security Council, the Iraqi Representative stated that the 
attack was in the nature of "direct preventive strike against military targets in Iran [which gave 
rise to] a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation. "47 Indeed, for Iraq, it seems that anticipatory self-defence was the only 
legal doctrine seriously available to justify the attack on such a large-scale. 
Given the extent of Iraqi activities, one might assume that the amassing of Iranian troops on the 
frontier or any imminent attack would have been noted. 48 However, Iraq did not mention such a 
threat in its communications to the United Nations or other reports. 9 Furthermore, Iraq's claim 
of preventive self-defence contradicts its previous claim that the hostilities had been opened by 
Iran on 4 September 1980. If this had been the case, then it is strange that 22 September should 
43 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 255-6 44 UN Doc. S/14236; see note 6 supra 45 Amin, note 1 supra, p 167-8; see also Wright, note 1 supra, p 286-7 46 Weller, note 4 supra, p 72; see also Wright, ibid. 47 SCOR, 2250th meeting, 35th year, 1980, para. 40 48 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 257 49 By way of analogy, a few days before the Israeli preventive strike against Egypt in 1967 Israel reported to 
the Security Council that Egypt had begun a "massive troop concentration" in the Sinai Peninsula against Israel's southern border. See Chapter 7, section C. 2.3 
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be described as the day "... on which Iraq exercised preventive self-defence to defend its people 
and territories 50 
A. 3 Territorial ambitions and a war of auression 
From the above examination of the legal grounds forward by the Iraqi authorities for the 
invasion, the inevitable conclusion is that Iraq's use of force on such large-scale cannot be 
justified within the Charter's framework of the use of force. Despite repeated assurances in its 
communications to the Secretary-General and the Security Council that its military actions were 
not territorially motivated, 51 Iraq actually was clear about its territorial objectives and frank in 
stating its war aims. President Saddam Hussein in his address stated that "The Shatt shall again 
be, as it has been throughout history, Iraqi and Arab in name and reality, with all rights of full 
sovereignty over it. "52 Also, in a letter to the UN dated 21 September 1980, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq indicated that the border between his country and Iran, particularly in the 
Shatt-al-Arab, had been redrawn to correspond with the lines existing before the Algiers 
Accord 
. 
53 These statements demonstrate clearly that Iraq's military invasion of Iran was 
territorially motivated. As Dekker rightly concluded, "even the official Iraqi viewpoints reveal 
little more than a common war of aggression, in which expansionist ambitions at least play a 
role. "sa 
As all Iraq's legal justifications fail, therefore, Iraq's unjustified military attack against Iran on 
22 of September, 1980 falls within the scope of Article 3 (a) of the Definition of Aggression as 
50 UN Doc. S/14236 
s' In a letter dated 21 September, 1980, from the Iraqi Minster of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General, he 
states that Iraq "... has no territorial ambition in Iran", UN Doc. S/14191; in a further letter dated 24 
September, 1980, he stated that "... my Government has on more than one occasion made it clear that we harbour no expansionist territorial designs against Iran. This policy was clearly stated in the statements 
emanating from the highest authorities of my Government", UN Doc. S/14192 
52 Saddam Hussein's Address, note 8 supra 
53 UN Doc. S/14191. He further added that Shatt-Al-Arab "shall again be, as it has always been throughout 
history, an Iraqi river subject to the full control and sovereignty of Iraq" 
54 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 259 
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an act of aggression. 55 In fact, Iraq's invasion of Iran, for its seriousness and brutality, may also 
be described as a "war of aggression" and, hence, constitutes a crime against peace. 56 Indeed, 
Article 6 (a) the Charter of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals defined crimes against 
peace as follows: "Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. "57 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal 
did not formulate a general definition of a "war of aggression", from their detailed discussions on 
German and Japanese foreign policies leading to the Second World War, the obvious conclusion 
is that the use of extensive armed forces by one State against another constitutes a "war of 
aggression", unless it is a response to a similar action by that State, or legally justifiable on other 
grounds, and when it has the intention of occupying or controlling the territory of that State. 58 
Viewed in these terms, it appears reasonable to categorize the Iraqi invasion of Iran as a "war of 
aggression. " This interpretation would still be valid even if it were possible only to demonstrate 
that the Iraqi intention was intended to achieve its aspiration for sovereignty over the entire 
Shaft-al-Arab. 59 In fact, this view was held by most of the world community. Particularly 
informative in this connection is Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar's determination, 
ss According to Article 3 (a) of the Definition of Aggression "the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof' is an 
act of aggression. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December, 1974 56 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 264-6. A "war of Aggression" is more serious form of aggression and, therefore, it constitutes a crime against peace. Ibid, p 265. This principle was enunciated in the Declaration of Friendly Relations which states that "A war of aggression constitutes a crime against peace, for which there is 
responsibility under international law. " 57 Nuremberg Judgment, note 41 supra, p 174. Notably, the General Assembly, in Resolution 95(I) of 1946, 
affirmed the "the Principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal. " General Assembly Resolution 95(I) of 11 December 1964 Similarly, the International Law Commission defined Crimes against peace as follows: " (i) Planning, Preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts 
mentioned under (i)" ILC Yearbook, 1950,374-8 
58 Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963, p 209 
59 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 265 
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pursuant to Security Cöuncil Resolution 598,60 that Iraq's attack on September 22 was a 
completely unjustified aggression in "violation of the prohibition against the use of force" and 
that Iraq was responsible for the conflict. 61 Remarkably, the US Representative stated 
unequivocally in the Security Council that "the national integrity of Iran was threatened by the 
Iraqi invasion. , 62 This opinion was extraordinary at a time when Americans were still being held 
hostage in Tehran. 63 
Section B: The Security Council and third States' responses to the Iran-Iraq 
War 
Iraq's aggression against Iran and its violations of the prohibition of the use of force in the UN 
Charter, the humanitarian law by using prohibited means of warfare and the law of treaty were 
unequivocal. This would have been sufficient grounds for the Security Council to invoke its 
powers under Chapter VII to impose non-forcible sanctions upon Iraq or even to take forcible 
action against it, if necessary, in order to stop the ongoing aggression and to restore international 
peace and security in the Gulf. M However, the reaction of the Security Council was 
unsatisfactory. Iraq's aggression was never condemned by the Security Council, and the 
Council's response to the war was minimal and negligent. Apart from the UN organs, the third 
States' reaction-especially the major powers-to the so called the "Tanker War" was also 
ambiguous and biased. This section highlights the Security Council and third States' reactions to 
the Iran-Iraq war and whether Iran was under obligation to discontinue its measures of self- 
defence when Iraq was driven back to the international boundaries in 1982. 
60 In Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987, the Security Council asked the UN Secretary-General to investigate 
responsibility for the conflict. 
61 UN. Doc. S/23273; see also UNYB, 1991, p 165 
62 UN Doc. SIP V. 2252,1987, p 16 
63 A similar view was expressed by the French Representative, see note 89 infra 
64 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 268 
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B. 1 The Security Council's response 
The Security Council response to the Iran-Iraq War was relatively minimal for such a long war, 
which lasted eight years: 17 resolutions in that time. Despite the gravity of the situation, the 
Council took a mediatory-not mandatory-approach for most of the war. This approach was 
clear in the language of the resolutions. Initially, the Council responded to the situation by 
unanimously adopting Resolution 479 of September 28,1980, which called upon both States to 
"refrain immediately from any further uses of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means 
and in conformity with principles of justice and international law. "65 Surprisingly, at the time the 
resolution was adopted, Iraqi forces were seizing Iranian territory; however, the Resolution did 
not call for a withdrawal to international boundaries but called on Iran as well as Iraq to refrain 
from the use of force. Resolution 479 (1980), thus, was inconsistent with the Council's practice 
in the majority of similar cases. As a corollary, Iran rejected the resolution, stating that the 
Council "should condemn the premeditated act of aggression that has taken place, call for 
immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory and call upon Iraq to compensate 
Iran for damages. It should also condemn the Iraqi authorities for war crimes. "66 
Ironically, on July 12,1982-after Iraq was driven out of Iran and the day before Iran invaded 
Iraq the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 514 calling for a withdrawal to international 
boundaries in addition to its call for a cease-fire. 67 The Resolution also asked other States to 
abstain from action that might contribute to continuation of the conflict. 68 Resolution 522 of 
October 4,1982 essentially repeated Resolution 514, though welcoming Iraq's acceptance of 514 
and called upon Iran to do likewise, calling for a ceasefire, restraint from any action that might 
endanger peace and security, cessation of military operations against civilian targets and 
65 Security Council Resolution 479 of 28 September 1980 66 Statement of the Representative of Iran to the UN, SCOR, 2252nd meeting, 35th year, para 87 67 Security Council Resolution 514 of 12 July 1982 68 Ibid 
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observation of humanitarian law, and affirming the right of freedom of navigation. 9 It is 
noteworthy that Resolutions 514 and 522 as well as Resolution 540 of 1983 were not also 
Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter. 
Resolution 552 (1984) took a more forceful tone. It was adopted after shipping in the Persian 
Gulf came under attack by the belligerents, and it reaffirmed the right of free navigation in the 
Gulf, condemned attacks on ships sailing to and from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and demanded 
an end to such attacks. It described Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as "not parties to the hostilities. "70 
Surprisingly the Resolution did not explicitly refer to Iraqi attacks on third-State tankers carrying 
Iranian oil. 7' Resolutions 582 of February 24,1986, and 588 of October 8,1986, and the 
discussions surrounding them were similar in tone, though Resolution 582 also "deplore[d]" both 
"the initial acts that gave rise to the conflict"72 and, among other disfavoured acts, "attacks on 
neutral shipping. " None of these Resolutions addressed the self-defence issue or attributed 
blame. Similarly, the General Assembly also adopted a resolution on 22 October 1982 calling for 
a cease-fire, without seeking to place blame. It was only in Resolution 598 of July 20,1987 that 
the Security Council abandoned its conciliatory stance. 73 'In that resolution, the Council 
determined the existence of a breach of a peace; invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and 
demanded a cease-fire and withdrawal to international boundaries. 74 This resolution, unlike the 
previous ones, was mandatory. 75 
The ambivalent attitude of the Security Council towards the conflict was obviously politically 
motivated, since there did not seem to be any legal reason why the Council should not condemn 
69 Security Council Resolution 522 of 4 October, 1982 
70 Security Council Resolution 552 of I June 1984 
71 Weisburd, note I supra, p 49 
72 Security Council Resolution 582 of 24 February 1986 
73 Weisburd, note I supra, p 49 
74 Security Council Resolution 598 of 20 July 1987 
75 Weller, note 4 supra, p 85 
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the Iraqi attack as an act of aggression. 76 As mentioned above, the members of the Security 
Council seem to have been in no doubt as to the facts of the matter. However, it seems that the 
Council's stance was influenced by Iran's disruptive activities in the region and Iran's neglect of 
international obligations, illustrated by the capture and holding hostage of American diplomats. 77 
However, this conciliatory stance of the Security Council constituted a gross failure on the part 
of the Council to fulfil its primary responsibility, "to maintain international peace and security". 
It can be suggested that the stance taken by the Council contributed directly to the continuation 
of the hostilities for eight years. 
B. 2 The "Tanker War" and third-States' reaction 
At the beginning of the war, major powers (including the US and the Soviet Union) announced 
their neutrality and the cut of armed supplies to both belligerents. 78 However, it was reported 
that, during the course of the hostilities, third States actively supported one or the other-or 
sometimes both-of the parties. 79 With the beginning of the so-called Tanker War in 1984, the 
partiality of the third States became unambiguous. The Tanker War was a notable aspect of the 
Persian Gulf conflict, where both belligerents during the war, albeit mostly Iraq, attacked 
shipping and merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf. 8° It was considered as a major incident in the 
history of naval warfare and the cause of the greatest loss of merchant ships and mariners' lives 
76 Dekker, note 26 supra, p 261 
" Weisburd, note I supra, p 49 78 Gioia, A. and Ronzitti, N. "The Law of Neutrality: Third States' Commercial Rights and Duties", in 
Dekker and Harry, note 4 supra, p 228-31 79 At the start of the war the Soviet Union declared its neutrality, and cut off arms supplies to both sides, 
though it assisted Iran in repairing its tanks and continued its arms supplies to Iraq, 27 Keesing's 
Contemporary Achieves, 1981, p 31012. The United States likewise proclaimed its neutrality, while 
permitting the delivery to Iran of arms previously ordered and the transfer to Iran by third states of American- 
supplied arms. 28 Keesing's Contemporary Achieves, 1982, p 31521. France also provided arms, aircrafts 
and warships to Iraq. 29 Keesing's Contemporary Achieves, 1983, p 32595 80 Gray, C. "The British Position in Regard to the Gulf Conflict", 37 ICLQ, 1988, p 423; for full account of 
the "Tanker War" see Walker, G. The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy, International Law Studies, vol. 74, Naval War College, Newport, 2000 
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since the Second World War. 81 Third State reactions to this situation and the attitude of seafaring 
States toward attacks on shipping were significant. After Kuwaiti oil tankers passing through the 
Persian Gulf suffered attacks from Iran, France, Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union all sent warships to the Gulf to protect vessels under their 
registration. In addition, the US, the UK and USSR allowed several Kuwaiti-owned tankers to be 
re-flagged as their own tankers. 82 However, this protection was afforded only against Iranian 
attacks; no action was taken to prevent Iraqi attacks on tankers carrying Iranian oil. Furthermore, 
in a series of incidents, the US engaged Iranian minelayers and boats used for attacks on 
shipping; it also, on October 1987, attacked an Iranian platform used for military purposes. In 
July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian Airbus Flight 655 claiming the right 
of anticipatory self-defence. 83 
Thus, third State reactions were not based on determination of the illegality of the belligerents' 
actions; in fact, third States showed a reluctance to make such an assessment. The ambiguity of 
third States' reactions to the Iraqi invasion of Iran and their clear bias for the Iraqi side was 
driven by their political and national interests and the deteriorating reputation of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the international community, especially after the Tehran Diplomatic Hostages 
episode. Viewed from a legal perspective, however, the reactions to the conflict, in general, and 
to the Tanker War, in particular, raised crucial legal questions regarding the concept of 
"neutrality" in international law. Was the third States' reaction a reflection of their acceptance of 
the Iraqi justifications for the war, or can it be considered as the emergence of a new rule of 
international customary law authorizing the invasion of a State perceived as ruled by an 
unreasonable regime? 
81 Walker, ibid, p 74 
82 Ibid, p 60; Gray, note 80 supra, p 423-4; see generally Gamlen, E. and Rogers, P. "U. S Re-flagging of Kuwaiti Tankers", in Rajaee, F. [ed. ], note 30 supra 
83 Gray, ibid, p 426-7; see also Chapter 7, section C. 2.5 for the incident of Iranian Airbus Flight 655 
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Generally speaking, the principle of neutrality seems problematic under the Charter legal system. 
On the one hand, the principle of neutrality supposes that third States should be impartial and 
refrain from supporting one or another party of the conflict. On the other hand, under the 
Charter, States are required to refrain from violating Article 2 (4); assertions of neutrality, 
placing violators and their victims on an equal footing may amount to acceptance of such a 
violation. 84 Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the concept of neutrality is 
inconsistent with the legal system that the UN Charter purports to establish. In the present case, 
the Security Council, as it appears from several resolutions, took the view that States not 
involved in the fighting could be regarded as neutral. The Council, for example, called upon Iran 
to stop its attacks against Saudi and Kuwaiti ships in the Gulf and characterized those States as 
neutral, 85 even though they provided vital subsidies to Iraq. 86 In this context, it has been argued 
that the Security Council's failure to identify an aggressor in this case left the way open for 
members of the United Nations to take such a position. 87 
Regardless the problematic question of neutrality and its application under the Charter system, 
third States' reactions towards the conflict and the clear bias to the Iraqi side were clearly 
inconsistent with the principle of neutrality in international law. 88 However, at any rate, the 
muted response to Iraq's invasion of Iran and the bias towards the Iraqi side should not be 
regarded as evidence of acceptance of some principle invoked by Iraq, nor should it be taken as 
implying support for a view that such invasions are not contrary to customary international law. 
It is more likely that the bias towards Iraq and failure to condemn the Iraqi invasion was due to 
84 Weisburd, note 1 supra, p 51 85 In Resolution 552 of I June, 1984, the Security Council characterized Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as "not 
parties to the hostilities. " 
6 Iran disputed this stance and tried to justify its attacks against ships en route to and from the ports of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the basis that those countries were not in fact neutral but partial to Iraq, since they 
extensively subsidized Iraq's war efforts. Therefore, they cannot avail themselves of the law of neutrality. UNDocs. S/16585 (25 May 1984) and S/18557 (5 January 1987) 87 Gioia and Ronzitti, note 78 supra, p 240 88 Bothe, M. "Neutrality at Sea", in Dekker and Harry, note 4 supra, p 206-7 
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fear and suspicion of Iran. There was a prevailing concern at the time that Iran intended to 
provoke an Islamic revolution throughout the Gulf region. Although Iran showed no sign of 
immediate intent to launch a conventional attack on any of its neighbours, it was evidently trying 
to undermine the governments in several of them, including Iraq, causing third States to fear that 
stability in the Gulf would be jeopardised. 
Indeed, in reality, the policy of a State and its unfriendly attitude in the international community 
is not time-bounded, but can cause remote effects. It might weaken the reaction of the 
international community when it came under attack or invasion, in the sense that it leads to 
greater toleration of the action taken by the attacker State. For example, during the first debates 
in the Security Council regarding the Iran-Iraq conflict, the French Representative implicitly 
placed the blame upon Iraq by declaring that in order to ensure its security, "one of the 
protagonists has placed its hopes in weapons", then he asked, "But, as for the other, has it always 
refrained from using weapons against its neighbour? "89 This view may be explained in light of 
the international reaction to the Kuwait crisis. In contrast to the hesitant and muted reaction to 
the Iran case, the world reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which had no violent history 
towards its neighbours, was completely different. The world community and the Security 
Council acted vigorously from day one to bring the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to an end. It is 
not suggested that this argument has yet been developed as legal rule, but it seems that it is a 
political reality. Like any community, the community of States can be influenced by the 
behaviour and attitude of a State. A regime that violates international law and displays a distorted 
attitude towards the international world order should not expect a vigorous reaction from the 
world community when its rights are violated. In a sense, the history of a State could work as 
"criminal records" do in municipal criminal laws. Recently, after the events of September 11, 
89 UN Doc. S/PV. 2252,1987, p6 
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this trend has become more obvious. For example, the world community almost unanimously 
supported the US action to overthrow the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, which had for a long 
time been perceived as an irrational and isolated regime. 
Conclusion 
The legal justifications forwarded by Iraq for its invasion of Iran do not stand much scrutiny. In 
light of factual circumstances, none of the legal grounds invoked by Iraq can justify the use of 
force on such a large scale under the rules of the use of force in the UN Charter. Therefore, the 
inevitable conclusion is that Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 was a war of aggression motivated by 
territorial ambitions. However, Iraq's aggression was never condemned by the Security Council. 
The ambiguity of third States' reactions and the weak response of the Security Council reflected 
political considerations and the suspicion towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 
international community, especially after the Tehran hostage events. Iran's violation of 
international law and its attitude in the international community contributed towards more 
toleration of the Iraqi aggression. Indeed, the lack of reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Iran reflects 
this history, rather than acceptance of any of Iraq's argument, or of a general view that such 
invasions are not contrary to customary international law. 
Despite this muted reaction for Iraq's aggression, the Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the 
course of Iraqi history. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe deterioration of 
the reputation of the regime headed by Saddam Hussein. Ever since, Iraq was widely perceived 
as a rogue State headed by a vicious, irrational dictator who posed a threat to the international 
peace and security in Middle East. In particular, Iraq's frequent use of chemical weapons against 
Iranian military personnel and civilians raised concerns among the world community regarding 
the military capabilities of Iraq and the dangerous consequences of allowing such a regime to 
possess WMDs, especially as it was known at the time that Saddam Hussein was pursuing 
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nuclear weapons. 90 Thus, this war set in motion effects and developments which had long-term 
implications that ultimately led to the U. S. 
-led coalition against Iraq in March 2003 and the 
demise of the Iraqi regime. 
From another perspective, the Iran-Iraq war, among other elements, enhanced the prospects of 
the invasion of Kuwait and contributed to Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait in two basic ways. 
First, the support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, especially from the United States, increased 
Iraq's confidence and thus made it more inclined to invade Kuwait than it otherwise would have 
been. Second, the muted and poor approach of the Security Council and the absence of any 
condemnation or even placing blame upon the Iraqi aggression made Iraq more confident that it 
would not face condemnation or a severe reaction if it invaded Kuwait. 
90 See Chapter 7, section C. 2.4 for the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor 
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Chapter 3 
The Invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm 1990-1991 
Introduction 
Iraq's invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 was the trigger for the 
confrontation between Iraq and world community that led to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 
enormity of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its repercussions, including the authorization of force 
against Iraq issued by the Security Council in Resolution 678, the disarmament sanctions 
imposed upon Iraq after the cease-fire in Resolution 687, and Iraq's defiance of these sanctions 
were the foundations for the decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his regime 
from power. The present chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive analytical view of the Kuwait 
crisis and its sequels. It is concerned with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the events following this 
crisis, up to Operation Desert Storm. The sequelae after the formal cease-fire established in 
Resolution 687 will be examined separately in the ensuing chapters. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on Iraq's invasion and the measures taken by the 
Security Council in response to it, including the economic sanctions imposed in Resolution 661 
and the naval blockade authorized by the Council in Resolution 665. It also examines the 
authorization of the use of force against Iraq issued in Resolution 678 and whether resort to force 
was essential to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait or non-forcible measures would have 
been enough to achieve that goal, had they been given more time. The second section examines 
one of the most controversial issues raised in the context of the Gulf war, that is, whether the 
action undertaken by the coalition forces was an exercise of the right of collective self-defence 
with the legitimate government of Kuwait under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or was carried out 
under the authority of Chapter VII as the first Security Council enforcement action. The third 
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section explores the "authorization technique" invented by the Council in this crisis, which 
became the model to follow in subsequent situations where the Council deemed appropriate the 
use of military force. It examines the legality of this method of collective security, its legal basis 
in Chapter VII and, particularly significant, the lack of Security Council control over the course 
of hostilities under this newly invented technique. The final section investigates the limits and 
objectives of the Gulf campaign in light of the condition of proportionality of the use of force in 
the international law of warfare. It attempts to evaluate whether the coalition forces in 1991 were 
legally justified in continuing their military operation to the source of aggression and 
overthrowing the aggressive regime. The conclusions reached in this chapter will be depended 
upon in the assessment of the legality of the invasion of Iraq (2003) presented in subsequent 
chapters. 
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Section A: Kuwait crisis and the Security Council's efforts to secure Iraq's 
withdrawal 
On August 2,1990, news broke of Iraq's massive invasion and purported annexation of the 
"State of Kuwait. "' The Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council proclaimed that it had "decided 
to return the part and branch, Kuwait, to the whole and origin, Iraq, in a comprehensive, eternal 
and inseparable merger unity... "2 Thus, similar to its unlawful repudiation of the 1975 Algiers 
Treaty with Iran, 3 by this proclamation, Iraq renounced its former recognition of "the 
independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait" evinced in the 1963 Agreed 
Minutes between the two States. Iraq's claim to Kuwait as "lost" Iraqi territory, however, was 
rejected by almost all States of the world community who condemned Iraq's aggression against 
Kuwait and demanded immediate withdrawal from Kuwaiti soil. 5 
This was not the first attempt by a State forcibly to pursue control of territory it claimed as its 
own, but never before, since the founding of the United Nations, had the entire territory of a 
member State been forcibly annexed. 6 The invasion of Kuwait was best described by 
Greenwood: "Iraq struck at the cornerstone of the post-1945 international legal order, the 
' During the 18th Century, "Qurain", as Kuwait was then called, was occupied by Arab tribes. In the Anglo- 
Ottoman Convention of 1913, Kuwait was defined as an "autonomous caza" of the Ottoman Empire and the 
Sheikhs of Kuwait classed not as independent leaders, but as provincial sub-governors of the Ottoman 
government. After World War I, the British Empire invalidated the Anglo-Ottoman Convention, declaring 
Kuwait to be an independent sheikhdom under British protection. On June 19,1961, Kuwait declared 
independence. This move was challenged by Iraq which claimed that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraqi 
territory. However, a threatened Iraqi invasion was deterred by the dispatch of British troops. In 1963, 
however, Iraq formally recognized the State of Kuwait with its established boundaries. 2 Arend, A. & Beck, R. International Law and the Use of Force: beyond the UN Charter paradigm, 
Routledge, London, 1993, p 187 3 See Chapter 2, section A. 1 4 The first paragraph of the 1963 Agreed Minutes between the Republic of Iraq and the State of Kuwait states 
that "the Republic of Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21.7.1932 and which was 
accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10.8.1932", available at 
<www. mei j. or. jp/text/Gulf%20 War/agreed. htm> 
s Cox, D. The Use of Force by the Security Council for Enforcement and Deterrent Purposes: a Conference Report, The Arms Control Centre, 1990, p. 42 6 Schachter, O. "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 AJIL, 1991, p 452-3 
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prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity of another State. "7 Indeed, by 
invading Kuwait Iraq challenged the global stability of the post-Cold War era and this alone 
indicated that decisive actions should be taken against the threat. Iraq's sudden invasion and 
attempted annexation of Kuwait and other related activity on Iraq's part during the Gulf crisis 
were clearly in contravention of the rule of law. They violated at least nine major categories of 
legal obligations fundamental to international law, namely: 
Waging a war of aggression against Kuwait contrary to the prohibition of the use of force in 
international relations affirmed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; 
Carrying out aggressive Scud missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and Israel; 
" 
Violation of the Pact of the League of Arab States; 
Violation of the 1963 Agreed Minutes; 
Violation of at least seven binding UN Security Council resolutions, adopted during the crisis 
calling upon Iraq to end its illegal occupation of Kuwait. These resolutions are Resolution 
660 of 2 August 1990, Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990, Resolution 664 of 18 August 1990, 
Resolution 666 of 13 September 1990, Resolution 667 of 16 September 1990, Resolution 674 
of 29 October 1990, Resolution 677 of 28 November 1990; 
Widespread violation of the laws of war, notably Iraq's obligations under the 1949 "Fourth" 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, under the 
1949 "Third" Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 
The taking of hostages and support for terrorism; 
Violation of general international human rights standards; 
Violation of international diplomatic and consular protection. 
7 Greenwood, C. "New World Order or Old? The invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law", 55 The Modern 
Law Review, 1992, p. 153 
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A. 1 Non-forcible sanctions and the affirmation of the right of self-defence 
Contrary to the poor showing of the Security Council during the Iran-Iraq war, the Council 
responded to invasion of Kuwait with unprecedented speed. On the same day that Saddam 
Hussein's troops invaded and occupied Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council answered 
with Resolution 660, demonstrating its determinant and active role. Resolution 660 was adopted 
unanimously by the Members of the Council. 8 It defined the invasion as "a breach of 
international peace and security" and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It also called on both countries to begin "intensive negotiations" to re- 
solve their differences 
.9 The resolution explicitly invoked Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. 
Thus, the matter was placed under Chapter VII, giving the Council power to impose mandatory 
measures. It seems that by the invocation of the power of Chapter VII, right from the outset, the 
Council was signaling that it is determined to take tough stance against Iraq's aggression and to 
bring about a quick and decisive way out of the crisis. 
Only four days later, on August 6 (1990), the Council adopted Resolution 661 noting the Iraqi 
failure to comply with Resolution 660 and deciding to "bring the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
Kuwait "10 To that end, the Council imposed trade and financial embargo on a defiant Iraq. 
Resolution 661 called on all States to cease imports from, and exports to, Iraq and Kuwait. It 
outlawed financial transfers to Iraq and Kuwait and, in effect, required a freeze on the bank 
accounts affected. " Importantly, however, in the Preamble of 661, the Council explicitly 
affirmed "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed 
attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. " This was the first 
8 The resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none; Yemen abstained 9 Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August, 1990 10 Security Council Resolution 661 of 6 August, 1990 
" Ibid 
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resolution in which the Council expressly declared the applicability of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence in a particular situation. It is noteworthy, too, that this declaration was 
made in the same resolution in which the Council mandated economic sanctions. 
12 The question 
raised by the affirmation of the right of self-defence was; what is the legal significant of such 
pronouncement? As shown in Chapter 1, the right of individual or collective self-defence granted 
in Article 51, is an inherent and autonomous right independently exercisable and not susceptible 
of the approval of the Security Council. 13 
Schachter argued that, from a legal standpoint, the Council's endorsement of the right of 
collective self-defence was not strictly necessary. It only helped to strengthen the case against 
Iraq and gave weight to the view that the use of force by third States would be permissible, to 
compel Iraq's withdrawal. 14 He interpreted the reference to self-defence as a confirmation for the 
view that self-defence remains available for the victim State until the measures taken by the 
Council prove successful to remove the invader from the occupied territories. " Thus, he took the 
view that the adoption of necessary measures by the Council does not automatically suspend the 
injured State's right of self-defence. It seems, however, that the affirmation of the right of self. 
defence in the Preamble of Resolution 661 is more appropriately to be taken as an indication for 
the exactly opposite view. By affirming the existence of the right of self-defence, the Council 
intended to allow that right to continue, despite the economic sanctions imposed by the 
resolution; in an exemption to the language of Article 51 which permits self-defence only "until 
the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. " In other 
words, the Council aimed to exempt this case from the general rule that the right of self-defence 
should cease once the Council has taken the necessary measures to face the situation. This view 
12 Schachter, note 6 supra, p 457 
13 See Chapter 1, section D. 2 
la Schachter, note 6 supra, p 458 
15 Ibid 
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is supported by the language used by the Council in Paragraph 9 of the operative part of the 
resolution: "notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above"--that is, the paragraphs decreeing 
sanctions"nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait. " If the right of individual or collective self-defence was any way 
available, as suggested by Schachter, there would be no need to repeat such affirmation after 
articulating the sanctions and to use the term "notwithstanding. " 
Another legal significance of Paragraph 9 is that the Council accepted that third States may 
render assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait, including military assistance, despite 
not themselves having been attacked, and not being bound by special agreements with Kuwait, 
contrary to the general understanding that collective self-defence under Article 51 is available 
only for States that had concluded mutual defence and collective security pacts and arrangements 
prior to the present conflict. 16 Both pronouncements-on self-defence and the right of third State 
to render assistance to the legitimate government of Kuwait-were legally pivotal because they 
constituted exceptions from the general rules. (Both arguments will be discussed in more detail 
below) 
A. 2 The authorization of naval blockade 
Less than three weeks after the adoption of Resolution 661, the Council was concerned to learn 
of continued use of Iraqi vessels to export oil. This prompted the Council to adopt Resolution 
665 calling "upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are 
deploying maritime forces in the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward 
and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and 
16 See section C. 2 below 
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to ensure strict implementation.... "17 of Resolution 661.18 Resolution 665 was interpreted as 
authorizing States to deploy naval power to enforce the embargo. 
19 
Prior to the adoption of Resolution 665, The United States had already started the first phase of 
the operations in the Gulf by stationing forces in Saudi Arabia and its naval contingents were 
used to blockade Iraq as a means of enforcing the embargo against Iraq adopted in Resolution 
61? ° On August 16,1990, the U. S. Department of Defence announced that President Bush had 6 
authorized: "U. S. forces to participate in a multinational effort that will intercept ships carrying 
products and commodities that are bound to and from Iraq and Kuwait. This action is consistent 
with U. N Security Council Resolution 661, which imposed mandatory sanctions on trade with 
Iraq and occupied Kuwait. "21 
Thus, from another perspective, Resolution 665 can be seen as an approval or after-the fact 
authorization of the position of the United States and the coalition and the actions they had 
already taken in the area. This approval can be inferred from the language of the resolution when 
it refers to "Member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait which are deploying 
maritime forces to the area. " This language also indicates that it was left to each of those States, 
possibly in consultation with Kuwait and others States whose forces were endangered, to make 
17 Security Council Resolution 665 of 25 August 1990 
18 In addition to its trade embargo against Iraq, the Security Council later adopted Resolution 670, under 
which States were required to refuse permission to any aircraft destined for Iraq or Kuwait to overfly their 
territory, except with the prior approval of the United Nations. The resolution also continued measures to 
strengthen compliance with the economic sanctions. Security Council Resolution 670 of 25 September, 1990 19 The only previous occasion when a similar use of force had been authorized by the Council in relation to 
trade sanctions was when it had specifically authorized the United Kingdom to block vessels believed to be 
transporting oil to Southern Rhodesia, contrary to a Security Council embargo by using force if necessary. See Chapter 1, section, C. l. l 
20 It was reported during this action that the US naval forces fired shots across the bows of two Iraqi tankers, 
but allowed the ships to continue their passage without further action. UN Doc. S/PV. 1441, p 41 
21 U. S. Secretary of Defence, Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Guidance Message 1702052,16 August, 
1990. Quoted in Moore, J. Crisis in the Gu(i Enforcing the Rule of Law, Oceana Publications, London, 
1992, p145 
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an assessment as to the adequacy of measures taken in response to the Iraqi aggression were 
sufficient, and if they were deemed insufficient, what further action would be needed. 22 
A. 3 Resolution 678 and necessity of the use of force 
The question now arises whether the sanctions imposed upon Iraq in Resolutions 661 and 665 
were sufficient to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait or the use of force was necessary to 
achieve this goal. Within the first two months, the general effectiveness of the sanctions was 
evident. The embargo had succeeded in preventing Iraq from exporting oil and had denied access 
to important technical and military supplies. It was evident that the Iraqi economy had suffered a 
severe blow. It was not certain, however, whether these measures, even if continued, would 
induce the Iraqi leadership to implement the required policy change, or how long such change 
might take to secure. 23 Most likely, though, these sanctions would not have succeeded in 
securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. In reality, the effect of economic sanctions is felt 
predominantly on the ordinary people within the sanctioned territory (who often have little or no 
voice in political decisions) rather than the government and powerful elites. 4 
By November 1990, the United States had come to the view that economic sanctions were not 
adequate to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and the use of military force is necessary. It 
solicited the support of other Council members, and even persuaded some of them, for a resolu- 
Lion authorizing the States assisting Kuwait to take the necessary means to enforce the 
previously-adopted resolutions and to restore peace and security in the Gulf region. 25 As a result, 
Resolution 678 was adopted, reportedly, because in the view of the majority of the Security 
22 Chayes, A. "The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf' in Damrosch L. and Scheffer, D. [ed. ], Law and Force 
in the New International Order, Westview Press, Oxford, 1991, p3 23 Schachter, note 6 supra, p 455 24 Kirgis, F. "The Security Council's First Fifty Years", 89 AJIL, 1995, p 536; see also Chapter 8, section D. 1 25 Weston, B. "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy", 
85 AJIL, 1991, p. 523. It was reported that to ensure the votes of the Latin American and African delegations (Colombia, the Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Zaire) in the Security Council, the United States is said to have 
promised long-sought financial help and attention. Ibid 
89 
Council, the embargo was or would be insufficient to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. 26 
Two members of the Council (Cuba and Yemen, ) however, voted against the resolution. Yemen 
expressed doubts as to its validity, arguing that the Council, in authorizing the use of force, had 
failed first to determine that economic sanctions would be inadequate. It considered that such a 
determination was necessary for the authorization of force under the terms of Article 42 27 This 
argument seems to be groundless for two reasons. First, as indicated in chapter 1, Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter gives the Security Council considerable discretion in the exercise of its authority. 
The Council thus has the power to decide that non-military measures will not suffice, and to take 
the decision to use armed force immediately and at the outset, if necessary, without first resorting 
to non-forcible measures. 8 Second, Article 42 imposes no obligation on the Council to explicitly 
pronounce in the text of the resolution that the non-forcible measures have proved to be 
inadequate. This can be inferred also from the language of Article 42 which states that "should 
the Security Council consider.... " not "decide. " 
Another issue raised at the time was related to the condition of necessity of use of force; whether 
the use of force was "necessary" to drive Iraq out of the Kuwaiti territory. In other words, would 
economic sanctions be effective enough to make military action unnecessary? Those countries 
who opposed the use of force argued that, given sufficient time, sanctions would achieve their 
goal. They contended, therefore, that force was not needed as a matter of self-defence and that 
the cost in human lives and materials could not be justified. 29 
26 See statements by Representatives of the Council Members in UN Doc. S/PV. 2963,29 November 1990. 
The Representative of Malaysia, Mr. Abu Hassan, for example, stated that "Iraq had shown no indication of 
complying with the Council's resolutions, " p 74. Similarly, the Representative of China, although abstained from the voting, stated that "Iraq had thus far not taken any practical steps on the key question of 
withdrawing troops from Kuwait, " p 61 
27 See statement by the Representative of Yemen, Ambassador Al-Ashtal, ibid, p 32-38 
28 See Chapter 1, section C. 1 
29 Ambassador Al-Ashtal of Yemen stated that "comprehensive and almost totally airtight sanctions regime 
would eventually force Iraq to comply and withdraw from Kuwait. It was too early to say that sanctions were 
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This argument, however, constitutes a departure from the general view that a large scale illegal 
armed attack, per se, suffices to meet the requirement of necessity of the use of force, whether in 
self-defence or in enforcement action. In case of self-defence, Article 51 permitted States to use 
force in self-defence "if an armed attack occurs"; it did not, however, require a State victim to an 
armed attack to exhaust peaceful means before opening fire. Indeed, such a requirement would 
effectively undermine the right of self-defence. 30 As to enforcement action, as indicated above, 
under Chapter VII, the possibility that the aggression might be ended by economic and other 
non-forcible measures was not viewed as undermining the Council power to take an enforcement 
action directly. 31 Admittedly, there might be occasions when peaceful measures adopted instead 
of armed force would be adequate to redress the wrong of an armed attack. However, to conclude 
on this basis that forcible measures against an attack or invasion cannot be justified under the 
"necessity" criterion until non-forcible measures have been tried and proved ineffective would be 
a significant departure from the prevailing view. As a practical matter, there is clearly a danger 
that peaceful measures could be blocked by delaying tactics or unreasonable demands on the part 
of the aggressor; meanwhile he is left free to pursue his goals at the victim's expense. 2 Above 
all, the authorization of the use of force in Resolution 678 essentially implies that the Security 
Council, a competent international body, has determined that the use of force was necessary to 
repel the aggression. 
not working; patience was needed. Doc. S/PV. 2963, note 26 supra, p 32-38. Cuba similarly favoured a peaceful resolution for the crisis, p 52-60 
° Schachter, 0. "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Michigan Law Review, 1984, p 1635 31 Note 28 supra 
32 Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", note 30 supra, p 1636 
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Section B: The Gulfcampain: enforcement action or collective self-defence? 
In the legal literature, the most controversial issue raised by the language of Resolution 678 and 
the factual circumstances surrounded the Gulf campaign was whether the Gulf War of 1990- 
1991 should be classed as an "international enforcement action" of the, United Nations Security 
Council or as an exercise of collective self-defence carried out with the sanction of the Security 
Council. 33 Before embarking on the legal debate on this question, the following part will briefly 
review the measures of collective self-defence that were already underway by the Allies. 
B. 1 Measures taken in collective self-defence under Article 51 
Parallel with the actions taken by the Council in its attempt to bring an end to the crisis, on the 
ground, there were measures of collective self-defence already underway. Very soon after Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait, the issue of collective self-defence was raised when the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia took measures to respond to Kuwait's request for assistance. 
A few days later, reports of massive concentration of Iraqi forces on Kuwait's southern border 
prompted the Saudi government to invite the US to station troops on Saudi territory, as a 
deterrent against possible Iraqi aggression. The US sent both ground and air forces, with the 
declared purpose "to deter further Iraqi aggression. "34 The mission of the troops was described as 
"wholly defensive °05 It was clearly stated that these troops would not initiate hostilities, but 
would defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other allies in the region. 6 Over 
the next few weeks, further deployments brought the number of troops to about 140,000. Troops 
were sent by other countries, including some of the Arab States, to join the U. S. forces. 
33 See Generally Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra; Chayes, note 22 supra; Weston, note 25 supra; Mullerson, R. "Self-Defence is the Contemporary World" in Damrosch and Scheffer [ed. ], note 22 supra; Rostow, E. "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence", 85 AJIL, 
1991; Franck, T and Patel, F. "UN Police Action in Lieu of War: The Old Order Changeth" 85 AJIL, 1991 34 Excerpts From Bush's Statement on U. S. Defense of Saudis, N. Y. Times, 9 August, 1990, at A15, col. 1. Quoted in Chayes, ibid, p2 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
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Reinforcements were sent to U. S naval forces already operating in the Persian Gulf. The U. S 
naval forces, like those on land, were significantly augmented by contingents from other 
countries. 37 As indicated above, these actions were approved by the Security Council in 
Resolution 665.38 
The right of collective self-defence, however, was raised again within a few weeks of the United 
Nations' imposition of sanctions under Article 41. Taking the view that these measures would be 
insufficient to secure an Iraqi withdrawal, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others 
proposed military action, which they considered as permissible collective self-defence, based on 
the necessity of ensuring the unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor. 39 The controversial issue 
then was whether the United States and the coalition were free, even in the absence of further 
provocation by Iraq against Saudi Arabia or authorization by the Security Council, to use force 
against Iraq by virtue of some continuing right of collective self-defence emanating from the 
original attack on Kuwait. In other words, so the argument runs, the original deployments in 
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region were made in response to the armed attack on Kuwait 
and thus could be seen as an exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defence. 40 In 
addition, the Council seemed to approve the position taken by the US and the coalition. On the 
other hand, eminent scholars have opposed this proposition. The debate is reflected below, 
beginning with the case against the self-defence proposition. 
B. 2 The academic debate 
Some prominent international lawyers have characterized the action taken by the coalition 
against Iraq as a Security Council "enforcement action" under the authority assigned to the 
37 Ibid 
38 See section A. 2 above 39 Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p 458 40 Chayes, note 22 supra, p3 
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Council by Chapter VII of the Charter, not an exercise of the right of collective self-defence. 4' 
This view is grounded on the language of Article 51, which asserts that nothing prevents the 
right of self-defence "until the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. " Accordingly, Kuwait's right of individual or collective self-defence ceased 
after the Security Council imposed what it considered to be necessary measures against an act of 
aggression: the economic sanctions stipulated in Resolution 661.2 Professor Mullerson argues 
that from the time the Security Council first takes note of a conflict and begins to consider 
whether it amounts to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, the 
"inherent" right of self-defence becomes "dormant. " It only re-emerges if the Security Council 
voters decide that it has failed to resolve the conflict 43 Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel, similarly, 
argued that "The Charter, in creating the new police power, intended to establish an exclusive 
alternative to the old war system. The old system was retained only as a fallback, available when 
the new system could not be made to work; not 
....... 
as an equal alternative, to be chosen at the 
sole discretion of the members. "44 This means that any military action taken by States in self- 
defence under Article 51, will be incorporated into the global enforcement measures once such a 
response is activated. In other words, the validity of the old approach ceases when operations 
begin under the new one. 5 Article 51, from this perspective, is not an "affirmative grant of a 
right of self-defence"46 but an indication of the circumstances in which the use of armed force in 
exercising of an "inherent right" is not ruled out by the Charter. However, the safeguard is finite, 
41 Ibid; see also Mullerson, note 33 supra, p 22-3 
42 Schachter, O. "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p. 458 
43 Mullerson's speech at the Conference on International Law and the Non-Use of Force, convened jointly 
by the American Society of International Law and the Soviet Association of International Law, Washington, 
D. C. 4-6 October, 1990. Cited in Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 511 
as Franck and Patel, note 33 supra, p 64 
as Ibid, p 63; see also Chapter 1, section E. 1 
46 Chayes, note 22 supra, p3 
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applying only "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. "47 
Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with plain language of Article 51 as well as the intention 
of the drafters of the Charter. As will be shown in the following chapter, a legal document should 
be primarily interpreted as it stands, and according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the 
text 48 Interpreting the text of Article 51 in accordance with this principle leaves no doubt that 
the drafters of Article 51 intended to represent the right of self-defence as an interim right "until 
the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. " The 
word "until" clearly indicates that temporary character. 49 In view of that interpretation, the right 
of self-defence would be overridden once the Council assumed its jurisdiction under Chapter VII 
and adopted measures considered necessary to deal with the situation. This interpretation is also 
consistent with the basic intention of Article 2(4), which is to limit as far as possible the 
permissible occasions for the unilateral use of force, confining it to those situations when there is 
an urgent and obvious need for an armed response. 
As against this position, others have argued that the Gulf War was an exercise of the right of 
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and strenuously rejected the view that 
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Council automatically deemed to suspend the injured 
party's rights of self-defence. 5° They argue that such a proposition, if accepted, would lead to the 
conclusion that the exercise of the "inherent" right of self-defence is subject to the permission of 
the Council. 51 In their view, Article 51 makes clear that the right of self-defence, an ancient right 
enshrined in customary law, is in no weakened by the Charter but continues to apply until the 
47 Ibid 
48 See Chapter 4, section B. 2.2 49 See Chapter 1, section E. 1 
so See Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 513; Schachter, 
supra, p 458 51 Rostow, ibid, p 506 
"The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 
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Council has successfully dealt with the issue facing it. 2 In occupation situations, measures 
cannot be considered successful as long as the aggressor still occupies the territories on the 
victim State-which was the case in the Gulf, notwithstanding Resolution 660 and subsequent 
Security Council resolutions. 53 In other words, the focal point of this view is the results achieved, 
not the action itself. Nevertheless, this view admits that the Security Council has the last word, 
and can stop a war of self-defence by deciding it has become a breach of the peace. 54 Otherwise, 
the Council's inscription or enclosure of the matter in its agenda, or even a call for cessation of 
hostilities, is not enough to restore international peace and security. 
Professor Dinstein also rejected the view that the adoption of measures by the Security Council 
would automatically be sufficient to remove the right of self-defence, on the grounds that in 
some situations the Council may take on inadequate or half-hearted enforcement measures, 
economic sanctions, for example, and desist from giving further instructions to the parties of the 
conflict. In Dinstein's words, "What is the legal status if the Council follows the middle of the 
road and refrains from issuing detailed instructions to the parties, merely calling upon them, say, 
to conduct negotiations aimed at settling their dispute? Does such a resolution terminate the 
entitlement of a Member State to rely on self-help? "55 
52 Ibid, p. 511 
53 Schachter, "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p 458. This view was expressed by Bowett who argued that "the necessary measures have been taken [by the Council] must be determined 
objectively, as a question of fact" Bowett, W. Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1958, p196 
sa Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 513 This view was held by Sir Humphrey Waldock who argued that "once action in self-defence is in motion........ it requires an affirmative decision of the Council, including the concurring 
votes of the Permanent Members, to order the cessation of the defensive action. " Waldock, H. The 
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil Des Cours, 1952, p 495- 6 
55 Dinstein, Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence, third edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2001, p 188-9. This view was also held by the UK during the Falklands Island Crisis of 1982. The Argentine 
Government argued that a provisional demand by the Security Council for withdrawal and cessation of hostilities, constituted a "measure" that would terminate the right of self-defence, regardless whether it was 
complied with by the aggressor. See Letter dated 29 April 1982 from the Representative of Argentina to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/15014, SCOR 37 Yr., Suppl. April- June (1982), pp. 53-54 In 
reply, the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir A. Parsons, stated, "The fact that Argentina has not 
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To lay down a condition that measures taken by the Council must be successful in order for the 
right of self-defence to be ceased, however, is to depart form the plain meaning of the text of 
Article 51, which contains no such rule. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that this view 
represents a logical understanding of the right of self-defence in light of the political realities, 
given that the Council is a political body affected by political considerations. Moreover, Article 
51, although it was created to protect the legal right of States to defend themselves, takes into 
account the political reality. As Bowett properly observed, Article 51 refers to "measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security", not "measures necessary to protect legal 
rights and legitimate interests of the State attacked. "56 Theoretically, such rights and interests 
could be held to be encompassed by the former phrase. However, the reality is that a "political" 
decision by the Council is always possible. The risk exists, therefore, that the individual 
member's legal rights may be subordinated to the political considerations involved. 57 In that 
case, indeed, it would be implausible to suggest that the injured State has lost its right of 
individual or collective self-defence on account of the political considerations and when there is 
a clear shortcoming in the Council's action in relation to the seriousness of the situation. This 
was exactly the case in the Iran-Iraq War, when the Council, because of the political factors 
involved, clearly failed to address the seriousness and gravity of the situation; 58 consequently, it 
could be suggested that Iran had the right to continue its measures of self-defence after it became 
clear that the Council has failed to take effective action. 
withdrawn its armed forces from the Falkland Islands, contrary to the demand in paragraph 2 of Resolution 
502 (1982), is sufficient to indicate that the decision of the Council has not, in fact, been effective to restore international peace and security because of Argentina's refusal to comply..... The true position is that, in the face of Argentina's flagrant and open violation of Resolution 502 (1982), the United Kingdom is exercising its inherent right of self-defence. " Letter dated 30 April 1982 from the Representative of the United Kingdom 
to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/15017, SCOR 37th Yr., Suppl. April- June (1982), pp. 55-56 
56 Bowett, note 53 supra, p 196-7 57 Ibid 
58 See chapter 2, section B. 1 
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This argument is not disputed. Even scholars who take the view that once the Security Council 
has seized the matter in its agenda, the "inherent" right of self-defence becomes "dormant", 
admit that the suspended right of self-defence might once again become applicable if the Council 
made it clear that it could not deal effectively with the problem or if it found itself prevented 
from taking necessary measures. 59 Mullerson, in light of Iraq's continuation to occupy Kuwait 
despite the economic sanctions, argued that if, for some reason, the Council had not ultimately 
authorized military action against Iraq in Resolution 678, then Kuwait and its allies would be 
entitled under international law to take armed measures in collective self-defence against Iraq. 60 
However, in the present case, the assumption made in favour of the right of collective self- 
defence under Article 51 and the arguments involved is hypothetical. 
From the outset of the crisis, the general opinion was that the Security Council was acting 
vigorously to bring an end to the crisis. Indeed, the Council worked as it was supposed to work 
according to the design of its framers. The Council was not blocked by veto, nor could it be 
argued that it had failed to address the situation with appropriate gravity or to adopt measures 
with real impact or to strengthen those measures as the need became apparent. The Council, as a 
body, the coalition forces, and the legitimate government of Kuwait (in exile) all worked 
together in harmony to achieve the ultimate goal of liberation of Kuwait and repel the Iraqi 
aggression. There was no sign of disagreement between those parties in order to suggest that the 
coalition forces abandoned the jurisdiction of the Council, which is the principal means to the 
use of force under the Charter system, and resorted to the right of self-defence, which became 
controversial after the involvement of the Security Council, to carry out their military campaign. 
59 Franck and Patel, note 33 supra, p 63 
60 Mullerson, note 33 supra, p 22-3. Chayes similarly argued that when there is a clear shortcoming in the Council's action in relation to the seriousness of the situation, "it would be a plausible argument that the Council was simply not exercising its functions, so that the preemption contemplated by Article 51 when the Council was truly addressing the situation does not come into operation. " Chayes, note 22 supra, p6 
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This argument is supported by the fact that the coalition forces did not act before the adoption of 
Resolution 678. They not only waited for the authorization of force, but persuaded the Council to 
issue such an authorization. If they were acting on the basis of Article 51 it would not have been 
necessary to wait for Resolution 678. Furthermore, after the adoption of that resolution, the 
coalition forces waited further for the elapse of the deadline set out in the resolution (15 January 
1991) to commence their military operation. This attitude, per se, affirms that they were acting 
on the basis of the Security Council authorization. 
From another point of view, as mentioned above, the Council affirmation of the right of self- 
defence in Resolution 661 was to rule out the conclusion that the right had been suspended. 61 
Implicitly, however, this pronouncement can be considered as an assertion of the general rule, 
that the Council involvement in the matter automatically suspends the right of individual or 
collective self-defence and, therefore, the Council intended to make an exception to that rule. If 
the general rule was that the right of self-defence continues to apply until the measures prove 
successful, there would be no point in such affirmation. Furthermore, in contrast to Resolution 
661, Resolution 678 did not mention Kuwait's right of individual or collective self-defence. This 
omission indicates that the Council considered that any subsequent action will be based solely on 
the authorization issued in that resolution. Consequently, the previous permission of self- 
defence, alongside the economic sanctions, expired with the adoption of Resolution 678. 
To conclude, the military campaign against Iraq in 1991 was the first enforcement action of the 
United Nations Security Council under the authority assigned to the Council by Chapter VII of 
the Charter. 62 The exceptional circumstances, which might have entitled the injured State to 
61 See section A. 1 above 62 The same view was held by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Perez de Cuellar, 
who argued that Kuwait's right of individual and collective self-defence no longer applied, because the 
response was delayed, eventually by more than five months. Washington Post, 9 November, 1990, at A30, 
col. 5. It is certainly true that under customary international law, action in self-defence should be taken 
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eschew this rule, were not present in this case. Nevertheless, the US-led coalition was legally 
justified to use armed force on basis of Article 51, even in the absence of a further attack by Iraq 
or authorization of the Security Council. Such an action would be legally permitted, not because 
the right of self-defence was still valid after the interference of the Security Council, but because 
the Council exempted this case from the general rule and allowed the exercise of self-defence 
alongside the economic sanctions imposed by it. 
Section C: New formula of collective action under Chapter VII 
The formulation and language of Resolution 678, at the time of adoption, was unprecedented 
and, therefore, provoked much criticism and was rejected by some Council Members who 
described the text of the resolution as "broad and vague... a classic example of authority without 
accountability"63 and claimed it "violated the United Nations Charter. "" In the legal literature, 
the language of the resolution has been taken as evidence that the Gulf campaign was a collective 
self-defence not an enforcement action. 65 This formula of "authorization", however, set a 
exercised as quickly as practicable, and should be confined to what suffices to remedy the original offence. 
However, in practice, the speed of response would vary from one situation to another, according to the 
circumstances surrounding each individual case. Hence, the time between the initial attack and the response 
must be determined objectively, as a question of fact and according to circumstances. For example, it was 
several years after the Pearl Harbor raid, before the United States was able to replace the ships destroyed by 
the Japanese; however, it was never suggested that for this reason the United States' right to fight back 
expired. Legally speaking, neither under customary international law nor under the Charter is there a fixed 
time or even suggested period for the victim State to fight back. This condition of immediacy in response is 
very expendable and has endless flexibility, but, in any event, the assessment of the timeliness and 
reasonableness of any self-defence action rests with the responding countries and, under appropriate 
circumstances, the Security Council. In the case of Kuwait, however, the Security Council's affirmation of 
the Kuwaiti right of individual and collective self-defence in Resolution 665 of 25 August 1990 more than 
three weeks after the initial invasion indicates that the Council confirmed the validity of the right. In other 
words, the Council did not require immediate countermeasures right after the invasion. Furthermore in 
confutation of the Secretary- General's Statement, it could be argued that countermeasures were already 
underway by the deployment of the American troops in the area immediately after the attack, which is 
considered the first phase in fighting back. These steps taken by "States co-operating with government of Kuwait" had been approved by the Council. Therefore, although the view presented here suggests that the 
action taken by the coalition forces was an enforcement action, the argument advanced by the Secretary- 
General cannot be relied on. For a similar view see Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 513 
63 Statement by the Representative of Yemen, UN Doc. S/PV. 2963, note 26 supra, p 32 
64 Statement by the Representative of Cuba, p 52 
65 See note 70 infra 
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precedent for subsequent situations in which forcible action was deemed appropriate. 66 This 
section highlights this newly invented "authorization technique, " its legal basis, and the 
consequences of the formula of authorizing or calling upon member States to act on behalf of the 
Security Council. 
Cl The innovation of the authorization technique in Resolution 678 
Resolution 678 of 29 of November (1990), after recalling and reaffirming all the previous eleven 
resolutions concerning the crisis, noted that, "despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq 
refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990)... in flagrant contempt 
of the Security Council. " As a result, the Council "authorize[d] member States co-operating with 
the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15,1991, fully implements.... the 
forgoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council 
Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions. " At first sight, this language seems to be 
merely recommendatory and not mandatory in style, against what was supposed to be an 
enforcement action under Chapter VII. In further deviation from the original model, the 
Resolution "request[ed] all States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on 
the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to" the foregoing authorization. This language 
clearly indicates that the Council did not assume responsibility for directing the action but 
merely required to be updated of the course of the action. 
It was the first time in the Security Council's history that it has adopted such a formula, one that 
was evidently not intended by the drafters of the UN Charter at San Francisco Conference in 
1945. As shown in Chapter 1, actions to maintain international peace and security should be 
multilateral collective force used under United Nations auspices. This original model for the use 
of force necessarily requires a decision by the Security Council on the need to initiate force, 
66 Quigley, J. "The `Privatization' of Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism", 17 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 1995-1996, p 254 
101 
operational control by the Security Council over the forces deployed, and power in the Security 
Council to determine when to cease hostilities, 67 in order to ensure that the use of collective force 
will be confined to pursuit of commonly held objectives of the international community. 68 
Resolution 678, as it stands, lacks these essential characteristics. Therefore, some authors 
contended that the Council, by adopting this language, intended nothing more than to 
acknowledge the existing right of self-defence and encourage willing States to act under Article 
51 69 As expressed by Rostow, "Except for the word "authorizes, " the resolution is clearly one 
designed to encourage and support a campaign of collective self-defence, and therefore not a 
Security Council enforcement action. "70 These views, however, were expressed before the same 
technique of authorization was used by the Council in other situations where the right of 
individual or collective self-defence was not present, for example, in Resolution 794 of 1992, 
concerning action in support of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, 7' and Resolution 929 
of 1994, concerning security and protection for displaced persons, refugees and civilians in 
Rwanda. 72 In those 'situations, the actions undertaken by the acting States could only be based on 
the power assigned to the Security Council by under Chapter VII of Charter, because Somalia 
and Rwanda were not subjected to external armed attacks that would activate Article 51; there 
were merely internal conflicts. To put it simply, if in Resolution 678 the Council was only 
referring to Article 51 and not using its powers under Chapter VII, on what grounds could the 
use of force in the cases of Somalia and Rwanda be justified? 
67 See Chapter 1, sections C. 2 & C. 3 
68 Quigley, note 66 supra, p 250 
69 Schachter argues that Resolution 678 merely "served the political purpose of underlining the general 
support of the United Nations for the military measures" being taken by the States already aiding Kuwait. 
Schachter, note 6 supra, p 460 
70 Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 508-9 
71 Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December, 1992 
72 Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June, 1994 
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In fact, the Security Council, faced with the reality that no troops have been designated to it by 
member States as envisaged in Article 43, failed to follow the model planned by the framers of 
the Charter. As an alternative, it resorted to a new formula for military action, in which it 
authorized or called upon willing member States to execute the mission on its behalf but without 
its control. 73 This, however, does not prove conclusively that the Security Council intended, by 
this formula, not to assume jurisdiction on the matter and to make use of its powers under 
Chapter VII. The Council merely adapted to the current realities and adopted a practical method 
of achieving international action where true collective force was politically or financially 
possible. Furthermore, although the Council by this technique delegates considerable authority to 
the member States acting on its behalf to direct the course of action on the ground, however, it 
still possessed ascendancy in the situation, as will be discussed in section C. 3 below. 
C. 2 The indeterminate (egal authority for the authorization technique 
Despite having frequently used the authorization technique, the Security Council has never gone 
beyond general references to Chapter VII to explicate how the technique conforms to its powers 
under the UN Charter. 74 Consequently, the exact basis of Resolution 678 in the UN Charter was 
not entirely clear. A number of possibilities were therefore available. 75 One was that a resolution 
authorizing military action would of necessity fall within Article 42 and would therefore have to 
fulfil the requirements of that article. 76 Another possibility is that the Resolution 678, similar to 
73 Quigley resembles this technique to the trend of capitalistic governments to privatize its national sectors, 
"To analogize to government policy in a domestic context, what the Security Council has done is to follow 
the trend toward privatization. Instead of carrying out military actions itself, the Council hires the work out to 
individual States, typically to States that have expressed an interest in doing so and which, as a consequence, 
may have private aims to pursue. " Quigley, note 66 supra, p 250 74 Ibid, p 254 
'S See generally Schachter, "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p 461-5; Weston, 
note 25 supra, p 518-22; Glennon, M. "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter", 85 
AJIL, 1991, p75. 76 Schachter, ibid, p 461. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is widely held that the Council's authority to have 
recourse to military action under Chapter VII can only be found in Article 42. See Chapter 1, section C. 2 
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the Korean case in 1950; the only precedent of a resolution leading to the use of force, 77 can fit 
under Article 39 in this sense. 78 Otherwise, Article 48, which imposes an obligation upon 
Member States of the United Nations, or some of them, "to carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security", could be considered 
the basis of Resolution 678 79 All these possibilities were debated in legal literature as the proper 
basis for Resolution 678. 
However, it is undisputed that Chapter VII, in general, provides an adequate legal basis, as the 
ICJ concluded in the Certain Expenses case. In that case, the Court rejected the argument that the 
military action authorized by the United Nations in the Middle East and the Congo had to be 
based on Article 42. It declared, "The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the 
Security Council. "80 The ICJ did not identify any other specific article as a basis for such action 
by the Security Council, but it indicated that the Council's general powers to maintain and 
restore international peace and security justified a liberal interpretation of its authority. 81 On that 
basis, in the case of Resolution 678, no further specification would be required than a broad 
reference to Chapter VII. The Council would rely on the wide scope of the Charter provisions. 
Indeed, taking a broader view, the terms of Articles 39,42,47 and 48 do not preclude a decision 
of the Security Council calling on Members, even if they have not concluded a special agreement 
to provide armed forces under Article 43, to take a specific enforcement action. 82 In other words, 
77 See Chapter 1, note 74 
78 Glennon, note 75 supra, p 75 
79 See Chapter 1, section, C. 4 
80 Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 167 
81 See Chapter 1, section C. 3 
82 Kelsen, H. The Law of the United Nations, A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, Stevens 
Sons, London, 1951, p 756 
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there is no article in Chapter VII to prevent States from making such resources available, on 
voluntarily basis, in order to implement Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. 83 
As against this view, it has been argued that the authorization issued by Resolution 678 was an 
exercise of the Council authority under Article 51.84 In other words, this proposal suggests that 
when the intention is to counter an armed attack by one State against another, the authorization 
technique takes its validity from the provision for collective self-defence. 
The difficulty with this view, however, is that Article 51 reads as an exception to the powers 
granted to the Security Council in Chapter VII. The purpose of Article 51 is to make it clear that 
until the Security Council deals with a matter, a State subjected to armed attack may defend itself 
-- 
calling on other States, if necessary, for assistance. There is nothing in the text or history of 
Article 51 to suggest that this right of member States could be invoked by the Council as a 
method of acting itself. 85 Article 39 vests in the Security Council the obligation to deal with 
threats to the peace. There is no indication that the Security Council may fulfil this responsibility 
by authorizing action by individual States, itself taking no control over either the initiation of use 
of force or its subsequent course. 86 In addition, this proposal is particularly problematic in the 
case of Kuwait. If Resolution 678 is viewed as based on Article 51 and therefore to amount to a 
delegation of authority in relation to the use of military action in collective self-defence, the 
adoption of Resolution 678 on these grounds would be a new interpretation of the Charter. It 
would seem inconsistent with the framers' apparent intention in Article 51, which was to 
safeguard mutual defence and collective security pacts and arrangements, which were not 
83 Sohan, L. "The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent Force, 52 AJIL, 1958, p 230 
84 Schachter, "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p. 459 85 See Chapter 1, section D. 2 86 Quigley, note 66 supra, p 270 
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involved in the Kuwait crisis. 87 This view was advanced by the majority of scholars who 
suggested that the right of collective self-defence under Article 51 was available only for States 
that had concluded mutual defence and collective security pacts and arrangements prior to the 
present conflict. Kelsen, for example, argued that "collective defence exists if two or more States 
organize their defence against attack from third States by concluding a treaty obliging or 
authorizing the contracting parties to assist one another in case one of them is attacked by third 
"88 State. 
In the context of the Kuwait crisis, this proposition may explain why the Council, in Resolution 
678, referred to "Member States co-operating with the government of Kuwait", not to "States 
acting in collective self-defence with the government of Kuwait. " The Council, however, did not 
indicate clearly whether such assistance must have been requested by the victim of the original 
attack, as held by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, 89 but this matter did 
not arise in the Iraq-Kuwait case, since Kuwait had expressly requested assistance. 90 
C. 3 The lack of Security Council's control over Operation Desert Storm 
As previously illustrated, nothing in Articles 42-48 precludes a decision of the Security Council 
being carried out by an individual State or a group of States, through their own armed forces. 
87 Weston, note 25 supra, p. 520. As illustrated in Chapter 1, the origins of Article 51 sprang from the 
discussion regarding regional arrangements. See Chapter 1, section D. 2 
88 Kelsen, note 82 supra, p 792; see also Bowett, note 53 supra, p 216-18; Higgins, R, The Development of 
International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1963, p 209-10; Goodrich, E, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations, the Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1969, p 349-51 
89 Nicaragua Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 105, para 199 
90 In a letter dated 12 August, 1990 from His Excellency Sheik Jabar al-Ahmed al-Sabah Amir of the State of 
Kuwait to President George Bush, he stated, "I am writing to express the gratification of my government with 
the determined actions which the Government of the United States and other nations have taken and are 
undertaking at the request of the Government of Kuwait to deal with Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. It is 
essential that these efforts be carried forward and that the decisions of the United Nations Security Council 
be fully and promptly enforced. I therefore request on behalf of my government and in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter that the 
United States Government take such military or other steps as are necessary to ensure that economic 
measures designed to fully restore our rights are effectively implemented. Further, as we have discussed, I 
request that the United States of America assume the role coordinator of the international force that will carry 
out such steps. " See in Moore, note 21 supra, p 152 
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The same, however, is not true as to the command and direction of the action. Article 47 makes 
clear that the forces deployed for an enforcement action under Chapter VII should be unified by 
being brought under the command of the Military Staff Committee, which functions under the 
control and strategic direction of the Security Council 91 In other words, the "Security Council is 
supposed to exercise-directly or indirectly the function of a commander-in-chief of the armed 
force. "92 
In Resolution 678, however, no role for the Military Staff Committee was established. 93 The 
Council only "request[ed] all States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the 
progress of actions. , 94 Thus, the Council plainly took a hands-off approach in regard to the 
course of military operations on the ground. 95 Weston rightly argued, "Surely this is not what the 
UN founders and Charter drafters had in mind. 996 In the Security Council, two members 
challenged this approach. The Representative of Yemen expressed concern that the Security 
Council would have no control over the forces deployed, although their actions would have been 
authorized by the Security Council. 97 The delegation of Malaysia, similarly, pointed out that the 
clear system of reporting and accountability normally associated with Security Council 
91 See Chapter 1, section C. 2. Falk argues that the Security Council has "an obligation to control the 
definition of war goals, the means chosen to achieve them and to use its authority to impose a ceasefire. " 
Falk. R, "Questioning the UN Mandate in the Gulf', IFDA Dossier, 1991, p 82 92 Kelsen, note 82 supra, p 763-4 
93 Schachter, "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p. 459-60 94 The Council was in fact behind the scene during the course of action. No Council meetings on the situation 
in the Gulf were held from November 29,1990, when Resolution 678 was adopted, to February 14,1991, 
when a secret meeting took place to discuss the political aspects of the end of the war. Even, the initial cease- 
fire in the Gulf war was secured, not by a Security Council resolution but by President Bush's ultimatum of 
February 28,1991. Moreover, whereas the symbolic panoply of the United Nations flag and other emblems 
characterized the UN-authorized force in Korea; these symbols have been omitted in this case. Rostow, note 
33 supra, p 508-9 9s This approach was favoured by the US administration. In a Hearing before the Senate Commission, 
Secretary of State, James Baker, stated that "if this were done you being getting into questions of whether or 
not there should be a U. N command of forces, whether or not the Military Staff Committee should give directions to the multinational forces, and questions of that kind, which we don't think, under these 
circumstances, are things that we ought to invite. " U. S. Policy in the Persian Gulf: Hearings before the 
Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, 101' Congress, 2nd Session., 1990, p 157 96 Weston, note 25 supra, p. 527 97 Statement by the Representative of Yemen, UN Doc. S/PV. 2963, note 26 supra, p 32 
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authorized action, was absent in Resolution 678 (1990) 98 Iraq took advantage of the absence of a 
role for the Military Staff Committee to argue the illegality of Resolution 678. The 
Representative of Iraq, Mr Al-Anbari, argued, "Only collective action under the command and 
control of the Security Council, in co-ordination with the Military Staff Committee, can lead to 
the use of force against any country, and no individual Member State may be authorized to lynch 
a particular country for any reason. "99 
An evident risk of this approach is that the acting States may apply a level of force beyond that 
intended by the Security Council. 100 However, a careful analysis of the authorization technique 
demonstrates that the Security Council had not completely lost its ascendancy over the situation. 
It was the Council, rather than the acting States, that made the initial decision to employ military 
force, and set out the general objectives of the mission. Most importantly, the Council retained 
the power to adopt a new resolution to deal with the situation in case of excessive use of force or 
to terminate its authorization if it found that the objectives of the action have been achieved. 01 
From this perspective, it would be a misconception to suggest that the authorization technique 
completely eviscerates the Council the power to control the situation. Additionally, even in the 
absence of Security Council control, in fact, States acting on behalf the Council are fettered in 
their conduct by another rule of international law, that is, the proportionality of the degree of 
force employed. This customary rule necessitates that military measures taken by the belligerent 
should be necessary and proportionate for achieving the designated objectives, as will be 
discussed in detail in the ensuing section. 
98 Statement by the Representative of Malaysia, ibid, p 74 
991bid, p 19 
100 Quigley, note 66 supra, p 266 
101 See Chapter 4, section C. 4.2 
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Section D: Limits and obiectives of the Gulf military campaign 
In light of the Security Council's apparent intention to leave the strategic control and day-to-day 
command of the coalition action to the participating States, during the Gulf conflict many 
questions arose regarding the geographical scope of the coalition's attacks, the methods and 
means of warfare employed, and the consequences of war in terms of the severe destruction of 
the Iraqi infrastructure and the loss of many civilian lives. 102 A legal debate was also centered on 
whether the American-led coalition was legally justified in taking its military operation to the 
source of aggression and overthrowing the aggressive regime of Saddam Hussein. 103 This section 
examines the proportionality of the degree of force employed in the Gulf conflict. It will start by 
reviewing the different interpretations of the condition of proportionality of the coercive 
response and whether it restricts the measures taken only to those needed to halt or repulse the 
aggression, or permits wider actions. 
D. 1 The condition of proportionality 
Under contemporary international law, the principles of necessity and proportionality are crucial 
criteria governing any use of force in international relations-whether in self-defence or 
enforcement action under the authority of the Security Council-and form an integral part of the 
law of warfare. The United Nations Charter itself does not expressly spell out the specific legal 
restrictions. Instead, it refers to customary international law embodying them. As the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case observed, the Charter "does not contain any 
specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the 
102 Schachter, "The United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", note 6 supra, p. 465-467; Weston, note 25 
supra, p 529; Gradam, J. "Proportionality and Force in International Law", 87 AJIL, p 391; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, second edition, Basic Books, New York, 1991, 
p xx. Several humanitarian organizations also expressed concerns about the loss of civilian life as a result of 
the coalition forces' bombing campaign in Iraq. They also voiced their concerns regarding the massive destruction of Iraq's infrastructure. See, for example, Amnesty International, Report on the Gulf War, (1991); Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf- War, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1991. 
103 Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 211-2, p 234-5; Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 514 
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armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international 
law. " 04 In the legal literature, the condition of proportionality has been discussed mostly in 
relation to military actions taken by a State acting in self-defence. In the context of enforcement 
action under the authority of the Security Council, this condition did not attract much attention 
seemingly because it is supposed that the military forces will be deployed under the control and 
direction of the Council which will restrict the military measures employed to only those 
proportionate. However, since the authorization technique applied by the Council in recent years 
delegates the powers to control and direct the course of hostilities to the acting States, this 
assumption no longer applies and emphasis should be placed on the proportionality of the actions 
taken by States acting on behalf the Security Council. During the Gulf war of 1991, the 
Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, referred to the need for reflection on the 
"mechanisms required for the [Security] Council to satisfy itself that the rule of proportionality 
in the employment of armed forces is observed. "05 It is, however, undisputed that 
proportionality is a component of use of force by way of UN enforcement action. 
The classical view of proportionality is that military measures employed should be confined to 
those which are proportional to the initial aggression and essential to respond to it. 106 Hence, 
even where resort to force is justified and perceived as necessary, the acting States will be 
violating this customary rule "if the degree of force which it employs becomes excessive. "' 07 
This view presupposes constant evaluation and assessment of the conduct of the military 
104 Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 94, para. 176. In the case of the Gulf war 1991, the condition 
of the necessity of initiating force against Iraq, as illustrated in the first section of this Chapter, has been 
satisfied. See section A. 3 above. This part will focus on the condition of proportionality 
105 Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the Organization, 1991, UN Department of Public 
Information, UN Doc. DPI/1168-40923 (1991) 
106 Bowett, note 53 supra, p 269; Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1963, p 261-4; Waldock, H. The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 Recueil de Cours, 1952, p 463 
107 Greenwood, C. "Self-defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict", in Dinstein, y. (ed. ) 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands, 1989, p 274 
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operations in the course of war. 1°8 The key factor in assessing the proportionality of the actions 
taken is the legitimacy of the goals these actions were designed to achieve, not the equation with 
the initial attack by the aggressor. 109 In the case of occupied territories, such as Kuwait, 
proportionality, according to this approach, confines the military action to repel the attack, expel 
the invader and restoration of the territorial status quo. 11 ° In other words, recourse to military 
action can be used only to restore and preserve the territorial integrity or political independence 
of the injured State as it was before the first strike, but not to justify the use of armed force 
simply to win the war. ' 11 This view was expressed by Judge Higgins, in her dissenting opinion in 
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. She argued that the approach is not to focus on the 
nature of the attack itself and ask what a proportionate response is, but rather to determine what 
is proportionate to achieving the legitimate goal under the Charter, the repulsion of the attack. ' 12 
By implication, this implies that the continuation of the `defensive measures' 113 after the 
aggressor has been driven back to the international boundaries in order to destroy the military 
capability of the aggressor or to impose a regime change would be disproportional and unlawful. 
108 Gardam argues that "proportionality remains relevant throughout a conflict. A state cannot assess 
proportionality at the time of making the decision as to the appropriate response to an armed attack and then 
dispense with it" Gradam, J. Necessity, Proportionality and the use of Force by States, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004, p156 109 McDougal and Feliciano observed: "proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding 
coercion be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary to promptly secure the 
permissible objectives. " McDougal, M. S and Feliciano, F. P, Law and Minimum World Public Order, the 
Legal Regulation of International Coercion, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961, p 242 
110 Higgins, R. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994, p 232; Greenwood, "New World Order or Old? The invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law", 
note 7 supra, p 164 11 Lagoni, R. "Comments: Methods of Means of Warfare, Belligerent Reprisals, and the Principle of 
Proportionality", in Dekker, I. and Harry, H. [eds], The Gulf War of 1980-1988, The Iran-Iraq War in 
International Legal Perspective, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p 120. Greenwood also 
suggests defensive measures continue as long as the invader retains control over the territories of the 
defendant State. Greenwood, ibid. 
112 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, The Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
0 inion, ICJ Reports, 1996, p 583-4 
" The terms "defensive situation" or "defensive action" are used in this section in their non-technical sense. They allude to the nature of conflict as it aimed at defending Kuwait against Iraq's aggression, not to say that 
the Gulf campaign was carried under the authority of Article 51 
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D. 2 Carryin'response to the source of aggression 
As against this view, it has been suggested that when the aggression has occurred and 
necessitates military response, there is the possibility of more such actions. 114 Ago commented in 
a report to the International Law Commission, "it would be mistaken. 
. 
to think that there must 
be proportionality between the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. 
The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions 
disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters in this respect is the result to be 
achieved by the defensive action, and not the forms, substance and strength of the action 
itself. "115 The Report of ILC seemed to uphold this view, it concluded that "a State which is 
suffers the aggression cannot realistically be expected to confine its response strictly to the limits 
of what might just suffice to repel and end the attack. "' 16 This proposition means that the 
responding State or States may not stop their responsive measures when the aggressor has been 
driven back to the international boundary or opted to discontinue its act of aggression. ' 17 
This school of thought suggests that proportionality has a special meaning in the context of 
defensive war, and is not a suitable basis on which to judge the legitimacy of the defensive 
action. Once war is raging, defensive measures may be pursued to the total defeat of the enemy's 
army regardless of the condition of proportionality. In Oppenheim's view, after the outbreak of 
hostilities, "no moral or legal duty exists for the belligerent to stop the war when his opponent is 
114 Schachter, O. International Law in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publications, the Netherlands, 
1991, p 150-1 
115 Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility" by Reberto Ago, Agenda Item 2,1980, II (1), 13 ILC Yearbook, 1980, p 69-70 
116 Report on State Responsibility Ibid. p 69 
117 See, for example, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, edited by Louise Doswald-Beck, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p 77; Greenwood, C. "Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict", 4 Strategic and Combat Studies Occasional Paper, No. 4,1993, p 7-8; Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 208-9 
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ready to concede the object for which war was made. "' 18 Dinstein argues that "an aggressor State 
may lose its appetite for continuing with the hostilities, but the victim State need not be 
accommodating... War of self-defence, if warranted as a response to an armed attack, need not be 
terminated at the point when the aggressor is driven back, and it may be carried on by the 
defending State until final victory. "' 19 This view is based on the argument that the legitimate 
aims of defensive action include the right to restore the security of the victim State, which might 
necessitate carrying the response to the source of aggression, destruction of the military 
capability of the aggressor or imposition of a regime change. Thus, the total defeat of the armed 
forces of the aggressor State would be necessary to achieve the goal of security. 
Scholars who advocate this proposal argue that the 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons indicates that the defending States is free to employ every 
means to ensure its security. Indeed, the Court did not rule out the possibility of using nuclear 
weapons "in an extreme circumstance self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would 
be at stake. "120 It observed that "there is in neither customary nor conventional international law 
any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such. " 121 
As to the condition of proportionality, the Court specially held that "the proportionality principle 
may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all circumstances. "122 
This pronouncement has been interpreted to mean that the defending State, when its continued 
existence is in danger, may deploy nuclear weapons against its attacker, even if the latter has 
"' Oppenheim, L. International Law, Vol. II, seventh edition (Lauterpacht, H. ed. ), Longmans, London, 
1952, p 225 
119 Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 210-11. Similarly, Kunz argues that Article 51 "... gives the State or States 
exercising the right of individual or collective self-defence the right to resort to justified war, to carry this 
war to victory, to impose a peace treaty upon the vanquished aggressor. " Kunz, J, "Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations", 41 AJIL, p 876-77 120 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports, 1996, p 266 121 Ibid 
122 Ibid, p 245 
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used only conventional weapons. 123 Thus, according to this view, when it is a question of 
survival, the defending State can employ whatever measures are necessary to ensure its security, 
irrespective of proportionality to the weaponry deployed by the aggressor. 
Analysis of both views shows that while there is considerable divergence as to the scope of 
defensive action that is warranted in the face of an aggression and how far the defendant State 
could carry its response, however, the aim of the defensive action under both views is legitimate 
and can be justified under the UN Charter. On the one hand, the classical view of the condition 
of proportionality between the force employed and the initial aggression, and the necessity of the 
measures taken, is in conformity with the values and principles of the UN Charter to minimize 
the use of armed forces in international relations. Furthermore, it could be argued that in the case 
of occupied territories, the necessity of coercion measures expires once the aggressor has been 
driven back to the international boundaries. Thereafter, the obligation of peaceful settlement of 
disputes comes into play and, hence, the defendant State should seek peaceful solution for the 
dispute. In other words, the principle of peaceful settlement of the dispute is to be activated once 
the status quo has been restored. Finally, interference in the territorial sovereignty or political 
system of the defeated aggressor to destroy its war-making power or to impose regime change, 
for example, violates the principle of non-interference emphasized in the UN Charter. However, 
this view of the requirement of proportionality leaves many problems unsolved. It may be 
questioned, for example, whether the requirement of proportionality under the Charter rules out 
action taken to remove a continuing threat. If it is accepted that defensive measures are 
warranted only to repel or halt the attack, would proportionality be violated by measures 
intended to prevent the recurrence of such an attack and restore the security of the State? 124 
123 Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 210 
124 Gradam, Necessity, Proportionality and the use of Force by States, note 108 supra, p 165 
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In support of the non-restrictive view, it could be argued that the ultimate goal of the UN Charter 
is to establish international peace and security. Therefore, the legitimate goals of defensive 
action under the United Nations Charter extend to restoration of security of the State after an 
aggression and the removal of further threat from the same source of aggression. Furthermore, an 
aggressor State which considers itself the victim of an excessive or disproportionate response has 
provided at least the primary cause for such action, by its own original breach of Article 2(4). A 
disproportionate degree of force in response to aggression is less unjust than the notion, which 
may be derived from the Charter, that a State is to remain threatened by an aggressive regime 
that can resume its military activities at any time. 125 From another standpoint, it could also be 
suggested that since proportionality is a customary rule, and the Charter did not express 
restriction on the conduct of hostilities, but rather refers to the customary law, as soon as an 
aggression has developed, belligerent behaviour is governed by ius in bello only. Hence, 
belligerents are not restrained by the obligations of the UN Charter in their conduct of hostilities. 
In fact, the principle of proportionality is an elusive one with "endless flexibility. " 126 The 
assessment of its application in such a use of force will depend on unlimited strategic factors 
such as the geographical context, the area of the attack that they are designed to repel, the 
temporal scope of the conflict, the choice of methods or means of warfare and the degree of 
coercion that may be applied against neutrals. 127 In addition, the degree of force employed will 
depend greatly on the military capability and attitude of the aggressor. This implies that the 
decisions needed to ensure the proportionality of a forceful response will not be confined to the 
planning stage but extend to senior command-level on the battlefield. Legally, the distinction 
between the aims of an action and the means to accomplish them are not always clear. States will 
125 Sinuna, B. The Charter of the United Nations; A Commentary, Volume 1, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p 792 126 Gardam, "Proportionality and Force in International Law", note 102 supra, p 412 127 Greenwood, "Self-defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict", note 107 supra, p 275 
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interpret these matters differently, depending on strategic factors and individual circumstances. 
These realities support the view that proportionality of the action is more appropriately assessed 
by reference to the rules of ius in bello, not to the principles and values of the UN Charter. 
D. 3 State practice regarding the condition of proportionality 
State practice in the post-Charter era shows a range of defensive responses, reflecting different 
views as to the extent to which the destruction of the enemy is justified in order to repulse the 
attack and establish security. In some cases, defending State took the view that defensive action 
may include carrying the combat to the source of aggression. For example, following the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States sought the unconditional surrender of Japan 
and its response was not confined to stemming the tide of aggression. 128 The view that the 
defensive action may include the destruction of the aggressor's military capability was also 
explicitly articulated by the UK in the context of the Yemen incident of 1964. In that case, 
Britain took counter-measures on Harib Fort in Yemen following the latter's alleged 
bombardment of Saudi territory. In the Security Council, Sir Patrick Dean, the United Kingdom 
Representative, argued that in order to minimize loss of life and danger to civilian property, the 
UK had focused on an isolated target. "To destroy the fort", he said, "... with the minimum use of 
force was therefore a defensive measure which was proportionate to and confined to the 
necessities of the case. "129 This statement can be interpreted to support the view that in reality 
the principle of proportionality would mean adherence to the rules of ius in Bello, in the sense 
that the consequences of the action must be minimal in terms of wastage of life, property and 
resources, but not to preserve the enemy's military capability. In contrast to this position, in the 
context of the Falklands War, the UK neither carried its response into Argentinean territory nor 
claimed such a right. The aim of the UK action was to remove Argentina from the Islands and, 
128 Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 211 
129 Statement by the the United Kingdom Representative on 2 April 1964, UN Doc. S/PV 1106 
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apparently, the UK view was that this goal could be achieved without attacking Argentina itself 
and the campaign was in fact confined to the Islands. 130 Greenwood, however, argues that the 
United Kingdom was entitled to use force not only to regain possession of the Islands but also to 
guarantee their future security against further attack. 131 
A relatively straightforward example of a disproportionate response, in the light of all the 
relevant factors, is the United States' invasion of Panama in 1989.132 The action was ostensibly 
an exercise of the right of self-defence to protect American lives in danger. Quite apart from the 
doubt as to whether the right of self-defence extends to the protection of nationals abroad, the 
American action was clearly disproportionate. 133 The acts cited as the trigger for invoking the 
right of self-defence were the death of one United States soldier and the threatening of two others 
by Panamanian Defence Force personnel. The United States responded by carrying out a full- 
scale invasion, involving the loss of many civilian lives, destruction of property and the 
overthrow of the Noriega regime. America's action was condemned by States and 
commentators. 
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The view that defensive action may justify carrying response to the source of aggression and 
overthrow of the aggressive regime was massively upheld by after the events of 9/11. In 2001, 
the USA with UK assistance, in pursuit of the parties responsible for the 9/11 attacks, launched a 
military operation, called "Enduring freedom", against Afghanistan. The espoused purpose was 
to destroy the Afghan bases and infrastructures of the A1"Qaeda terrorist organization, and to 
overthrow the Taliban authorities, who allegedly actively assisted, supported, and even used the 
terrorist organization. Despite the different contexts between the defensive action taken in 
"30 Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, note 110 supra, p 232; Greenwood, "Self-defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict", note 107 supra, p 275 131 Greenwood, "Command and Laws of Armed Conflict", note 117 supra, p 7-8 132 Gradani, J. Necessity, Proportionality and the use of Force by States, note 108 supra, p 166 133 IbId 
134 See Chapter 8, section C. 1.2 
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response to armed attack or invasion and actions taken in response to terrorist attacks, the US 
carried its response to the Afghani territory and overthrew the Taliban regime. Most of the world 
States supported the US in doing so and the Security Council explicitly accepted this action and 
it was not seen as disproportionate or unlawful. 135 
To conclude, over the years of the post-Charter era, State practice shows that States have at times 
been reluctant to relinquish the freedom of action they had under customary international law, 
prior to the adoption of the Charter. 136 Despite the existence of contrary State practice, there is 
still an uneasy consensus that the Charter marked a turning-point in the law on the use of military 
action and requires States to confine themselves to the level of force needed to repel the 
aggression and respond to it. 137 The inconsistencies in State practice can be explained to a great 
extent by the fact that each case depends on individual circumstances. Furthermore, the extent to 
which interference with the territorial rights of an aggressor State may be consistent with 
limitations inherent in proportionate self-defence will, again, differ from case to case. Sometimes 
the defensive response will warrant the invasion of the territory of the aggressor State only to 
reduce or destroy its military capabilities and, at the most extreme, to overthrow the aggressive 
regime. 
As against this view, Gardam argues that actions taken by States in the context of the extent of 
the invasion of territory should be viewed as violations of the requirement of proportionality, 
rather than the establishment of a new rule. 138 However, international law develops through the 
practice of States, and particularly since the event of September 11, such practice seems to 
display a tendency towards the acceptance of a more extensive action against incumbent regimes 
that are perceived to threaten the stability and security of the international community. This is 
"' See Chapter 7, section B. 6.1 
136 Brownlie, note 106 supra, p 231-3 
137 Gradam, J. Necessity, Proportionality and the use of Force by States, note 108 supra, p 138 
138 ]bid, p 164-5 
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not to suggest that carrying response to the source of aggression became a new rule of 
international law, but, depending on the context, such comprehensive measures, encompassing 
the total destruction of the military forces of an aggressor State and the toppling of a perceived 
hostile regime, may sometimes be seen as acceptable and proportionate. Admittedly, such a 
decision or recommendation, more appropriately belongs to the Security Council. Should the 
Council disagree, then the acting State or States runs the risk of its continued action being 
characterized as disproportionate or even a "threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression" 
p. 4 The proportionality of the coalition forces action against Iraq in 1991 
Resolution 678, as mentioned above, authorized member States co-operating with the 
Government of Kuwait, to use "all necessary means" to implement the Council's resolutions 
about Kuwait if, by 15 January 1991, Iraq had not withdrawn its troops from Kuwait. The 
Resolution went further to call for the restoration of "international peace and security in the 
area. , 
139 At first sight, it appears that the legitimate aim of the authorized force was to liberate 
Kuwait by ousting Iraqi troops from its soil and restore the legitimate government of Kuwait to 
power. According to the strict view of the requirement of proportionality, any further measures 
taken by the coalition after Iraq had been driven back to the international frontiers would be 
disproportionate and illegal. Some writers, on the other hand, took the view that Operation 
Desert Storm could legitimately extend to action in Iraq to destroy the latter's military capability 
and overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. 140 This view was based on the language "to 
restore international peace and security in the area. " Indeed, in the absence of any more specific 
definition, these words could justify wider military actions rather than only liberating Kuwait. 
'39 This later phrase will be interpreted and discussed in detail, in the context of reinforcing the disarmament 
regime imposed on Iraq after the cease-fire, in the following Chapter. However, for the purpose of this Chapter, this phrase will be looked at in relation to the military operation carried out on 1991. 140 Dinstein, note 55 supra, p 234-5; Rostow, note 33 supra, p. 514 
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Thus, it seems that this phrase was in line with the non-restrictive view, indicating that the 
coalition forces were empowered to invade the Iraqi territory and carry their military operation to 
the source of aggression. 
As a factual consideration at the time of the Gulf war 1991, as shown in the preceding chapter, it 
was evidenced that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was seeking nuclear 
weapons. Iraq's conventional armed forces were apparently-in terms of size and equipment- 
one of the most powerful armies in the region. In addition, the government headed by Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq was widely perceived as a hostile and aggressive regime motivated by 
expansionism and territorial ambitions. In light of these considerations, it seems justified for the 
coalition forces not to terminate their military operations at the point when Iraq was driven back 
to the international boundaries. It would appear reasonable and proportionate to extend the 
response into Iraqi territory to reduce or destroy its military capabilities and even to the extent of 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime, in order to achieve the objective of security of the State 
of Kuwait. Additionally, if the US-led coalition opted to do so, such interference with Iraq 
territorial sovereignty would be covered by the Security Council authorization to "restore 
international peace and security in the area. " In fact, the coalition forces chose to confine the aim 
of their military campaign to returning Iraq to the international boundaries. That decision has 
never been fully explained by the US and its allies. When the UK Defence Secretary was asked, 
he stated, "We were part of a coalition acting under the authority of the United Nations, for the 
purposes authorized by the Security Council and none other. Had we tried to go beyond the 
scope of those authorized purposes, the coalition would have fallen apart. "41 It is unclear from 
this answer whether the coalition actually took the position that the destruction of the 
141 IIC Debs., vol. 216,13 January, 1993, quoted in Gray, C. "After the Cease-Fire: Iraq, the Security 
Council and the Use of Force", 65 BYIL, 1994, p 137 
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Government of Iraq exceeded what was authorized by Resolution 678.142 It seems, however, that 
the decision to terminate the military operations at the point of liberating Kuwait was merely for 
political considerations. 
The coalition allies, whilst continuing to assert that their objective did not go beyond expelling 
Iraq from Kuwait, took the view that, bearing in mind Iraq's military capability, it was tactically 
necessary to take the response to Iraqi territory. As mentioned above, the actual conduct of the 
campaign, such as the massive aerial bombardment, the destruction of Iraq infrastructure and 
huge loss of lives was viewed by many writers and humanitarian organizations as 
disproportionate. 143 Michael Walzer suggests that the massive bombardment was designed for an 
unjust aim, namely, to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. 144 David Hannay, the United 
]Kingdom Representative at the Security Council at the time of the Kuwait crisis, commented on 
these accusations. He stated, "Some have suggested that military action being taken by the allies 
is in some way excessive or disproportionate and thus exceeds the "all necessary means" 
authorized in Resolution 678 (1990) to bring about the liberation of Kuwait. But the nature and 
Scope of the military action is dictated not by some abstract set of criteria but by the military 
capacity of the aggressor, who has refused all attempts to remove him from Kuwait..... It is to 
that aim and in those specific circumstances that the force used must correspond. " 45 
In fact, as indicated above, the proportionality of action depends on a wide range of strategic 
factors. In addition, however sophisticated the coalition forces, Iraq was a defiant and tricky 
adversary. Therefore, it is difficult to arrive to any firm conclusion about the proportionality in 
all aspects of the coalition forces' military operations against Iraq. '46 However, in light of the 
142 Gray, ibid 
143 Note 102 supra 
144 Walzer, note 102 supra, p xx 145 UN Doc. S/PV. 2977, part II, Para. 72,14 February 1991 146 For a similar view see Gradam, J. "Proportionality and Force in International Law", note 102 supra, p 405 
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massive loss of civilians and almost complete destruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, it could be 
argued that some aspects of the Operation Desert Storm were disproportionate and inconsistent 
with the ius in bello. It seems that the coalition, by this massive destruction, aimed at 
destabilizing the government in Baghdad. But, at any rate, this aim was not the focus of the allies 
at this time; otherwise, they would have pressed harder to achieve it under the authorization 
umbrella of Resolution 678. 
Conclusion 
Iraq's invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 was an unprecedented act of 
aggression in modern history, challenging the global stability of the post-Cold War era and 
threatening international peace and security in the already turbulent Meddle East. It was a further 
confirmation of the aggressive and hostile attitude of the regime in Baghdad and its ambitions for 
territorial expansionism, demonstrated beforehand by its aggression against Iran. However, for 
various political reasons, including the end of the Cold War, the reaction of the world 
community and the Security Council response to the Kuwait crisis was completely different from 
their previous attitude towards Iraq's prior aggression. From the onset of this crisis, the Security 
Council's firm and vigorous stance marked the revival of the collective security system 
established by the UN Charter. 
Instantly after the invasion, the Council activated its powers and authorities under Chapter VII, 
imposing economic sanctions and a naval blockade against Iraq. Soon after, when these 
sanctions appeared to be ineffective to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the use of 
force was deemed to be necessary, the Council authorized its first ever enforcement action. 
However, faced with the absence of troops assigned to it by member States, the Council adopted 
a practical method of achieving international action where true collective force was politically or 
financially feasible, by delegating willing member States to execute the mission on its behalf. 
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Indeed, by adopting this method, the Council eschewed the original model of collective security 
System envisaged 
in Chapter VII and relinquished its Charter defined role of controlling and 
directing the course of action through a Military Staff Committee. However, a careful 
examination of this 
formula shows that while the Council assigns its powers and authorities over 
the strategic control and day-to-day command of the hostilities to the participating member 
States, it still possesses its ascendancy and ultimate control over the situation. Furthermore, even 
in the absence of the Military Staff Committee, in fact, the coalition forces were not unfettered in 
their conduct; they were confined by the rule of proportionality which obligated them to employ 
only, the 
degree of force necessary to achieve the objectives designated by the Council. 
erefore, practically, the lack of the Council's constant control over the action does not make 
much difference. 
In the legal literature, some scholars have taken the lack of Council's control over the Gulf war 
alongside the fact that the coalition troops were already deployed in the Gulf region prior to the 
adoption of 
Resolution 678 to suggest that the Gulf campaign was carried out as a collective self- 
defence with the legitimate government of Kuwait under the authority of Article 51. This 
proposal, 
however, does not stand much scrutiny. Article 51 made it clear that the right of self- 
defence is only permissible "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. " In addition, no such proposal has ever been suggested by the 
coalition allies themselves. 
Finally, examining the legal theories of the condition of proportionality and State practice shows 
that there 
is a shift towards the acceptance of more comprehensive action against incumbent 
regimes that appear to pose a danger to the stability and security of the international community. 
From this perspective, having in mind the military capabilities of Iraq and its unmistakably 
aggressive and defiant attitude, it seems that the coalition forces were justified in taking their 
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response to that source of aggression and overthrowing the government in Baghdad. If they had 
opted to do so, such an action would be covered by the language of Resolution 678, "to restore 
international peace and security in the area. " In addition, if they had taken that decision at the 
time, it would be far less controversial rather than leaving nearly 12 years to elapse before doing 
so. Indeed, as expressed by Gray, "the Security Council has paid the price for the decision of the 
coalition not destroy Saddam Hussein's regime under the authorization. " 147 
147 Gray, note 141 supra, p 136-7 
124 
Chapter 4 
Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687 
Introduction 
The primary legal ground invoked by the US and the UK to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was the Security Council authorization. ' Two interrelated Security Council resolutions which 
were claimed to provide authority to use force against Iraq after the liberation of Kuwait. The 
first was Resolution 678.2 It was argued that its mandate still governed the situation and had not 
been terminated after Iraq had been driven out of Kuwait. Specifically, the argument was based 
on the language of the resolution which, according to the US and the UK approach, permitted the 
Council allies to "use all necessary means" not only to oust the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, but 
also to "restore international peace and security in the region. "3 The second was Resolution 687, 
The US and which laid down the conditions of cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition forces 4 
the UK maintained that any violation of these conditions gave the other party the right to resume 
f ghting. s 
These arguments, however, were rejected by some States such as China and Russia who argued 
that the mandate for force established by Resolution 678 was extinguished and that any 
resumption of fighting required a new explicit authorization from the Security Council. 6 This 
counterargument implies two propositions; first, that the language of Resolution 678 cannot be 
1 See, for example, President Bush's Address before the UN General Assembly (12 September 2002), 38 
Weekly Comp. Press. Doc. 1529 (16 September 2002), available at 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1. html> [Hereinafter President Bush's 
Remarks] See also Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/351; Chapter 7, section D. 2 2 Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 3 Ibid 
4 Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 S Note I supra 
6 Yoo, J. "International Law and the War in Iraq", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 563 
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interpreted to cover the situation after the liberation of Kuwait has been achieved; second, that a 
material breach by Iraq of its obligations under Resolution 687 did not "automatically" give rise 
to the right of the coalition forces to suspend or terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities 
without new explicit authorization of use of force by the Council. 
This controversy triggers two important legal issues, which for a long time, appeared to have 
been comparatively abandoned in the legal literature. The first is regarding the method of 
interpreting Security Council resolutions, particularly, as to resolutions authorizing individual 
members to use force on behalf of the United Nations. As this method of authorization is likely 
to continue, in the absence of the UN's own forces as envisaged by the founders of the Charter in 
Article 43, establishing a set of rules to be applied in interpreting Security Council resolutions is 
necessary. The second is pertaining to the legal rules governing the armistice agreements 
sponsored by the Security Council, especially, in case of material breach of a cease-fire 
agreement. As to the present study, examining these issues is crucial to determine the pertinence 
of the arguments forwarded by the invading powers, and hence, the legality of their action. 
This chapter is concerned with the issue of interpretation of Resolution 678; the legal rules 
governing armistice agreements will be dealt with in the ensuing Chapter. The purpose of the 
present chapter is to investigate the exact scope of Resolution 678 and, accordingly, the validity 
of the interpretation advanced by the US and the UK. The chapter begins with an explanation of 
the legal nature of Security Council resolutions and the reason for subjecting them to the general 
rules of interpretation in international law. Then follows a revision of the theories and principles 
of interpretation including the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and their applicability 
for interpreting the Security Council resolutions. The third section of this chapter interprets 
Resolution 678 according to the conclusions reached in the preceding section. 
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Section A: The leeal nature of the Security Council resolutions 
The Security Council, as an international institution, is a political forum where States convene to 
discuss issues related to international peace and security and to reach a decision (resolution) on 
the matter by voting. These resolutions (whether mandatory-adopted under Chapter VII-or 
recommendatory) are political decisions concluded by the members of this forum, motivated by 
political (not legal) reasons. Therefore, the legal nature of these instruments cannot be described 
as anything but international agreements between Member States of the Security Council. 
The provisional draft of the International Law Commission defined a "treaty" as: "any 
international agreement in a written form, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, 
covenant, charter, statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, 
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi or any other appellation), concluded between two or 
more States or other subjects of international law and governed by international law. "7 Thus, in 
the legal sense, a Security Council resolution is an international agreement (or a treaty) 
concluded by a group of States (the fifteen Member States of the Security Council) in a written 
form and governed by international law. Consequently, these resolutions, like international 
treaties, should be subject to and governed by the rules of the law of treaties. 
As to the issue of interpretation, it is acknowledged that the imprecision of any language is such 
that most legal documents, despite the care taken in drafting, will be amenable to more than one 
legally and logically conceivable interpretation. 8 Security Council resolutions are no exception. 
In addition, the United Nations Charter, like the Covenant of the League of Nations, does not 
7 Yearbook ofInternational Law Commission, 1962, p 161 8 Kelsen, H. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, Stevens & Sons, London, 1951, p. xiii ff 
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give any organ authoritative power of interpretation. 
9 It therefore seems reasonable to argue that 
Security Council resolutions should be interpreted according to the general rules of treaty 
interpretation in international law. Support for this argument can be found in Article 5 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stated that "the present Convention applies to 
any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international organization and to any treaty 
adopted within an international organization without prejudice to any relevant rules of the 
organization. "10 Security Council resolutions fell perfectly within the second category. An 
objection may be raised, however, that some States and permanent members of the Security 
Council have not yet ratified the Convention, and so are not bound by these rules. " Nevertheless, 
the Convention provisions on interpretation are part of customary international law. With regard 
to the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the ICJ has expressed that 
they may "in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law. "12 
Section B: Theories and principles of interpretation and the Security Council 
resolutions 
Traditionally, views on the matter of interpretation can be classified into three main schools of 
thought: the "intentions of the parties" or "founding fathers" school; the "teleological" or "aims 
and objects" school; and the ` textual' school. Their ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
and theories of interpretation may contain elements of all three. 13 In addition, all three 
approaches may, in a given case, have the same practical implications; on the other hand they 
9 Kunz, J. L. "Legality of the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27,1950", 45 AJIL, p 138 10 Article of 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties[Hereinafter Vienna Convention] 
11 Simma, B, The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, Volume 1, second edition, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002, p 18 
'2 Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1971, p 47 
13 Fitzmaurice, G. "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and 
other Treaty Points", 28 BYIL, 1951, p1 
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may also (although the differences may be more methodological or matters of emphasis rather 
than principle) lead to very different outcomes. 14 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stated that: "A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. "15 Clearly the Convention 
adopted the textual approach as the primary method of interpretation; however, it did not 
completely disregard the teleological approach. Consistent with Article 31 of the Convention, in 
the jurisprudence of the International Court, many statements can be found which imply that it 
views the textual approach to treaty interpretation as established law. In particular, the Court has 
on a number of occasions emphasized that the function of interpretation does not extend to 
revising treaties, nor must an interpretation read into them anything that is not clearly expressed 
or implied in them. 16 However, there are no mandatory rules on interpretation. Recourse to the 
various principles and maxims in this respect is discretionary, and the interpretation of 
documents has been characterized as something of an art, rather than an exact science. 17 It might 
appear that, as a result of this non-obligatory character of these principles and the lack of any 
particular limitation to certain types of treaties or texts, there is substantial leeway for 
interpretation. Nonetheless, at any rate, these principles are boundaries that protect against 
arbitrary interpretation. 
14Ibid, p2 
15 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
16 Reports of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, 
Part 3: Observance, Application and Interpretation of Treaties, printed in 61 AJIL, p 354-5 [Hereinafter ICL 
Reports] 
17 The ILC described these rules as "principles of logic and good sense valuable only as guides to assist in 
appreciating the meaning which the parties may have intended to attach to the expressions that they 
employed in a document. Their suitability for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations 
which have first to be appreciated by the interpreter of the document; the particular arrangement of the words 
and sentences, their relation to each other and to other parts of the document, the general nature and subject- 
matter of the document, the circumstances in which it was drawn up, etc. " Ibid, 350 
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B. 1 The "intentions" School 
For the ` intentions' school, the prime object is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the 
parties: the approach is therefore to discover what these were, or must be taken to have been. The 
view that to ascertain and give effect to them is the prime and sole legitimate object of 
interpretation is derived from well-known principles of private contract law. '8 As this school 
places the main emphasis on the intentions of the parties, in consequence, it admits a liberal 
recourse to the travaux preparatoires and to other evidence of the intentions of the contracting 
States as means of interpretation. 19 
It is widely accepted that the main goal of interpretation is to carry out the intention of the 
parties. With the exception of the extreme teleological approach, which places more emphasis on 
the objects and purposes of the text rather than the intention of the parties, no one seriously 
rejects such an aim. ° Certainly, no one would assert the contrary view, that it would be 
appropriate for interpretation to produce a result outside the intention of the founders of the text. 
Consequently, the "intentions" method of interpretation may be thought to have the most direct 
appeal; it is natural to ask "What did the parties intend by this clause? "21 There are, however, a 
number of difficulties with this approach in the context of Security Council resolutions, as 
follows: 
(I) The nature of the Council and the rotation system of its members make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to ascertain the intention of the members as it existed at the time of the adoption of 
the resolution in question. Apart from the permanent members, many of those States which 
18 Fitzmaurice, note 13 supra, p3 Professor Lauterpacht, for example, stated that "it is the intention of the 
authors.... which is the starting-point and the goal of all interpretation. It is the duty of the judge to resort to 
all available means.. 
. 
to discover the intention of the parties... Words have absolutely no meaning in 
themselves. They are an expression of will" Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties", BYIL, 1949, p 83 
19 Lauterpacht,, ibid, p51 
to Fitzmaurice, G. "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation 
and other Treaty Points", 33 BYIL, 1957, p 204 
u Ibid 
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played a part in the framing of the resolution may no longer be members of the Council in the 
implementation stage or at the time of interpretation, while on the other hand other States which 
took no share in the framing do become members by subsequent accession. Those more recent 
members may participate in debate over a particular resolution long after it was originally 
formulated, by which time, even if the exact intentions of the framers can be identified, they will 
have been overlaid by the practice and application of the intervening years. This may be the case 
on many occasions in which the majority of the present members of the Council-it might be in 
some cases up to all 10 non-permanent members of the Council-are States which had no hand 
in the original drafting of the resolution. An example can be derived from the Gulf case. In 1990, 
when the Council adopted Resolution 678, the ten non-permanent Council members were: 
Canada, Colombia, Cote D'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania, Yemen and 
Zaire. In 2003, in debating the invasion of Iraq, the ten non-permanent Council members were: 
Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain and Syrian Arab 
Republic. Thus, none of the ten non-permanent members had a share in drafting the original 
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Therefore, the only intentions which can be 
ascertained are those of the five permanent members. 
(II) The aim of carrying out the intentions of the parties can refer only to their joint or common 
intentions. Professor Lauterpacht, an advocate for the `intentions school, ' insists that this 
common intention of the parties is "necessarily implied" can be discovered in light of the 
purposes and objects underling the treaty as a whole. 2 Fitzmaurice, on the other hand, asserts 
that in the context of multilateral conventions this common intention might be impossible to 
discover. 23 This latter view seems more compatible with regard to Security Council resolutions. 
The formulation of Security Council resolutions often reflects the varied aims, motives, interests, 
22 Lauterpacht, note 18 supra, p 81 23 Fitzmaurice, 1957, note 20 supra, p 205-6 
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and ideologies of whichever States were represented in the Council at the time. When 
interpretation is subsequently debated, the parties will not only be placing different 
interpretations on the text, but they will actually be claiming different intentions in regard to it. 
In other words, they will be claiming to have had different intentions from the beginning, since 
obviously a resolution cannot be interpreted based on a subsequent change of attitude or 
intention by one or more of the parties only. The effect is that, when there are disputes on 
interpretation and different claims as to intention, it is not possible to identify anything which is 
agreed by all the members concerned to have been their common intention. In such a situation, it 
would clearly not be acceptable, from a legal perspective, to favour the alleged intentions of one 
or more parties, based on what can only be a value judgment about the relative desirability of 
each set of professed intentions. Such a finding can have no legitimacy. Resolution 687 is a case 
in point. The negotiations of that resolution show deep differences of opinion about the 
intentions and the ultimate purpose of the resolution. It is nearly impossible to discover a 
common intention of the member States in that resolution. It is difficult even to find a general 
consent among all members over the provisions of that resolution. 
(III) As a political reality, States are not always clear in expressing their intentions and motives 
and the declared intention may cover a hidden one. In other cases, some members, as is obvious 
in the official records of the Security Council, had no intentions at all on the point. Furthermore, 
the unbalanced nature of the constitution of the Council gives the permanent members influence 
over the other members; indeed, sometimes Permanent Members may exert political and 
diplomatic pressure over other members to secure their votes. 4 
24 For an example on the point see Chapter 3, note 25 
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In the light of these issues, the idea of parties' intentions is a rather tenuous concept, at it is 
virtually impossible to identify and give effect to them. As a corollary, this leads to doubts of the 
significance of the travaux preparatoires of the resolutions. 
8.2 The textual school 
In the view of the "textual" school, the basic aim is to ascertain what the text means according to 
the ordinary or apparent sense of its terms: the approach is therefore one of detailed textual 
analysis. 25 The approach is more scientific than the previous one. The textual school does not 
ignore the question of intentions, but it places its main focus elsewhere, or, it could be said, aims 
to give effect to intentions by a less direct method than investigation of them per se. Whereas the 
`intentions' approach tries to decide the meaning of the text in the light of intentions of the 
parties, the textual school takes the converse approach of deducing the intentions of the parties in 
the light of the meaning of the text they drew up. If this were not so, logically, after a quick and 
superficial reading of the text, the starting point of interpretation would be an independent 
investigation, ab extra, of the parties' intentions, not until these had been settled would detailed 
consideration of the text take place and its meaning and effect be decided. However, this is not 
how the process is carried out. 26 Interpretation inevitably starts with in-depth analysis of the text 
to be interpreted, because it is in and through the text that the will and intentions of the parties is 
expressed. To clarify its meaning, therefore, is, it is assumed, to give effect to that will and 
intention. Nevertheless, although the finding can in this sense be linked to the question of 
intentions, each case actually proceeds on an independent basis; the interpretation could be 
arrived at without any explicit investigation of or pronouncement on intentions. 7 
25 Fitzmaurice, 1951, note 13 supra, p 1-2 26 Fitzmaurice, 1957, note 20 supra, p 206-7 27 Ibid 
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However, where there are ambiguities, omissions or obscurities in the text, recourse to other 
means of interpretation may be justified and even necessary. Even if it is necessary to resort to 
extraneous sources of interpretation, however, the object is still the same-to decide what the 
text means or must be assumed to mean. Thus, the purpose in employing extraneous means of 
interpretation is not to discover specifically what the parties intended as such, but to discover 
what the resulting text must be taken to mean, or (on a teleological basis) what the objects and 
purposes of the treaty apparently were. 28 The majority of writers emphasize the primacy of the 
text as the basis for the interpretation of a treaty, while at the same time giving a certain place to 
extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the parties and to the objects and purposes of the treaty as 
means of interpretation. 9 
With respect to the Security Council Resolutions, the fact is that any resolution was drafted, 
following a process of negotiation in which all legal and political considerations were taken into 
account, specifically to express the intentions of the members, and it must be assumed that they 
do so. This intention is, therefore, on the face of it, contained in the text of the resolution itself, 
and so the key issue is not what the Council Members intended by the text, but what the text 
itself means. Whatever meaning is derived from an ordinary and natural construction of its terms, 
will be assumed to be what the Members intended. There is therefore no need or justification for 
looking beyond the ordinary meaning, unless the text contains manifest ambiguities, obscurities, 
or lacunae. However, the existence of a dispute about the meaning does not in itself mean that 
there is any obscurity or ambiguity, as evidenced by numerous instances where international 
28 Ibid 
29 ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 350 
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tribunals have found the face meaning of disputed texts to be perfectly clear. 30 The dispute about 
the interpretation of Resolution 678 seems to be a case in point, as will be discussed below. 
Textual interpretation, according to Article 31 of Vienna Convention, should follow the 
following principles; 
B. 2.1 The Principle of "Good Faith" 
The first principle, bona fides, meaning that the document must be interpreted in good faith, is a 
direct consequence of the pacta sunt servanda rule 31 It is not confined to interpretation, but is a 
general principle of law. 32 The implication of this rule for interpretation is that it must not be 
arbitrary and must not deviate from the ` true' substantive meaning. 33 
B. 2.2 The principle of the natural and ordinary meanin. 
The textual approach proposes that an agreement is to be interpreted primarily as it stands, and 
on the basis of their actual text. Adherence to the "natural and ordinary meaning" is the basic 
principle of the textual approach: it is assumed that what appears from the ordinary meaning of 
the terms used is what the parties intended 34 Particular expressions should be given their normal, 
natural, and unstrained meaning in the context in which they occur. 35 Any departure from the 
natural and ordinary meaning is permissible only if there is clear evidence that the terms used are 
30 For example, in the (First) Admissions case, the Court stated that "The Court considers that the text is 
sufficiently clear. " ICJ Reports, 1948, p 63; in the (Second) Admissions case, the Court held that "In the 
present case the Court finds no difficulty in ascertaining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in 
3question and no 
difficulty in giving effect to them. " ICJ Reports, 1950, p 8, 
ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 355 32 In the Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), for example, the ICJ stated that "One of the basic principles 
governing and performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust 
and confidence are inherent in international co-operation. " ICJ Reports, 1974, p 268, para. 46 33 Simma, note 11 supra, p 19 34 ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 355 35 The ICJ, in its Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State 
to the United Nations, said: "The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is 
called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor to give effect to them in their 
natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. " ICJ Reports, 1950, p8 
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meant to be accorded a meaning other than the natural and ordinary one, or if the consequence of 
the ordinary interpretation would be unreasonable or absurd in the context. 36 
B. 2.3 The principle of integration (Systematic Interpretation) 
Common sense and good faith dictate that the ordinary meaning of a term cannot be decided in 
the abstract but must be viewed in the context of the treaty and taking into account its object and 
purpose. 7 The Court had on a number of occasions reiterated this principle. 8 This principle has 
been formulated in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention 39 Accordingly, in the case of a 
Security Council resolution, the context of such a resolution covers not only the position of a 
word or group of words within a sentence but goes beyond that and also encompasses the text of 
the resolution as a whole. All elements comprised in a given resolution, including all its parts 
such as the preamble and annexes, should be considered since they form a part of or are 
intimately related to the resolution. Most importantly, it is suggested that a resolution should be 
read in connection with other resolutions regarding the same case. For example, for a better 
understanding for resolution 678, all prior and subsequent resolutions adopted regarding the 
same case should be taken into account. This suggestion is consistent with the Security Council 
practice to mention all related resolutions regarding the case in the preamble of such resolution. 
This suggestion can also find grounds in Article 31(3) (a) which stated that it "shall be taken into 
36 Fitzmaurice, 1957, note 20 supra, p 211 
37 ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 355 
38 The Permanent Court, for example, in an early Advisory Opinion stressed that "in considering the question before the Court upon the language of the Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and 
that its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, 
may be interpreted in more than one sense. " Advisory Opinion of the Competence of the I. L. O to Regulate 
Agriculture Labour, PCIJ Reports, 1922, Series B, No. 2, p 23 
39 Article 3](2) of the Vienna Convention states that "the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating 
to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. " 
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account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. "40 
B. 3 The teleological school 
The application of the teleological approach is almost entirely in the field of general multilateral 
conventions, particularly those formulated for social, humanitarian, and law-making purposes. 1 
This approach implies that interpretation of a text should take into account what is declared, 
known, or presumed about its objects, principles and purposes. As long as these are upheld, 
lacunae can be filled, corrections made, or texts expanded or supplemented 42 Thus, the starting 
point is to determine the general purpose of the text based on, for example, its overall sense and 
tone, the circumstances of its formulation and its function in international relations; and to 
interpret individual expressions accordingly. 43 As a result, there is, with the teleological 
approach, especially in the case of multilateral agreements, a greater possibility of interpretations 
being accepted which go beyond, or even diverge from, the original intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the text. However, because of this possible departure from the intentions of the 
founders of the resolution or extending the meaning of text illegitimately to cover matters were 
not originally intended by the parties at the time of adoption, therefore, theological interpretation 
has been considered as a secondary approach. This proposition was held by the International 
Law Commission. As indicated previously, however, Article 31 of Vienna Convention did not 
completely ignore the objects and purposes of the text. 4 It stated that "A treaty shall be 
interpreted in 
... 
the light of its object and purpose. " In a negative way, the text cannot be 
ao Article 31(3) (a) of the Vienna Convention 41 Fitzmaurice, 1951, note 13 supra, p2 
az thid, p8 
43 Ibid, p2 
44 In drafting Article 31, the Commission took the view that for the purpose of formulating the general rules 
of interpretation; the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat should not be 
considered as one of those rules, although that does not preclude recourse to the principle where the 
circumstances warrant it, and the Commission accepted that it has always been recognized in international 
rulings. ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 351 
137 
interpreted to give effect to a meaning not within the declared framework of the objects and 
purposes of the text. 
The same applies to Security Council resolutions. Such weight is attached, for interpretation, to 
the purpose of the resolution, that it reduces the will of the Member States of the Council at the 
time of the adoption to a secondary role. Interpretation depends on the scope of the resolution's 
objectives, with a distinction being made between resolutions of universal and binding character 
differs and those with more limited scope or which are not binding on member States. However, 
although teleological interpretation comes as a subordinate approach after the textual approach, it 
might play an important role in interpreting Security Council resolutions, especially; those 
authorize the use of force. For example, taking account of the political considerations, for 
resolutions that authorize States to use forceful measures against an aggressor, it might be 
necessary to utilize the principles of effectiveness and implied power in interpreting them. 
Two essential rules pertain to the objects and purposes of the text (the teleological approach), as 
follows; 
B. 3.1 The "Effectiveness" rule 
This rule means that texts are to be interpreted in the light of their expressed or evident objects 
and purposes; and individual provisions are to be given the maximum effectiveness consistent 
with the normal meaning of the words and with other parts of the text, and interpreted in a 
manner whereby a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every part of the text 45 Thus, if 
there is more than one possible interpretation of a text, preference should be given to that which 
best serves the recognizable purpose of the resolution and its various provisions. 46 When applied 
45 Fitzmaurice, 1957, note 20 supra, p 211 
46 Simma, note 11 supra, p 31 
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correctly, this principle does not warrant an "extensive" or "liberal" interpretation that goes 
beyond the declared or clearly implied purpose manifested in the terms of the treaty. 47 
B. 3.2 The rule of implied power 
When the text to be interpreted is a statute of an international organization, particularly the UN 
Charter, an important consideration in the teleological approach is the determination of implied 
powers. The assumption is that an organization must be granted the powers necessary for the 
performance and execution of its functions and responsibilities, 48 a view which was expressed by 
the ICJ 49 
This rationale, which led the Court to apply this principle to charters of international 
organizations to carry out its responsibilities and duties, should also, by analogy, result in the 
applicability of this principle to some Security Council resolution, where the Council assigns to 
its members-all or some of them-the power to execute missions on its behalf. This is 
especially the case, when the Council authorizes Member States to use force against an aggressor 
State. In the absence of the Council's own standing forces, it should be assumed that the Council 
assigned some of its powers to Member States; this is one of the basic principles of the law of 
contract. 50 This assumption is consistent with the political reality. Reaching a decision in the 
Council is not an easy matter; it involves a prolonged process of negotiations, taking account of 
all related political and legal considerations and compromises, in order to avoid the use or threat 
of veto power. As a result, referring back to the Council in every step in the implementation 
stage of such a resolution is not practical and may slow down or even impede the execution of 
47 ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 351 48 Simma, note 11 supra, p 31 49 In the Reparations Case the ICJ stated that "under international law, the Organization must be deemed to 
have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary 
application as being essential to the performance of its duties. This [is a] principle of law. " Reparations case, 
ICJ Reports, 1949 p 182. Similar view has been expressed by the ICJ in the Effect of Awards case, ICJ Reports, 1954, p 56 
50 See Chapter 3, section C 
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the resolution. However, this is not to suggest that the Council loses control over the matter after 
the adoption of the decision; the Council simply can terminate its authorization or assignment in 
an explicit way after achieving the goals intended by the resolution. Nevertheless, owing to the 
risk of malpractice of this principle, it should be categorized as a secondary mean of 
interpretation. 
B. 4 Supplementary means of interpretation 
The general principle is that cognitive elements outside the text, such as the preparatory works 
and subsequent practice, should not be resorted to for interpretation purposes, if a clear result can 
be derived from the text itself. The International Court in practice has taken the approach that the 
text of an international treaty should be interpreted on its own terms, and that the wording itself 
should be of decisive significance. 51 The ICJ dismissed any recourse to supplementary means if 
the wording is clear. 52 
B. 4.1 Recourse to travaux preparatoires 
As to the resort to the travaux preparatoires, Article 32 of the Convention stated that recourse to 
further means of interpretation, including preparatory work, is permissible for the purpose of 
confirming "the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31" and for the purpose of 
"determining the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. " In harmony with this principle, International Tribunals have on occasions 
referred to the preparatory work for the purpose of confirming their conclusions as to the 
s' In the IMCO case the ICJ stated that "The words of Article 28(a) must be read in their natural and ordinary 
meaning, in the sense which they would normally have in their context. It is only if, when this is done, the 
words of the Article are ambiguous in any way that resort needs to be had to other methods of construction. " 
ICJ Reports, 1960, p 159 
52 In its Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General Assembly, the ICJ stated "if the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable result, then, 
and then only, must the Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties 
really did mean when they used these words " ICJ Reports, 1950, p8 
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"ordinary" meaning of the text where the language is unambiguous, 53 although often this is 
considered unnecessary. 54 
Regarding the "absurd or unreasonable" result, the Court has recognized this exception to the 
rule that terms must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning. However, it has 
comparatively rarely had recourse to other sources for such a reason, suggesting that the 
absurdity or unreasonableness of the "ordinary" meaning must be manifest, for non-textual 
sources to be considered. 55 According to the International Law Commission, such strict 
limitation is necessary to prevent the authority of the ordinary meaning of the terms being unduly 
weakened. 56 
As to the Security Council resolutions, there are difficulties attached to recourse to the 
preparatory works in case of ambiguity in the wording of the text, due to the frequently 
incompleteness or misleading nature of the records of negotiations and preparatory work, which 
necessitate considerable caution in employing them for the purpose of aiding interpretation. 7 
Resolution 687 is a case in point. The negotiations took place in a context of deep differences of 
opinion about the intentions and the ultimate purpose of the resolution, which related to almost 
every part of the resolution, as to the border, the weapons-related obligations and 
compensation. 58 Additionally, although the resolution made no explicit reference to the removal 
of Saddam Hussein from power, representatives of the UK and US suggested that his removal 
s3 The Permanent Court made such a confirmatory reference in its opinion on the Interpretation of the 
Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during the Night saying: "The preparatory work thus 
confirms the conclusion reached on a study of the text of the Convention that there is no good reason for 
interpreting Article 3 otherwise than in accordance with the natural meaning of the words. " PCIJ, 1932, 
Series A/B, No. 50, p. 380 
sa For example, in its Advisory Opinion on Admission of a State to the United Nations: "The Court considers 
that the text is sufficiently clear; consequently it does not feel that it should deviate from the consistent 
practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to 
reparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself. " ICJ Reports, 1948, p. 63 s Simma, note 11 supra, p 26; ILC Reports, note 16 supra, p 360 56 ILC Reports, ibid 
57 Ibid, p 354 
58 Johnstone, I. Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action, International Peace Academy, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1994, p 17-18 
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was a prerequisite for the restoration of peace and security. Sir David Hannay of the United 
Kingdom, in explaining the vote of his country, stated, "My government believes that it will in 
fact prove impossible for Iraq to rejoin the community of civilized nations while Saddam 
Hussein remains in power. "59 This view was not shared by other member States. 0 Consequently, 
it seems that in the case of Security Council resolution, resorting to the travaux preparatoires or 
investigating the intentions of the parties, in general, would result in a misleading and distorted 
vision and, indeed, to do so might only lead to the possible exclusion of relevant evidence. As a 
political reality, it will rarely be possible to find consistent declarations of States' representatives 
if many States involved in the preparatory work. Therefore, recourse to the travaux 
preparatoires may be useful only to confirm the interpretation derived by means of the textual or 
teleological methods of interpretation, depending on the given resolution. 
B. 4.2 Recourse to the subsequent practice 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention stated that for the purpose of interpretation "any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the understanding of the 
parties regarding its interpretation" should be taken into account together with the context. 
According to this paragraph, reference may be made to the subsequent conduct and practice of 
the parties in relation to the treaty, the advantage being that such practice offers evidence of how 
the treaty has been interpreted in practice, and, hence, what meaning should be imputed to it 61 
Recourse to subsequent practice as a means of interpretation is well established in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals. 62 
S9 UN Doc. SIP V. 2981, p 116 
6' See generally UN Doc. S/PV. 2981 
61 Fitzmaurice, 1957, note 20 supra, p 211 
62 In its opinion on the Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labor, the Permanent Court said: "If there were any ambiguity, the Court might, for the purpose of arriving at the true meaning, consider the 
action which has been taken under the Treaty. " Advisory Opinion of the Competence of the I. L. 0 to Regulate Agriculture Labour, PCIJ Reports, 1922, Series B, No. 2, p. 39. The ICJ referred to subsequent practice in 
confirmation of the meaning which it had deduced from the text and which it considered to be unambiguous. 
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In the context of Security Council resolutions, it is suggested that this principle may be 
applicable to two kinds of practice; first, the preceding and subsequent practice of the Security 
Council, as an international body, in similar cases, which constitutes a normative element of 
interpretation; second, the subsequent practice of the members of the Council in implementing a 
given resolution. It should be noted, however, that State practice does not necessarily reflect 
agreement among all member States 63 
B. S Summary of the rules applicable for Security Council Resolution 
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the theories and principles of the rules of interpretation, 
the following may be offered as guidelines for interpreting Security Council resolutions; 
(A) The text of a given resolution must be, first and foremost, interpreted as it stands and to give 
effect to intention of the drafters at the time of conclusion. This textual approach must be carried 
out in good faith, regardless any political factor, and according to the following principles: 
(I) The natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the text, taking account of the 
purposes and objects of the resolution. 
(II) All elements comprised in a given resolution, including all its parts such as the 
preamble and annexes, should be considered since they form a part of or are intimately 
related to the resolution. In addition, a resolution should also be read in connection with 
other resolutions regarding the same case. Interpreting a resolution in isolation may 
give a distorted vision for the intentions of the drafters. 
(B) Once the meaning of the text has been established according to the foregoing principles, its 
individual provisions are to be given the maximum effectiveness consistent with that meaning. 
preference should be given to that interpretation which best serves the recognizable purpose of 
In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ said: "The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows it has not been their intention, by entering into the Special Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the amount of the 
compensation. " ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 25 63 Simma, note 11 supra, p 28 
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the resolution and its various provisions. In some cases, especially where the resolution assigns 
to some or all Council Members the power to execute missions on its behalf, it might be 
necessary to attach more weight to the purpose of the resolution and to utilize the principle of 
implied power in interpreting these resolutions However, reliance on purposes of the resolution 
in the interpretation or resorting to the principle of implied power, which usually emerge out of 
political necessity, does not mean going beyond, or diverging from, the original intentions of the 
Council Members as expressed in the text or extending the meaning of text to cover matters not 
originally intended by the parties. Thus, a balance has to be struck between the need to overcome 
the political difficulties and maintaining the meaning of the text according to the textual 
interpretation. 
(C) Recourse to cognitive elements outside the text of the resolution (including all its parts and 
the other related resolutions) is only permissible to clarify the meaning if there is an ambiguity in 
the wording of the text or to confirm the meaning reached by the textual interpretation. However, 
differentiations have to be made in this respect. 
(I) Resorting to the travaux preparatoires of the resolution may be useful only to confirm 
the interpretation derived by means of the textual or teleological methods of 
interpretation, depending on the given resolution. However, in case of ambiguity of the 
wording of the text, it is suggested that the preparatory works should be avoided in this 
regard, owing to the fact that it might result in a misleading and distorted vision and the 
possible exclusion of relevant evidence. 
(II) As to the subsequent practice, reference may be made to the subsequent conduct and 
practice of the parties in relation to the given resolution for both purposes (clarifying an 
ambiguity in the text and confirming the meaning. ) However, two kinds of practice 
must be distinguished; first, the preceding and subsequent practice of the Security 
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Council, as an international body, in similar cases, which constitutes a normative 
element of interpretation; second, the subsequent practice of the members of the 
Council in implementing a given resolution. 
Section C: Interpreting Resolution 678 in light of Resolution 687 and other 
relevant resolutions 
Before dwelling on interpreting Resolution 678 according to the guidelines concluded in the 
preceding section, attention must be drawn to a theory of interpretation suggests that Security 
Council resolutions that authorize the use of force should be interpreted restrictively. This theory 
has been emerged particularly regarding Resolution 678; therefore, it has to be examined first. 
C, 1. The theory of restrictive interpretation for Resolution 678 in light o/ the principles of the 
UN Charter 
The Gulf War mandate of Resolution 678 authorized member states "to use all necessary means" 
not only "to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant 
resolutions" but also "to restore international peace and security in the area. " Among the 
"subsequent relevant resolutions", the cease-fire Resolution 687 was particularly important. 
Resolution 678 has been cited to support the authority of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, both to enforce Resolution 687's obligations and to restore "international peace and 
security" to the region. 64 An ongoing threat to such peace and security was said to be presented 
by Iraq's material breach of its disarmament obligations under Resolution 687.65 As a result, the 
authorization of the use of force under Resolution 678, which had been in abeyance but remained 
valid, was triggered. From this perspective, the end of the cease-fire and resumption of hostilities 
64 Yoo, note 6 supra, p 567; Taft, W and Buchwald, T. "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law"; 97 AJIL, 
2003, p 559; Wedgwood, R. "The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self- Defence", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 578-9 65 President Bush' Remarks at the UNGA, note 1 supra 
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with Iraq was justified to counter Iraq's continuing threat of international peace and security. 66 
Thus, the uses of military force against Iraq after the establishment of the formal cease-fire on 
many occasions and eventually in 2003 were lawful and necessary to obtain Iraqi compliance 
with the terms of the cease-fire in order to restore international peace and security to the region. 
This understanding of Resolution 678 has been disputed. It has been argued that this argument is 
both incorrect and unjustified by the terms of the text of Resolution 678, where, it is claimed, the 
clear intent of the Security Council was to authorize the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It 
did not mean that any member State should have carte blanche to attack Iraq to enforce 
inspections mandated after the war. 67 Consequently, an armed response to breaches of the cease- 
fire agreement would not be made by individual states; a new Security Council authorization was 
needed. This view that the mandate of Resolution 678 was terminated by the ousting of Iraq from 
Kuwaiti soil seemed to be held by the representatives of China, France, and Russia in the 
Security Council. They appeared to consider that the refusal of the current members of the 
Security Council to agree to the use of force in the Spring of 2003 nullified the 1991 resolution's 
broad authorization. 68 
This proposition has been grounded on two arguments. First, resolutions that authorize the use of 
force should be interpreted restrictively in light of the Charter Principle of minimizing the use of 
force in international relations. 69 Second, the phrase "and to restore international peace and 
security in the area" should be read in the context of the liberation Kuwait. 70 In other words, 
international peace and security in the region is to be restored by returning to the status quo prior 
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The first part of this section addresses the fist argument in order 
66 Yoo, note 6 supra, p 567 
67 See, for example, Ratner, M. "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime", 93 AJIL, 1999, p 140 
68 See Statements by the Representatives of China, France and Russian Federation after the adoption of Resolution 1441 in Security Council 4644th meeting of 8 November, 2002. Press Release, UN Doc. SC/7564 69 Ratner, note 67 supra, p 128 
70 Ibid, p 140-1 
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to explore whether the general principle of the UN Charter of prohibiting the use of force in 
international relations implies that Resolution 678 should be interpreted restrictively. The second 
argument will be examined in the ensuing parts in the course of the interpretation of this 
resolution. 
Professor Ranter emphasized that the general and substantive principle in the United Nations 
Charter is that international disputes are to be resolved by peaceful means. Arising from that 
principle, he argued: (1) that explicit authorization of force must be interpreted narrowly in order 
to minimize violence in the international community and to reduce the scope for states to take 
advantage of such authorization to pursue national objectives that go beyond the Council's clear 
intention; (2) that authorizations are valid only until the goals of the operation are met and a 
permanent cease-fire is established. 7' Application of these rules to the present case suggests that 
the authorization of use of force in Resolution 678 lasts only as long as necessary to meet the 
goals of the operation and establish a permanent cease-fire unless the Council explicitly indicates 
otherwise. By implication, the authorization of Resolution 678 was terminated by the ousting of 
Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territories and when the permanent cease-fire resolutions 686 and 687 
were negotiated. This view is directly linked to the preference, expressed in the Charter, for 
peaceful means of dispute resolution, and the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use force other than 
in self-defence. 72 In addition, the Council's mandate for military action against Iraq in 1990 
should be seen in the context of the broad aim of the United Nations, of minimizing violence in 
the international community. Therefore, the Security Council, by authoring the use of force in 
Resolution 678, should not be presumed to have intended the maximum use of force that might 
" Ibid, p 128. These remarks was made in the context of incident of 1998, when the US and the UK asserted 
that they had the authority under Resolution 678 to use of force to compel Iraqi compliance with the UN inspection obligations under Resolution 687, not in the context of the invasion of 2003. However, these 
remarks are applicable for the later situation. 72 Ibid, p 129 
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be inferred from a broad authorization. 73 Moreover, force should be used to the benefit of the 
international community, not individual states. Too broad an interpretation of the authorization 
of force would allow powerful states to act in their own self-interest, under the cloak of UN 
authorization, possibly to the detriment of the international community as a whole. 74 Finally, the 
fundamental values of the Charter require that the Security Council retain strict control over the 
initiation, duration and objectives of the use of force in international relations. 75 Therefore, he 
concluded that the Charter principles suggest that the less extensive view of Resolution 678 
should be presumed to prevail, unless there is clear evidence of a different intention. 
This view, however, is not consistent with the rules of interpretation. The issue of extensiveness 
or restrictiveness does not refer to the rules of interpretation per se. The interpretation is based 
on the text of the resolution. One or other type of interpretation may be preferred in a given 
case, according to whether it produced a restrictive or extensive result, but the terms extensive 
and restrictive do not connote distinctive methods as such that could be applied to the 
resolution. 76 As to Resolution 678, in fact, the Security Council has never readily authorized the 
use of force, neither in the present case nor in any preceding or subsequent case. 77 The Council 
resorts to forcible measures after peaceful means and non-forcible measures have been totally 
exhausted. This is evidenced by the fact that the Council has adopted 11 resolutions demanding 
non-forcible end for the crisis before authorizing the use of force. 78 However, according to the 
rule of "effectiveness", when the Council authorizes the use of military force as the sole and last 
73 Ibid 
74 Ibid, p 127 
7s Ibid 
76 Simma, note 11 supra, p 32 
" Yoo, note 6 supra, p 567 
78 These resolutions are; Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990, Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990, Resolution 662 
of 9 August 1990, Resolution 664 of 18 August 1990, Resolution 665 of 25 August 1990, Resolution 666 of 13 September 1990, Resolution 667 of 17 September 1990, Resolution 669 of 24 September 1990, Resolution 670 of 25 September 1990, Resolution 674 of 29 October 1990 and Resolution 677 of 28 November 1990 
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resort, its authorization should be interpreted in its fullest weight and to give the utmost effect to 
the purpose of the text, otherwise, the Council decisions may be flouted and fail as the other 
means have failed. 
In practice, confining the interpretation of a resolution by the general principles or provisions of 
the United Nations Charter could be confusing and may lead to misunderstanding of the true 
meaning of the text and the intentions of the drafters. Political and diplomatic considerations 
may require that the text of a resolution to be formulated in a way that does not contain specific 
terms such as the word "force". For example, in the negotiation history of Resolution 678 of 
1990 the United States apparently wanted an explicit reference to the use of military force 
against Iraq, but owing to Soviet objections the Council substituted the expression "all necessary 
means. "79 Nevertheless, it was clearly understood that the Council's intent was to authorize the 
use of force. 80 Similarly, the word "force" was not used in the cases of Korea, 81 Somalia, 82 
Rwanda, 83 or Haiti. 84 However, there was also a general consent that this language means that 
the Council has authorized the use of military force. If the principles of prohibiting the use of 
force and peaceful settlement of disputes are to be taken as general and rigid limitations, neither 
resolution could be interpreted to mean the use of force; which is clearly incorrect and against 
what was intended by the drafters. From a different point of view, the constructions of these 
79 Woodward, B. The Commanders, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p 334 80 See generally UN Doc. S/PV. 2963. Council members clearly understood "all necessary means" to include 
military action, Security Council 2963`a meetings, SCOR 1990. Mr. Qian Qichen the Representative of 
China, stated that "all necessary means 
. 
in essence, permits the use of military action"), ibid p 62; Mr. Clark 
the Representative of Canada, stated that the "means" in the Iraq resolution "include the use of force", ibid at 
71; Mr. Hurd, the Representative of the U. K, referring to the resolution as "the military option", ibid p 81-82; 
Mr. Baker the Representative of the U. S., stated that the "[Iraq] resolution is very clear. The words authorize 
the use of force" ibid, p 103. Only the Representative of Malaysia understood that further approval was 
needed before military action been taken. Mr. Abu Hassan, the Representative of Malaysia, stated that "any 
proposed use of force must be brought before the Council for its approval. " " Ibid, at 76 1 In Resolution 83 of 27 June 1950, the Council used the phrase "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack. " 82 Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December, 1992; see Chapter 3, note 75 83 Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June, 1994; see Chapter 3, note 76 84 Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July, 1994; see Chapter 8, note 155 
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resolutions, in fact, leave the decision as to what measures, e. g. military force, or some lesser 
measure short is needed, to the discretion of member States. This being so, if they decide to use 
military force, they would be doing so with Security Council approval-85 Again, if the restrictive 
method of interpretation is to be applied, actions taken in those situations could be seen as a 
violation of the principles of the UN Charter because the peaceful means were not exhausted by 
the acting members first. 
Therefore, in conclusion, it seems more appropriate to interpret such a resolution as it stands and 
to give effect to intention of the drafters rather than take as prerequisite a restrictive view of 
interpretation and compulsory reference to the Charter principles. As for the obligation of 
peaceful settlement of disputes, as long as the Council has authorized the use of force, its 
decision undoubtedly implies that peaceful means and non-forcible measures have already been 
exhausted. 
CZ Textual interpretation for Resolution 678 
Having reviewed the arguments and theories for interpretation of Security Council resolutions 
and reached the conclusion that Resolution 678 should be interpreted as it stands without 
applying prerequisite restrictive view, the following parts of this section embark on textual 
interpretation of that resolution in light of its purposes and objectives in order to find out: what 
the Council actually intended by the language of Resolution 678; merely to oust Iraq out of 
Kuwait or did it have other broader intentions behind the text? And did the Council intend by the 
permanent cease-fire established in Resolution 687 to terminate its prior authorization of force? 
C. 2.1 The natural and ordinary meaning of words 
Resolution 678, after extensive negotiations taking account of all legal and political 
considerations, was drafted precisely in order to give expression to the intentions of the 
8S Quigley, J. "The `Privatization' of the Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateral ism", 17 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1996, p 262 
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members, and must be presumed to do so. From a purely textual approach and according to the 
principles of good faith and the ordinary meaning of the words, the language "Authorizes 
Member States.. 
. 
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and 
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" 
should be interpreted to say that the Council's intention was not only to drive Iraq out of Kuwait 
but also to leave room for other actions that might reasonably be related to ensuring continued 
peace and security and eliminating aggression in the region. The use of the term "and" is a clear 
textual evidence of this specific intent. Moreover, it could be argued that the textual approach- 
and according to the principles of good faith and ordinary meaning of words-yields an 
extensive view of the text. Although the text seems clear on its face, Professor Ranter disputed 
this meaning, albeit without giving any other interpretation. He suggested that the phrase "and to 
restore international peace and security in the area" in Resolution 678 and similarly in Resolution 
83(1950) in the case of Korea was "unnecessary 
," 
"essentially boilerplate" and "added no clear 
meaning or objectives to either the 1950 Korean War or the 1990 Persian Gulf War 
authorization. "86 In both cases, he argues, the legitimate objectives of the forcible action could be 
expressed and served without "such open-ended language. "87 He attributed this "problematic 
expression" to the "poor drafting or insufficient attention to linguistic precision. "88 
What this argument seems to suggest is that this phrase should be omitted in the interpretation 
process. However, there is no rule or theory of interpretation whatsoever that permits the 
omission of a word or a phrase from the document. At any rate, it is irrational and against the 
principles of good faith and the ordinary meaning to suggest that the Security Council intended 
nothing by inserting this phrase. This proposition finds support in the ICJ judgment in the Corfu 
86 Ratner, note 67 supra, p 140-1 87 Ibid, p 141 
88 Ibid, p 140 at footnotes 
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Channel case. The Court in interpreting a Special Agreement said: "It would indeed be 
incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision 
... 
should be devoid of purport or effect. "89 Furthermore, as stated in Article 31(4), "a special 
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. " Thus, the natural 
and ordinary meaning can only be displaced by direct evidence that the terms used are to be 
understood in another sense than the natural and ordinary one. No such direct evidence has been 
submitted to suggest the negation of that phrase. 
The natural and ordinary meaning of Resolution 678 was rejected on the ground that it appears to 
be virtually limitless. "Restoring international peace and security", in the absence of any more 
specific definition, could justify occupying Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein's regime, or bombing 
Iraq's military capacity 90 In fact, the phrase "to restore international peace and security" cannot 
be defined on legal basis; its only definition is of political nature. 91 To put it simply, how it can 
be determined that international peace and security has been restored in legal terms? Indeed, this 
determination can only be made on a political basis. But, the Council is a political organization, 
which formulates its resolutions from a political rather than a legal perspective. Therefore, if the 
interpretation chosen by'the Council-albeit perhaps for political reasons, is legally and logically 
possible, it is perfectly entitled to make such a choice 92 Thus, the difficulty of defining 
"restoring international peace and security" on a legal basis, does not preclude such an 
interpretation on political and logical grounds. Such ambiguity can be clarified by taking account 
89 Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p 24 
90 Ratner, note 67 supra, p 139-40; see also Rostow, E. "Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self- 
Defence? ", 85 AJIL, p 516; A similar view was expressed by the Representative of Malaysia in the Security 
Council during the drafting of Resolution 678. He argued that the Resolution "does not provide a blank 
cheque for excessive and indiscriminate use of force. " UN Doc. S/PV. 2963. p 76-77 
91 As mentioned in Chapter 1, Professor Henkin has observed that the term "threat to international peace and 
security" in the UN Charter "is not capable of legal definition, but only of political determination by a 
political body. " Henkin, L. "Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International 
Law", 60 Alabama Law Review, 1997, p 575; see also Chapter 1, section C. 1.1 
92 Kunz, note 9 supra, p 138 
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of the surrounding political considerations. Furthermore, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
the condition of proportionality would limit the degree of force employed to what is reasonably 
necessary to promptly secure the permissible objectives 93 Hence, in the present case, the US and 
the UK would not be able not justify coercive measures unnecessarily taken to achieve the 
restoration of international peace and security in the region. Accordingly, there is no need to 
employ a restrictive interpretation of Security Council Resolution 678 and challenge the 
principle of natural and ordinary meaning of the words, as there is a condition already serving 
the same function. Finally, even if it is accepted that the term "restor[ing] international peace and 
security" is not clearly defined in the text of Resolution 678, a systematic interpretation of 
Resolution 678 and Resolution 687 gives a clear definition of this phrase. Resolution 687 made it 
clear that the "restoration of international peace and security" in the region will be achieved by 
eliminating Iraq's war-making power, as will be examined below. 
Taking all the above arguments into account, one can conclude that the Council's intention was 
broader than merely driving the Iraqi troops out of the Kuwaiti territories and consequently, the 
mandate of Resolution 678 was not terminated by achieving this goal. In other words, the 
drafters' will was to accomplish some other goal or goals alongside the obvious one; therefore, 
they deliberately adopted such broad language. 
C. 2.2 Systematic interpretation in connection with Resolutions 686 and 687 
To achieve an exact understanding of the literal meaning of the language of Resolution 678 and 
to investigate the intentions of the founders, Resolution 678 should be interpreted in light of all 
other resolutions concerning the present case, in particular, Resolutions 686 and 687. As 
mentioned above, this proposition is consistent with the "systematic" principle of interpretation 
and the provisions of Vienna Convention. Resolutions 686 and 687 fell into the category of 
93 See Chapter 3, section D 
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"agreements relating" to the context of Resolution 678 according to Article 31(2) (a). They are 
also "subsequent agreements" that should be taken into account in interpreting the latter, 
according to Article 31(3) (a) of the Convention. 
Resolution 686 laid down basic terms of the "definitive end to the hostilities" after the U. N. 
coalition had unilaterally suspended offensive combat operations. In this resolution the Council 
expressly preserved the authorization in Resolution 678 to use "all necessary means", including 
the use of force, to ensure compliance with the cease-fire obligations. 94 Although Resolution 687 
did not use the same explicit language, it recalled and affirmed all the thirteen previous 
resolutions 95 It was argued, in the context of Resolution 678, that the term "restore" used in the 
text shows that the Council intended nothing more than to expel Iraq from Kuwait; "restoration 
means returning to the status quo prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "96 However, this 
interpretation seems to be implausible when read in the light of Resolution 687. In the Preamble 
of the latter resolution the Council welcomed "the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government, "97 however, 
the Council did not welcome the restoration of "international peace and security in the area. " 
Hence, the term "restore" in Resolution 678 was not intended to refer to the status quo prior to 
the invasion, but was connected to the term "international peace and security in the area. " This 
statement confirms the view that the Council intended some other goal or goals along with the 
liberation of Kuwait. 
In the carefully worded preamble of Resolution 687 the Council expressed concerns about the 
intentions of the Iraqi regime and reaffirmed "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions 
94 See Chatper 5, section A. 1 
95 Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 
96 Ratner, note 67 supra, p 140, at footnotes 
97 Preamble of Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 
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in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. "98 Reference was made to reports 
of Iraq's failure to fulfil its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Saddam's 
threats to use chemical weapons and Iraq's failure to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention. 
Mention was also made of Iraq's unprovoked use of ballistic missiles against Israel and its 
history of deployment of chemical weapons. In the light of these observations, the Council 
stressed the "objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent 
resolutions of the Security Council"99 
The repetition of the same language used in Resolution 678 together with the hint "as set out in 
recent resolutions" indicates that this language was not used arbitrarily in the early resolution. 
The wording of the preamble linked the ultimate "objective of restoring international peace and 
security in the area" to the disarmament of Iraq and, in a broader scope, to "the establishment in 
the Middle East of a zone free... [of weapons of mass destruction] 
... 
using all available 
means. , 
ioo In other words, when reading Resolutions 678 and 687 together, it is obviously that 
the Council perceived that "international peace and security in the area" could only be achieved 
by eliminating Iraq's war-making power. Furthermore, the wording of the Preamble and the 
following disarmament obligations imposed upon Iraq shows that simply driving Iraq out of 
Kuwait without reducing its military capabilities provided no guarantee that it would not commit 
similar aggression in the future1°' and did not secure the ultimate objective of "restoring 
international peace and security in the area. " Logically, if the Council was satisfied by the 
achievement of driving Iraq out of Kuwait, there would be no reason for imposing such 
obligations as were laid upon Iraq by Resolution 687. Such obligations, coupled with the 
9s Ibid 
99 Ibid 
100 Resolution 687, China and the nonaligned states sought to make the disarmament of Iraq the first move towards a more comprehensive goal of regional disarmament. Johnstone, note 58 supra, p 16 101 Johnstone, ibid, p 21 
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deliberate omission of the termination the mandate of use of force, confirm the understanding 
that the mandate of Resolution 678 could be used in upholding the purposes of Resolution 687. 
Section (C) of the resolution requires the neutralization of Iraq's weapons machinery, monitoring 
of its future programme, and reaffirmation of its obligations under Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and its ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention 
of 1972. These conditions, in fact, had little relation to the invasion of Kuwait, since, apart from 
the Scud missile attacks, Saddam had not used weapons of mass destruction during the war. 102 
Two reasons can be cited for this disparity. First, Iraq had just committed its second unlawful act 
of aggression within ten years. Its manifest willingness to resort to force therefore justified the 
imposition of arms restrictions. Second, Iraq had demonstrated the willingness to threaten with 
or use weapons of mass destruction, as indicated in the Preamble. Although no explicit link was 
made between the weapons-related obligations and enforcement of the treaties, in the Council's 
view, Iraq's record of violation or non-ratification was evidence that it posed an ongoing threat 
to international peace and security. It was for this reason that Iraq was denied a right which all 
other States retained unless they yielded it voluntarily. '03 
At this point of interpretation, one could argue that the Council, while drafting Resolution 678- 
having in mind Iraqi regime's aggressive propensity, intended to formulate it in such broad 
language in order to leave room for further measures against Iraq, if necessary. Therefore, the 
authorization of use of force in Resolution 678 to "restore international peace and security in the 
area" could be used to achieve compliance with the disarmament obligations without the need for 
a new authorization or even an extension of the mandate of Resolution 678. Textual and 
teleological (according to its purposes and objects) interpretation of Resolution 687 would lead 
for the same meaning that the Council intended-among other objectives- to disarm Iraq in 
102 Ibid, p 20-1 
'03 Ibid, p 21 
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order to restore international peace and security in the region. Therefore, when reading 
Resolutions 678 and 687 together (systematic interpretation) and according to the rule of 
"effectiveness", one should interpret them in the most effective way to give effect to the 
intentions of the drafters. This view can find further support in the "subsequent practice" as a 
means of interpretation that reflects the understanding of the Council Members. 
C. 3 Teleological interpretational and the theory of implied authorization of force 
In the absence of effective UN sanctions, States flagrantly breach Council resolutions or pose a 
threat to peace in other ways, they should be sanctioned and made to respect the will of the 
Council in the interest of international peace and security. However, in practice, diplomatic and 
political considerations may prevent the Council from explicitly authorizing measures that some 
or even most of its members tacitly wish or at least would accept. The Council's inability to 
explicitly authorize the force that appears to be clearly necessary leads States and commentators 
to look for implied authorizations. ' 04 The theory of such implicit authorization in Security 
Council resolutions depends on the purpose of the resolution concerned, and on the ultimate 
purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, which may 
necessitate forceful action to remove threats to the peace. One suggestion is that when a State or 
a group of States adopts measures to enforce a Security Council resolution when the Council 
itself is unable to take action, those States are not acting unilaterally, but pursuant to a clearly 
articulated community mandate. '05 
It could be argued, however, that such action does not rely only on a community mandate, as 
suggested; but also on the Council's implicit mandate that exists in the text of the resolution. The 
theory of implied authorization, although it emerged out of the political necessity, has well- 
104 See generally, Wright, Q. "The Goa Incident", 56 AJIL, 1962; D'Amato, A. "Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor", 77 AJIL, 1983; Meeker, L. "Defensive Quarantine and the Law", 57 AJIL, 1963 105 D'Amato, ibid, p 587; Meeker, ibid, p 519-20; Ratner, note 67 supra, p 130-31 
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founded legal grounds, if applied correctly. As mentioned earlier, the teleological school of 
interpretation emphasizes that the text must be interpreted by reference to its objects, principles, 
and purposes, as declared, known, or to be presumed. Therefore, interpreting a resolution 
according to its purpose is not eschewing or tempering the formal textual rules. Although this 
approach is a secondary one, it is, sometimes, useful in the light of the political reality. 
Implied powers and authorizations are important aspects of teleological interpretation derived 
from the resolution purposes. This theory implies that members of the UN must be granted those 
authorizations which are essential for the execution of the resolution when the Council is unable 
to move forward for some diplomatic or political reasons. Thus, when the Council declares that 
there is a threat to international peace and security and orders its removal, its decision is made in 
the interest of the international community. If such a decision is ignored or violated and the 
Council is unable to authorize forceful measures explicitly against this breach, it should be 
presumed that the Council is undoubtedly willing to enforce those decisions. In other words, 
when the Council is blocked for political reasons, the assumption can be made that some of its 
powers are assigned to the member States of the UN or regional organizations to carry out the 
Council's decisions and to maintain world order. 106 As Oscar Schachter said, "It does not make 
sense to conclude that failure of the Council to endorse action by a State should bar that action 
when it is otherwise permitted by the Charter and international law. "' 07 
It may be argued that except in case of self-defence, unilateral use of force is completely banned 
by Article 2(4). Therefore, the use of force even to uphold Security Council resolution or 
maintain international peace and security needs a Council clear authorization otherwise it comes 
under the prohibition of Article 2(4). However, the prohibition of use of force in international 
relations embodied in Article 2(4) applies essentially to force that is "inconsistent with the 
106 Meeker, ibid, p 519 
107 Schachter, 0. "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 AJIL, 1991, p 459 at footnotes 
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purpose of the United Nations. " This is obviously not the case when a State or group of States 
uses force to enforce a Security Council resolution. Furthermore, it has been argued that if States 
are permitted to take unilateral military action on the basis of creative or disputed interpretations 
of ambiguities in Security Council resolutions or by the Council's failure to act, Article 2(4) 
would be rendered meaningless. Powerful States could use that theory to justify the use of force 
in their own national interests. 108 The UN, however, will still have the final word on the matter 
by endorsing, acquiescing in or, on the contrary, condemning the action. 
As to the present study, it is undoubted that the Council was willing to enforce its disarmament 
regime on Iraq as a measure deemed essential to "restore peace and security in the region. " 
However, owing to some political considerations, the Council did not explicitly authorize the use 
of force to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, depending on the theory of implied authorization, the 
clear purpose of Resolution 687 that Iraq's war-making power must be neutralized coupled with 
prior authorization of force, can be interpreted to suggest that the Council implicitly authorized 
the use of force to accomplish the its ultimate objective of disarming Iraq, especially after the 
non-forcible measures including the inspection regime appeared to be fruitless. Furthermore, 
theoretically-if the invasion had no political motives and was not based on the national interests 
of the acting States-the use of force to disarm Iraq and, consequently, to bring about peace and 
security to the region was not "inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations" and, 
therefore, not covered by the prohibition of use of force in international relations embodied in 
Article 2(4). However, even if this interpretation in itself cannot be accepted as a legal basis for 
the use of force against Iraq, for the reasons explained above, at least, it can be considered as an 
ancillary ground confirming the meaning resulted from the textual interpretation of Resolution 
678. 
108 Ratner, note 67 supra, p 134 
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C3.1 After-the fact authorization 
An interrelated theory in connection with the doctrine of implied authorization of force is the 
post-hoc authorization. That theory argues that Security Council authorization is not necessarily 
a prior authorization; instead, it could be after-the fact ratification. As one commentator 
suggested, "It should not be assumed that `authorization of the Security Council' automatically 
and necessarily means prior authorization. "' 09 Post-hoc authorization was also suggested by the 
USSR in September 1960, when the Soviet Representative in the Council asked the Council to 
endorse action had been already taken by the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics 
against the Dominican Republic in San Jose in the preceding month. The Soviet thinking 
evidently was that the Council could legitimately give its authorization after the fact. "0 
Practice of the Council on a few occasions reaffirmed this understanding. For example, in 
August 1990, armed forces from five member states of Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), without explicit Security Council authorization, intervened in Liberia to 
attempt to stop a civil war. l 1 After the fact, the Council's actions tacitly accepted and expressed 
praise for the intervention. 112 It was widely acknowledged that on this occasion the Security 
Council had implicitly authorized the use of force, and the fact that it was after the fact was 
uncontested. 113 Again in 1998, the ECOWAS intervened in Sierra Leone to restore democracy 
and reinstate President Kabbah to office without explicit authorization from the Security 
109 Meeker, note 104 supra, p 520 
1'0 SCOR, 893rd meeting, (8 September, 1960) p2 
111 See generally Mgbeoji, I. Collective Insecurity: The Liberian Crisis, Unilateralism, and Global Order, 
University of British Columbia Press, 2004; Wippman, D. "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian 
Civil War" in Damrosch, L., (ed), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York, 1993 
112 In Resolution 788 of 19 November, 1992 the Security Council "Commend[ed] ECOWAS for its efforts to 
restore peace, security and stability in Liberia. " 
113 Wippman, note 111 supra, p 185 
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Council. After the fact, the Council adopted Resolution 1162, commending the action. 114 
However, there is still the risk that a regional organization or individual states will be encouraged 
to take unilateral action in the hope of that they can later extract Security Council approval. ' 15 
On the other hand, some commentators have invoked the principle of implied authorization in 
attempt to legitimatize actions which obviously were not authorized by the Council and even in 
cases where no resolution was issued on the matter. 116 Therefore, it is suggested that appeal to 
this theory should be strictly confined to cases where there is a prior resolution (or resolutions) 
on the matter and the textual interpretation of this resolution (or resolutions) strongly suggests 
that the purposes of resolution can be achieved by military means. Of course, if these elements 
are present, most likely there will be no need to resort to such a means of interpretation. Hence, 
this proposition leads to the same result, that interpretation according to the theory of implied 
authorization can only be as a secondary means of interpretation to uphold the meaning arrived 
to by the textual interpretation, but not a legal ground on its own. 
As to the case of Iraq, despite the rejection of some of Council members, the course of action 
adopted by the Security Council in response to the invasion can be well interpreted as 
acquiescence in the invasion or after-the-fact authorization. Soon after the invasion, the Council 
adopted Resolution 1483. In the Preamble of that resolution, the Council "welcom[ed] the 
commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which" the 
114 Resolution 1162 of 17 April, 1998; on this case see Chapter 8, section C. 2.2. Similarly, India's seizure of 
Goa from Portugal in 1961 was justified as enforcing for the UNGA resolutions against colonialism. 
Eventually, the Security Council has acquiesced in India's takeover of Goa which was perceived as an after- 
the-fact authorization. Wright, note 104 supra, p 617. Many commentators also viewed the Council's 
subsequent actions for the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 as ratification for the intervention after the 
fact. Louis Henkin, for example, suggested that Resolution 1244 was a "formal ratification by an affirmative 
vote of the Council. " Henkin, L. "Kosovo and the Law of `Humanitarian Intervention"', 93 AJIL, 1999, p 
827 
1's Ratner, note 67 supra, p 132 
116 Professor Anthony D'Amato's suggested that the Israeli 1981 air strike against the Osiraq nuclear reactor 
was an example of implicit Security Council approval of an armed action. Although, the Security Council 
strongly condemned the air strike in Resolution 487 of 1981, however, D'Amato took this to be purely for form's sake, because it contained no sanctions against Israel. D'Amato, note 104 supra, p 587 
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Iraqi people can freely "determine their own political future. "' 17 The Council also expressed the 
willingness of the United Nations "to play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction 
of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative 
governance. "' 18 Importantly, the Council unequivocally "recognize[ed] the specific authorities, 
responsibilities, and obligations" of the occupying powers under international law. 119 In the 
operative part of the resolution, the Council, acting under Chapter VII, requested Member States 
of the United Nations "to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are 
alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring them to 
justice. "120 Thus, in no way can this resolution be interpreted to mean that the Council deplored 
or condemned the invasion. On the contrary, the language of the resolution indicates that the 
Council tacitly accepted the intervention, in a post-hoc authorization. 
C. 4 Interpretation by Practice 
Assuming that there is an ambiguity in the wording of text of Resolution 678, therefore, recourse 
will be made to the subsequent practice to investigate the understanding of Council members for 
that resolution and/or to confirm the meaning arrived to through the textual interpretation. As 
mentioned above, in the context of Security Council resolutions, the practice of the Security 
Council-as an institutional organ-and that of member States must be distinguished. The 
practice of the Council, including the institutional decisions and the modalities for decision- 
making, such as authorizing the use of force or the termination of such a mandate, can be 
inferred from the Council's previous and subsequent attitude in similar cases. On the other hand, 
the practice of member States is their attitude in carrying out a decision or practicing a mandate, 
which reflects their understanding of the resolution in question. 
117 Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003 
118 Ibid 
1 19 Ibid 
120 Ibid. Operative para. 3 
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When considering Council practice (as a body), a potential difficulty is whether it is possible 
legally to evaluate a consistent and permanent practice on the part of the Council, when the 
resolution concerned was keenly debated by the member States at the time of adoption and so 
may not reflect a consensus of opinion and intention. However, it is not necessary that the 
practice of the Council should represent a common or unanimous agreement among all member 
states. 
121 What is important, for interpretation purposes, is the agreement of the majority of 
member states, including the five permanent members, in any given case. 
With regard to the subsequent practice of member States in implementing such a resolution, in 
theory, such practice should reflect both the historical intentions of the original supporters of the 
resolution and a dynamic consensus based on the resolution purpose at the time of 
interpretation. 122 However, a difficulty may arise in reconciling the original intention of the 
founders of the given resolution and the practice of member States at the time of the 
interpretation. The constant changing of the Council members and the shifting of political 
considerations and ideologies of some permanent members will make the evaluation of such 
practice more complicated. Presumably the question to be asked in this context is how much of a 
unified practice of member States concerned can be considered a reflection of a common 
understanding regarding the interpretation of such a resolution. Obviously, a common practice by 
member States concerned may very well indicate such interpretational consensus; however, this 
is rare. The practice of member States is most likely to be disputed among the Council members. 
In case of dispute or controversy over the practice in application, the attitude of the Council in 
response to the practice in question should be taken into account. If the Council welcomed or 
acquiesced to the practice in application, that practice should be considered to reflect a common 
121 Simma, note 11 supra, p 28 122 Ibid 
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understanding among member states. By contrast, if the Council condemned the practice, it 
should be disregarded and not taken into account. 
C. 4.1 Subsequent practice of the Council Members regarding resolution 678 
In the case in question, Iraq for a period of several years was implacable in refusing to cooperate 
with diplomatic and other peaceful means to induce it to meet its obligations to disarm and to 
allow UN inspectors full access to its WMD programme. This intransigence led UNSCOM, and 
many States, to conclude that Iraq maintained significant biological and chemical weapons 
capability in defiance of the ban. 123 Therefore, the Security Council several times declared Iraq 
to be in "material breach" or "flagrant violation" of the conditions imposed by Resolution 687, 
and warned of "serious consequences. " 124 Moreover, Council allies more than once threatened or 
used force in order to fulfil the mandate of Resolution 
(I) The incident of 1993 
On January 7,1993, Iraqi officials withdrew UNSCOM's access to the Habbaniyah airfield, 
which meant that short-notice inspection would no longer be possible. 125 The Security Council, 
in a Presidential Statements, condemned Iraq's decision and warned of "serious 
consequences. " 126 On January 13,1993, the United States, the United Kingdom and France 
carried out air strikes on targets in southern Iraq in an attempt to restore inspectors' access to the 
air facilities they needed. 127 These raids were not expressly authorized by a new Council 
123 Murphy, S. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 93 AJIL, 1999, p 
472 
124 See Chapter 5, section A. 2 
125 UN Department of Public Information, The UN and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996 (Introduction b. 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN) UN/Sales No. E. 96.1.3,1996, p 86-7; see also Wedgwood, R. "The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threats of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", 92 AJIL, 1998, p 727 
126 Statements by the President of the Security Council, UN. Docs S/25081 and S/250911 (8 and 11 Januar-. 1993) 
'Z' Wedgwood, note 125 supra, p 727 
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resolution. However, they were not condemned by the Council and no objection was raised by 
member States. 128 On the contrary, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on 14 January 
1993, said, "The raid yesterday, and the forces which carried out the raid, have received a 
mandate from the Security Council, according to Resolution 687 concerning the cease-fire. So, 
as Secretary-General of the United Nations, I can say that this action was taken and conforms to 
the resolutions of the Security Council and conforms to the Charter of the United Nations. " 129 
(ID The incident of 1998 
On March 2nd, after Iraqi officials disrupted the inspection process, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1154 which approved the Memorandum of Understanding concluded 
between the Iraqi authorities and the Secretary-General for continuing compliance with 
inspection regime. 130 However, the Resolution also warned that any failure by Iraq to provide 
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" would "have the severest consequences. , 131 
During the debate on this resolution, several States, Russia, China and France among them 
expressed the view that it could not relied upon to provide what the Chinese delegate called 
"automatic authorization of the use of force against Iraq. " 132 
In August 1998, Iraq, in breach of its renewed commitments, suspended cooperation with the 
UNSCOM and on October 31,1998, Iraq formally halted all cooperation with the inspection 
128 Ibid, p 727-8 
129 Quoted in "Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of 
Force", available at <http: //www. ico. gov. uk/cros/documentuploads/annex> 130 In early 1998, after the inspectors failed to gain admittance to what, at the time, were called the 
presidential palaces, the Council allies declared their willingness to use military force to force Iraq to comply 
with its obligations. In an attempt to avert tension and secure Iraq's cooperation with the conditions of 
Resolution 687, the Secretary-General in February 1998 obtained a renewed declaration of commitment from 
Iraq. Murphy, note 123 supra, p 472; Wedgwood, "The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: 
The Threats of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", note 125 supra, p 725-7; see also 
Memorandum of Understanding (23 February, 1998), UN. Doc. S/1998/166 (1998) 
131 Security Council Resolution 1154 of 2 March, 1998 132 Statement by the Chinese Representative, UN. Doc. S/PV. 3858, p 14,1998; Russia p 15, France p 18 
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teams. 133 At the meeting of the Security Council on November 5,1998, the United Kingdom 
Representative warned of a possible revival of legal authorization for states to use force against 
Iraq if the latter seriously breached its obligations under Resolution 687; the U. S. representative 
simply asserted that the United States had sufficient authority to use force. 134 However, on 
December 15, Executive Chairman Butler reported to the Security Council that the commission 
"is not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security 
Council. "135 The following day, in face of this evidence of Iraq's continuing non-compliance, the 
UK and the USA embarked on Operation Desert Fox, a limited air campaign against Iraqi 
military sites, without new authorization from the Security Council. 136 
Views in the Council towards the air strikes were, however, split. China, France, and Russia 
condemned them, mainly because the allies had acted without waiting for the matter to be 
debated at the Security Council. 137 Russia called the attack an "unprovoked act of force" that 
"violated the principles of international law and the principle of the Charter. "138 On the contrary, 
the US and the UK repeatedly insisted that they had sufficient authority to use force against Iraq 
if it did not fully comply with its disarmament obligations. 139 
(III) The no-fly zones and Resolution 688 
The no-fly zones are an additional practice in application by States related to Resolution 678 
authorization of force to "restore international peace and security in the area. " The 
implementation of such zones, notwithstanding that it had nothing to do with disarmament 
133 See letters dated 31 October, 1998 and 2 November, 1998 from the Deputy Executive Chairman of ft Special Committee Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN. Docs. S/1998/1023 2n3 S/1998/1032 
134 UN. Doc. S/PV. 3939, (5 November, 1998); see also Murphy, note 123 supra, p 473 135 Letter dated 15 December, 1998, from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting the UNSCOM and IAEA Reports, UN Doc. S/1998/1172 
136 Murphy, note 123 supra, p 474 
137 UN. Doc. S/PV 3955 (16 December, 1998); Murphy, ibid, p 477 138 Security Council Press Release, SC/6611 (16 December, 1998) p4 139 Security Council Press Release, SC/6611, ibid, UK p 5, US p8 also Japan supported the action, ibid, p9 
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obligations of Resolution 687, was undertaken for the same goal, namely, to "restore 
international peace and security in the area. " Humanitarian concerns raised by the savage 
aggression against dissident minorities in Iraq after the end of war led to demands for the 
Security Council to intervene and proposals for military action by the coalition forces. 14° Of 
particular concern was the increase in region instability caused by the flight of large numbers of 
Kurdish and Shiite opponents into neighbouring Turkey and Iran. 141 In these circumstances, 
Resolution 688 was adopted with the support of the majority of member States, just two days 
after the adoption of Resolution 687.142 The resolution condemned Iraq's repression of the Kurds 
and other groups as a threat to international peace and security. The Council linked the 
"restoration of international peace and security in the area" to the immediate "end of this 
repression. -)9143 The resolution was regarded as providing a basis for continuing economic 
sanctions, but no explicit mention was made of military action. '44 
With the continued use of force by Iraq against dissident minority refugees, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, without recourse to or endorsement from the Council, set up no- 
fly zones or enclaves, in order to protect Iraqi Kurds from repression by Iraqi troops. They 
argued that Resolution 688 implicitly authorized the use of force for patrolling these zones and to 
provide safe havens to the Kurdish refugees. l45 Their failure to seek Council authorization was 
attributed to the fact that China and Russia would have opposed such a proposal. 146 
However, the fact that the allies acted without explicit Security Council endorsement, together 
with the basic principle in the Charter that States should not intervene in matters essentially 
140 See generally Stromseth, J. "Iraq's Repression of its Civilian Population: Collective Response and 
Continuing Challenges" in Damrosch, L. [ed. ] Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal 
Conflicts, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p 77 141 Schachter, note 107 supra, p 468 
142 Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April, 1991 was adopted by a vote of 10 to 3, with two abstentions 143 Ibid 
144 Schachter, note 107 supra, p 468 145 Stromseth, note 140 supra, p 77 146 Ibid, p 100 
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within another State's domestic jurisdiction, were taking by dissenting Council members as 
reasons for condemning the use of troops in the safety zones as serious violation of the 
Charter. 147 This was the view taken by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, who 
concluded that deployment of foreign troops on Iraqi territory required either the express 
authorization of the Security Council or Iraqi consent. 148 Against this proposition, it has been 
argued that Resolution 688 implicitly authorized the use of force to protect Iraq's dissenting 
minorities. In particular, that the resolution requested the Secretary-General to "use all the 
resources at his disposal.. 
. 
to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced 
Iraqi population. ""' In fact, most of the Council members acquiesced in the safe-haven 
operation. 150 
(10 Assessment of the "subsequent practice" 
The question now is whether this practice can be considered a subsequent practice of Resolutions 
678 and 687 that "establishes the understanding of the parties" that "serious violation" of the 
disarmament obligations on the part of Iraq triggered the authorization of force of Resolution 
678. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that the use of force in these episodes supports the view that 
compliance by Iraq with its disarmament obligations was an essential part of restoring peace and 
security in the region, and that obstruction of the inspections was a material violation of the 
cease-fire. '5' Consequently, it confirms the view that the mandate of Resolution 678, for using 
force, had not expired and could be used to force the disarmament obligations upon Iraq. This 
view is supported by the fact that the Council did not condemn these actions; therefore, its 
147 Schachter, note 107 supra, p 469 
148 Ibid 
149 Ibid, p 469 at footnotes; Stromseth, note 140 supra, p 100 150 Ramer, note 67 supra, p 132 
's' Yoo, note 6 supra, p 569; Wedgwood, "The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates 3. N' Preemptive Self-Defence", note 64 supra, 579 
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posture can be considered as one of acceptance or acquiescence to the practice in application, 
despite the disputes raised by some members. 
On the contrary, arguments can be made to suggest that these actions cannot be taken as 
subsequent practice because they did not represent a common understanding among the members 
of the Council, especially as some members, including three of the permanent members, 
expressed the view that resolutions condemning the Iraqi violations for its cease-fire obligations 
did not "automatically" revive the mandate of Resolution 678 and further negotiation among the 
Council members would be required to use force in response to the Iraqi defiance. In addition, 
the fact that the Council did not condemn the actions taken by the US, the UK and France, in the 
1993 episode only, was not a sign of approval or acquiescence on the part on the Council. This 
silence on the part of the Council was due to the political reality that the Council almost certainly 
would be blocked from condemning the practice in application by the veto power of those 
members. 
From a purely legal viewpoint, leaving aside the political factors, the argument advanced by 
China, France, and Russia in 1998 that the matter should have been debated at the Security 
Council before the action was undertaken undermines the legal status of UN Security Council 
enactments. 152 In 1991, the members of the Security Council unanimously agreed to authorize 
the use of force against Iraq, an agreement expressed in the written text of Resolution 678. The 
text had not been altered, nor circumstances changed, since then. If the current members of the 
Security Council disagreed with Resolution 678, they could have repealed it. The view that 
Resolution 678's authorization was invalidated by the different opinions of some of the current 
152 Yoo, ibid, p 568 
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members of the Council would reduce Council resolutions to the status of recorded temporary 
diplomatic agreement, rather than legal enactments with lasting effect. '53 
Against this proposition, it might be argued that those States could not repeal Resolution 678 
because the US and the UK would simply veto any attempt to do so. However, in the face of the 
veto power, resort can be made to the General Assembly to decide on the matter. This is not a 
theoretical assumption; on some occasions in the past, when the Council was blocked by veto, 
such resort to the General Assembly was made, as in the cases of Korea in 1950 and the Suez 
crisis in 1956. Furthermore, the argument advanced by China, France and Russia implicitly 
suggests that every succeeding resolution is to be considered initially as an alteration to the 
original resolution, unless the current members agree that it was not intended as such. One could 
ask why this intention was written in the text of the resolution, although it is generally accepted 
that any legal text should be drafted in way that gives full effect to the intentions of the founders. 
The view adopted by those three States treats Security Council resolutions as ad hoc executive 
edicts, rather than legislative acts. Accepting such a position would leave considerable doubt as 
to their legal force and period of effectiveness. 154 Finally, from a political point of view, France's 
contradictory positions in 1993 and 1998, although the facts regarding the Iraqi resistance had 
not changed, illustrates how changes in national ideologies would affect the interpretation of 
Council resolutions and, consequently if followed by the Council, would lead the Council to lose 
its credibility and cause instability in world affairs. 
The argument advanced here finds support in the view expressed by the UN Secretary-General, 
Kofi Annan when he brushed aside any suggestion that a new Council resolution was needed for 
military action. In March 1998, when he was asked whether any future forcible action would 
require a new Security Council resolution, he gave a careful answer, saying that the United 
153 Ibid 
154 Ibid 
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States had consulted broadly during the recent events, and would undoubtedly continue to do so. 
He went on to say, "If the US had to strike I think some sort of consultation would be 
required. " 55 This careful answer, with its significant omissions, may well recapitulate the 
international law governing the continuing problem of the enforcement of Resolution 687. Thus, 
one can conclude that since the Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations did not 
condemn the actions taken by the US and the UK in 1993 and 1998 and France in 1993 these 
practices, although controversial, reaffirmed the understanding that the authorization of force in 
Resolution 678 was not expired and could be used in forcing the disarmament obligations upon 
Iraq. This proposition is enhanced further by the practice of France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States in establishing the protective enclaves in northern and southern Iraq. This 
operation and the fact that most of Security Council members acquiesced in it, confirms the 
understanding that the mandate of Resolution 678 did not expire after the cease-fire but rather 
covered other measures-as decided by the Council-to ensure peace and security in the region. 
C. 4.2 The Council' practice in terminating the authorization of force 
The question almost certainly to be asked, is would the Council authorization of using force 
established by Resolution 678 remain forever? Exploring the practice of the Council in similar 
occasions can manifestly answer this question. The Security Council has not readily authorized 
the use of force in the past, nor has it rescinded those decisions lightly. When the Security 
Council has taken the significant step of terminating its authorization to use force, it has only 
done so in one of two ways: either by expressly declaring the end of the prior authorization or by 
setting an up-front time limit on the authorization. '56 In the case of Bosnia, for example, the 
Security Council ended the legal authority for the use of force by expressly terminating the 
155 This Week : Remarks of Secretary-General Kofi Annan (ABC television broadcast, 8 March, 1998), in 
Fed. Doc. Clearing House, Transcript No. 98030802-j 12, available at Lexis/Nexis Library, News File 156 Yoo, note 6 supra, p 567 
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previous authorization in a separate resolution. Security Council's Resolution 1031 (1995) 
decided that "the authority to take certain measures conferred upon states by [various 
resolutions] shall be terminated. "' 57 In the case of the UN mission in Somalia, when the Security 
Council extended the authorization, in Resolution 954 (1994), it clearly established that this was 
for a "final period" until 31 March, 1995.1 58 Furthermore in the case of Rwanda, Resolution 929 
specified that "the mission of Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General will be 
limited to a period of two months following the adoption of the present resolution, if not 
earlier. " 59 With regard to the case of Haiti, the Security Council preferred to reserve for itself 
the role of deciding whether the conditions for termination of its mandate had been fulfilled. In 
Resolution 940 the Council decided that "the multinational force will terminate its 
mission.... when a secure and stable environment has been established... [as determined] by the 
Security Council, taking into account recommendations from the Member States of the 
multinational force. "160 Security Council practice has been consistent on this point over a many 
years. Resolution 678, by contrast, contains no such time limit, nor has any resolution been 
adopted relating to Iraq, explicitly ending the resolution's mandate for the use of force. In the 
absence of any explicit expression by the Council, using such terms as in the past, that it has 
terminated Resolution 678's authorization for the use of force, any such authorization would 
remain valid. 
Conclusion 
The natural and ordinary meaning of the text of Resolution 678 clearly indicates that the 
Council's intention was broader than merely driving the Iraqi troops out of the Kuwaiti territories 
and consequently, the mandate of Resolution 678 was not terminated by achieving this goal. The 
'' Security Council Resolution 1031 of 15 December, 1995 
iss Security Council Resolution 954 of 4 November, 1994 
159 Security Council Resolution 929 of 31 March, 1995 
160 Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July, 1994 
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drafters of this resolution were willing to accomplish some other goal or goals alongside the 
obvious one; therefore, they deliberately adopted such broad language. Although this additional 
goal was not specified in the text of Resolution 678, the Council elucidated its object in the 
subsequent Resolution 687 when it determined that "international peace and security in the area" 
can only be achieved by disarming Iraq and eliminating its war-making power. Thus, when 
reading Resolution 678 in light of Resolution 687, according to the systematic rule of 
interpretation, it becomes clear that the authorization of force can be used to liberate Kuwait 
"and to restore international peace and security" by enforcing the disarmament regime upon Iraq 
by forcible means, if necessary. As a result, no fresh authorization was needed. This meaning 
arrived to by the textual interpretation can also be reached by the teleological approach and 
according to the principles of implied authorization. 
Furthermore, analysis of the practice of member States is their attitude in carrying out the 
mandate of Resolution 678, although controversial, reaffirmed the understanding that the 
authorization of force in Resolution 678 was not expired and could be used in forcing the 
disarmament obligations upon Iraq, especially that these practices were not condemned by the 
Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. This understanding of 
Resolution 678 is further supported by the practice of the Security Council in termination its 
authorization of force. Examination of these practice shows that the Council is consistent on 
terminating the mandate of force either by expressly declaring the end of the prior authorization 
or by setting an up-front time limit on the authorization. Neither of those explicit expressions has 
been articulated regarding Resolution 678, therefore, the mandate of that resolution remains 
valid. Finally, the attitude of the Council after the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom indicates that 
the Council tacitly accepted the intervention, in a post-hoc authorization. 
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Chapter 5 
Security Council Resolution 687 and the Law of Armistice - 
Introduction 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, US and UK officials claimed that the finding that Iraq 
was in material breach of its obligation under the cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687) gave rise 
to the right of the coalition forces to suspend or terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities 
without new authorization of use of force. ' This argument, however, has been dismissed by some 
members of the Council, arguing that a material breach by Iraq of its obligations under 
Resolution 687 does not "automatically" authorize the US and the UK to resume hostilities and, 
to do so requires a new explicit authorization of use of force by the Council. 
This chapter investigates the validity of the US and the UK claim under the rules of armistice in 
international law. The first section will highlight the cease-fire Resolution 687 and the related 
resolutions which determined that Iraq was in material breach of the cease-fire obligations. The 
second will examine the pertinent rules of customary international law on the subject of armistice 
agreements and whether these rules have been affected by the law of the UN Charter in order to 
determine the applicability of these rules to the present case. The third section focuses on the 
Vienna Convention's rules on the termination of treaties and the extent to which those rules may 
be applied in case of violation of a cease-fire agreement. 
1 See, for example, Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to 
the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/351; Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney General, 
"Memorandum on the legality of military action against Iraq", available 1 
<http: //www. ico. gov. uk/upload/documents/library/> [Hereinafter Lord Goldsmith's Memorandum]; see also 
section A. 2 below and Chapter 7, section D. 2 
2 See statements made by the Representatives of France, Russia, China, Mexico and Syria after the adoption 
of Resolution 1441, UN Doc. Press Release, SC/7564 (8 November, 2002); see also note 25 infra 
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Section A: The cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the Coalition forces 
A. 1 The cease-fire Resolutions 686 and 687 
On March 2nd, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 686, which brought a provisional 
end to the hostilities. Resolution 686 laid down basic terms for a "definitive end to the 
hostilities" after the coalition had unilaterally suspended offensive combat operations. Although 
it imposed relatively limited obligations on Iraq, it expressly preserved the authorization in 
Resolution 678 to use "all necessary means", including military intervention, to ensure 
compliance. 5 One month later, the Council adopted Resolution 687 which explicitly established 
"a formal cease-fire 
... 
between Iraq and Kuwait, and the [UN] Member States cooperating with 
Kuwait in accordance with Resolution 678 (1990). "6 Thus, the parties to this armistice agreement 
were Iraq, on the one hand, Kuwait and the members of the coalition forces, including the United 
States and the United Kingdom, on the other. 
In contrast to Resolution 686, Resolution 687 set out much broader conditions to be met before 
enforcement measures generally including economic sanctions and disarmament obligations 
would be ended. After affirming all thirteen resolutions adopted by the Security Council since 
the outset of the crisis and the relevant substances, the Council went on to stipulate the terms and 
conditions upon which the cease-fire agreement would be established. The sanctions and 
conditions imposed on Iraq in that resolution fell broadly into three categories. The first 
concerned Iraq's military capabilities. The second concerned Iraq's liability for loss and damage 
3 Security Council Resolution 686 of 2 March, 1991. From explanations of votes of most of the Council 
Members in drafting this resolution, it is apparent that most of expected a full-blown cease-fire to follow. See 
enerally UN. Doc. S/PV 2978 
The cease-fire on the ground was achieved when President Bush ordered a unilateral suspension of 
offensive combat operation on 28 February, 1991. Freedman, L and Karsh, E. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: 
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, Faber and Faber, London, 1993, p 405 S The Council intention to preserve the authorization of force clearly appeared in the language of Resolution 686. In the first paragraph the Council expressly stated that "all twelve resolutions noted above [including Resolution 678] continue to have full force and effect. " 6 Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April, 1991 
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to foreign governments, nationals and corporations arising from the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources. The third 
concerned the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. 
7 For the purpose of this study, the present 
section will highlight only the first category. 
Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council decided in Part C paragraph 8 of the resolution 
that Iraq "shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under 
international supervision, of: 
All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and 
components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; 
All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair 
and production facilities"8 
In order to implement this disarmament regime, the resolution provided for the creation of a UN 
special commission to carry out "on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missiles 
capabilities, " and ordered Iraq to yield such weapons to the commission for "destruction, 
removal or rendering harmless. "9 Resolution 687 was without precedent in UN history, in the 
extent of the terms imposed on a defeated belligerent. No previous cease-fire or armistice 
agreement sponsored by the UN had imposed such a stringent disarmament regime. 1° The 
severity of the terms of Resolution 687 and the inclusion of these weapons can be seen as a 
reflection both of the extent of Iraq's military defeat and States' perceptions of the threat posed 
by Iraq's military aggression. " These intrusive requirements can also be seen as a response to 
Iraq's record of violence and misuse of weapons of mass destruction, both within and beyond the 
7 Schachter, 0. "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 AJIL, 1991, p 456 
8 Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April, 1991 
9 Ibid 
10 Freedman, L and Karsh, E. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Ord'?. 
Faber and Faber, London, 1993, p 416 
11 Morriss, D. M. "From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of the 
United Nations", 36 Virginia Journal of International Law, 1996, p 893 
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State's borders. 12 Hence, the cease-fire was made contingent on a solemn promise to give up its 
military capabilities, 13 as an assurance of Iraq's "peaceful intentions" towards its neighbours and, 
subsequently, as a part of post-conflict efforts to restore international peace and security in the 
region. 
Resolution 687, in its fmal part, expressly stated that cessation of offensive military operations 
by the coalition forces depended on the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council being notified of Iraq's acceptance of these terms and conditions. Iraq formally accepted 
Resolution 687; however, it protested that the sanctions imposed in this resolution were illegal 
and unfair. 14 The negotiation history of Resolution 687 shows that the disarmament obligations 
were proposed by the coalition forces and that Iraq's acceptance and compliance with these 
obligations was indispensable for the coalition forces to discontinue their offensive combat 
operations. It has even been reported that the UK threatened to use the veto in the face of any 
objection against this proposal. '5 
X1.2 Iraq's non-compliance with the terms and conditions of Resolution 687 
Only four months after the adoption of Resolution 687, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
707 condemning Iraq's "serious violation of a number of its obligations under section C of 
Resolution 687.... which constitutes a material breach of the relevant provisions of that resolution 
which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace 
and security in the region. "16 In 1993, after Iraqi officials disrupted the inspection process, the 
President of the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, denounced the action taken by the 
12 See Chapter 2, notes 35-38 
13 Wedgwood, R. "The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defence", 
97 AJIL, 2003, p 579 
14 UN Doc. S/22456 (1991). The question of the legality of these sanctions will be dealt with separately in the following chapter. 
is Johnstone, I. Aftermath of the Gulf War, International Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
London, 1994, p 15 
16 Security Council Resolution 707 of 15 August, 1991 
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Iraqi government as an "unacceptable and material breach of the relevant provisions of 
Resolution 687. "17 Subsequently, on January 11,1993, the President, speaking on behalf of the 
Council, warned Iraq that "serious consequences" would flow from Iraq's "continued 
defiance. "18 
In 1996, the Council adopted Resolution 1060 condemning "the refusal of Iraqi authorities to 
allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which constitutes a clear violation 
of the provisions of' Resolution 687.19 In 1997, the Council adopted Resolutions 1115 and 1137 
repeating its condemnation and the later resolution "warned... [ofJ serious consequences of 
Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully and without conditions or restrictions with its 
obligations. "20 However, Iraq's defiance continued and in 1998 it formally halted all cooperation 
with UNSCOM. The Council responded by adopting Resolution 1205 which condemned Iraq's 
decision as a "flagrant violation of Resolution 687. "21 The last resolution on the matter before the 
invasion was Resolution 144122 That resolution was in many aspects equivalent to an ultimatum 
for the regime in Iraq that its intransigence will not be tolerated any longer. 
The Preamble, for the first time, recalled in full the second operative Paragraph of Resolution 
678 which authorized the use of force against Iraq in 1990. The Council, after deploring Iraq's 
non-compliance with its obligations and the "absence" of international inspection in Iraq since 
1998, determined that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under 
relevant resolutions. " However, it decided "to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity 
to comply with its disarmament obligations. '23 In its final paragraph the resolution "warned Iraq 
17 Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25081 (8 January, 1993) 
18 Note by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/25091 (11 January, 1993) 
19 Security Council Resolution 1060 of 12 June, 1996 
20 Resolutions 1115 of 21 June, 1997 and Resolution 1137 of 12 November, 1997 
21 Resolution 1205 of 5 November, 1998 
22 Resolution 1441 of 8 November, 2002 
23 Ibid, Operative paras. 1 and 2 
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that it will face serious consequences as result of its continued violations of its obligations °'24 
Some Council Members, in their comments on Resolution 1441, stated that the resolution 
eliminated "automaticity" in the use of force as a result of material breach and that if Iraq's 
intransigence continued, the matter should be referred to the Council for a decision25 On the 
other hand, the US and the UK asserted that if Iraq did not comply with its obligations, nothing 
in the resolution constrained them from acting to enforce the relevant Security Council 
resolutions and protect world peace and security. 26 Overall, the unanimous view among the 
Council Members was that Resolution 1441 provided the last peaceful and non-forcible measures 
on the matter. There was a general consensus that any further defiance by Iraq would be faced by 
military action. 7 The question was, whether in case of Iraq non-compliance, such an action 
should be referred back to the Council or not. 
In fact, the resolution does not contain any provision to suggest that a further Council resolution 
was needed. Furthermore, Operative paragraph 12 in the Resolution stated that the Council, after 
the receipting of the reports of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, would "consider the situation and the 
need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure 
international peace and security. "28 The use of the word `consider' (not decide) seems to uphold 
this understanding. 29 One suggestion was made by the British Attorney General that "Resolution 
24 Ibid, para. 13 
25 See statements made by the Representatives of France, Russia, China, Mexico and Syria after the adoption 
of Resolution 1441, UN Doc. Press Release, SC/7564 (8 November, 2002) 
26 See statements by the Representatives of the US and the UK, ibid. The UK Representative frankly stated 
"if Iraq chooses defiance and concealment, rejecting the final opportunity it has been given by the 
Council.. 
. 
the United Kingdom-together with other members of the Council-will ensure that the task of 
disarmament required by the resolutions is completed. " 27 See generally statements made by the Representatives of the US, the UK, France, Mexico, Ireland, 
Bulgaria, Norway, Singapore, Colombia and the Secretary-General. ibid. 28 Resolution 1441 of 8 November, 2002, operative para. 12 29 In his memorandum on the legality of military action against Iraq, Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney 
General, argued that the word `consider' "was chosen deliberately to indicate the need for a further discussion, but not a decision. " He went on to say "the Council knew full well 
... 
the difference between 
`consider and `decide' and so the omission is highly significant. " Lord Goldsmith's Memorandum, note 1 
supra. 
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1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to sanction 
force was required if that had been intended. Thus, all that Resolution 1441 requires is reporting 
to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but not an express further decision to 
authorize force. , 30 
In his briefing of the Security Council on 27 January 2003, the Executive Chairman of 
UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, stated that although there was some progress in Iraq's cooperation 
with the inspection teams, it had not come "to come to genuine acceptance, not even today, of 
the disarmament which was demanded of it "31 In his following briefing, days before the 
invasion, he said, "The question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, 
unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 
(2002)... I would say... while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side 
can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 
... 
cannot be said to constitute 
"immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. "32 
To conclude, examination of the facts from the adoption of Resolution 687 up to the time of 
intervention leaves no doubt that Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament obligations 
under Resolution 687. For 12 years, Iraq consistently disrupted the inspection process and 
refused to cooperate with the UNSCOM and the IAEA. Even Members of the Security Council 
who opposed the use of force against Iraq in 2003 never claimed that Iraq "lived up to its 
obligations. "33 
3o Lord Goldsmith, Legal Basis for Use of Force against Iraq, statement by UK Attorney General in answer 
to a parliamentary question, 17 March, 2003. Quoted in Taft, W and Buchwald, T. "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law"; 97 AJIL, 2003, p 562 
31 The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, briefing of the Security Council on 27 January 
2003, available at <http: //www. unmovic. org> 
32 The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, briefing of the Security Council on 7 March 2003, 
available at <http: //www. unmovic. org> 
33 Yoo, J. "International Law and the War in Iraq", 97 AJJL, 2003, p 566 
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Section B: The customary rules on armistice and the effect of UN Charter 
Before examining the customary rules on armistice, it should be noted that, in the legal literature, 
there is confusion regarding the precise meaning of the terms, "armistice, " "truce, " and "cease- 
fire. " Some writers have entered into a lengthy discussion in an attempt to find clear distinctions 
between these terms, but no agreement has been reached. 4 For the purpose of this study, 
however, the important point to be mentioned is that the Security Council has used these terms 
interchangeably, though, since 1948, the expression "cease-fire" has been more common. 
Nevertheless, the Council practice suggests that by this term it intends no more than the 
definition of "armistice" in its traditional sense 35 
g. l The HaQUe reRu/ations on armistice 
For hundreds of years, the armistice agreement has been the favoured mechanism of belligerent 
parties to end hostilities in international conflict. The customary rules on armistice have their 
origins in Medieval times. Hugo Grotius used the term truce to mean an agreement by which 
parties for a time refrain from warlike acts, though the state of war continues-"a period of rest 
in war, not a peace. , 36 With the beginning of the codification of international law in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the customary rules of warfare were either restated and codified, 
or developed at the Brussels Conference of 1874 and at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 
and 1907.37 These Conferences were only of a declaratory effect; simply codifying or restating 
existing customary rules. 
34 See generally Baxter, R. Armistice and Other Forms of Suspension of Hostilities, 149 Recueil des Cours de 
l'Academie de Droit International (R. C. A. D. I), 1977. Bailey, S. "Truces and Armistices in the Practice of the 
UN Security Council, " 71 AJIL, 1977 
35 The majority, however, agree that these terms are synonymous and have been used by the Security Council 
interchangeably. See, for example, Levie, H. "The Nature and Scope of Armistice Agreement, " 50 AJIL, 
1956, p 880; Morriss, note 11 supra, p 809-10; Bailey, ibid, p 468 36 Grotius, H, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri, Book III, sections I and II, (translation by Francis W. Kelsey) 
and Introduction by James Brown Scott, Wildy & Sons LTD. London, reprinted 1964, p 832 37 Cassese, A. International Law, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 400 
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On the subject of armistice, Article 47 of the Declaration of Brussels stated that "an armistice 
suspends military operations by mutual agreement, between the belligerent parties. "38 Precisely 
the same clause was stated by Article 36 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention; 
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 39 The term "suspend" is a clear 
indication of the temporary nature of such agreements. Therefore, a distinction must be made 
between an armistice agreement and a peace treaty. The latter is the final and complete cessation 
of hostilities which ends the state of war between belligerent parties; an armistice is an 
agreement between the belligerent parties to a formal but temporary cessation of hostilities, 
without ending the state of war; "an armistice is not a peace treaty. 40 
As to the case of violation, the traditional customary law permitted a party to an armistice to 
abandoned the agreement and resume fighting if the other party violated the terms and conditions 
of that agreement. According to Grotius, if a truce was violated, the injured party was free to 
 
resume hostilities "even without declaring war. 
41 In his view there would be no need for a new 
declaration of war, since the state of war was "not dead, but sleeping. "42 This rule was also 
codified in Article 51 of the Declaration of Brussels of 1874. The article stated that "the violation 
of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it. "43 The 
problem with this rule was that a belligerent could denounce an armistice for breach of even a 
minor condition. The Hague Convention of 1907 tried to overcome this shortcoming by 
38 Declaration of Brussels of 27 August, 1874 available at 
<http: //wwwl. umn. edu/humanrts/instree/I 874a. htm> The term "cease fire" is exactly of the same meaning of 
"armistice", as correctly observed by Bailey Bailey, A cease-fire "is simply a suspension of acts of violence by military and paramilitary forces, resulting from the intervention of a third party. It is a preliminary and 
provisional step, providing a breathing space for the negotiation of more lasting agreements. " Bailey, note 34 
supra, p 469 
39 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
printed in Roberts A and Guelff, R. Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford University Press, third edition, 2000, p 80 
40 Bailey, note 34 supra, p 462 
41 Grotius, note 36 supra, p 838-9 
42 Ibid, p 834 
43 Declaration of Brussels, note 38 supra 
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confining the right to denounce the agreement and resume hostilities to "serious violation. "44 
Article 40 stated, "Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other 
party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities 
immediately. -), 45 
The majority of the Hague Convention rules on warfare, including the rules of armistice, have 
been accepted as customary law and were subsequently accepted by the Nuremberg Tribunal as a 
statement of customary international law and so constitute the most reliable indication of the 
consensus of the international community. 46 Furthermore, although some of the Hague rules 
were revised or updated by more recent agreements such as the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and the 1977 Protocols, 47 the Hague rules on armistice remain unchanged. Up till now, no 
convention has supplanted or revised these rules. Thus, these customary rules apply to any 
international conflict and no belligerent could argue, for example, that it was not party to the 
J-1ague Convention, so it is not bound by its provisions. All States are bound in their international 
relations by the existing customary international law rules. The Security Council in many 
international conflicts explicitly urged the belligerent parties to abide by the Hague regulations 
of warfare 48 
B. 2 The effect of the UN Charter on the customary law on armistice 
Some scholars argue that there are a number of essential differences between a cease-fire reached 
in response to UN resolutions, and previous arrangements negotiated between the parties 
themselves, in the context of a legal regime where the use of force was one of the sovereign 
44 Morriss, note 11 supra, p 810 
as Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
printed in Roberts A and Guelff, R. Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford University Press, third edition, 2000, p 80 
46 Morriss, note 11 supra, p 810 
°' Cassese, note 37 supra, p 401 
48 See, for example, Resolutions 1472 of 28 March, 2003 and Resolution 1483 of 22 May, 2003 
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rights of States. 9 According to this view, an U. N. -imposed cease-fire order or decision (binding 
cease-fire resolution) differs from traditional armistice in being of unlimited duration, freezing 
hostilities pending the negotiation of a more lasting, durable peace. S° The rationale for this claim 
is that when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII to order a cease-fire, it is exercising the 
authority conferred on it by the Charter to maintain international peace and security. Richard 
Baxter argues that "the contemporary agreements on the suspension of hostilities reflect the 
fundamental changes that have been effected in international law by the United Nations Charter. 
The threat br use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State has 
been made unlawful, and the Security Council has been vested with the power to call for an end 
of the use of force in particular case. Thus the conclusion of an agreement for the suspension of 
hostilities reflects not so much a free decision by the parties that they will cease to exercise a 
right or privilege to employ force as an acceptance by them of the obligations of the Charter not 
to resort to the use of force. This consideration is valid whether or not the agreement is 
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations. "5' Consequently, the Council is not merely 
facilitating negotiations between the parties, but instead asserts itself to counter aggression or 
demand that certain terms be accepted as measures necessary to preserve peace. 52 
This view likens the Security Council resolution to cease-fire under Chapter VII to a military 
order "from a superior to a subordinate to cease-firing, and thereby, to stop all means of 
hostilities under the subordinate's control. "53 What this view seems to say is that the under the 
Charter legal framework a cease-fire does not depend on the consent of the parties and denies 
them the right to negotiate and bargain the terms of the agreement. However, this view 
a9 Morriss, note 11 supra, p 822-3; Baxter, note 33 supra, p 382-5; Simon, E. "The Operation of the Korean 
Armistice Agreement, Military Law Review, 1970, p 126-7 
50 Morriss, ibid, p 803 
sl Baxter, note 34 supra, p 384 
52 Morriss, note 11 supra, p 808 
53 Ibid, p 812 
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challenges the very idea of armistice agreements. The key notion underlying an armistice, as 
shown above, is that the belligerent parties agree to suspend "military operations by mutual 
agreement. " Thus, the consent of the parties and a balancing of their interests are indispensable 
factors for the conclusion of an armistice and accordingly for its survival. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that States would accept this view. 
As to actions taken under the authority of the Security Council, proponents of the foregoing view 
argue that when a UN enforcement action results in a complete military victory, as it did in the 
Gulf campaign, cease-fire and peace treaty are intended as the "final resolution of the conflict. "54 
By implication, in the case of Iraq, Resolution 687 was in fact a peace treaty, not an armistice. 
This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. Resolution 687 was basically an armistice- 
unlike a peace treaty, it did not terminate the state of war, but merely suspended hostilities. As 
Professor Dinstein pointed out, "a labelling of Resolution 687 as a `permanent cease-fire' is a 
contradiction in terms: a cease-fire, by definition, is a transition-period arrangement"55 If the 
Council regarded Resolution 687 as a final peace treaty, it would not have imposed such rigorous 
obligations upon Iraq to ensure that it would not resume its aggression and warned it of "severe 
consequences" in case of non-compliance. The Council in the Preamble of Resolution 687 
clearly expressed doubts regarding Iraq's "peaceful intentions. " It also expressed its concern 
about Iraq's "unprovoked attacks" by ballistic missiles against Israel and its threat to "make use 
of terrorism against targets outside Iraq. "56 In light of this scepticism, it is irrational to say that 
the Council, before being assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, deemed appropriate to conclude a 
peace treaty by Resolution 687 at this time. 
sa Ibid, p 815 
ss Dinstein, Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence, third edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2001, p 50 
56 Resolution 687 of 3 April, 1991 
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In another deviation from the traditional rules of armistice, it has been suggested that, under the 
law of the UN Charter, a violation of a U. N. 
-backed cease-fire provides no right of unilateral 
denunciation and reprisal, but only a response in self-defence if a new aggression occurs. In 
other words, the existence of a UN cease-fire narrows the scope for resuming hostilities in the 
event of a violation, and changes a basic principle of the traditional armistice that viewed serious 
violations as a material breach of the agreement that could justify an immediate resumption of 
hostilities. 57 Therefore, irrespective of the possible failure of important aspects of U. N. 
- 
sponsored armistice or cease-fire agreements such as verification regimes or implementation 
mechanisms, the fundamental obligation not to resort to force as a means of dispute settlement is 
severable and is still binding. 58 Lobel and Ratner supported this view, arguing that the UN 
practice prior to the Gulf War upholds this approach to cease-fire law under the Charter. They 
pointed to some occasions during the Middle East conflicts between Israel and Arab States where 
the Security Council and UN officials strongly asserted that violations of cease-fire or armistice 
were not legal grounds for forceful countermeasures by individual States. 59 Three UN 
Documents have been cited in this respect, which are worth briefly highlighting: 
First is the Report of UN Mediator on Palestine to the belligerent parties in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In 1948, the Security Council adopted Resolution 54 which imposed a cease-fire 
between Arab States and Israel and "instruct[ed] the Mediator to supervise the observance of the 
truce. "60 Pursuant to this resolution, the UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, sent to the belligerent 
parties instructions interpreting the Council's resolution to mean that "(1) no party may 
unilaterally put an end to the truce. (2) No party may take the law into its own hands and decree 
s' Morriss, note 11 supra, p 822 
58 Ibid, p 822-3 
59 Lobel, J. and Ratner, M. "Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease- Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime", 93 AJIL, 1999, p 146 
60 Resolution 54 of 15 July, 1948 
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that it is relieved of its obligations under the resolution of the Security Council because in its 
opinion the other party has violated the truce. The latter is not an agreed truce negotiated by the 
parties and which may be terminated as stipulated by them or according to certain rules. °'61 
The second document is the Security Council Resolution 56 of August 19,1948. Despite Count 
Bernadotte's instruction, the Israelis and Arabs continued violations of the truce, claiming in 
justification violations by the other party. 62 In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
56 reaffirming that "no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking 
reprisals or retaliations against the other party; No party is entitled to gain military or political 
advantage through violation of the truce"63 
The third is the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Palestine 
Question. After the exacerbation of hostilities in the Middle East, the Council adopted 
Resolution 113 "request[ing] the Secretary-General to undertake.... a survey of the various 
aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and 
.... 
to 
arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures 
... 
would reduce existing tensions along 
the armistice demarcation lines. "M During the Secretary-General's negotiations with the parties 
of the conflict, both Israel and Egypt sought an interpretation of the armistice whereby, as under 
pre-Charter customary international law, each party would be entitled to take reprisals in 
response to the other's violations. 5 In his Report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General, 
Dag Hammarskjold, rejected that view, arguing that "compliance [with the armistice] should be 
61 Cablegram dated 7 August, 1948 from the UN mediator, Count Bernadotte, to the UN Secretary- General, 
UNDoc. S/955 (1948) 
62 For a detailed account of the violations of the cease-fire on both sides, see Bailey, S. How Wars End: the 
United Nations and the termination of armed conflicts, 1946-1964. Vol. 1, Oxford Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1982 
63 Resolution 56 of 19 August, 1948 64 Resolution 113 of 4 April, 1956 65 Bailey, How Wars End, note 62 supra, p 557 
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unconditional, subject only to resort the Security Council if attacked and the inherent right of 
self-defence. "66 
In conformity with the statements expressed by Count Bernadotte and Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold, Lobel and Ranter argue that once the Security Council has ordered or decided 
that a cease-fire is necessary to maintain international peace and security, the parties are not free 
to reopen hostilities on the ground that the other party has violated the terms of the agreement. 
They may exercise the right of self-defence to repel an armed attack, but they must not renew 
offensive activities. Hence, in the case of Iraq, Resolution 687 has "extinguished any right of 
those States [the US and the UK] to resume fighting in the event of an Iraqi violation of the 
cease-fire agreement unless Iraq reinvaded Kuwait, retriggering Article 5 1. "67 
This argument, overall, seems to say that armistice agreements are things of the past and that 
practice under the UN Charter has completely displaced or abolished the traditional law of cease- 
fire agreements in the body of international law. In a sense, it eviscerates the armistice 
agreement's basic principle and leaves it meaningless. However, this view is implausible for the 
following reasons: 
First, the statements of Count Bernadotte and Secretary-General Hammarskjold, on which this 
proposition was built, were expressed in the context of Arab-Israeli conflict, where the armistice 
agreements were unremittingly violated by both belligerent parties on grounds of violations by 
the other party, however, this view was not articulated or repeated by the Council or any UN 
officials in any other case. Therefore, obviously, it is not a consistent and frequent view of the 
UN, that could be generalized to all UN-sponsored armistices. 
66 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/3596 (1956). Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold went further to argue that "only the Security Council could decide that a case of non- 
compliance was a justification for self-defence [under] Article 51. " Ibid. 
67 Lobel and Ratner, note 59 supra, p 147 
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Second, the weight and legal authority of these documents cannot be taken to replace a well- 
established customary rule. On the contrary, State practice on the matter indicates the opposite 
conclusion and upholds the customary rules. This can be dictated from the view expressed by 
Egypt and Israel in 1956 that a serious violation of a cease-fire agreement releases the other party 
from its obligations under that agreement. 68 The same view was expressed by Netherlands and 
Indonesia and was codified in the Renville Truce Agreement concluded under the auspices of the 
UN. 69 Paragraph 10 of this truce stated, "This agreement shall be considered binding unless one 
party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce 
regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be 
terminated. "70 This paragraph was widely interpreted to mean that the belligerent parties agreed 
that any violation for the terms of the truce justifies countermeasures by the other party. 7' Thus, 
one can conclude that State practice does not reflect agreement with the view expressed by 
Count Bernadotte and Hammarskjold. Even Morriss agreed with this conclusion; he admitted 
that this suggested rule is "not perfectly reflected in practice. "72 
Third, in practice, it is apparent that this proposition is unrealistic and no cease-fire agreement 
could survive under this formula. The corollary of this proposition is that a party to a cease-fire 
will feel free to infringe the terms and conditions of that agreement since he is confident that 
other party is prohibited from repudiating the cease-fire and renewing hostilities on the grounds 
of violation. As a political reality, this view simply allows the party violating the armistice to 
benefit from the prolonged process of the Council or from differences between the five 
permanent Members of the Security Council. The practice of the Security Council shows that 
68 See note 65 supra 69 Truce Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 17 January, 1948. Reprinted in UN Doc. S/649/Rev. (1948) 
70 Ibid 
71 See, for example, Levie, note 35 supra, p 880 72 Morriss, note 11 supra, p 904 
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many cease-fire agreements ordered by the Council have been violated and the Council took no 
effective response against the defaulting party, in most cases the Council's reaction was no more 
than condemnation. The Korean Armistice Agreement is an example in place. 73 
Moreover, the formula suggested the a UN-sponsored cease-fire does not authorize its parties to 
resume hostilities in case of violation by the other party-except if a new aggression occurs or 
authorization is given by the Security Council-does not give an answer for many issues usually 
associated with cease-fire agreements. In some cases, the cease-fire agreement had been 
implemented while one belligerent occupied territories that belonged to the other belligerent or 
belligerents, as in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Does this formula suggest that the State 
which has part of its land occupied has lost its right to resume fighting in order to push back the 
occupier to the border and liberate its occupied territories? If it did so, would the defending State 
be considered in violation of a binding cease-fire agreement sponsored by the Council? It might 
be argued that, in that case, a State should seek a peaceful solution or it must obtain a prior 
permission from the Council to liberate its occupied territories. But, what if the Security Council 
failed to bring back the situation to the status quo ante bellum, as in the case of Arab territories 
still occupied by Israel after nearly 60 years from the original armistice? Additionally, it is likely 
that the Council could be blocked from acting by veto of one of the Permanent Members. In both 
situations, according to this formula, a State which has a part of its soil occupied by foreign 
troops, seems to have lost its occupied land forever and if it acted unilaterally, it would be 
considered in violation of the armistice. Therefore, from a practical perspective, the traditional 
customary rule is more realistic because it provides serious and effective remedy for the 
violation. On the other hand, it compels the belligerent parties to respect the terms and conditions 
73 Many aspects of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 27 July, 1953 have been repeatedly violated. For the Agreement see UN Doc. S/3079/Appendix A (1953). For the violations, see United Nations Command Report to the United Nations on the increase in violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement, UN Doc. S/8217 (1967); Morriss, ibid, p 886-7 
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of the cease-fire, otherwise the hostilities will be resumed. This formula of cease-fire could be 
acceptable only if the mechanism of the Council worked as it was intended by the framers of the 
Charter. For the legal and practical reasons mentioned above, it seems that the more appropriate 
view is that the traditional customary law rules on armistice is still valid and has not been 
affected by the UN Charter. If a party to an armistice agreement seriously violates the conditions 
of the cease-fire, this releases the other party from its obligations under the agreement. 
Section C: Violation of an a'reement under the treaty law 
Having examined the customary rule regulating the violation of the cease-fire agreement, this 
section will look at the rules regulating the suspension or termination of a treaty under Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
C. 1 Article 60 of'the Vienna Convention 
The settled view among international lawyers is that if a party to a treaty violates its terms, the 
other party may be justified in abrogating the treaty or suspending the performance of its own 
obligations under the treaty, vis-a-vis the defaulting party's rights under the treaty. 74 This 
principle has always been recognized in international jurisprudence. For example, in 1937, 
referring to this principle, Judge Anzilotti, in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case, 
described it as "so just, so equitable, so universally recognized that it must be applied in 
international relations also"75 The rationale underlying this principle is that "a party cannot be 
called upon to fulfil its obligations under a treaty when the other party fails to fulfil those which 
it undertakes under the same treaty. "76 This rule was crystallized in Article 60 (1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stated that "a material breach of a bilateral treaty by 
74 International Law Commission Reports to the UN General Assembly, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2,1966, p 253 [Hereinafter ILC Reports] 
's Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti, Diversion of Water from the Meuse case, PCIJ, 1937, Series AB, 
No. 70, p 50 
76 ILC Reports, note 74 supra, p 255 
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one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or 
suspending its operation in whole or in part. "77 In the multilateral context, the Convention stated 
that a material breach of a treaty by one of the parties entitles a party "specially affected" by the 
breach to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part, in relation to the defaulting 
State. 78 However, even if a State party was not "specially affected", a violation that "radically 
changes" the position of the parties has been held to permit complete or partial suspension. 79 
The ICJ observed in the Advisory Opinion in Namibia Case that: "the rules laid down by Vienna 
Convention 
... 
concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of breach (adopted 
without dissenting vote) may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing 
customary law on the subject : '80 Thus, Article 60 was merely declaratory of existing customary 
rule. 
C. 1.1 Material breach 
At the time of drafting of Article 60, some jurists were particularly concerned that, since there 
were no effective international enforcement mechanisms, innocent parties should be entitled to 
terminate or suspend treaties as a sanction for violation. They tended to take an absolute view of 
the matter, allowing the innocent party a general right to terminate the treaty in the event of 
violation. 81 Other jurists, however, feared this might give scope for States to abuse the right by 
invoking trivial breaches, or making false allegations, as an excuse to free themselves from 
inconvenient treaty obligations. They therefore felt it would be unwise to allow such a right 
without control, for example compulsory reference to the International Court of Justice 82 The 
77 Article 60 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted on 22 May 1969 and opened for 
signature on 23 May 1969 by the UN Conference on the Law of Treaties. It was entered into force on 27 January 1980 [Hereinafter Vienna Convention] 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid, Article 60 (2)(C) 
S0 Advisory Opinion in Namibia Case, ICJ Reports, (1970-71), p 47 
81 ILC Reports, note 74 supra, p 254 
82 Ibid 
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Commission unanimously took the view that termination or suspension should be allowed only 
in case of serious breaches. Therefore, it tended to restrict the right of abrogation to "material" or 
"fundamental" breaches. 83 
The term "material" was preferred to "fundamental" to express the nature of violation to which 
the right applied, as the latter might be thought to indicate that the violation must be of a 
provision directly touching the central purposes of the treaty. However, other provisions 
considered by a party to be essential to the effective performance of the treaty, albeit of a 
secondary nature, may have been very material in the decision to enter into the treaty at all. 84 
Thus, Paragraph 3 of Article 60 defines the kind of breach which may give rise to a right to 
terminate or suspend the treaty as: "A material breach for the purpose of this article consists in; 
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present convention; or (b) the violation of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty. "85 A repudiation 
of the treaty other than provided for under any of the present articles would clearly be considered 
a material breach of the treaty. The second form of material breach, set out in sub-paragraph (b), 
is a more general one, defined as a violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of 
any object or purpose of the treaty. 86 
An example on the difference between the two kinds of breaches is the argument advance by 
Russia during the 1998 crisis. In contrast to the view held by the vast majority of the Council 
Members that Iraq's non-compliance with the disarmament obligations constituted a material 
breach of the cease-fire, the Russian Federation's Representative to the United Nations argued 
that only a re-invasion of Kuwait by Iraq would constitute "a material breach of the cease-fire 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid, p 255 
85 Article 60 (3) of the Vienna Convention 
86 1LC Reports, note 74 supra, p 255 
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resolution" and that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with inspectors was not a material breach. 
87 This 
latter argument, however, is groundless, given that the Convention made it clear that terms 
outside the "central purpose" of the treaty may still be considered "material". 
It should be noted that a breach of a treaty, however serious, does not necessarily and by itself 
result in termination of the treaty, and also, a State cannot simply allege a violation of the treaty 
and thereby abrogate it. The expression "invoke as a ground" highlights that the right provided 
by the article is not a right of arbitrary denunciation. 88 Moreover, the Commission, realizing the 
need to have proper safeguards against arbitrary abrogation of the treaty on the ground of an 
alleged breach, imposed procedural conditions in Article 65, such as a notification period prior to 
the termination and seeking peaceful settlement to the dispute, as will be discussed below. 89 
G2 The applicability ofArticle 60 to armistice agreements 
It could be argued that Article 60 does not apply to Armistice Agreements simply because it 
belongs to and is governed by a quite distinct part of international law. However, this argument 
would be incorrect. In the discussion over Article 60 of Vienna Convention, questions were 
raised as to the possibility of suspension or termination in the cases of law-making treaties such 
as the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, 
sick and wounded or special types of treaties such as disarmament treaties (where a breach by 
one party endangers or renders ineffective the whole regime of the treaty as between all parties). 
The view of the Commission was that general law-making treaties or special types of treaties 
should not, per se, be treated differently from other multilateral treaties in this respect. This view 
was based on the idea that it would be inequitable to allow a defaulting State to hold the injured 
87 Wern, C. "UN Resolutions Allow Attacks on the Likes of Iraq, " New York Times, 5 February, 1998, at AS. quoted in Wedgwood, R. The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", 92 AJIL, 1998, p 727 at footnotes 
881LC Reports, note 74 supra, p 254 
89 Article 65 of the Vienna Convention 
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party to its obligations under a treaty, whilst itself in breach of its obligations towards that State 
under the treaty. 90 Accordingly, although from one perspective, armistice agreements belong to 
the law of armed conflict and international law of human rights, however, the Commission did 
not exclude them from the umbrella of Article 60 on the ground that they belong to distinct parts 
of international law. 
Another objection may arise on the basis that UN-sponsored cease-fire cannot be considered as a 
treaty, but is a decision taken by the Council, and that its original authority comes from a binding 
resolution adopted by the Council, not by the discretion of the parties. In other words, the parties 
are under an obligation to obey the decision of the Council, whether they like it or not. However, 
the Security Council sponsorship or ordering for the armistice does not obliterate its legal status 
as international agreement concluded between the parties. This view is supported by the ICJ 
judgment in the South West Africa cases 91 In that case, a similar contention was presented by 
South Africa in its preliminary objection. South Africa, the mandatory State, contended, inter 
alia, that the Mandate was not ab initio a "treaty or convention", since its original authority was a 
resolution of the Council of the League of Nations; "the Council was taking executive action in 
pursuance of the Covenant and was not entering into an agreement which would itself be a treaty 
or convention. "92 It added that "this view 
... 
would regard the Council's Declaration as setting 
forth a resolution 
... 
which would, like any other valid resolution of the Council, owe its legal 
force to the fact of having been duly resolved by the Council in the exercise of powers conferred 
upon it by the Covenant. "93 The Court rejected this claim arguing that while the Mandate for 
South West Africa took the form of a resolution, it was obviously of a different character. It 
90 ILC Reports, note 74 supra, p 255 91 South West Africa cases (Second Phase), (Preliminary Objectictions), ICJ Reports, Judgement of 21 December, 1962 
92 Ibid, pp 330-1 
93 Ibid 
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could not be regarded as embodying only an executive action in pursuance of the Covenant. In 
fact and in law it was an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention. 94 
In short, the Court held that the Mandate was an agreement, irrespective of the confirmation by 
the Council of the League. The case of a cease-fire agreement sponsored by the Council is 
exactly of the same position; although the sponsorship by the Security Council, in law, it is still 
an international agreement governed by the law of treaties. 
Based on the above arguments, it is submitted that armistice agreements-as international 
agreements-are governed by Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and that in case of 
material breach of the terms of the agreement, the other party (or parties) has the right to invoke 
this violation as a ground to suspend or terminate the cease-fire. At any rate, even if it is 
accepted that Article 60 of the Vienna Convention does not apply to cease-fire agreements 
ordered by the Security Council, the Convention stated in the preamble that questions not 
regulated by its provisions would continue to be governed by the rules of customary international 
law. Thus, the applicable rule would be the traditional rule of customary international law of 
warfare, codified in the Hague Regulations. 
C. 3 Peaceful settlement of disputes and the case of aggressor State 
Another objection may be raised against the view presented above on the basis that a party to a 
cease-fire agreement is under an obligation not to resume fighting and to seek peaceful solution 
for the violations committed by the defaulting party. Article 43 of the Convention states that 
"The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the 
suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present Convention or of the 
provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation 
embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the 
94 Ibid 
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treaty. , 95 Since all States are bound by a general obligation to seek peaceful settlement for their 
disputes-a clear obligation stipulated in Article 2(3) of the Charter as well as the Declaration of 
Friendly Relations stated in the General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970)-resuming fighting, 
as a consequence of the termination of an armistice agreement, is not permitted under this 
Convention. Further reaffirmation for the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes can be 
found in Article 65 of the Vienna Convention which referred to methods of dispute settlement set 
forth in Article 33 of the UN Charter 96 Paragraph (3) of Article 65 states that in case of dispute 
regarding a treaty "parties shall seek a solution through the means indicated in Article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. " Paragraph (4) also said that "Nothing in the foregoing 
paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force 
binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes °'97 These provisions regarding the 
peaceful settlement of dispute, if taken literally, however, would in many situations paralyze the 
world community from acting in response to aggression or cease-fire violations. The drafters of 
the treaty seemed to be aware of such a situation, so they provided Article 75 which stated that 
"The provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any obligation in relation to a 
treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken in conformity 
with the Charter of the United Nations with reference to that State's aggression. "98 The 
reservation articulated in this article implies that an aggressor State cannot be protected by the 
provisions of this Convention. Accordingly, in case of an armistice agreement concluded with an 
95 Article 43 of the Vienna Convention 
96 Article 33 of the UN Charter states that: (1) "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. (2) The Security Council shall, when it deems 
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. " 97 Article 65 of the Vienna Convention, paras. 3&4 98 Article 75 of the Vienna Convention 
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aggressor, the other party is not bound by any provision of this Convention which may prejudice 
his legitimate rights under the UN Charter. 
As to the present case, it could be argued that, according to Article 75, the Council allies were 
not constrained by the provisions of Vienna Convention regarding the termination of the treaty 
such as the notification period99 and the peaceful settlement of dispute obligations. In other 
words, these provisions cannot be interpreted to mean that the allies were under the obligation 
not to use force in response to Iraq's material breach of the cease-fire obligations. However, this 
is not to suggest that the Council allies were absolutely free to resume hostilities before 
exhausting all possible peaceful solutions for the Iraqi violations to the cease-fire, but, according 
to Article 75, they could sidestep this obligation, at least under the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention. 
Regarding the general obligation of seeking peaceful settlement under UN Charter, a strong 
argument can be made that the allies throughout 12 years, from 1991 to march 2003, have 
already exhausted all possible peaceful measures to bring about Iraq's compliance with its 
obligations. On the contrary, it may be argued that, in this case, peaceful means for dispute 
settlement would not be exhausted unless the Security Council determines the failure of the 
peaceful means. However, as indicated above, the Council Members unanimously viewed 
Resolution 1441 as the last peaceful measure on the matter; any further defiance by Iraq would 
be faced by military action. 100 The finding by the UNMOVIC that Iraq was still refusing to 
cooperate fully with the inspection process left no doubt that peaceful means had been 
99 Article 65 laid down the procedures for the termination or suspension of the treaty. These procedures include that a notification period, not be less than three months, should be given by the party (or pies) Who invoked the breach to the defaulting party before the termination or suspension of the treaty. In the present 
case, however, an argument can be made to suggest that Resolution 1441 has warn ed Iraq of a resumption of hostilities as it cautions the Iraq's continued violation of its disarmament obligations will result in "serious 
consequences" 
100 See note 27 supra 
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exhausted. '°' Furthermore, as a factual matter, the US and the UK did not resume hostilities 
immediately after the resolution, but they allowed a period of more than four months for peaceful 
disarmament. It was only after the reports of UNMOVIC that the allies decided to resume their 
military operations. 
Conclusion 
Examination of the customary rules on armistice agreements shows that customary law permitted 
a party to an armistice to denounce the agreement and resume fighting if the other party seriously 
violated the terms of the agreement. The proposal submitted by some scholars suggesting that 
this rule has been affected by the law of the UN Charter does not stand much scrutiny. Therefore, 
the customary rule regarding the violation of an armistice agreement remained unchanged and 
still governs the current international conflicts. This rule is enhanced further by Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is also applicable to cease-fire agreements. 
As to the present case, Resolution 687 clearly linked the cease-fire between the coalition forces 
and Iraq to the later "unconditional acceptance" of two vital terms: to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction and to allow verification by a Special Commission. This link between the cease-fire 
and Iraq's compliance with the terms and conditions of Resolution 687 was confirmed in many 
Security Council Resolutions and statements by UN officials. The fact of the matter, however, is 
that Iraq was unremittingly in violation for its disarmament obligations established in Resolution 
687. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the finding that Iraq was in material breach 
of its obligation under the cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687) gave rise to the right of the 
coalition forces to suspend or terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities without new 
authorization of use of force. 
101 See notes 31 & 32 supra 
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Chapter 6 
Iraq's Sovereign Rights and the Legality of the Security Council 
Sanctions 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter concluded that, according to the customary rules on armistice agreements 
and the rules of Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, the finding that Iraq was in material 
breach of its obligation under the cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687) releases the coalition 
forces from their obligations under the agreement and permits them to suspend the cease-fire and 
resume fighting. But were these obligations legal under international law and the law of the UN 
Charter, in the first place? Iraq, while accepting the terms and conditions of the cease-fire 
Resolution 687, protested that the sanctions imposed in this resolution were illegal and unfair, 
describing Resolution 687 as "iniquitous" but accepting it had "no choice but to accept. "' In the 
legal literature, some scholars have expressed concerns about the sovereign rights of Iraq. They 
questioned the legality of the decisions and proposals stipulated in Resolution 687, and their 
compatibility with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, which emphasize on the 
sovereign rights of States. This argument, if accepted, leads to the fundamental question 
whether Iraq had the right to defy these measures or was estopped from protesting the illegality 
of these measures by its declaration of acceptance. 
The first section of this chapter highlights the disputes surrounding the legitimacy of the 
disarmament measures imposed upon Iraq in Resolution 687, and the legal arguments advanced 
for these arguments. It also examines the legal foundations for the disarmament regime and the 
' Iraq formally accepted the terms of the cease-fire in a letter delivered to the Security Council on 6 Apra 1991. UN Doc. S/22456 (1991) 
Z See, for example, Kirgis, F. "The Security Council's First Fifty Years", 89 AJIL, 1995, p 536 
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capability of the Security Council to impose such a decision under the UN Charter. The second 
section investigates Iraq's right to reject or defy the implementation of the disarmament 
measures that it considers to be unconstitutional under the current regulations of the law of 
international organizations. The final section focuses on the doctrine of estoppel in international 
law and its applicability to the present case. It also explores the legal effects of Iraq's notification 
of acceptance of Resolution 687 and to what extent this representation of fact has estopped it 
from protesting the legality of the disarmament sanctions. 
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Section A: The le titimacy of the disarmament obligations imposed upon Iraq 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the disarmament measures imposed upon Iraq in Resolution 687 had 
little to do with the invasion of Kuwait, since the military hardware specified in that resolution 
had not been deployed by Iraq during its invasion of Kuwait or during the Operation Desert 
Storm? These measures, in fact, go well beyond the original demands for Iraqi withdrawal' and, 
indeed, beyond any Iraq had assumed in the treaties it signed. By these measures, Iraq was 
deprived, forever, of a right claimed by all other States unless voluntarily forsaken. 5 As Iraq's 
acceptance of the terms of Resolution 687 was necessary for the cessation of hostilities, Iraq 
resentfully accepted these conditions, while protesting that the sanctions were illegal and unfair 6 
In fact, the landslide defeat of Iraq in the Operation Desert Storm eviscerated it of any power to 
bargain or to resist these obligations. However, the basic legal question raised by the decisions 
and proposals imposed upon Iraq in Resolution 687 relating to the sovereign rights of Iraq 
concerns their compatibility with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Article 24 (2) imposes an obligation on the Security Council to "act 
in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" in discharging its duties. 
Thus, the Charter Principles and the Purposes related to them could be considered as boundaries 
for the Council's authority in imposing sanction.? Conversely, a Council's decision that violates 
these Principles may be considered as legally invalid. Among the basic principles on which the 
UN Charter is founded are the principles of "sovereign equality" of States and non-interference 
in matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. "8 These principles call into 
3 See chapter 4, section C. 2.2 
4 Schachter, 0. "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict", 85 AJIL, 1991, p 457 
s Johnstone, I. Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UNAction, International Peace Academy, L}nne Rienner Publishers, London, 1994, p 22 
6 UN Doc. S/22456, note I supra 
7 See Chapter 1, section C. l 
8 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter; see also Chapter 1, section C. l 
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question the legitimacy of disarmament measures imposed on defeated aggressor or on any other 
State. 9 In other words, a Council decision to deprive an individual State of the right of possessing 
some sort of weapons, which are available for other States, can be seen as a violation of the 
principle of "sovereign equality" of States and interference in a matter essentially within its 
internal affairs. 
A. 1 The legal basis for the disarmament mandate 
A strong argument, however, can be made in supporting the legitimacy of the disarmament 
regime imposed by the Council on defeated Iraq. While it is true that no other State has ever 
been subjected to such a disarmament mandate under Chapter VII, no other state since North 
Korea in 1950 has committed such an act of aggression against a neighbouring State. 1° Iraq's 
aggressive behaviour towards Kuwait and previously against neighbouring Iran, coupled with its 
revealed propensity to threaten with or use weapons of mass destruction in the future justifies the 
intrusive measures taken by the Council in an attempt to eliminate Iraq's war-making powers 
and, hence, to restore peace and security in the area, even if these measures are unprecedented or 
go beyond the original demands for Iraqi withdrawal. In addition, little credence should be given 
to the claim of an aggressor that its sovereign rights are violated by restraints on its military 
capability. " Surely, a State that has already been guilty of aggression could reasonably have 
some limitations imposed on its capability to use force. 12 
From a legal perspective, the disarmament regime imposed upon Iraq was within the scope of the 
Council's authority as long as it could be reasonably be said to fall within the broad aim of 
restoring international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
9 See Chapter 1, section C. 1.1 for the sanctions imposed by the Council upon the Iranian Nuclear programme 10 Kirgis, note 2 supra, p 536 
" Schachter, note 4 supra, p 457 12 Ibid, p 468 
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Charter. 13 The Charter includes several articles that empower the Council to make 
recommendations or to take binding decisions under Chapter VII to maintain and restore 
international peace and security. Article 41, in particular, authorizes the Council to impose 
economic and other non-forcible sanctions to enforce UN requirements that extend beyond 
repelling aggression or ending hostilities. That article provides explicitly for the use of sanctions 
to enforce Council decisions taken under Chapter VII. Such decisions must of course be 
compatible with the terms of Article 39 and therefore serve the broad aim of maintaining or 
restoring peace and security. 14 In Iraq's case, the Council based its decisions in part on the claim 
that the measures taken would serve to maintain the peace by curtailing the military capabilities 
of a State that had already perpetrated acts of aggression and could continue to pose a threat to 
international peace and security. Furthermore, enforcement measures taken under Chapter VII 
are not subject to the restriction of Article 2(7) against intervention in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The article explicitly states that the 
general principle of non-interference in internal affairs "shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII. "ls 
With regard to the principle of "sovereign equality" stated in Article 2(1), any disarmament 
measures imposed after a breach of the peace or act of aggression must be fitted to the context. 
Thus, such measures would be inconsistent with Article 2(1) only if they were wholly 
disproportionate both to the threat of renewed conflict and to sanctions taken against other 
aggressors in similar circumstances. 16 In Iraq's case, having in mind its antagonistic attitude, the 
disarmament mandate cannot be seen as inappropriate or far-fetched, given that the Council 
refrained from demanding the complete demilitarization and neutralization of Iraq. The Council 
13 Johnstone, note 5 supra, p 19 
14 See Chapter 1, sections B. 1 and B. 2 
's Article 2(7) of the UN Charter 
16 Kirgis, note 2 supra, p 535-6 
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implicitly recognized the right of Iraq to possess military means allowing it to defend itself from 
external attack; a right guaranteed in Article 51, which remains exercisable, however serious 
Iraq's past violations have been. ' The sanctions only aimed at depriving the aggressive regime 
in Baghdad of the capacity to threaten or commit further aggression in the region, not to render it 
unable to defend itself. Furthermore, Resolution 687 also recognized Iraq's sovereign rights, as 
there was no attempt to impose constitutional decisions or to change the Iraqi regime or to 
remove the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, although the leaders responsible for aggression and 
war crimes might be subject to prosecution by victim States. 18 Overall, one can argue that the 
disarmament obligations were balanced with the threats Saddam Hussein's regime posed to 
security and stability of the Meddle East. To fetter the Security Council from employing such a 
measure on an aggressive State who has already been guilty of aggression would be to rendering 
it impotent to fulfil its main task of maintaining international peace and security. 
Against this sensible and well-founded view, the legitimacy of some particular sanctions has 
been disputed on grounds that they encroach Iraq's right of self-defence under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. It has been argued that if the disarmament sanctions applied only to nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, Iraq would still be able to exercise its right of self-defence. 
However, limiting its weapons capability to ballistic missiles with a range of no more than 150 
kilometres, whilst understandable in light of the proximity of potential Middle East targets and 
Iraq's use of Scud missiles during the Persian Gulf conflict, could constitute deprivation of 
legitimate means of self-defence. In the turbulent Middle East, this would mean endangering 
Iraq's political independence and territorial integrity. This argument might be countered if the 
prohibition were limited to Scud missiles, or to any others that specifically threatened non- 
military targets, or to missiles with a particularly destructive type of warhead. In the absence of 
"Johnstone, note 5 supra, p 21-2 18 Schachter, note 4 supra, p 468 
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any such limitation, however, the prohibition does seem open to objection on Article 51 
grounds. 19 This argument, if accepted, would mean that Iraq had the right to reject or defy the 
implementation of disarmament measures that encroached its right of self-defence under Article 
51 of the UN Charter on the grounds that these measures were unconstitutional and, therefore, 
legally invalid. 
Section B: Iraq's right to challenge illegitimate disarntan, ent measures under 
the law of international organizations 
The scepticism surrounding the legitimacy of some elements of the disarmament regime imposed 
upon Iraq by Resolution 687 leads to the fundamental question of whether Iraq had the right to 
reject and defy the implementation of measures that undermined its right of self-defence or was 
estopped from doing so by its declaration of acceptance. In order to answer this question, the first 
part of this section will investigate the rules and principles of the law of international 
organizations regarding ultra vires decisions adopted by international organizations and the right 
of member States to reject them. The following part explores the doctrine of estoppel in 
international law and its applicability to the present case. 
B1 The legal validity of ultra vires decisions 
The issue of the legal validity of acts and decisions adopted in excess of the authority of those 
concerned has long occupied international lawyers, as well as international courts and tribunals 20 
The importance of the issue is increased by persistent procedural irregularities and the tendency 
19 Kirgis, note 2 supra, p 536 
20 See Lauterpacht, H. "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organization", in Cambridge Essabi 
in International Law: Essays in Honour of Lord McNair, Stevens, London, 1965, p 88; Pollux, "The 
Interpretation of the Charter", 23 BYIL, 1946, p 54 Osieke, E. "Ultra Vires Acts in International 
Organizations: The Experience of the International Labour Organization" 48 BYIL, 1976-1977 p 159; Osieke, E. "Unconstitutional Acts in International Organizations: The Law and Practice of the International 
Aviation organization, 28 ICLQ, 1979, p 1; Morgenstern, "Legality in International Organizations" 48 B17G 
1976-1977, p 24; Osieke, E. "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organiztions", 77 
AM, 1983, p 239; Waston, J. "Auto-interpretation, Competence, and the Continuing Validity of Article 2 (7) 
of the Charter", 71 AJIL, 1977, p 60 
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of some international bodies to act in ways not expressly provided for in their constitutive 
instruments, claiming that such measures are essential for the effective fulfilment of their 
responsibilities and duties. This issue necessarily involves two key questions: (i) whether 
member States of an international organization have the right to challenge unconstitutional 
decisions adopted in excess of the authorities vested on the organization and (ii) whether the 
international body itself is competent to rule on such challenges. 
B. 1.1 The member States' right to challenge ultra vires 
The UN Charter, like constitutions of most international organizations, does not explicitly 
provide for challenge to the acts and decisions of its organs, on grounds of excess of authority or 
procedural irregularity, or for the competence of its bodies to rule on such challenges. In the 
absence of such provisions, some writers argue that unconstitutional acts and decisions of 
international organizations, i. e. those clearly exceeding the scope of their functions and powers, 
or grounded on irrelevant political considerations, are ultra vires and, hence, member States are 
entitled to reject them. 21 Such a right, in the absence of a judicial machinery to review acts of 
international organizations, does not rest on a prior judicial determination or finding of nullity by 
a competent tribunal. In other words, the nullity of an ultra vires act can be determined solely by 
the Member State concerned 22 
The right of member states to reject decisions they consider unconstitutional in the absence of a 
legal determination by a review body to that effect has been premised on two legal grounds. First 
is the consensual nature of the constitution concerned. Because the constitutive instruments are 
21 Osieke, "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations", ibid, p 240-1 
'a In the Certain Expenses case, the President of the Court, Judge Winiarski, in his dissenting opinion 
supported this view arguing that in the international legal system where there is no tribunal competent to 
make a finding of nullity, "it is the state which regards itself as the injured party which itself rejects a legal instrument vitiated, in its opinion, by such defects as to render it a nullity. " In his opinion that this is "the 
only means of protesting against a resolution of the majority which, in its opinion, disregards the true 
meaning of the Charter and adopts in connection with it a decision which is legally invalid. " Dissenting Opinion of Judge Winiarski, Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 232 
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in fact international treaties, each party possesses an inherent right to supervise their implemen- 
tation to ensure that the organizations do not adopt decisions that would be incompatible with 
their objects and purposes, or that would be detrimental to the interests of the member States in 
excess of what they had accepted as the basis for membership 
23 Second, it has been argued that 
this right is derived from the member States inherent right to interpret the law if they are not 
satisfied with the interpretation given by an international organ. States can assert the correctness 
of their own interpretation of the constitutions of international organizations is the correct one, 
and in consequence refuse to comply with decisions of the international bodies that they claim to 
4 be unconstitutional. 
There have been instances in international practice, where member States rejected decisions they 
considered to be unconstitutional, and some Judges of the ICJ have accepted their right to do so. 
For example, Judge Bustamante in his Dissenting Opinion in the Certain Expenses case: "When, 
in the opinion of one of the Member States, a mistake of interpretation has been made or there 
has even been an infringement of the Charter, there is a right to challenge the resolution in which 
the error has been noted for the purpose of determining whether or not it departed from the 
Charter. "25 Similarly, in the case of the Interpretation of the Agreement between the WHO and 
Egypt, Judge Gros, in his separate opinion, stated that "member States are not bound to 
implement an unlawful act if that is what they hold it to be, and the practice of international or- 
ganizations has shown that recourse is had in such circumstances to a refusal to carry out such 
act. "26 According to this view, it could be argued that Iraq had the right to defy some of the 
23 Osieke, "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations", note 20 supra, p 240 24 Waston, note 20 supra, p 60 
25 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bustamante, Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 304 26 Separate Opinion of Jude Gros, Interpretation of the Agreement between the WHO and Egypt case, ICI Reports, 1980, p 104 
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disarmament measures imposed on it by Resolution 687, should it find that these measures 
impinged its inherent right of self-defence. 
B. 1.2 The competence of the international organization to rule on the challenge 
On the other side of the issue, it has been suggested that international bodies have no competence 
to rule on such challenges by a member State and that for them to do so would be to act as 
"judges in their own cases, " contrary to the general legal principle. 7 In his dissenting opinion in 
the Namibia case (1971), Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice put the issue thus: "In the institutional 
field, the justification for the act of some organ or body may turn upon considerations of a 
political or technical character, or of professional conduct or discipline, and if so, the political, 
technical or professional organ or body concerned will, in principle, be competent to make the 
necessary determinations. But where the matter turns, and turns exclusively, on considerations of 
a legal character, a political organ, even if it is competent to take any resulting action, is not itself 
competent to make the necessary legal determinations on which the justification for such action 
must rest. This can only be done by legal organ competent to make such determinations. "28 
B. 1.3 The accepted rules under the law of international organizations 
The proposals mentioned above have not been generally accepted. The generally held view, 
supported by pronouncements of the International Court of Justice and the consistent practice of 
the organs of international organizations is that international bodies are competent to deal with 
claims against their jurisdiction. The ICJ repeatedly confirmed this view in its jurisprudence. For 
example, in its Advisory Opinion in the Certain Expenses case (1962), the Court stated that "In 
the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determining the validity of even a 
legislative or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure of the 
27 Osieke, "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations", note 20 supra, p 241 
28 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gerald Fitzmaurice, Namibia case, ICJ Reports, 1971, p 299 
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United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority 
to interpret the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which 
the Court is in course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each 
organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. "29 The Court went further to 
state that "when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. "30 In a more explanatory way, 
Judge Morelli, in his separate opinion in the same case, wrote, "It is not possible to suppose that 
the Charter leaves it open to any State Member to claim at any time that an Assembly resolution 
authorizing a particular expense has never had any legal effect whatever, on the ground that the 
resolution is based on a wrong interpretation of the Charter or an incorrect ascertainment of 
situations of fact or of law. It must on the contrary be supposed that the Charter confers finality 
on the Assembly's resolution irrespective of the reasons, whether they are correct or not, on 
which the resolution is based; and this must be so even in a field in which the Assembly does not 
have true discretionary power. "31 
Indeed, in practice, to give individual member States the right to interpret the UN Charter 
unilaterally would lead to numerous different, and maybe contradictory, views which eventually 
would result in a hopeless incapacity of the bodies of the United Nations to function and to 
29 Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 168 
30 Ibid. Similarly, when the Court considered the objection raised in the Namibia case that General Assembly 
Resolution 2145 (XXI) made pronouncements that the Assembly, not being a judicial organ and not having 
previously referred the matter to any such organ, was not competent to make, the Court stated: "To deny to a 
political organ of the United Nations which is a successor of the League in this respect the right to act, on the 
argument that it lacks competence to render what is described as a judicial decision, would not only be inconsistent but would amount to a complete denial of the remedies available against fundamental breaches 
of an international undertaking" The Court concluded, therefore, that it was "unable to appreciate the view 
that the General Assembly acted unilaterally as party and judge in its own case. " Namibia case, ICJ Reports, 
1971, p 49 
31 Separate opinion of Judge Morelli, Certain Expenses case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 224 
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discharge their duties. 32 Furthermore, to confer upon States the right to decide for themselves the 
legal validity of the decision, and subsequently, to reject decisions that they consider unconstitu- 
tional without a legal determination by a review body to that effect is, actually, to give them 
unfettered right to reject any inconvenient obligation. 33 In the case of the Security Council, 
where matters are related to international peace and security, this proposal may result in 
dangerous situations. Finally, to allow member States in general to reject a properly adopted 
decision on the basis of a unilateral determination as to its constitutionality would be tantamount 
to making the members judges in their own cases, contrary to the general principles of law. 34 
While admitting that, in the absence of a review body, it is indispensable that determinations on 
the legality of decisions claimed to be unconstitutional must be left to the organization itself, 
these determinations, however, seem unsatisfactory as legal decisions because the organization 
will be judging its own jurisdiction, contrary to the general principles of law. Perhaps, this is 
particularly the case with respect to the Security Council, as a corollary of the unique structure of 
that body. The Council is dominated by a few powerful States who can effectively influence its 
decisions. In addition, the veto power granted to the permanent members means that the Council 
cannot take any decision against the will of any of those members. These factors render the 
Council less able to carry out such determination of a judicial nature. Moreover, if it did so, such 
determination, certainly, would not satisfy the States who challenged the legality of the original 
decision, especially, if that decision seriously affected them. There would always be claims of 
prejudice and bias towards the views of powerful States. Indeed, political realities suggest that 
such determination will, in fact be made, or at least must be approved, by those members. For 
instance, if the majority of Council members recognized that the disputed decision was indeed 
32 Wright, Q. The Strengthening of International Law, 98 Recueil des cours, 1959, p 125 33 Pollux, note 20 supra, p 56 34 Osieke, "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations", note 20 supra, p 255 
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ultra vires or inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter, any alteration or 
modification of that decision can only be made at the approval of all permanent members. 
However, if such action aggrieves the interest of one of permanent members or their allies, the 
Council most likely will be blocked from making such pronouncement. 
As to the present case, according to the general and settled view, Iraq has no right to reject any of 
the disarmament measures imposed on it in Resolution 687 even if they are unconstitutional or 
ultra vires. These measures will remain enforceable upon Iraq unless lifted or modified by the 
Security Council itself. The Council, however, did not make any determination on Iraq's claim 
that the sanctions were illegal and unfair. It is also highly unlikely that the Council was willing 
or able to reconsider these measures. In fact, the original decision to call for the destruction of all 
Iraq's missiles "with a range greater than 150 kilometers" came as a result of a request from the 
Israeli government to the US officials 35 During the debate in the Security Council, Russia 
wanted to confine the sanction to missiles with a range over 300 kilometers, whereas the US 
favoured 120 kilometers, but eventually compromised on 150 kilometers, short enough to keep 
Israel out of range. 6 This implies that the US would, almost certainly, veto any resolution that 
extended this limit. 
Section C: The doctrine of estoppel and its applicability for the present case 
Apart from the controversies concerning the legal validity of ultra vires decisions and the 
lawfulness of the principle of competence de la competence, Iraq was, in fact, precluded from 
protesting or defying the implementation of measures that appear to be inconsistent with the 
principles of the UN Charter by another operational rule of international law, namely, the 
doctrine of estoppel. According to that doctrine, Iraq was estopped from protesting the illegality 
35 "Gulf Victors Pushing New Terms for End to War", Christian Science Monitor (19 March, 1991), p 3, quoted in Johnstone, note 5 supra, p 68 
36 Johnstone, ibid, p 16 
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of these measures by its declaration of acceptance. Before explanation of this proposal, the 
following two parts will briefly review the doctrine of estoppel, its purpose, forms, and scope of 
application. 
Cl 
. 
The doctrine of estoppel in international law 
The doctrine of estoppel is on the face of it a private law doctrine forming a part of the law of 
evidence. 37 Its basic purpose is to prevent a party from benefiting by his own inconsistency at the 
expense of another party who has in good faith relied upon a representation of fact made by the 
former party. 38 While admitting that estoppel can be described "as a rule of evidence" the Board 
in the Privy Council in Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, Limited v. Canadian National 
(West Indies) Steamships, Limited pointed out that "the whole concept [of estoppel] is more 
correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law. "39 The principle of estoppel is an important 
operational rule in international law, widely held among jurists as a general principle of 
international law. International tribunals have frequently referred to estoppel, preclusion or 
equivalent terms 40 
The principle of estoppel is based on the expectation that a State should be consistent in its 
attitude to a given factual or legal situation, an expectation originating in the continuing need for 
37 Lauterpacht, H. Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Archon Books, London, 1970, p 
203 
38 Bowett, D. "Estoppel before International Tribunals and its Relation to acquiescence", 33 BYIL, 1957, p 
177. The classic formulation of estoppel in English Law, as defined by Lord Denman, is that "where one by 
his word or conduct willfully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and 
induces him to act on that belief so as to alter his previous position, the former is concluded from averring 
against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. " Lord Denman, C. J., in Pickard v. 
Sears, 1837,6 Ad and E. p. 474 39 The case of Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, Limited v. Canadian National (West Indies) 
Steamships, Limited, 1947, A. C. p 56 
40 In his Separate Opinion in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 
Merits, Vice President Judge Alfaro said that "there is in international law a principle, which is moreover a 
principle of substantive law and not just a technical rule of evidence, according to which `a State party to an international litigation is bound by its previous acts or attitude when they are in contradiction with its claims in the litigation. ' This principle is designated by a number of different terms, of which "estoppel" and 
"preclusion" are the most common. But it is also clear that these terms are not to be understood in quite the 
same sense as they are in municipal law 
... 
that this principle can operate with decisive effect in international itigation. " Separate Opinion of Judge Alfaro, Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, ICJ Reports, 1962, p. 39 
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a degree of stability and predictability in States' behaviour. A State's inconsistency in its 
international relations would be viewed unfavourably both by other States and, in the event of 
dispute, by any international tribunal called upon to adjudicate. 1 The jurisprudence of 
international tribunals, in many cases, asserted the need for constancy and predictability in 
States' behaviour and, to this effect, States are to be bound by their declarations and barred from 
acting contrary to their representations of fact, even if these declarations in fact do not 
correspond to their real intention. 2 An example is the classical Eastern Greenland case, where 
Denmark claimed that, because in various bilateral and multilateral treaties, to which Norway 
was a party, Greenland was described as a Danish colony or as a part of Denmark, or Denmark 
was allowed to exclude Greenland from the operation of the agreement, Norway was therefore 
precluded from contesting Danish sovereignty over Greenland. 3 Denmark also relied on a 
statement by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Danish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, declaring that "the plans of the Royal Danish Government respecting Danish 
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland... would meet with no difficulty on the part of Nor- 
way. "44 The Court stated, "A careful examination of the words used and of the circumstances in 
which they were used, as well as of the subsequent developments, shows that M. Ihlen cannot 
have meant to be giving there and then a definitive recognition of Danish sovereignty over 
Greenland, and shows also that he cannot have been understood by the Danish Government at 
the time as having done so. "45 Therefore, it held Norway to be bound by the ministerial 
declaration, so that subsequent actions by Norway to occupy parts of Greenland were rendered 
41 MacGibbon, I. "Estoppel in International Law", 7 ICLQ, 1958, p 468-9 
42 Bowett, note 38 supra, p 183-4 
43 Ibid, p 182 
44 The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, PCIJ, 1933, A/B, No. 53 
45 Ibid, p 69 
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"unlawful and invalid. 1,46 This case illustrates that estoppel, if it exists, may suffice to settle the 
issue because of its unambiguous characterization of the situation, resting on good faith and the 
principle of consistency in State relations. 
Some scholars went further to emphasize the existence of a rule of anti- inconsistency in 
international law independently from the principle of estoppel, 47 whereby States are to be bound 
by their representation of fact or unilateral declarations- not outcome of negotiations, whether 
or not the result of inconsistency would be to prejudice another party. 48 However, the existence 
of such a principle, independently from the principle of estoppel, is controversial. 
46 Ibid, p 70-1 
47 This principle has been labelled by different names such as the principle of "contradiction", "consistency" 
or "anti-consistency". The usually cited difference between estoppel and the rule of consistency is that the 
latter does not require the existence of `reliance' by one party on the representation made by the other. 
Cheng, for example, argued that "Unlike [estoppel], an admission does not peremptorily preclude a party 
from averring the truth. It has rather the effect of an argumentum ad hominem, which is directed at a person's 
sense of consistency, or what in logic is paradoxically called the "principle of contradiction. " See Cheng, B. 
General Principles of Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953, p 147; Similarly, Lord McNair 
distinguished the principle of consistency from estoppel and admitted that international jurisprudence has 
accorded some recognition to the former. He argued that it has been "demonstrated that some advantage is to 
be gained by one State, party to a dispute, by convicting the other State of inconsistency with an attitude 
previously adopted.... This is not estoppel eo nomine, but it shows that international jurisprudence has a place 
for some recognition of the principle that a State cannot blow hot and cold-allegans contraria non 
audiendus est. " McNair, "The Legality of the Occupation of Ruhr", 5 BY1L, 1924, p 35. In the case 
concerning the Temple at Preah Vihear, Judge Alfaro asserted the existence of an "anti-inconsistency" 
principle in international law that requires a State to hold to its view of fact or law, even where there is no 
reliance by another State. He distinguished this rule from the doctrine of estoppel; suggesting that the rule 
against inconsistency applied in international cases is based primarily on good faith, secondly on analogy to 
the municipal law of contract, and thirdly on analogy to `prescription' and a supposed public policy of 
avoiding controversies. However, Judge Alfaro was the only member of the ICJ to hold such a view. The 
Temple at Preah Vihear case, ICJ Reports, 1962, p 42 48 It has been suggested that States are to be constrained by their unilateral declarations, albeit not directed 
towards the formation of agreement. That is, when a State unilaterally-not outcome of negotiations- 
publish its intention to perform a specific conduct or to take a particular course of action, this notified intent 
is binding and it is blocked from acting contrary to its declared intention. See generally, Rubin, A. "The 
International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations", 71 AJIL, 1977. Support for this argument was found 
in the ICJ judgement in Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France). In that case, the ICJ held that France was 
legally bound by public declarations, made on behalf of the French government, that it would end the 
conduct of atmospheric nuclear tests. Therefore, the Court found that the "claim advanced by Australia no longer has any object. " Because France could not act against its notified intention and resume its nuclear tests 
or assert its right to do so in the South Pacific Ocean. Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France), ICJ Reports, 
1974, p 267-71 
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C2 Forms and applications of estoppel 
The doctrine of estoppel has a wide range of forms and applications. Estoppel can be created by 
undertakings by a State evidenced in a written form (treaty, memorandum of understanding, 
compromise, exchange of notes, etc. ) Estoppel can also be created by conduct, whether through 
express representation of fact, or through conduct which can reasonably be construed to imply 
the existence of a certain state of fact 
49 This is the most frequent form of estoppel referred to in 
international jurisprudence and it is known as "equitable estoppel. " The concept of equitable 
estoppel does not encompass the entire range of ideas conveyed by the doctrine of estoppel 
itself. 50 In equitable estoppel, assuming a statement made by a party leads to that party gaining 
some benefit, or induces a party relying on that statement to act to its own detriment; the 
principle of good faith requires the party making the statement to stand by it, irrespective 
whether or not it is true. " Estoppel, thus, can be viewed as resting upon responsibility incurred 
by the party making the statement for having created an appearance of fact, or as a necessary 
assumption of the risk to another party acting upon the statement on good faith 52 Thus, the vital 
element to create an equitable estoppel in international law is the existence of reliance in good 
faith upon statements or conduct of the other party, either to the detriment of the party so relying 
on the statement or to the advantage of the party making the statement. The advantage to the one 
party or detriment to the other is the consideration which binds the parties; therefore, it must be 
49 Bowett, note 38 supra, p 183 
so Rubin, A. "The International Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations", 71 AJIL, 1977, p 18 51 The American Commissioner in his Conclusions in the Santa Isabel Claims explained the idea of equitable 
estoppel in international law as "the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely 
precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either 
of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such 
conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some 
corresponding right, either or property, of contract, or of remedy. " The USA, on Behalf of Cornelia J. Pringle 
and Sidney J. Pringle, Administrator of the Estate of Charles A. Pringle Deceased v. The United Mexican 
States", in 26 AJIL, 1932, p 196 [Hereinafter USA v. Mexico] 
52 Bowett, note 38 supra, p 184 
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clearly shown to exist S3 In the 1969 ICJ Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, the 
Court declared explicitly that in international law, the condition of detrimental reliance must be 
fulfilled before a declaration would be held binding on a declaring State under the estoppel 
doctrine. 54 In addition to the element of `reliance', in his earlier observations on the essentials of 
estoppel, Professor Bowett argued that the statement or representation of fact must be voluntary, 
unconditional, and authorized 
. 
55 This element, however, is not conclusive and was not upheld by 
the most other scholars or by the ICJ. 56 
C. 3 Equitable estoppel in the case of Iraq 
When the government of Iraq accepted the cease-fire Resolution 687, it thereby clearly and 
unambiguously accepted all the terms and conditions of that resolution, including the measures 
which are contested as illegitimate and committed itself to the obligations imposed in it. Besides 
the acceptance of Resolution 687 per se, Iraq also accepted the mandate of the Commission. 
Through an exchange of letters in May 1991, the UN Secretary-General, the UNSCOM 
Executive Chairman, and the Iraqi Foreign Minister agreed on the modalities for the 
51 Ibid, p 193 
sa The Court stated that "having regard to these considerations of principle, it appears that only the existence 
of a situation of estoppel could suffice to lend substance to this contention-that is to say if the Federal 
Republic were now precluded from denying the applicability of the conventional regime, by reason of past 
conduct, declarations, etc., which is not only clearly and consistently evinced acceptance of that regime, but 
also had caused Denmark or the Netherlands, in reliance on such conduct, detrimentally to change position or 
suffer some prejudice. " ICJ Reports, 1969, p 26. para. 30. A Similar view was expressed by Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, in his concurring opinion in the Case Concerning the Temple at Preah Vihear. He stated that 
"the essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as strictly to be understood, is 
that the party invoking the rule must have ` relied upon' the statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the other party's advantage. The often invoked necessity for a consequent "change of 
position" on the part of the party invoking preclusion or estoppel is implied in this. " ICJ Reports, 1962, p 63. Although, in neither case the Court mentioned the form of estoppel it referred to, both situations were 
understood to be equitable estoppel. 
ss Bowett, note 38 supra, p 190-2 56 See section CA below 
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commission's inspections. Those modalities included unrestricted freedom of movement without 
advance notice to the Iraqi government 
57 
The notification of acceptance for Resolution 687 has certain legal effects. By this notification 
Iraq published its intention to comply with the terms and conditions of the resolution. 
Accordingly, Iraq was bound by its declared intention, even if its real intention at the time of 
acceptance was not to correspond to these obligations or some of them. Iraq was expected to be 
consistent in its attitude to that representation of fact and to carry out its obligations under that 
declaration in good faith and constant manner and without laying down conditions for 
cooperation with the inspection process. However, in fact, Iraq never carried out its obligations 
without constant political, diplomatic and sometimes military pressure; 58 this attitude itself 
violates the rules of good faith and consistency. 
By its notification of acceptance, Iraq gained the advantage that the coalition forces halted their 
offensive military operation and the hostilities have been ceased. On the other hand, the coalition 
forces had clearly relied upon the statements of fact made by the Iraqi government-its 
notification of acceptance for Resolution 687 to terminate their military operations. Ergo, the 
Iraqi acceptance resulted in a `change of position' of the coalition forces from war to peace and 
allowed the defeated Iraq to secure advantages by ceasing the hostilities. A similar proposition 
was held by the Hague Tribunal in the Russian Indemnity case. The Tribunal noted that Turkey 
had obtained value for its agreement on indemnity by the cessation of hostilities 59 Equally, the 
advantage Iraq obtained by the cease-fire and the consequent change in the position of the 
coalition forces had binding effect upon the parties; this means that in order to maintain good 
s' For a summary of UNSCOM's rights and duties, see Plan for the Implementation of Relevant parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/22614 (1991) 58 See Chapter 4, section C. 4.1 
59 Scott, J. The Hague Court Reports, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford University press, London, 1916, p 319 
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faith, Iraq must stand by its representation of fact and it was estopped from contesting the 
legality of the measures or obstructing the implementation of the terms of Resolution 687, even 
those measures that appear to be inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter. In other 
words, by its statements of fact and the reliance of the other party in good faith upon such 
statements, thereby changing its position, Iraq waived its right to possess ballistic missiles with a 
range more than 150 Kilometers; a right which might perhaps have otherwise existed. 
C. 4 The voluntary character and treaties imposed on defeated belligerent 
As mentioned above, Bowett argued that to create an estoppel, the representation concerned must 
be made voluntarily by the party against which the estoppel is pleaded. 60 Hence, representation 
made under coercion or involving fraud of any material kind will render an estoppel plea 
invalid. 1 In the Cuculla case of 1868, when it was put to the Tribunal that the constitutional 
government of Mexico had accepted responsibility for the acts of the rebel Zuloaga Government 
by the treaty of Puebla with Great Britain, the Tribunal said: `But these concessions, extorted by 
a duress as actual and relentless as ever pressed upon an embarrassed and exhausted government, 
were made to buy its peace and, rejected by its powerful adversaries, can not now furnish any 
assistance to this commission in determining the interesting question presented in this case. , 62 
On this basis, it could be argued that the condition of voluntariness is absent in the present case. 
The Iraqi concessions were extorted by a sort of duress. In other words, after its landslide defeat, 
Iraq's government was exhausted; the acceptance of Resolution's 687 obligations was made to 
60 Bowett, note 38 supra, p 190-2 61 Ibid, p190 
62 Moore, J, B. International Arbitrations, vol. 3, p 2879; quoted in ibid. A situation similar, though not 
identical to the one created by fraud or duress, arises when the conduct of one party is not "voluntary" in the 
sense that the party is not in a position to act otherwise; again, the plea of estoppel would be nullified. In the 
Serbian Loans case, one of the reasons given by the Permanent Court for not holding the bondholders as 
estopped from claiming payment under the original terms of the debt was the fact that they had been unable 
to act otherwise than to accept the Serbian payment of French francs. The Permanent Courts said "it does not 
even appear that the bondholders could have effectively asserted their rights earlier than they did, much less 
that there is any ground for concluding that they deliberately surrendered them" PCIJ, 1929, Series A, No. 
20/21, p39 
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buy its peace and it had no alternative but to do so. Indeed, Iraq's acquiescence in the 
disarmament obligations and the other sanctions was not voluntary, at any rate. The obvious 
implication is that the plea of estoppel is nullified and, consequently, Iraq was not estopped from 
protesting the illegality of these measures and it had the right to challenge the implementation of 
these sanctions. 
This proposition, however, would render all obligations and conditions included in any 
armistices imposed upon the vanquished after a war null and void. This would lead to an illogical 
and impractical position, whereby a defeated aggressor could agree to obligations imposed upon 
it, confident that it could protest the illegality of these conditions or challenge their 
implementation soon after. Consequently, this would lead to parties benefiting from their own 
inconsistency. It is suggested, therefore, that the voluntary character of the representation, if it 
existed as an essential element to the doctrine of estoppel, should not apply in this situation. A 
defeated aggressor cannot have it both ways; to avail itself of the advantages of the cease-fire 
and repudiate the agreement when the performance of its terms becomes onerous. Bowett, 
indeed, was aware of the dangers inherent in such situations and alluded to the possible 
exemption of treaties imposed upon the vanquished after a war, from the `voluntariness' 
condition; when he discussed this condition, he said, "leaving aside the question of treaties 
imposed upon the vanquished after a war"63 
Furthermore, the Russian Indemnity case illustrates the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel to 
that kind of treaty. The Treaty of Constantinople concluded on 8 February, 1879, between Russia 
and Turkey, which ended the war of 1877-78 between those two countries, contained conditions 
imposed upon the defeated Turkey after the war. One of those conditions was stipulated in 
Article 5 of this treaty, which stated that "the claims of Russian subjects and institutions in 
63 Bowett, note 38 supra, p 190 
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Turkey for indemnity on account of damages sustained during the war shall be paid as soon as 
they are examined by the Russian Embassy at Constantinople and transmitted to the Sublime 
Porte. "" Consequently, Turkey was held liable for compensation for the damages inflected by 
Turkey on Russian subjects and institutions in Turkey during the war. The Hague Tribunal did 
not dismiss the dispute that arose during the implementation of this condition on the basis that 
the obligation was not undertaken voluntarily by Turkey. Instead it held that "Turkey had 
obtained value for its pretended gift by the fact that hostilities have ceased. It is, therefore, not 
possible to admit the existence of an act of generosity, and still less of a gift. "65 Thus, the 
Tribunal admitted that the compensation was not an entirely voluntarily act on the part of 
Turkey. This case shows that the mere fact that the conditions of a peace treaty were forced upon 
the defeated does not nullify the operation of the doctrine of estoppel. 
Conclusion 
The cease-fire terms applied to Iraq are unprecedented in UN practice and world history; they 
demonstrate the extent to which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, may intervene in 
matters traditionally within the exclusive province of national sovereignty. Its ability to do so 
reflected an unusual degree of agreement within the international community as to the threat 
posed by Iraq, as well as the outcome of an annihilating military defeat which left Iraq in no 
position to bargain or resist. From a legal point of view, the Charter has vested the Security 
Council with wide range of authorities in order to execute the responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security. It is certainly within the scope of the Council's authority to 
impose sanctions such as a disarmament regime on the defeated aggressor as long as they can be 
reasonably be said to fall within the broad aim of restoring international peace and security, in 
64 Scott, note 59 supra, p 297 65Ibid, p319 
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accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Indeed, a State with a long history of 
aggression and a revealed propensity to continue such an attitude in the future could reasonably 
have some limitations imposed on its capability to use force, in order to modify its behaviour. 
While it is admitted that the Council is empowered by the Charter such a measure, it is also 
undisputed that Iraq's right of self-defence guaranteed in Article 51 remains exercisable however 
serious Iraq's past violations have been. 
On the grounds of Article 51, concerns have been articulated regarding the legitimacy of some 
measures imposed by Resolution 687 that appear to encroach Iraq's inherent right of self-defence 
and render it powerless to defend itself in case of external attack. From this perspective, these 
i 
measures seem to be contrary to the Charter Principles and therefore legally invalid. 
Accordingly, the pivotal question arose whether Iraq had the right to reject and defy the 
implementation of these decisions. Examination of the contemporary rules of international law 
i 
leads to the definite conclusion that, under current regulations, Iraq has no right to reject 
disarmament measures even if they were unconstitutional or ultra vires. These measures remain 
enforceable upon Iraq unless lifted or modified by the Security Council itself. The Council, 
however, did not decide on claims raised by Iraq regarding the illegality of the disarmament 
measures. Even, apart from the law of international organizations, Iraq was actually estoppel 
from protesting the illegality of those decisions or defying their implementation by the 
operational rule of equitable estoppel. Thus, while the legality of some disarmament obligations 
stipulated in Resolution 687 were and remain doubtful, Iraq was legally bound by them. 
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Chapter 7 
The Right of Self-Defence against Iraq's Threats 
Introduction 
The second legal ground for the use of force against Iraq in 2003 was the right of self-defence 
under Article 51. The US claimed that it had the right of self-defence in pre-emptive action 
against twofold threats from Iraq: (i) the threats of Iraqi links with terrorism: the war on Iraq was 
justified as a part of the global war against terrorism, proclaimed by President George W. Bush 
in response to the 9/11 attacks; (ii) the threats likely to emerge in the future as a result of Iraq's 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. ' 
In fact, the events of 9/11 and its aftermath had a substantial influence on the situation on Iraq, to 
the extent, that it could be argued that if the 9/11 attacks on the US had not occurred, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 would not have taken place. These attacks influenced the situation on 
Iraq in two ways: first, the classical right of self-defence was expanded to comprise a new right 
that permits States to use force against non-State actors (terrorists) and States that support and 
harbour them; second, its impact on the American policy on the use of force, in particular, the 
adoption of the doctrine of "preventive self-defence", which has come to be known as the "Bush 
Doctrine. " This chapter examines the significant changes and alteration of the traditional right of 
self-defence brought about by the events of 9/11 and its aftermath and how far the use of force 
against Iraq in 2003 could be justified as a defensive war in the light of the developments. The 
chapter is divided into four sections, as follows: 
(A) The first examines the "law of terrorism" in the period prior to the events of 9/11 including 
the regulations stated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case for the use of force against `private' use 
1 President Bush Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 Weekly Comp. Press. Doc. 338-39; see section D below 
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of force. It also examines State practice regarding the use of force against terrorism before the 
9/11 attacks. 
(B) The second section focuses on the events of 9/11 and their implications, including the 
reaction of the international community and whether the massive support for the US can be seen 
as amounting to a new customary rule regarding terrorism. It also examines the new `legislation' 
on terrorism enacted by the Security Council in response to the attacks and its effect on the 
previous legal framework. The section highlights the legal debate over the condition on necessity 
in relation to the use of force in response to past terrorist attacks. Finally the section examines 
the State practice in the post-9/11 period including the war on Afghanistan (2001), the Israeli 
attack on Syria (2003) and the war between Israel and Hezbollah (2006) 
(C) The third section analyses the ` Bush Doctrine' of preemptive self-defence which constitutes 
the legal base for the American claim of self-defence in its invasion of Iraq. This section also 
examines the State practice regarding anticipatory self-defence 
(D) The final section, in light of the conclusions reached in the preceding sections and the facts 
prevailing at the time of invasion, investigates how far the invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be 
justified as a defensive war: whether as a part of the global war against terrorism or as an 
preemptive action against threats of WMDs. 
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Section A: The use of force ajiainst terrorism before 9/11 
International terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon, which did not exist at the time of 
adoption of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the UN Charter does not use the term 
"terrorism". The drafters of the UN Charter did not fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and 
technology of modem day terrorism. In turn, the right of States to take forcible measures or pre- 
emptive actions against terrorist networks or States that harbour these organisations was not fully 
recognized by the UN Charter at that time. Furthermore, the language of Article 2(4) is vague in 
the area of response to terrorism, in the sense that it is unclear whether or not 2(4) can be deemed 
to be a prohibition on the behaviour of non-State actors such as terrorists. Generally speaking, 
international law contains no specific category of "law of terrorism" and so terrorism issues have 
to be addressed through the applicable areas of public international law, such as the right of self- 
defence, State responsibility and the notion of armed attack. Basically, the debate here concerns 
military action taken by individual States, without the consent of the territorial sovereign, in 
order to eliminate sources of terrorism. 
A. 1 The "Law of terrorism" before 9/11 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the term "armed attack" represents the key notion of the concept of 
self-defence pursuant to the exact words of Article 51. Its interpretation decides how far 
unilateral force is still admissible. 4 Hence, it goes without saying that a far-reaching consensus 
on the meaning of this notion is of the utmost significance for the effectiveness of the rules of 
international law on use of force. In the context of terrorism, clearly, the basis for the right of 
armed intervention is the characterization of a terrorist attack as an "armed attack, " within the 
meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, as the necessary prerequisite of the right to take forcible 
2 Arend, A. and Beck, R. International Law and the Use of Force, Routledge, London, 1993, p145-6 3 Brownlie, I. Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, sixth edition, 2003, p 713 4 See Chapter 1, section E. 2 
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action in self-defence. 5 However, the nature of terrorism is such that such action cannot be taken 
directly against the terrorists themselves, in the way that a State could respond to a conventional 
military attack. Nevertheless, the theory in support of the use of force against terrorism is 
meaningless without a target. Clearly, one cannot target suicide bombers or aircraft saboteurs, as 
the former are destroyed along with their victims, and the latter unknown. The focus of attention 
therefore turns to the origins of the terrorism, the so-called State-sponsor. 6 Terror groups start 
their attacks from the territory of a sovereign State. Consequently, that State can be held 
responsible for the relevant actions. Thus, to satisfy the armed attack requirement in case of 
terrorism, the State against which force is used in self-defence must have borne responsibility in 
respect of the attack.? 
Participation in the use of force by military organized unofficial groups is understood to be 
encompassed in the prohibition of the use of force-8 The Definition of Aggression, in Article 
3(g), includes certain forms of assistance to the private use of force 
.9 Likewise, the ICJ, in the 
Nicaragua Judgment, referred to Article 3(g) as being a case of an armed attack. The Court 
stated that "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed forces against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial 
involvement therein. "10 However, this pronouncement is unsatisfactory in many ways and does 
s Cassese, A. "The International Community's Legal Response to Terrorism", 38 JCLQ, 1989, p 596 6 Levitt, G. "Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking", in Damrosch, L and Scheffer, D. (eds) 
Law and Force in the New International Order, Westview Press, oxford, 1991, p 226 
7 Cassese, note 5 supra, p 596-7 
8 Simma, B. The Charter of the United Nations; A Commentary, Volume 1, second edition, Oxfi University Press, Oxford, 2002, p 800 
9 Article 3(g) states that "The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein" is "qualify as an act of aggression" See also Chapter 1, section E. 2 
10 Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, p 103, pars 195 
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not fit the contemporary practice of international terrorism. In other words, it is not compatible 
with the complex reality of the modem terror networks. 
First, the term "substantial involvement" in the Nicaragua Judgment is too vague and susceptible 
to varied value-oriented interpretations, " as the Court did not establish any criterion by which 
"involvement" might be considered sufficiently "substantial" to constitute an armed attack. 
Second, the phrase "sending by or on behalf a State" suggests the existence of such a close link 
between the State and the private group, that the latter is akin to a de facto State organ. 12 Hence, 
the acts that amount to an armed attack must be "imputable to a State" 13 in order to justify 
defensive response. This view was further advocated by some scholars. Cassese, for example, 
argues that "international law is clear: the terrorist attack is attributable to the State and a use of 
force against it by way of individual or collective self-defence is allowed. 14 This means that an 
attack executed by terrorist network that has no relation with any State, cannot amount to an 
armed attack justifying the use of force in self-defence. Indeed, the concept of self-defence 
against non-State actors has generally been considered problematic. Few States and 
commentators have explicitly supported a right to use force against a State where the terrorists 
operated or were present, unless the State's complicity was clear. 15 Moreover, some terrorist 
networks operating in the international arena today, such as Al-Qaeda, cannot be seen as a de 
facto organ of any sovereign State. Therefore, this view is not compatible with the contemporary 
realities and cannot be accepted. 
As another point related to the kind of assistance provided by the State, in the Nicaragua case, 
the Court held that a State's mere passive toleration of private attacks by its nationals or from its 
1' Simma, note 8 supra, p 801 
12 Ibid 
13 Greenwood, C. "International Law and the ` war against terrorism", 78 International Affairs, 2002, p 308 14 Cassese, note 5 supra, p 598 Is Gray, C. International Law and the Use of Force, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p 165 
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territory was not sufficient to justify a direct attack. Even logistic support or the delivery of 
weapons were not viewed by the Court as constituting an armed attack that would give rise to a 
right to use force in self-defence. In the Court's view, "such assistance may be regarded as a 
threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of another 
State, "16 but, it is not an armed attack. In fact, the denial that the provision of weapons or 
logistical or other support can amount to an armed attack, although it could be illegal 
intervention, is an anachronism. This view was rejected by many scholars, as well as Judges of 
the Court in their Dissenting Opinions, '7 on the basis that it is "flatly wrong as a principle of 
international law, "18 too broad and in need of further differentiation. 19 It is unsatisfactory to 
exclude generally certain types of assistance to terrorism from the category of "substantial 
involvement" which would equate to armed attack. Indeed, there seems to be no good reason 
why, if a State knows that a private group is willing to use military force against another State 
and allows the group to train its members on its territory, harbours them after they have 
committed these acts, and provides them with weapons and logistical support, such assistance, 
which the Court itself characterized as illegal intervention, should be considered less substantial 
than simply sending the group20 Indeed, State practice shows that this norm of international law 
has acquired its own "credibility gap" by reason of the divergence between the norm and the 
actual practice of States. 
16 Nicaragua Judgement, (ICJ Reports 1986), p 104, para 195; see also Chapter 1 section E. 2 17 See Dissenting Opinions of Judges Jennings and Schwebel, Nicaragua Judgement, ICJ Reports, 1986, p 
543 and 259 respectively. Judge Schwebel stated that the Judgement "misconceives and misapplies the law- 
not in all parts.. 
. 
but in paramount respects: particularly in its interpretation of what is an `armed attack'. 18 Moore, J. "The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order", 81 AJIL, 1987, p 154; Franck T. 
"Some Observations on the ICJ's Procedural and Substantive Innovations", 81 AJIL, 1987, p 119-20 19 Simma, note 8 supra, p 801; Moore, J "The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order", 80 AJIL, 1986, p 107-9, for the contrary opinion see Briggs, H. W., "The International Court of Justice Lives Up to its Name", 81 AJIL, 1987, p 83-4; Gray, note 15 supra, p 109-10 
20 Simma, note 8 supra, p 801 
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A. 2 State Practice before the 9/11 
Most of the State practice was executed by Israel and USA, since they have been the main targets 
of terrorist attacks. From a legal point of view, both States adopted the view that anticipatory 
self-defence against terrorism and States that support and harbour terrorists, to deter the 
occurrence of similar attacks in the future, is permissible under the UN Charter. The American 
stance was clearly expressed in 1984, in a speech by the Secretary of State, George Shultz. He 
said, "We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modem tool of 
warfare... to combat it, we must be willing to use military force 
. 
"21 Two years later, Secretary 
Shultz elaborated on this theme: "We do not have the luxury of waiting until all the ambiguities 
have disappeared... Our intellectual challenge is especially to understand the need for prudent, 
limited, proportionate uses of our military power.... "22 He then discussed the legality of such 
responses, clearly explicating the argument in support of the use of military force against 
terrorism. He stated, "The [U. N. ] Charter's restrictions on the use or threat of force in 
international relations include a specific exception for the right of self-defence.... A nation 
attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-empt future attacks, to seize 
terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no other means is available. The law requires that such 
actions be necessary and proportionate. "23 He extended the argument to include States that 
harbour and support terrorists, saying, "There is substantial legal authority for the view that a 
State which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against another State, or which supports or 
encourages terrorist planning and other activities within its own territory, is responsible for such 
attacks. Such conduct can amount to ongoing armed aggression against the other State under 
21 US Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1984, p 314-5 (1986) 22 Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, Remarks by the George P. Shultz, the US Secretary 
of State, before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference, National Defence University, Washington, D. C., 25 
January 1986, p7 23 Ibid, p 11-2 
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international law. "24 Although the proposal of the use of force against terrorists and States 
harbour them was presented by Secretary Shultz as anticipatory self-defence, it is more 
accurately characterized as "defensive reprisal", because it combined elements of an immediate 
retribution with a projected application of its right of self-defence. 5 
A. 2.1 The Israeli attacks on Lebanon 1968 and 1975 
The first such case of the use of force against terrorism was exercised in 1968 when the Israeli 
air forces attacked Beirut airport. Israel argued that it was entitled to exercise its right of self- 
defence in response to earlier attacks on an Israeli aircraft in Athens airport, carried out by 
terrorists based in Lebanon. 26 Israel accused Lebanon of allowing Arab terrorist organizations to 
base themselves in Beirut and to run training camps in Lebanon, and thereby officially 
encouraging warfare by terror against Israel. The Lebanese government, Israel maintained, had 
assumed responsibility for the activities of terror organizations. 7 The Security Council, however, 
rejected this explanation, and unanimously condemned the Israeli action as a "violation of 
[Israel's] obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions. -28 Notably, although the 
USA joined in the condemnation, it made clear that it took this stance only because Lebanon had 
not in fact been responsible for the terrorist attack on Athens airport and the Israeli action was 
disproportionate to the harm suffered; it did not reject the idea of deterrence action in principle. 
A State that is victimized by continuing terrorist attacks may in response take appropriate 
military measures to defend itself against further attacks, as part of the inherent right of self- 
defence recognized in the UN Charter. 29 However, this thinking was not adopted by the other 
States in the Security Council in 1968; nevertheless, it was repeated by the USA and Israel on 
24 Ibid 
25 See section B. 5 below 
26 Falk, R. ` Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation", 63 AJIL, 1969, p 415-6 27 Ibid, p 416-7 
28 Security Council Resolution 262 of 31 December 1968 
29 UN Yearbook, 1968, p 228 
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subsequent occasions 30 In 1975 Israel once again resorted to force when it launched pre-emptive 
attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon. The action was unanimously condemned by the 
Security Council, including the USA. 31 
A. 2.2 The Israeli attack on Tunisia 1985 
In another incident in 1985, Israel attacked Tunis, claiming that it was acting against the PLO 
headquarters in response to Palestinian terrorists' attacks on Israelis abroad. It also claimed that 
Tunisia's international obligations required it to prevent such attacks from being carried out from 
its territory. Israel claimed to be acting in self-defence-an argument accepted by the USA in the 
Security Council debate. 2 The other member States, however, disagreed, and strongly 
condemned the Israeli action as an act of armed aggression against Tunisia's territory, contrary 
to the provisions of the UN Charter. 3 Eventually, the Council "condemn[ed] vigorously the act 
of armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct. "34 The US, however, 
abstained. 
A. 2.3 The American air strikes on Libti'a 1986 
As mentioned above, throughout the 1980s, an increasing trend appeared to emerge for State 
support for acts of international terrorism, leading the American administration openly to 
characterize it as an act of war, warranting a military response. The first implementation of this 
American strategy was against Libya in 1986, following successive terrorist incidents linked to 
30 Falk, note 26 supra, p 417 31 The Lebanese delegate in the Council summarized the reasoning for the condemnation. He said that, 
"Israel.. 
. 
has stated that the aggression it undertook was not punitive in nature. This is a dangerous course to 
follow in international affairs. Are States to be allowed to determine on their own what should be termed 
preventive acts? If so, this will lead the world back to the law of the jungle, and far away from the 
international order based on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. " See in the SCOR, Thirtieth 
Year, 1859th Meeting, 4 December 1975. p 11, para 99 32 UN Yearbook, 1985, p 285 33 Security Council 26106 and 2615th Meetings, 1985 
34 Resolution 573 of 4 October 1985. The resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none with the USA 
abstention 
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Libya, in the context of open military confrontation between the United States and Libya. 
Finally, in April 1986 following a bombing in West Berlin, causing two deaths and large-scale 
injury, the US air forces carried out a substantial air raid against various targets in Tripoli 35 The 
U. S. Government put forward apparently hard evidence of Libya's culpability. Following the 
U. S. attack, the U. S. representative to the United Nations explained the American position in a 
letter to the President of the Security Council, which asserted that "The United States forces have 
exercised the United States right of self-defence by responding to an ongoing pattern of attacks 
by the Government of Libya.... The Libyan policy of threats and use of force is in clear violation 
of Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter. It has given rise to the entirely justifiable response by the 
U. S.,, " 
Most members of the Council rejected the US argument, on the ground that self-defence should 
be narrowly interpreted and could not be pre-emptive and voted to condemn the action. 
However, the UK and France joined the USA in vetoing the condemnation resolution 37 The UK 
accepted that "the right of self-defence is not an entirely passive right"; seeing it as within the 
inherent right of self-defence to attempt to repel terrorism and to discourage further attacks 38 
A. 2.4 The American attack on Iraq 1993 
The right of self-defence was further cited by the USA to justify its missile attack on the Iraqi 
Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad, in June 1993. The US accused Iraq's Intelligence Agency 
of culpability in the assassination attempt on ex-President Bush (senior) in Kuwait, two months 
previously. 39 The American Permanent Representative in the Security Council, Ambassador 
35 Leich, M. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 80 AJIL, 1986, p 
633 
36 Letter from the US Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council dated 14 
April, 1986, Quoted in Ibid, p 632-3 
37 UNDoc. S/18016/Rev. 1(1986) Australia and Denmark also rejected the draft resolution 
38 Quoted in Gray, note 15 supra,. p 162 
39 Reisman, W. "The raid on Baghdad: Some Reflections on its Lawfulness and Implications", 5 EJIL, 1994, 
p 120-1; Kritsiotis, D. "The Legality of the 1993 US Missile Strike on Iraq and the Right of Self-Defence in 
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Madeleine Albright, said the assassination conspiracy amounted to "a direct attack on the United 
States, an attack that required a direct United States response [and to which we] responded 
directly, as we are entitled to do under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides 
for the exercise of self-defence in such cases. '))40 This time, members of the Security Council 
were more sympathetic towards the American position and the Security Council did not pass any 
resolution on the matter. 41 The UK response was fairly cautious; it accepted that force might be 
used in self-defence against threats to one's nationals, where the target continued to support 
terrorist acts against one's nationals and no alternative existed 42 Russia accepted the American 
argument, without reservation. 43 Some writers have, hence, been induced to see this event as 
rnarking the emergence of a new rule of international law permitting the use force in response to 
terrorism. Whilst a few States expressed concern, 44 only China explicitly condemned the US 
action 45 Other States generally expressed understanding of the US action. 46 
A. 2.5 The American strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan 1998 
Similarly, when terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 were 
countered by American missile attacks on a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, there was little international outcry. The USA justified its actions 
on the grounds that the camp had been used by the Al Qaeda organization to support terrorism 
International Law, 45 ICLQ, 1996, p 162-3; Greenwood, C. "International Law and the United States Air 
Operation against Libya" 89 West Virginia Law Review, 1986-1978, p 933 40 Speech of Madeleine Albright, US Representative to the UN, before the Security Council (27 June, 1993) 
Quoted in Kritsiotis, ibid, p 163 41 UNDoc. S/5657,27 June 1993 
42 "UK Materials on International Law", 64 BYIL, 1993, p 732; see also Speech by the British Foreign 
Secretary before the House of Commons on 28 June 1993. Quoted in Kritsiotis, note 39 supra, p 165 43 UN Yearbook, 1993, p 431 44 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran criticized the US action against Iraq, Kritsiotis, note 39 supra, p 164 as UN Yearbook, 1993, p 431 46 Ibid. The Japanese representative, for example, noted that, given the facts as represented, the US response 
was an "unavoidable situation. " UN Doc. S/5657,27 June 1993 
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and that the pharmaceutical plant also produced chemical weapons for terrorist activities 
47 The 
United States reported the operations to the Security Council as follows: "These attacks were 
carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the Government of Sudan and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation with 
the Bin Laden organization. That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that `strikes 
will continue from everywhere' against American targets, and we have convincing evidence that 
further such attacks were in preparation from these same terrorist facilities. The United States, 
therefore, had no choice but to use armed force to prevent these attacks from continuing. In 
doing so, the United States has acted pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The targets struck, and the timing and method of attack 
used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral damage to civilians and to comply 
with international law, including the rules of necessity and proportionality. "48 Sudan called for a 
meeting of the Security Council, but the American action issue was not put on the agenda and no 
action was taken pursuant to the short meeting. The US use of force was condemned by Arab 
States, the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan and Russia. Others refrained from condemnation 
or expressed support, without, however, espousing the US doctrine of self-defence 49 
A. 3 Summary of the period prior to the 9/11 events 
State practice shows that States have responded to terrorist attacks with immediate military 
measures, such as attacking States harbouring or actively supporting terrorists, bombing terrorist 
bases tolerated by States. On a number of occasions, Israel and the USA, have responded to 
attacks coming from terrorists living in other States, with forcible action against the States 
47 Murphy, S. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 93 AJIL, 1999, p 161-2 
48 Letter dated 20 August 1998 from the US Permanent Representative of to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council. UN Doc. S/1998/780 (1998) 
49 Gray, note 15 supra, p 163 
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concerned, and have sought to justify their actions, both as self-defence against attack as 
provided for under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and as a means of deterring further attacks. As 
to the legality of these actions, from examination of State and UN reactions, it can be seen that 
most States were convinced that it is impermissible under the UN Charter. Only a few States, 
among them Israel, the US and the United Kingdom, have adopted the standpoint that there are 
in some circumstances, at least, when such action may be justified. Thus, although the majority 
of the UN members deny the legitimacy, under the UN Charter, of defensive reprisal and 
anticipatory self-defence against terrorism, some important States think otherwise. 5° Therefore, it 
can be argued that, prior to the events of 9/11, there was no consistent legal view regarding the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of forcible action against terrorists and States that sponsor them. 
However, it seems that during the Nineties, States were more willing to accept military actions 
against terrorists and States that support and harbour them. This can be inferred from the 
international reactions to the cases during this period. 
In relation to the present study, these practices evince that States resorted to military action only 
after the occurrence of a terrorist attack or a series of attacks against them with a substantial 
effect and the aim of the action was to prevent future attacks from the same source. 51 This means 
that States did not see that military action against terrorists and States harbour them can be taken 
pre-emptively, in the sense that it can be carried out without recent precedent of terrorist attack. 
Furthermore, the States against which the actions were taken were all accused of complicity in 
acts of terrorism, apart from Tunisia, which was attacked as the State where the PLO (which was 
50 Cassese, A, International Law, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p 476 
s' This understanding is also supported by President Clinton's justification for the action against Afghanistan 
and Sudan, he stated: "I order this action for four reasons: First, because we have convincing evidence these 
groups played the key role in the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania; second, because these groups have executed terrorist attacks against Americans in the past; third, because we have compelling information 
that they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens and others with the inevitable 
collateral casualties we saw so tragically in Africa; and fourth, because they are seeking to acquire chemical 
weapons and other dangerous weapons. " Remarks of President Clinton, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1642 (20 August 1998) 
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blamed for attacks on Israel) was headquartered. In each of these cases, there was a strong and 
obvious link between the terrorists and the target State. 
Section B: September 11 attacks and their implications of the use of force 
against terrorism 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US enforcement agencies mounted a massive criminal 
investigation. The outcome was that the perpetrators of the attacks were Al-Qaeda operators 
authorized and funded by the Saudi expatriate, Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan. 52 The 
United Kingdom government also released a document entitled "Responsibility for the Terrorist 
Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001. " The document confirmed the US findings 
and reported on Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and their relationship to the de facto government in 
Afghanistan, the Taliban. S3 
The US government communicated with the Taliban regime, through the government ' of 
Pakistan, 54 demanding the handover of Al-Qaeda leader and members to the US and closure of 
their training camps on Afghan soil. These demands were announced publicly by President Bush 
with a threat of the use of force, if the Taliban authorities did not comply. In his Address before 
the Joint Session of the Congress, President Bush stated: "The United States of America makes 
the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of 
Al-Qaeda who hide in your land.. 
. 
close immediately and permanently every terrorist training 
camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure to 
appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can 
52 Murphy, S. "Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon', 96 AJIL, 2002, p 238-41 53 UK Press Release, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001, " 4 October 2001, available at <httP; //www_nimber" 
10. gov. uklnews. asp? NewsID=2686> 
sa There was no diplomatic relations between the US and the Taliban regime since it seized power in Afghanistan in 1994. For the history of Taliban, see Rashid, A, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2001 
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make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or 
discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they 
will share in their fate. "55 Thus, the US clearly took the position that it would not differentiate 
between terrorists and States who harboured them, and it would treat any nation that assisted 
terrorists as a hostile regime. The Taliban, however, refused to comply with the American 
demands, without proof of Osama bin Laden's involvement in the 9/11 attacks. 56 In response, 
President Bush declared the global war against terrorism. 
Notably, at no point in these massive investigations by the US and the UK was Iraq mentioned. 
No indication whatsoever was given that Al-Qaeda had any link with the government in 
Baghdad. No mention was made of Al-Qaeda having has or had training camps in Iraq or 
receiving support in any form from Saddam Hussein. One could argue that if there was any link 
between Iraq and the atrocities of 9/11 it would certainly have appeared at this time. 
8.1 The Security Council and the World Community response 
The American government evidently considered the September 11 attacks as amounting to armed 
attack justifying the use of force in self-defence. 57 Most of the international community took a 
similar view. In response to the events, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1368 and 
1373,58 which condemned the terrorist attacks and called for international cooperation to combat 
terrorism. The Preamble of Resolution 1373 confirmed that international terrorism constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security and emphasized "the need to combat by all means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security 
55 President Bush Address before the Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, (20 September 2001) see in 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1348 
56 Murphy, S. "Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon", note 52 supra, p 244 57 Ibid, p 242 
 Security Council Resolutions 1368 of 21 September, 2001 and 1373 of 28 September, 2001 
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caused by terrorist acts. "59 Most importantly, both resolutions, while not explicitly authorizing 
the use of force, recognized the inherent right of self-defence in connection with terrorist 
attacks. 60 
Outside the UN, the North Atlantic Council unanimously adopted a statement, grounded upon 
Article 5 of the NATO Statute (Washington Treaty), which provides for the right of collective 
self-defence, should any of the 19 members of the Alliance be subjected to an attack. 61 The 
European Union, in a declaration by the European Council of 21 September, went a step further 
and made it clear that "on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1368, a riposte by the US is 
legitimate"62 The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution stating that "these 
terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks against all American States and 
that in accordance with all the relevant provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance (Rio Treaty). "63 
This overwhelming support of the US indicates that most States of the world community viewed 
the events 9/11 as amounting to an armed attack justifying the use of force in self-defence. 
Indeed, the savagery and gravity of the attacks would certainly not be considered anything less 
than an actual armed attack if carried out by a conventional army and, hence, satisfied the 
requirement of "gravity" stated by the ICJ. However, the other pre-conditions in the ICJ's 
formula that the attack must be imputable to a State (not non-state actors) and that that State 
should have "substantial involvement" in the attack (not merely provide passive assistance or 
logistic support)-seem to be absent in this case. In fact, it was not claimed that Al-Qaeda was 
59 Resolution 1373, ibid 
60 Ibid 
61 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Press Release No. 124, Statement by North Atlantic Council, 
12 September2001) 
62 Conclusions and plan of action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting of 21 September 2001, SN140/01 
63 Terrorist Threat to Americas, Resolution 1, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. F/II. 24/Res. 1/01 (21 September, 2001) available at 
<http: //www. oas. org> 
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acting on behalf of the Afghani authorities, or that the Taliban regime had provided more than a 
training-ground and safe-haven for Al-Qaeda members. The Nicaragua norms, however, were 
evidently changed after the attacks. 
B. 2 The Law after 9/11 
B. 2.1 The right of self-defence against "non-State actors" 
As mentioned above, the Preamble of Resolution 1373, as well as Resolution 1368, recognized 
the inherent right of self-defence in connection with the attacks. That recognition of the right of 
self-defence leaves no doubt that the Security Council considered that terrorist attacks on this 
massive scale, carried out by non-State actors, can amount to an armed attack for the purpose of 
Article 51.64 Thus, the resolution altered the concept established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua 
case, that the attack must be imputable to a State. Some commentators, however, have 
questioned whether these resolutions do, in fact, support self-defence in response to terrorist 
attack by non-state actors, because such a right is only mentioned in the preamble, not stated in 
the operative part of the resolutions, and the exact words used are "threat to international peace 
and security" rather than "armed attack" as in Article 51.65 Cassese, for example, argued that 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognized the right of individual and collective self-defence, but 
noted that they characterized the terrorist acts of 11 September as a `threat to the peace', but not 
as an `armed attack', which would legitimize self-defence under Article 51.66 
Indeed, the resolution did not explicitly point out that terrorist attacks amount to an armed attack. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter 4, according to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, all 
elements comprised in a given resolution, including all its parts such as the preamble and 
annexes should be considered since they form a part of or are intimately related to the 
64 Greenwood, "International Law and the `war against terrorism", note 13 supra, p 308 65 Gray, note 15 supra, p 165 
66 Cassese, A. "Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", 12 EJIL, 
2001, p 996 
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resolution. 67 Furthermore, the resolution should be interpreted in the light of its purpose and 
objective of combating and eliminating the threat of international terrorism. 8 Applying these 
rules in interpreting Resolution 1373, one can conclude that the Council viewed terrorist attacks 
by non-State actors on this massive scale as amounting to an armed attack for the purpose of 
Article 51. This view was held by many writers. Gray, for example, argued that "it seems clear 
from the international reaction at the time that the members of the Security Council were in fact 
willing to accept the use of force in self-defence by the USA in response to the terrorist 
attacks. "69 As to the recognition of the right of self-defence in the Preamble, she pointed out that 
"the reference to self-defence in the preamble is of greater significance than might appear taken 
in isolation, because the Security Council does not commonly make any express reference to the 
right of self-defence in its resolutions. "7° Indeed, this explicit recognition of the right of self- 
defence would be meaningless, unless the Council considered that these attacks could justify the 
use of force in self-defence. 
It should be noted, however, that the ICJ in 2004, in its Advisory Opinion on Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Mall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, repeated its 
previous view that self-defence is permissible against States only. The Court enunciated that 
"Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the 
case of armed attack by one State against another State. "71 Accordingly, the Court still rejects the 
idea that the right of self-defence may be applied against non-state actors. This view, however, 
was criticized by Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion. She correctly observed that "there is, 
67 See Chapter 4, section B. 2.3 
68 See Chapter 4, section B. 3 
69 Gray, note 15 supra, p 165; see also Byers, M. "Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September", 51 ICLQ, 2002, p 412; Franck, T, M. "Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence", 95 AJIL 2001, 839; Murphy, "Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon", note 52 supra, p 244 
° Gray, note 15 supra, p 165 
71 Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 11'all in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, ICJ Reports, 2004, in 43 ILM, 2004, p 1050 
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with respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defence is available 
only when an armed attack is made by State. 72 Despite the ICJ's view, it could be concluded 
that today the vast majority of States and writers of the opinion that the right of self-defence can 
be applied against non-state actors. 
B. 2.2 New standards of State responsibility 
Initially, the Preamble of Resolution 1373 recalled the principle established by the General 
Assembly Declaration of Friendly Relations which states that "Every State has the duty to refrain 
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the com- 
mission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of 
force. "73 Acting under Chapter VII, the Council moved forward to set out a range of general 
measures for all States to undertake in combating terrorism. These measures subsumed 
obligations on all States to refrain from providing any kind of support for terrorist groups and to 
"take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. "74 Article 2 (a) of the 
resolution states that all States shall "refrain from providing any form of support, active or 
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of 
members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists. "75 Other articles 
provide for obligations such as "prevent[ing] and suppress[ing] the financing of terrorist acts" 
and "freez[ing] without delay funds and other financial assets" of terrorist networks. Importantly, 
the resolution laid down an obligation on all States to "deny safe haven to those who finance, 
plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. "76 
72 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, in Ibid, p 1063 73 Friendly Relations Declaration, The General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
" Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September, 2001 7s Ibid 
76 Ibid 
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Resolution 1373 thus imposes new standards of State responsibility, stating that States will be 
held liable for assistance, of any kind, to international terrorist groups. The Council has gone 
well beyond the standards applied in the Nicaragua case, deciding that a State that provides, or 
fails to suppress the provision of logistics, finances, asylum, or materials to international terrorist 
groups is to be held culpable. 77 In other words, the Council has broadened the scope of State 
involvement to subsume any degree of support, even the providing of passive support or safe- 
haven; any such assistance would render the State responsible for the attack. This, of course, 
constitutes a departure from the classic form of self-defence, where the target is the State that 
committed the aggression; now, the target is the terrorist organization and the State who 
harbouring it. The legal justification for violating the sovereignty of that State is that it is in 
breach of its international obligations, by aiding and abetting terrorism. 78 
It has been argued that the right to take defensive measures against a State that harbours terrorists 
only applies in certain strictly defined circumstances, where "the State actively assists terrorists 
or allows them to mount serious, repeated, and large-scale terrorist onslaughts on other States. "79 
In fact, however, the resolution did not distinguish between active or passive assistance. The 
Council did not exclude States that passively support acts of tenor from the possible response of 
the attacked State. Hence, it could be argued that, according to Resolution 1373, a State that 
merely tolerates terrorist groups within its borders and is reluctant to take the necessary steps to 
suppress them and to prevent the commission of terrorist acts starting from its territory against 
another State can still be held responsible for the consequences. Indeed, as the ILC concluded, "it 
" Wedgwood, lt. " The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defence", 
97 AJIL, 2003, p 583 
'$ Cassese, A. "Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", note 66 
supra, p 997 
79 Cassese, International Law, note 50 supra, p 476 
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is peremptory that a State is responsible for the consequences of permitting its territory to be 
used to injure another State. "80 
One may argue that this proposition is too broad and might lead to the risk that a State, victim of 
a terrorist attack, might rush to accuse another State of tolerating or supporting terrorism and 
claim the right to take defensive measures against it; therefore, the criterion set out by the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case is more conservative and lessens this risk. On the other hand, however, 
taking into consideration the modern practice of international terrorism, today the criterion of the 
ICJ is not sufficient to confront this phenomenon. It would lead to the result that States are not 
sufficiently protected by Article 51 of the Charter against the indirect use of force by other 
States, thereby, undermining the intention of this rule. 8' Nevertheless, it is admitted that 
extending the right of self-defence to include the use of force against terrorists and States that 
harbour them raises the risk of arbitrary exercise. In fact, the exact scope and pre-conditions for 
this new right are still unclear and, in order to avoid this risk, further clarification on the 
conditions for exercising this right is essential. For example, it is still unclear how the scale of 
the attack can be measured and who is competent to decide whether the degree of destruction 
caused by the terrorist attack amounts to an armed attack justifying the use of force in self- 
defence. Furthermore, the extension of the right of self-defence to include terrorists and States 
Harbouring them poses serious problems with regard to the target, objective and duration of self- 
defence. 82 
Traditionally, self-defence has been considered legitimate only against the aggressor State or 
States. Thus, there was no ambiguity as to the target. Following the 9/11 attacks, however, it was 
8° International Law Commission, State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 602/Revs. 1,2 (2001) 
81 Simma, note 8 supra, p 801 82 Cassese, A. "Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", note 66 
supra, p 997 
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accepted that the USA made its own determination as to which State had harboured, supported, 
and assisted the attackers, thereby becoming culpable and rendering itself open to a legitimate 
military response. 83 Furthermore, the terror organization may have links with more than one 
country. Al-Qaeda, for example, has been said to span as many as 60 countries; could all these 
countries be a legitimate target for military response? 
84 In reality, this would lead, as it already 
has in the case of Iraq, to the possibility that the victim State may choose more than one target. 
As to the questions of objective and duration of self-defence, under the classic formula of self- 
defence the purpose of the defensive action was to repel the aggression and would therefore end 
once that aim was fulfilled. Thus, the use of force has a clear ending, namely, when the 
aggression is repelled. The action in self-defence post-9/11 is indeterminate; does it last until the 
target State revokes its policies? Or until the regime in that State is changed? Remarkably, the 
US after the 9/11 attacks asserted that the war on terrorism would take years. 85 Most 
significantly, the right of self-defence against States that harbour terrorists raises the question as 
to who has authority to decide that the evidence of State complicity is sufficient to legitimize the 
use of military force. 86 This latter issue is of particular significant in the case of Iraq, as will be 
discussed later. 87 
B. 3 Resolution 1373 as a lej'islative act 
Apart from the problems associated with the new standards of State responsibility, in fact, 
Resolution 1373 is a new universal legislation on terrorism, binding on all Member States of the 
United Nations. It was not simply an individualized resolution, addressing a specific event or a 
single country; it was a new legislative or generic resolution. For a long time, the prevailed view 
83 Cassese, A, International Law, note 50 supra, p 474 
84 Cassese, A. "Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", note 66 
supra, p 997 
85 Ibid, p 998 
86 Byers, note 69 supra, p 413 
87 See section D. 1 below 
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was that "there is no machinery of international legislation"88 and that States are the legislators 
of the international legal system. However, Resolution 1373 can be considered a turning-point to 
a new legislative era. 89 As the representative of Angola stated in the Council debate on 22 April, 
2004: `By adopting Resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council took the unprecedented step of 
bringing into force legislation binding on all States on the issue of combating terrorism. "90 
Similarly, in a briefing on the Council's schedule for April 2004, the Council President, referring 
to the ongoing consultation for the prospective Resolution 154091 (another legislative resolution), 
described that process as "the first major step towards having the Security Council legislate for 
the rest of the United Nations' membership. " He cited Resolution 1373 as "the first step" and 
suggested that such legislative work would become, increasingly, a role of the Counci192 
Indeed, the prevalent conception of legislative authority in the UN setting, as expressed by 
Edward Yemin, is that: "legislative acts have three essential characteristics: they are unilateral in 
form, they create or modify some element of a legal norm, and the legal norm in question is 
general in nature, that is directed to indeterminate addressees and capable of repeated application 
in time. "93 Thus, international legislation94 is characterized by the general and abstract character 
of the obligation imposed. Appling these standards to Resolution 1373, one could argue that the 
resolution fulfils all the essential characteristics to be considered as a legislative act. For 
88 Oppenheim's International Law, Ninth edition, [Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts. eds. ], Longman, 
London, 1992, p 
89 Talmon, S. "The Security Council as World Legislature", 99 AJIL, 2005, p 175 90 UN Doc: S/PV. 4950, p 9-10 (2004) 91 Resolution 1540 of April 28,2004, is the most recent example of Security Council legislation. In that 
resolution also the Council imposed a range of universal obligations on all States to keep weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery out of the hands of non-State actors 92 Press Conference by the Security Council President (April 2.2004), See at <http: // 
www. un. org/News/briefings/docs/2004/pleugerpc. DOC. htm> 
93 Yemin, E. Legislative Powers in the United Nations and Specialised Agencies, Leyden, 1969, p6 94 Writers have used the expression "international legislation" in different ways. Sometimes it is used broadly 
to cover "both the process and the product of the conscious effort to make additions to, or changes in, the law 
of nations. " It has also been used to denote the conclusion of lawmaking treaties (i. e., multilateral treaties on 
matters of general interest), the making of customary international law, and the adoption of binding decisions by international organizations. 
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instance, while Resolution 1390 provides that "all States shall 
... 
freeze without delay the funds 
and other financial assets or economic resources"95 of Osama bin Laden, members of Al Qaeda, 
and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them, 
Resolution 1373 calls for the same measures, but expresses the target in more general terms, 
saying that "all States shall 
... 
freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or 
economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in 
or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts. "96 The key feature of this new type of legislative or 
generic resolution is, as expressed by the Colombian delegate to the Security Council, that it 
"does not name a single country, society or group of people. "97 
From another point of view, it is given that the Security Council resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter are of mandatory character and, hence, binding upon Member 
States. Obligations enacted by these mandatory resolutions take precedence over any other 
obligations or rules, this principle was confirmed by the ICJ in the Lockerbie case. 8 
Accordingly, the obligations set forth in Resolution 1373 take priority over the criteria 
established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case or by the Definition of Aggression. 
B. 4 Is the new right of the use of force against terrorism amount to customary rule? 
It has been argued that the position of the Security Council, coupled with the lack of challenge 
and indeed massive support by States for the US war against terrorism, could be seen as 
amounting to instant customary international law and an authoritative re-interpretation of the 
95 Security Council Resolution 1390 of 16 January, 2002 
96 Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 
97 Qouted in Talmon, note 89 supra, p 177 
98 The Court stated that "Whereas both Libya and the United Kingdom, as Members of th e United Nations, 
are obliged to accept and carry the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter; whereas the Court 
... 
considers that prima facie this obligation extends to the decision contained in 
resolution 748 (1992); and whereas, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter 
, 
the obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the 
Montreal Convention. " Questions of Interpertation and Application of the 1971 Montereal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional 
Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports 1992, p 15 
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Charter, at least with regard to terrorism 
. 
99 On the other hand, there are those who, while 
admitting the existence of a substantial trend in the international community towards a new 
concept of self-defence, argue that this was largely an exceptional response, motivated by the 
horror of the 9/11 events, and that it may not provide sufficient evidence of consistent practice 
and opinio juris to amount to a customary change. '°° In Cassese' view, for example, the legal 
regime laid down in the UN Charter and in customary international law has primacy and express, 
clear and consistent behaviour and opinion of States, in more than one instance, would be 
required before those rules could be considered to be modified. '°' 
Indeed, duration is one of the elements of custom among others such as uniformity, consistency, 
generality of the practice, and the opiniojuris et necessitates. However, given clear evidence as 
to the consistency and generality of a practice, which will be shown in part over the passage of 
time, no particular duration is required. A long practice or repetition of the practice in more than 
one instance is not necessary. 102 The practice of the ICJ does not show any special emphasis on 
time period or number of occasions. 103 Furthermore, in some areas of law, for example 
pertaining to airspace and continental shelf, customary rules have evolved quite rapidly. 104 Even 
if Cassese's argument is accepted, the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 seems to be a 
second instance where most States, including Arab States, while condemning the 
disproportionate level of Israeli force, did not deny its right to use force in response to 
Hezbollah's terrorist attack. 105 Therefore, it could be argued that the ` new legislation' enacted by 
Resolution 1373 and the international reaction to the events of 9/11, including the massive 
99 Gray, C. "The Use of Force and the International Legal Order" in Evans, M [ed. ], International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p 604 
100 Cassese, International Law, note 50 supra, p 475 101 Ibid 
102 Brownlie, note 3 supra, p7 103 See, for example, Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 195 1, p 131; Asylum case, ICJ Reports, 1950, p 276-7 104 Brownlie, note 3 supra, p7 105 See section B. 6.3 below 
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support to the US in fighting international terrorism, are to be taken as evidence of customary 
international law or, at least, will influence the development of a new or emerging customary law 
rule. Indeed, the widespread international acceptance of and support for US and UK action 
against Afghanistan may be regarded as reflecting an opinio juris as to the legitimacy of 
defensive action against States that harbour and support terrorism. 106 
B. 5 Necessity of the use for force against past terrorist attacks 
The fundamental problem associated with the right of self-defence against terrorism is regarding 
the condition of necessity of the use of force in response to past terrorist attack. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, necessity is a condition for invoking the right of self-defence, whether in anticipatory 
mode or in the reactive mode. ' 07 This condition means that a response with force is only 
permissible when the situation is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation. "' 08 In the case of terrorism, legally speaking, the use of force in 
response to past attacks involves two propositions: on the one hand, it is punitive rather than 
defensive action, because the harm is already done. 109 From this perspective, the action is totally 
illegal, as armed reprisal is prohibited under the UN Charter. 10 The second is that the use of 
force in response to past terrorist attack is to prevent future attacks. Hence, the action will be 
defensive rather than punitive-"' The first view considers actions in response to past terrorist 
attack more in the nature of retaliations, because they are in the classic form of an armed reprisal, 
given their essentially retributive (as opposed to defensive and protective) nature. 112 According 
to proponents of that view, even if the target was those actually responsible for the terrorist 
106 See section B. 6.1 below 
107 See Chapter 3, section D. 1 
108 This formula was adopted by the American Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Carolina affairs of 1937. See section C. 1 below 
109 Gray. International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 167 
110 See Chapter 1, section A 
"' Bowett, D. "Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force", 66 AJIL, 1972, p 3-4 112 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 163; see also Kritsiotis, note 39 supra, p 166 
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attacks, and even if the response was considered to be proportionate, the criterion of necessity 
would not be met, since the attacks had already taken place. 113 Since armed reprisals are 
absolutely prohibited under the UN Charter, they cannot be encompassed in self-defence 
pursuant to Article 51.114 Proponents of this view point to the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention where the General Assembly stated 
that "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. "' 15 They also 
allude to Resolution 188 (1964) where the Security Council, in response to the British attack on 
Yemen, condemned reprisals as incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN. ' 16 
On the other hand, some authors argue that armed reprisal is permissible if it defensive in aim; 
so-called "defensive reprisal. " This concept suggests that, notwithstanding the technical illegality 
of reprisal, it is legitimate in the case of terrorism, as a deterrent or protective action against 
future attacks (i. e. defensive in aim). Thus, a distinction is drawn between reprisals with 
defensive and those with punitive aims. In other words, the de jure status of reprisals as illegal 
must be differentiated from their de facto acceptance as permissible and necessary actions in 
self-defence. 
The leading authority on the concept of defensive reprisal is Bowett. He stated that "indeed, 
within the whole context of a continuing State of antagonism between States, with recurring acts 
of violence, an act of reprisal may be regarded as being at the same time both a form of 
punishment and the best form of protection for the future, since it may act as a deterrent against 
future acts of violence by the other party. " 7 By way of illustration, he poses the case where a 
State, suffering guerrilla raids originating in another State, responds with attacks against guerrilla 
13 Gray, ibid 
114 Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p 281 115 The Declaration on Friendly Relations, Resolution 2625 of October 1970 116 Resolution 188 of 1964 117 Bowett, note 111 supra, p3 
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bases in the harbouring State. In Bowett's view, such a response could be justified as 
anticipatory self-defence, and he argues that to reject such action would be extremely unrealistic 
in the modem era and inconsistent with State practice. ' 18 He also pointed out that the Security 
Council position is "moving towards a partial acceptance of reasonable reprisals. "119 Many 
authors support this proposal. Schachter, for example, accepts the possibility of defensive 
reprisals "since its prime motive would be protective, not punitive: , 
120 However, he emphasises 
that there must be continuing and imminent threat coming from the same source of aggression to 
justify the use of force in anticipatory form: "defensive retaliation" is permissible "when a State 
has good reason to expect a series of attacks from the same source and such retaliation serves as 
a deterrent or protective action"121 
This latter view seems more sensible. Today, terrorism has become a major issue facing the 
world community. International terrorism is been used as another weapon of warfare to gain 
strategic advantage where conventional means are useless. Therefore, to outlaw armed reprisals 
altogether, including actions that are defensive in aim and designed to deter future attacks, would 
simply allow those who use terrorism as a tool of warfare to escape liability for their actions and 
would deny the victim State its basic and inherent right to defend itself against further attacks. 
For these reasons, it can be argued that the view which prohibits defensive reprisals is unrealistic 
and anachronistic. 
"8 Ibid, p 3-4 
'19 Ibid, p 21 
120 Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force", 82 Michigan Law Review, 1984, p 1638 121 Ibid. Tucker also defended the legality of defensive reprisal as its aim is to "induce a delinquent State to 
abide by the law in the future. " Tucker, R. "Reprisals and Self-Defence: The Customary Law", 66 AJIL, 
1972, p 591. Similar view was expressed by Dinstein, he argues that "To be defensive, and therefore lawful, 
armed reprisals must be future-oriented, and not limited to a desire to punish past transgressions" Dinstein, 
Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence, fourth edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p 227; 
see also O'Brien, W. "Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defence in Counter-terror Operations", 30 Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 1989, p 421; Reisman, note 39 supra, p 127 
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As to the question of the necessity of use of force against past attacks, it is admitted that terrorist 
incidents tend not to correspond to the conventional conception of an armed attack, such as a 
land invasion or the deployment of one country's military forces against those of another 
country, where there is an obvious and overwhelming need for a response, and it is clear when 
and where the attack is occurring. In contrast, terrorist attacks occur with astonishing speed, 
being over almost on the instant. 122 However, two basic variations of the classical paradigm have 
to be addressed. The first is the idea that successive incidents may, when viewed in total, 
constitute an ongoing armed aggression. In other words, the time that passes between actual 
terrorist incidents is equivalent to pauses between successive phases of a military campaign; 
, Which do not mark the end of the attack, or the removal of the need for self-defence, but are, 
rather, matters of tactical convenience. 123 The second, and closely related, variant on the basic 
paradigm is the idea of preemption. Since one of the main reasons for these actions is to avert the 
possibility of similar attacks in the future, the invocation of the right of self-defence can be seen 
as grounded partly upon the concept of anticipatory self-defence. It can be argued that the actions 
of the target State evince an intention and capability to perpetrate further attacks. Therefore, it is 
acceptable for the victim to act to forestall such attacks by removing the capability. 124 From a 
legal viewpoint, the "ongoing pattern" and the "preemption" rationales both have the same 
purpose, which is to make a clear distinction between the use of force against terrorism 
(defensive reprisal), and illegal retaliation, which it might otherwise be perceived as. 125 
The concept of defensive reprisal against terrorist attacks, thus, seems to be realistic and 
consistent with the State practice and the Security Council's new legislation on terrorism. This 
rational and practical concept makes such a balance between the need for the use of force in self- 
122 Levitt, note 6 supra, p 227 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid 
125 lbid 
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defence against a wrong that has already taken place, as well as against the prospect of a future, 
although unidentified wrong. In these terms, anti-terrorism actions combined elements of an 
immediate retribution with a projected application of its right of self-defence. 126 However, if the 
defensive reprisal is to be accepted and justified as anticipatory self-defence, there must be clear 
evidence of the likelihood of future attacks from the same source, albeit at an indeterminate time 
in the future; otherwise there would be no boundary to the right of self-defence. 
The perfect example here is the case of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. This organization 
had made it clear that it was committed to targetting American citizens and interests worldwide 
(on their homeland and overseas). Al-Qaeda was held responsible for the attacks on US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and, subsequently, the attacks of 9/11 on 
Washington and New York. Thus, the notion of the "ongoing pattern" of incidents is fulfilled 
and the US has every reason to expect further attacks from the same source of aggression. 
Consequently, whether or not these future attacks are specifically identified, it seems that the US 
has the right to take defensive action against this organization, its bases, and operatives. The 
question arose now, however, is the same argument applicable to Iraq? In other words, had Iraq 
committed itself to attack US citizens and interests or was there an "ongoing pattern" of 
incidents attributed to Saddam Hussein's government to suggest that Iraq posed a threat to the 
US in order to justify defensive action? 
The only terrorist attack linked to the government in Baghdad, as illustrated above, was the 
assassination attempt of President Bush (Senior) in 1993. The question is whether this incident 
can fulfil the criterion of an "ongoing pattern" and justify the use of force against Iraq in 2003. 
Remarkably, ever since this occasion, the US has characterized Iraq as a State that sponsors 
terrorism. However, this incident was the only one to be attributed to the Iraqi government. No 
126 Kritsiotis, note 39 supra, p 167 
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other terrorist attack, against the US or any other State, has been linked to the government in 
Baghdad. Even if it accepted that this incident was a sufficient reason for the US to classify Iraq 
as a State sponsoring terrorism and to expect further attacks from the same source, the US had 
already responded by attacking the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad. It cannot use 
force again after ten years, for the same incident; otherwise, one incident could be used to justify 
the use of force indefinitely. To conclude, the use of force against Iraq in 2003, at any rate, 
cannot be linked to or justified on the basis of the incident of 1993. 
R. 6 Sfafe practice after 9/11 
B. 6.1 The War on Afghanistan (2001) as the first application for the global war 
Against terrorism 
On 7 October 2001 the USA, with UK assistance, in pursuit of the parties responsible for the 
events of 9/11, launched Operation Enduring freedom against Afghanistan. The espoused 
purpose was to destroy the Afghan bases and infrastructures of the Al-Qaeda terrorist 
organization, and to disrupt the Taliban authorities, who allegedly actively assisted and 
Supported the terrorist organization. 127 
After the beginning of the military action, the US and the UK reported to the Security Council 
that their action was taken in accordance with their inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence. Both States claimed to be acting in response to the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon, in order to prevent further terrorist attacks. In a letter to the 
Security Council, the US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Negroponte, 
explained the American view. He stated that the US had "obtained clear and compelling 
information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks... The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the 
127 Cassese, International Law, note 50 supra, p 474 
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ongoing threat to the United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have 
been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it 
controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite every effort by the United 
States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. 
From the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support 
agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United States 
nationals and interests in the United States and abroad" 128 Thus, in accordance with the new 
standards of State responsibilities enacted in Resolution 1373, the US and the UK extended the 
right of self-defence to include the Taliban, since it allowed Al-Qaeda to exist and operate its 
activities from Afghan soil. 129 
Only Iraq and Iran explicitly challenged the legitimacy of the US military action. 130 The Security 
Council, however, explicitly accepted this argument. In a press statement on the same day, the 
President of the Security Council declared that "the members of the Council were appreciative of 
the presentation made by the United States and the United Kingdom"131 As an indicator of the 
worldwide acceptance and support for the US and the UK action against Afghanistan, many 
States among them Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
New Zealand and Norway, participated by sending troops and aircraft after the initial invasion. 132 
B. 6.2 The Israeli attack on Syria 2003 
After 9/11 Israel used similar rhetoric to the USA in relation to the war against terrorism, 
invoking the key notions of global terrorism and harbouring. Israel claims that Hezbollah is a 
terrorist organization, operating from Lebanon and Syria, and the perpetrators of multiple attacks 
128 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the US Permanent Representative to the UN to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946 
'29 Byers, note 69 supra, p 408 
130 Cassese, International Law, note 50 supra p 474 
131 Statement by the President of the Security Council on 8 October 2001, Press Release, UN Doc SC/7167 132 See in <bttp: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/War_in_Af ghanistan_(2001%E2%80%93present)> 
254 
on Israeli nationals and armed forces. 133 Israel alleges that Lebanon, Syria and Iran have 
persistently supported Hezbollah, in breach of their obligations to prevent terrorism under 
Security Council Resolution 1373. Israel accused Syria and Lebanon of providing active 
assistance to Hezbollah, holding them liable for its actions and legitimate targets of self-defence 
action by Israel against Lebanon and Syrian bases within Lebanon. 134 In October 2003, following 
a Palestinian suicide bombing in a restaurant in Haifa, Israel responded by attacking a site near 
Damascus in Syria. Syria strongly condemned the attack as an act of aggression and accused 
Israel of violating international law and the UN Charter. 135 Israel, however, argued that the 
action was a legitimate response to Syria's harbouring, training and supporting of terrorists. 136 
Israel claimed that the attack was specifically directed against a Palestinian terrorist training 
camp for Islamic Jihad and that it warned terrorists not to hide in neighbouring States. The Israeli 
attack was claimed to be an act of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and also 
designed to prevent further Syrian-sponsored terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. 137 
Whilst most of members of the Security Council, including Pakistan, Spain, Germany, France, 
$ulgaria, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Cameroon, condemned the attacks as contrary to 
international law, the United Kingdom, Russia, Angola, and the United States refrained from 
such a judgment. 138 The first three described the attack as "politically unacceptable" but made no 
pronouncement on its legality, while the United States merely called on Syria to end its support 
for terrorists. 139 The UN Secretary-General strongly deplored the Israeli air strike on Syrian 
territory as well as condemning the preceding terrorist attack. 140 Thus, in reaction to this 
133 See UNDoc. S/2003/96 
134 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 172-3 135 UNDoc. S/PV. 4836, p 3-4 
136 mid, p5 
1371bid, p7 
139 Statements by the Representatives of the United Kingdom, ibid, p 9, Russia, ibid, p 10, Angola 
, 
ibid, p 12 139 Statements by the Representative of the United States, ibid, 14 140 UN Press Release, SG/SM/8918,6 October, 2003 
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incident, no general support was expressed for a wide right to use force against terrorist camps in 
a third State. 
B. 6.3 The war between Hezbollah and Israel 2006 
Again in July 2006, after three Israeli soldiers were killed and two captured in a cross-border raid 
by Hezbollah, Israel responded with air strikes across Lebanon during which more than 7,000 
targets were struck, a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, and an air and naval blockade. 
Meanwhile, Hezbollah launched thousands of rockets into Israel and mounted a guerrilla 
campaign against the Israeli Army. The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, described 
Hezbollah's incursions as an "act of war. "141 A number of governments, including the United 
States, 142 United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Canada, 143 asserted Israel's right to self- 
defence. On the other hand, spokespersons from the United Nations, the European Union, the 
Organization of Islamic Conference, and an assortment of human rights organizations 
condemned Israel for its disproportionate response to Hezbollah's attacks, although it seems that 
they accepted Israel's claim of self-defence. The Arab League issued statements condemning 
both Hezbollah's attack and Israel's response. 144 
It seems from the international community's reaction to the Israeli action that the Israeli right of 
self-defence was accepted. The criticism of the Israeli action focused on the disproportionate use 
of force, not on the legality of resort to force by Israel. Finally, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1701 calling for "a full cessation of hostilities" from both sides. The Preamble of the 
resolution "emphasiz[ed] the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the 
141 
"Israelis invade Lebanon after soldiers are seized", Gurdian Unlimited, (12 July 2006), available at 
<httP: //www. guardian. co. uk/israel/Story/O,, 1818696,00. html> 
142 "President Bush and German Chancellor Merkel Participate in Press Availability" available at http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060713-4. html 
143 112006 Lebanon War" available at <http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/2006_Israel-Lebanon conflict# note- 98> 
144 Stalinsky, S "Arab World Divided over Hezobollah", The New York Sun, (30 July 2007), available at 
<http: //www. nysun. com/article/36281> 
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current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers. "las Thus, 
although there is no general agreement on whether the September 11 attacks and its aftermath 
have created an instant customary law on the issue of terrorism, there are clear indications that 
the international community is increasingly inclined to accept forcible response against acts of 
terrorism, even in the absence of the consent of the territorial sovereign. 
R. 7 Evaluation of State practice after 9/11 
The reaction of the world community to the events of 9/11 and the support extended by almost 
all States to the USA in its war against Afghanistan, coupled with the above-mentioned Security 
Council new legislation on terrorism, was one that implied a major shift in the legal regime on 
the use of force, which effectively broadened the notion of self-defence to include non-State 
actors and States that support or harbour terrorists. Today, it could be argued that the vast 
rnajority of States accept such an extension of the notion of self-defence. Besides the war on 
Afghanistan, the world community's acceptance of the Israeli claim of self-defence in 2006 
endorses this argument. This, in turn, strengthens the claim that after 9/11 there is an emerging 
riew customary rule and an authoritative re-interpretation of the Charter with regard to terrorism 
-1-he wide rejection of the Israeli attack on Syria on 2003 does not undermine this view. In fact, 
the rejection of that case seems to be based on the application of this right, not on the legal 
principle itself. That is, no general consensus has yet been reached on whether the right can be 
applied against terrorist camps in a third State. 146 Furthermore, it is not clear what scale of 
terrorist attack can justify military action in response. While the American argument to justify its 
military response in the case of Afghanistan, that the Taliban regime had allowed Al-Qaeda to 
exist and operate its activities from Afghan soil, was accepted and massively supported by the 
world community, exactly the same argument was rejected in the case of Syria 2003. This 
las Security Council Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 146 Gray. International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 175 
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apparent inconsistency in the world reaction can be attributed to two main variations in the 
merits of each case. In the first case, Afghanistan was the main base for Al-Qaeda and the 
toleration and support for this terrorist organization by the de facto government in Afghanistan 
(Taliban) was clear. In addition, the 9/11 attacks were on a massive scale that certainly can be 
seen as amounting to an armed attack by a regular army. In the second case, Syria is not the main 
State-of-residence for Hezbollah and the links between the government in Damascus and 
Hezbollah are controversial. In addition, the terrorist attacks to which Israel claimed it was 
responding are obviously incomparable with the 9/11 attacks. In sum, while it is clear that the 
right of self-defence has been broadened to include terrorists and States that support and harbour 
them, the exact scope and pre-conditions for exercising this right are still unclear and 
controversial. 
Therefore, until there is clear elaboration on the preconditions of this right, the example of the 
case of 9/11 and the war on Afghanistan should be narrowly interpreted. This view was held by 
the majority of States and commentators who expressed concerns as to possible abuse of this 
right by States. 14' It can be inferred from the world reactions to the cases in the post-9/11 period 
that accepted action against terrorists and States that harbour them essentially must have the 
following five pre-conditions; (i) The occurrence of an actual large-scale terrorist attack against 
the acting State (whether on its territory or against its nationals and interests abroad) with a 
substantial effect; (ii) tangible evidence as to the strong likelihood of further attacks from the 
same source in the future; (iii) a clear link between the target State and those responsible for the 
attack; (IV) the target State's refusal to take action to suppress the terrorist network operates 
from its soil or to cooperate with the victim State in bringing those responsible to justice; (V) if 
the terrorist group has links with more than one State, the State chosen as a target for the military 
147 Ibid, p 171-2 
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action should be the main State-of-residence of the terrorist group. If, however, the terrorists 
have strong and equal links with more than one State, it seems that the only possible way for the 
acting State to legitimatize its action against more than one State is to seek approval from the 
Security Council. Otherwise, one terrorist attack can justify military action against unlimited 
number of States. 
Some have argued that Security Council approval in needed in any case, and even against the 
Train State of residence. In other words, the Security Council must have determined the existence 
of a threat to international peace and security and asserted a right of self-defence. 
148 This means 
that, even after the aforementioned conditions have been fulfilled, ultimately it is for the Security 
Council to decide whether the target State was in breach of the general legal duty set out in 
gesolution 1373 and approve the action proposed by the victim State. Of course, this condition 
will eliminate any possibility of arbitrary exercise of this right; however, it is highly unlikely that 
States will accept that their proposed action must be approved by the Security Council. In reality, 
States will prefer to take their own decision and to avoid the possibility that the Council might 
not authorize the use of force, or that the Council might put some limitations to that force. In 
other words, a State victim of a terrorist attack will prefer to reserve to itself the right to decide 
how to use that force, including when and where it should be used. 
Appling these pre-conditions to the case of Iraq, surprisingly, one can argue that none of them 
existed. The only basis for exercising this right against Iraq was the unilateral fact-finding and 
undisclosed evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had links with Al-Qaeda, as will be 
discussed below. 
148 Cassese, A. "Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", note 66 
supra, p 1002 
259 
Section C: The right of anticipatory self-defence and Bush Doctrine of 
`preventive war' 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Bush administration claimed that it had the right of pre- 
emptive action against threats from Iraq. The legal basis of this argument was the new doctrine 
of `preventive war' adopted by the US government in the wake of the events of 9/11, known as 
`Bush Doctrine'. The first part of this section will examine the legality of this new doctrine in 
light of the traditional conditions of the right of anticipatory self-defence. The following part will 
study the five most notable incidents in State practice in which a claim of preemptive self- 
defence was made or were widely held by States and writers as examples of anticipatory self- 
defence. The purpose of examining these cases is to find out how far the world community can 
accept the Bush doctrine of `preventive war'. 
C. ] `Bush Doctrine' and Webster's formula of anticipatory self-defence 
In response to its perception of a fundamentally changed international situation, in 2002 the USA 
adopted a new National Security Strategy. The Strategy warned: "while the US will constantly 
strive to enlist the support of international community, we will not hesitate to act alone if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to 
prevent them form doing harm against our people and our country. "149 Despite the controversies 
and divisions between States and writers on the legality of preemptive or anticipatory self- 
defence under the UN Charter, ' 5° the Bush Administration asserted that "for centuries, 
international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take 
action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal 
scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence 
149 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, available at 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss. pdf. > [Hereinafter National Security Strategy] 
150 See Chapter 1, section E. 3 
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of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. " 151 
Indeed, the right of anticipatory self-defence has its roots in the just war doctrine of the middle 
Ages-' 52 In the positivist era of international law, the right of anticipatory self-defence was 
mounded on the formula stated by the American Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the 
Carolina affairs of 1837. In that incident, the British authorities located in Canada destroyed the 
Caroline vessel in a US port, because the Caroline had been supplying groups of American 
nationals engaged in armed revolution in Canada. The United States disagreed with the British 
government as to the legality of the action, Secretary Webster argued, "While it is admitted that 
exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be 
coned to cases in which the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. " 53 Thus, whilst the Caroline 
incident evinces that the occurrence of an armed attack is not necessary to justify the exercise of 
Self-defence, it fettered the right of preemptive action with some conditions in order to be legally 
accepted. According to this formula, preemptive action is only lawful when the danger is 
imminent in a way that the defending State had no time for deliberation or to choose an 
alternative course of action. This implies that the danger can be identified credibly, specifically 
1d with a high degree of certainty. 154 
, 17he Bush administration, however, was not satisfied with the condition of imminence in 
Webster's formula. In discussing the US National Security Strategy, the National Security 
Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, argued that modem weapons technology demands reconsideration of 
151 National Security Strategy, note 149 supra 152 See Chapter 1, section E. 3, note 196 
153 Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton dated August 6,1842, quoted in 2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, 1906, p 412 154 Franck, "Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence", note 69 supra, p 841 
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the concept of "imminence" of a threat. '55 In the view of American administration this condition 
must be interpreted flexibly and to be adapted "to the capabilities and objectives of today's 
adversaries. " 56 The new interpretation of imminence, according to this view, should mean the 
elimination of the "emerging threats before they are fully formed. " 
157 This concept was declared 
by President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union Address with specific reference to Iraq. He 
said, "Some have said that we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have 
terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? 
If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all 
recriminations would come too late. " 
58 
What the Bush Doctrine implies is that the traditional conditions of anticipatory self-defence and 
the requirement of clear demonstration of the threatening intentions of the adversary are no 
longer tenable, since an attack by weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, 
anywhere, without warning. Rather than wait for that to happen or waiting for the last moment 
which, of course, would reduce the chance of forestalling such an attack, States have the right to 
use force preventively to eliminate such a threat in its early stage. Thus, the strategy would be 
better described as "preventive" rather than "pre-emptive", because the aim is to prevent 
materialization of generalized threats, rather than to avert an identified, imminent threat. '59 
155 Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President's National Security Strategy, October 2002, in 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6. html> 
156 Ibid 
151 Introduction of President Bush to "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (Sept. 2002), Section V, in <http: //whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss. pdf> The Strategy states that the "greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack". The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002), Section V, in 
<http: //whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss. pdf> 
158 Quoted in Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 177 
159 Sapiro, M. "Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defence", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 599; Falk, R. "What 
Future of the UN Charter System of War Prevention", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 598 
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-fbe Bush Doctrine appears to extend the much-debated doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, to 
encompass the preclusion of any potential danger even if the threats are uncertain and 
1identified. This concept was severely criticized by the overwhelming majority of scholars. 160 
Indeed, it is a dangerous concept, since its criteria are ambiguous and it lends itself to the 
justification of virtually any use of force whether defensive or offensive. 161 Certainly, such a 
concept, free of any limitation, cannot be contained within in any legal theory of self-defence 
including anticipatory self-defence itself)62 On this basis, any implementation of this concept 
will certainly be preserved as illegal. 
C 2. Anticipatory self-defence in State practice v_ 
C. 2.1 The Corfu Channel incident (1964) 
The first case in modern history which is frequently cited as proof for the legality of anticipatory 
Self-defence is the Corfu Channel incident. In 1946, Albania denied that foreign warships had a 
fight of innocent passage through its territorial waters in the Corfu Strait. In May 1946, Alban ian 
Shore batteries fired on two British minesweepers passing through the Strait. In response, in 
pctober 1946, the UK sent four warships at action stations to defend its right of passage through 
e Corfu Channel. The UK claimed not only its right to prepare itself for an armed attack but 
also the right of anticipatory self-defence when there is a strong possibility of armed attack. 
'63 
Although there was threat of an imminent danger, the British warships did not attempt to fire on 
the Albanian shore batteries in a pre-emptive strike, but were only ready to respond to any attack. 
initially the UK did not report the situation to the Security Council; however, after its warships 
Were damaged by mines allegedly laid by the Albanians in the Strait, the UK took the matter to 
160 See, for example, Gardner, K "Neither Bush nor the `Jurisprudes"', 97 AJIL, 2003, p 588; Farer, T. J. 
`Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium", 96 AJIL, p 360 
161 Gardner, ibid 
162 Farer, note 160 supra, p 360 
163 McCoubrey, H. and. White, N. International Law and Armed Conflict, Dartmouth, England, 1992, p 92 
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the Council in 1947. During the debate, the vast majority of States supported the UK. However, 
the discussion focused on the Albanian alleged mining of the Channel, the concept of 
anticipatory self-defence was not explicitly addressed. Nevertheless, the wide support for the UK 
action can be seen as acceptance of the right of anticipatory self-defence where there is strong 
possibility of future attack, or at least, that a State is allowed to take defensive measures against 
potential attack including the threat of force. Eventually, the Council did not decide on the 
dispute and "Recommend[ed] that the United Kingdom and Albania Governments should 
immediately refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. "164 
In the Corfu Channel case, the Court did not condemn the UK action but only referred to its 
"show of force" to affirm its right of passage in the channel. 165 The Court held that "the legality 
of this measure taken by the Government of the United Kingdom cannot be disputed, provided 
that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. "66 
Perhaps the Court by using the language "in a manner consistent with requirements of 
international law" alluded to the conditions of necessity and proportionality of the defensive 
measures. In a further assertion on these conditions, the Court stated that "In view of the firing 
from the Albanian battery on May 15th, this measure of precaution [taken by the British 
authorities] cannot, in itself, be regarded as unreasonable. " 167 The Court concluded, "The Court 
is unable to characterise these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a violation 
of Albania's sovereignty. "" 68 
" Security Council Resolution 22 of 9 April 1947 
165 McCoubrey and White, note 163 supra, p 92 
166 Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p 30 
167 Ibid, p 31 
168 Ibid 
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It 'd 
The ICJ judgment in this case has been seen as by many writers as a support for the right of 
anticipatory self defence. 
169 It seems, however, that two main reasons were behind the Court's 
Stance. First, the UK was reasonable in expecting danger, simply because of the previous 
Albanian attack. Second, the action was proportionate to the threat; the UK did not rush to fire 
on the Albanian shore batteries but was ready to respond. From another point of view, the UK 
action can be seen as inconsistent with the legal framework of the UN Charter because the 
British authorities did not take the matter to the Security Council in the first place or otherwise 
Seek peaceful settlement. In conclusion, however, the wide support for the UK action in the 
Security Council and the non-condemnation by the ICJ could be seen as recognition of 
anticipatory self-defence in case where there is a strong probability of armed attack provided the 
proportionality of the response. 
C. 2.2 The US Quarantine a'ainst Cuba (1962) 
Another case often associated with the concept of anticipatory self-defence is the US Quarantine 
against Cuba in 1962. On 22 October 1962, after reviewing newly acquired intelligence, 
president John F. Kennedy declared that the Soviet Union was building secret missile bases in 
Cuba, a mere 90 miles off the shores of Florida. As a consequence, he ordered a naval quarantine 
(blockade) of Cuba to prevent Russian ships from supplying further "offensive missiles" and 
construction materials to the island. 
17° The US government demanded that Russia remove all the 
fissile bases and their deadly contents already insulted in Cuba. Significantly, it has been noted 
that President Kennedy had considered many options, such as an armed invasion of Cuba and air 
169 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, note 114 supra, p 277 170 Statement of Mr. Stevenson the Representative of the US to the Security Council, SCOR, 1022nd meeting 
of 23 October 1962, p3 
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strikes against the missile sites, but he decided on a less dangerous response; a "pacific 
blockade. "171 
The US perceived the installation of "medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a 
nuclear warhead"172 in Cuba as a "threat to the peace"173 and "a new phase of aggression"174 by 
the Soviet Union, not only towards the US but also to the entire Western Hemisphere, in 
violation of its obligations under the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 175 Subsequently, the US 
claimed, among other justifications-mainly the Rio Treaty and resolutions of the Consultative 
Organ of OAS in accordance of regional peacekeeping under Chapter VIII of UN Charter, that 
the quarantine was justified as a measure of self-defence permitted by Article 51. However, the 
US did not rely on the concept of anticipatory self-defence. In response, Cuba and the Soviet 
Union protested the US action and described it as an "act of war in violation of the Charter and 
the principles of the UN. "176 
In general, the international response divided along the Cold War lines. '77 Western States and 
their allies supported the action and viewed it as legally and morally justifiable, whereas the 
Soviet Bloc and socialist States took the opposite view. This division was reflected in the 
"' "Pacific blockade" traditionally recognized in international law as constituting a "peaceful method" for 
settling a dispute as called for by Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter. By using this word Kennedy 
hoped to avoid the legal implications of blockade and to emphasize the non-warlike intent of the action. 172 See Mr. Stevenson's statement, note 170 supra, p3 
173 Ibid 
14 Ibid, p 15 
175 Ibid, p3-4 
176 Statement of Mr. Garcia the Representative of Cuba to the Security Council, SCOR, 1022nd meeting of 
23 October 1962, p 24 
177 See letter dated 24 October 1962 from the Republic of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
S/5189; letter dated 24 October 1962 from the Dominican to the Secretary-General, UN. Doc S/5191; letter 
dated 24 October 1962 from Czechoslovakia to the Secretary-General UN Doc. S/5192, letter dated 23 
October 1962 from the Secretary-General of the OAS to the Secretary-General of the UN, UN Doc. S/5193, 
letter dated 25 October 1962 from the Representative of Hungary to the President of the Security Council 
S/5194, letter dated 25 October 1962 from the Governments of Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, addressed 
to the Secretary-General S/5195, letter dated 26 October 1962 from the Representative of Mongolia 
addressed to the Secretary-General S/5196, letter dated 25 October 1962 from the Representative of Haiti 
addressed to the Secretary-General S/5198 and S/5199, letter dated 30 October 1962 from the Representative 
of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General S/5200 
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Security Council discussion. Chile, China, France, Ireland, the UK, and Venezuela supported the 
lawfulness of the Quarantine. In contrast, Ghana, Romania, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt 
only without Syria) 178 opposed the action. During the debate, the concept of anticipatory self- 
defence was not frankly discussed. However, the course of the discussion shows that most of the 
Meinbers were prepared to accept the pre-emptive use of force under certain circumstances. This 
eaýa be deduced from the fact that the major subject in the debate was the nature of the missiles 
istalled in Cuba. As summarized by Mr. Aiken, the Representative of Ireland "One of the major 
points of disagreement ... relates to the character and purpose of the large-scale military 
equipment recently supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union"179 Even Cuba and the Soviet Union 
contended that the missiles were defensive in nature, 
18° seemingly giving credence to the 
tegument that if they had been offensive, there might have been some justification for 
preemptive action. 
China, in particular, seemed to accept the right of anticipatory self-defence but in general terms. 
, I-he Representative of China stated, "In the view of my delegation, measures undertaken to 
prevent the possibility of war cannot be regarded as acts of hostility, but should be considered as 
cornpatible with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the 
preservation of peace and security. " 
8' More obviously, the delegate of Ghana openly accepted 
Webster's formula of anticipatory self-defence; he asked, "Are there grounds for the argument 
that such action is justified in exercise of the inherent right of self-defence? Can it be contended 
that there was, in the words of a former American Secretary of State whose reputation as a jurist 
it, this field is widely accepted, `a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
18 The United Arab Republic was established on February 1958 combining of Egypt and Syria under that 
name, however, Syria disjoined the Union in 1961. Egypt continued to use the United Arab Republic name 
until the advent of President Sadat and the adoption of its new constitution in 1971 19 Statement of Mr. Aiken the Representative of Ireland, SCOR, 1023d meeting of 24 October 1962, p 17 180 Statement of the Representative of the USSR, SCOR, 1022nd meeting of 23 October 1962, p 30. Statement 
of the Representative of the Cuba, SCOR, 1022o' meeting of 23 October 1962, p 18 18' Statement of Mr. Liu Chieh the Representative of China, SCOR, 10240' meeting of 24 October 1962, p5 
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choice of means and no moment for deliberation' ? "182 The discussion, whilst not indicating 
unequivocal support for anticipatory self-defence, neither indicates its rejection. Given the 
absence of specific condemnation of the doctrine, especially by States that opposed the American 
action, it seems that the idea of anticipatory self-defence in case of imminent danger may have 
been accepted. 
It is interesting that the Bush administration in 2002 repeatedly cited the Cuban Missile Crisis as 
an example of preemption self-defence. It has been argued that Kennedy's response to missiles 
in Cuba was an historical precedent for the right of "preemptive defence". For example, in a 
news conference, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld argued, "Now, what would you call the 
Cuban Missile Crisis action by President Kennedy... preventing, if you will, the Soviet Union 
from placing nuclear missiles in Cuba? That was certainly self-defence, it was certainly 
anticipatory self-defence, it was certainly preventive... he engaged in pre-emption. , 183 President 
Bush himself invoked the Kennedy pedigree to bolster the case for the war on Iraq: "As president 
Kennedy said in October of 1962, neither the United States nor the world community of nations 
can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or 
small. "' 84 
However, this is a misleading analogy. The truth is that President Kennedy ruled out such 
options as preemptive strike or invasion of Cuba. He worried constantly that a preemptive attack 
against Cuba might be too dangerous as a first approach to removing the missiles. Indeed, if he 
had undertaken a preemptive defence strategy, the likely outcome would have been an outright 
182 Statement of Mr. Quaison-Sackey the Representative of Ghana, SCOR, 1024u' meeting of 24 October 
1962, p 19. Similar observation has been made by Anthony Clark Arend and Beck, note 2 supra, p 75 183 Quoted in Blight, J and Lang, J, "On the 40th Anniversary, George Bush Hijacks the Cuban Missile 
Crisis", available at <http: //www. brown. edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2002-03/02-027. html> 
184 Ibid 
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destructive nuclear war. 185 Furthermore, the merits of the Iraqi case in 2003 are completely 
different from the case of Cuba. In the latter case, the threats posed by Cuba must be seen in the 
context of the 
Cold War. In other words, the threat was not caused by tiny Cuba for the Super- 
power USA, but by another Super Power; the Soviet Union. As the French delegation stated in 
the Security Council, "Cuba is not acting alone now... When a small 
Power places itself at the 
disposal of a great power and lends itself to offensive military preparations, there can be no 
doubt that this will imperil world peace, and the international community is therefore entitled to 
the matter up. "186 This point indicates that the nature of the threat and the size of the tay 
t , atening 
States are major elements in assessing the potential danger. 
C. 2.3 The Six-Day Mar 
Qne of the famous examples of anticipatory self-defence is the Israeli attack against 
neighbouring 
Arab States in 1967. A few days before the outbreak of the hostilities, Israel 
reported 
to the Security Council that Egypt had begun a "massive troop concentration" in the 
Sinai Peninsula against Israel's southern border. Israel also complained about threats made 
President Nasser "to interfere with [the Israeli] shipping in the Straits of Tiran. " Reciprocally, 187 
Egypt notified the Council that it "had received accurate information that Israel had been 
concentrating 
huge armed forces on the Syrian border and had every reason to believe that 
... 
the 
Israeli authorities had seriously contemplated an attack against Syria" and that it had decided to 
,, defend the Arab nation by all measures. "188 As relations deteriorated, Egypt requested the 
SecretaryGeneral to withdraw the UNEF (which had been in place between Egypt and Israel 
Since 
1956), lest they be caught up in the anticipated conflict. Israel, on the other hand, construed 
iss lbid 
186 Statement of Mr. Seydoux, the Representative of France, SCOR, 1024th meeting of 24 October 1962, p2 187 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1966-1968, UN Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add. 5, (1971); see 
also UN Doc. S/PV. 1342, p 41-2 188 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1966-1968, ibid, p 136 
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the request for "eviction of UNEF from its position" as a "signal for the revival of 
belligerence. " 189 
On 6th of June 1967, Israel commenced the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria by attacking 
military airports in all the three States, which clearly appeared as a pre-emptive strike. In the 
Security Council, Israel initially did not depend on anticipatory self-defence. It claimed that 
Egypt has initiated the attack by shelling Israeli villages in Gaza Strip and the Israeli Defence 
Forces was only repelling the Egyptian assault "acting in self-defence in accordance with Article 
51 of the Charter. "190 This argument appeared to be false and that the Israeli forces who was 
responsible for the opening of the hostilities. 191 Soon after, the Israeli delegate in the Council 
claimed that the Egyptian attack was impending. He argued that the expulsion of the UN peace- 
keeping force, the build-up of Egyptian forces along the frontier and the Egyptian decision to 
blocking off the Straits of Tiran for passage by Israeli ships'92 amounted to an act of war justify- 
ing self-defence under Article 51. Although he kept insisting that Egypt begun the hostilities on 
the morning 5 June, 193 as his statement progressed, he appeared to rely more on the anticipatory 
nature of Israel's action. Mr. Eban quoted a statement made by President Nasser on 26 May 
saying that Egypt "intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our 
basic aim will be to destroy Israel. "194 Then he went on to say, "the question then widely asked 
in Israel and across the world was whether we had not already gone beyond the utmost point of 
danger. "195 
1S9 Ibid, p 137 
19° Statement of Mr. Rafael the representative of Israel on the 1347b meeting, 5 June 1967, in the SCOR, p 3- 4 
191 Statement of Mr. U Thant the Secretary-General of the United Nations, ibid, p 2-3 192 Statement of Mr. Eban the Representative of Israel on the 1348`h meeting, 6 June 1967, in the SCOR, p 17 193 Ibid, p 15 
194 Ibid 
195 Ibid 
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The Council's debate focused predominantly, first on the identity of the aggressor and then on 
the implementation of the cease-fire; it did not discuss the concept of anticipatory self-defence. 
Nevertheless, some States such as Morocco, Syria and the Soviet Union held the first attack to be 
a decisive proof in determining the identity of the aggressor. In the words of the USSR 
Representative, "By launching aggression against neighbouring Arab States, the Government of 
Israel has defied the United Nations Charter and the elementary rules of international law. "196 
Other States such as India, Iraq, Bulgaria and Mali strongly condemned the Israeli action as an 
act of aggression in violation of international law and the UN Charter, without addressing the 
concept of anticipatory self-defence. The rest of the Council Members placed no blame on either 
side and also they did not examine the concept of anticipatory self-defence. 197 
Analysis of these discussions reveals that only Israel considered the right of anticipatory self- 
defence. Notwithstanding the lack of express condemnation of the Israeli pre-emptive action, by 
most States, none unequivocally expressed support for the doctrine itself. Therefore, the efficacy 
of anticipatory self-defence remains in doubt. Conversely, the condemnation of the Israeli action 
by some States, and their apparent stance that the first to strike is the aggressor, their position 
cannot be taken as clear consensus opposed to anticipatory self-defence, because it was linked to 
their political posture. 
C2.4 The Israeli strike on the Osirag nuclear reactor (1981) 
This incident requires some examination in detail by virtue of its being the only precedent in the 
State practice that seems to echo the Bush Doctrine of "preventive self-defence" and resembles 
the action taken against Iraq in 2003. Similar to the case of the present study, the Israeli strike on 
Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 focused on eliminating an intangible possible threat, long before it 
196 Statement of Mr. Fedorenko the Representative of the USSR, ibid, p6 197 See Statements of the Representatives of Argentina, ibid, p 6, Brazil 7, Canada 7, China 9, Denmark 10, 
Ethiopia 3, France 4, Japan 8, the UK 4 and the US 11 
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was fully formed; in other words, to incapacitate the enemy, despite the absence of any 
reasonably-assessed imminent danger. 
In June 1981, perhaps perceiving that its preemptive action in 1967 Evas not condemned, Israel 
sought to rely, this time explicitly, on the same doctrine. Israel launched an air raid against an 
Iraqi nuclear reactor (under construction) invoking its right of anticipatory self-defence. Israel 
argued that the reactor was intended for the production of nuclear weapons which would be 
directed at Israel, and therefore constituted a threat to the existence of the State of Israel. 
Therefore, under no circumstance would Israel allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass 
destruction. In assertion of this ideology, the Israeli Premier, Mr. Begin, announced that if Iraq 
tried to rebuild the reactor, Israel would destroy it again. 198 In the Security Council, Iraq strongly 
condemned the strike as an unequivocal "act of aggression"199 and demanded that "mandatory 
sanctions in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter should be imposed 
upon Israel. "20° The vast majority of States supported Iraq's view. 
On the other hand, the Israeli delegate, Mr Bulm, claimed that Israel's action was justified as an 
act of self-defence. He stated that "in destroying Osiraq, Israel performed an elementary act of 
self-preservation, both morally and legally. In doing so, Israel vas exercising its inherent right of 
self-defence as understood in general international law and preserved in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. A threat of nuclear obliteration was being developed against Israel by Iraq, one 
of Israel's most implacable enemies. "201 In support of the permissibility of the right of 
anticipatory self-defence, the Israeli representative referred to writers who advocated the right of 
198 Quoted in the Statement of Mr. Saadoon Hammadi the Representative of Iraq on the 2280'h meeting, 12 June 1981, SCOR, p3 
199 Ibid, p7 at 48 
200 Ibid, p7 at 52 
20! Mr. Bulm referred to views of Sir Humphrey Waldock, Professor Morton Kaplan and professor Derek 
Bowett. See Statement of Mr. Blum the Representative of Israel on the 2280` meeting, 12 June 1981, SCOR, 
p8 
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anticipatory self-defence. 202 All delegates in the Council, however, rejected the Israeli claim and 
condemned the action on the basis that there was no immanent danger. The reactor was under 
construction and not able to produce nuclear weapons; in addition, it was designed for peaceful 
purposes and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which declared that 
Iraq had fully complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 203 Mindful of 
these facts, the Security Council unanimously condemned Israel's action as a violation of the 
Charter. 204 
As to the concept of anticipatory self-defence per se, some States including Ireland, Guyana, 
Philippines, Romania, Syria, and Yugoslavia205 expressed the view that self-defence under 
Article 51 is only permitted "if an armed attack occurs. "206 The Syrian delegate said that 
anticipatory self-defence is "a concept that has been refuted time and again in the Definition of 
Aggression and dismissed as unacceptable, since it usurps the powers of the Security Council as 
set forth in Article 39 of the Charter and curtails the Council's authority. "207 Similarly, the 
Guyanian Representative stated that "nowhere does [Article 51] provide for the use of the 
preemptive strike, which is contrary to the spirit of the Charter and to the purposes and principles 
of the Organization. "208 The delegate of Romania described the notion of "preventive war" as 
202 Ibid, p 11 203 The Director General of IAEA, in his statement to the Board of Governors, stated that "The Agency has 
inspected the Iraqi reactors and has not found evidence of any activity not in accordance with the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. " Quoted in Mr. Saadoon Hammadi's statement, note 204, supra, p 7, at 49 204 Resolution 487 of 19 June, 1981 tos The Yugoslavian delegation argued that "the absurd and particularly dangerous argumentation concerning 
the right of preventive attack in self-defence must be rejected because not to reject it would be to open the 
way to lawlessness and to legalize aggression. If such argumentation were even partly endorsed, no country 
would be safe. Force would become the law that any powerful country could take into its own hands on the 
basis of subjective appraisal of the existence of an alleged danger threatening its security. " Statement of Mr. 
Komatina the Representative of Yugoslavia on the 2283`d meeting, 15 June 1981, SCOR, p 5, at 46 206 Statement of Mr. El-Fattal the Representative of Syria on the 2284th meeting, 16 June 1981, SCOR, p 6, at 65 
207 Ibid, at 66 208 Statement of Mr. Sinclair the Representative of Guyana on the 2286th meeting, 16 June 1981, p 6, at 65 
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"totally unacceptable for reasons which relate both to an elementary respect for international 
morality and law. "209 
Opposite to this restricted interpretation of Article 51, many States expressed the view that 
anticipatory self-defence is only permissible in case of imminent danger, and some of them, 
recited Webster's conditions of this right. However, they rejected the Israeli action because these 
conditions were not met in the Oziraq case. Among those States are Algeria, Niger, Malaysia, 
Sierra Leone and the UK. The delegate of Sierra Leone stated that "the plea of self-defence is 
untenable where no armed attack has taken place or is imminent. " '210 He went further to say, "As 
for the principle of self-defence, it has long been accepted that, for it to be invoked or justified, 
the necessity for action must be instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no 
moment for deliberation. "211 Webster's conditions of anticipatory self-defence were similarly 
invoked by Sir Anthony parsons, the delegate of the UK. He condemned the attack as "grave 
breach of International lave' because there was "no instant or overwhelming necessity for self- 
defence. "212 Mr. Oumarou, the Representative of Niger, stated that Israel's "reference to Article 
51 of the Charter is not merely abusive but also misleading. In this case, there was no legitimate 
self-defence; there was aggression, because Israel was in no way facing an imminent attack, "213 
Hence, it seems that those States upheld the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence under the 
conditions evinced in the Carolina incident and their only reason for opposing the Israeli strike 
was that these conditions were not met. Other States, such as Ireland214 and Jordan, rejected the 
Israeli claim of self-defence because it did not first have recourse to the Security Council. The 
209 Statement of Mr. Marinescu the Representative of Romania on the 2281" meeting, 13 June 1981, p 12, at 117 
210 Statement of Mr. Koroma the Representative of Sierra Leone on the 2283" meeting, 15 June 1981, p 14, 
at 147 
21Ibid, at148 
212 Statement of Sir Anthony Parsons the Representative of the UK, ibid. p15 
213 Statement of Mr. Oumarou the Representative of Niger on the 2284t° meeting, 16 June 1981, p 2, at 11 214 Statement of Mr. Dorr the Representative of Ireland on the 2283rd meeting, 15 June 1981, p3 
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Delegate of Jordan stated that Israel in its relines Article 51 forgot that "it is not an isolated 
article; it comes after a series of other articles, all of them referring to actions by the Council. "215 
Many other States such as Egypt, Sudan, Kuwait, Cuba and Zambia condemned the Israeli action 
without explicitly addressing the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. As to the US, its 
representative, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, condemned the action also without addressing the issue 
of the legality of anticipatory self-defence. However, she pointed out that the condemnation was 
based on Israel's failure to exhaust peaceful means for the resolution of the dispute before 
resorting to force. Thus, it can be deduced from this posture that the US shared the Israeli 
concept of preventive self-defence. 
In fact, this was the only case in which such a large number of States (more than forty-five 
delegates spoke before the Council) expressed views on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. 
It would therefore seem to be a reasonable reflection of the attitudes of States towards both the 
doctrine of anticipatory self-defence and the concept of "preventive self-defence". The debate 
suggests that, while a few States rejected the idea of anticipatory self-defence, the majority 
considered it permissible in case of imminent danger and according to Webster's formula. Even 
some of those States who rejected the permissibility of pre-emptive strike under Article 51, in 
fact, seemed focus on the notion of "preventive war, " not anticipatory self-defence. For example, 
the representative of Ireland, in his rejection of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, stated, 
"Israel has argued that, in an age of massive and dangerous weapons, [the right of self-defence] 
must be extended to include imminent attack. But the present claim goes well beyond this. It 
starts with the assertion that, despite evidence to the contrary, Iraq's nuclear programme will 
result in the secret development of a bomb within three to five years; through a further 
extrapolation it asserts that Iraq will use the bomb, once developed, with immense damage to 
215 Statement of Mr. Nuseibeh the Representative of Jordan on the 2280th meeting, 12 June 1981, p 22, at 224 
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Israel and its people; and it concludes that an immediate strike to eliminate that possible future 
danger is fully justified under Article 51: '216 To conclude, this case indicates for certain that 
there is a unanimous rejection for the concept of "preventive war" which focuses on eliminating 
the threat before it is fully formed. 
C'. 2.5 The US shooting of Iranian civilian aircraft (1988) 
In July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian Airbus Flight 655 during the 
Iran/Iraq war. The USA argued that its action was part of an ongoing battle and that it was 
engaged in a response to an armed attack by Iran217 The Iranian military aircraft was fired on a 
helicopter from the USS Vincennes after it had been blocked in by Iranian patrol boats 218 
Consequently; the USS Vincennes exercised its right to self-defence and fired at what it believed 
to be a hostile Iranian military aircraft, after sending frequent warnings. 219 
In the Security Council, the US argued that it has exercised its right of self-defence under Article 
51 in response to an attack by Iran, however, and it did not expressly rely on anticipatory self- 
defence. 20 Nevertheless, Iran argued that Article 51 does not permit pre-emptive self-defence 
and that the US action was aggressive. Many other states agreed with Iran in its argument, 
however, they did not reject the concept of anticipatory self-defence. The UK, on the contrary, 
supported the US action in general terms, but did not clearly support the principle of anticipatory 
self-defence 221 
216 Statement of Mr. Dorr the Representative of Ireland, note 214 supra, p 3, para 26 
217 SCOR, 2818th Meeting, UNDoc. S/19989; see also 42 UNYB, 1988, p 199 
218 There was a series of recent incidents between the US and Iraq. For example, on October 16,1987, an Iranian missile hit a US vessel, a re-flagged Kuwaiti tanker, in Kuwaiti territorial wasters. Two days later, the 
US attacked an Iranian oil platform. See chapter 2, section B. 2 
219 SCOR, 2818th Meeting, UN Doc. S/19989 
220 Although the US did not invoke anticipatory self-defence in the Security Council's debate, this was 
clearly its policy of the use of force. After Iraq's accidental attack on USS Stark on 17 May 1987, the US issued new rules of engagement for its forces in the region. These rules included that "aircraft of either 
country [Iran and Iraq] flying in a pattern which indicates hostile intent will be fired on unless they provide 
adequate notification of their intentions. " Thus, it was clear the US government adopted anticipatory self- defence as tactical. 26 ILM(1987), p 1422 
221 SCOR, 2818`h Meeting, UN Doc. S/19989 
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B. 6 Summary of State practice 
Some leading writers, such as Antonio Cassese and Christine Gray, 222 after examining these 
incidents, drew the conclusion that the vast majority of states reject the concept of anticipatory 
self-defence and do not see it as legal under the UN Charter. Cassese, for example, argued that 
"analysis of State and UN practice shows that the overwhelming majority of States firmly that 
anticipatory self-defence is not allowed by the UN Charter. "223 However, this view can be 
disputed. A thorough examination for discussions in the Security Council clearly indicates that 
the majority of States view anticipatory self-defence as lawful and consistent with the Charter 
legal framework in case of imminent danger and under the conditions evinced in the Carolina 
incident. Indeed, it cannot be concluded, at any rate, that the majority of States believe that 
anticipatory self-defence in case of imminent danger is unlawful. Only a few States seemed to be 
convinced that self-defence is only permitted "if an armed attack occurs. " Even those views were 
mostly expressed in the context of Israel's strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor which, in fact, was a 
"preventive" not "anticipatory" action. Therefore, one may dispute the credibility of these views 
because they were expressed regarding an action taken under the guise of anticipatory self- 
defence, not the concept per se. Even though it can be accepted that there is no clear-cut 
consensus over the permissibility of anticipatory self-defence, there is no ground in States' 
reactions to sustain the opposite view. Furthermore, if, as suggested, the majority of States reject 
anticipatory self-defence, the Security Council or the General Assembly would have expressed 
this view clearly as it did regarding armed reprisals. In sum, States' views expressed in those 
incidents support the view reached in the Opening Chapter, that anticipatory self-defence against 
imminent and clearly identified danger is lawful under Article 51. 
222 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 129-33 223 Cassese, International Law, note 50 supra, p 361 
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On the other hand, States' reactions to these episodes suggest that a clear distinction must be 
made between anticipatory self-defence and the notion of "preventive war". As demonstrated in 
the case of Israel strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, there Was unanimous rejection of such a 
doctrine. This doctrine, based on incapacitating the enemy and preventing him attaining or 
maintaining a level of power considered threatening, cannot be classified under any defensive 
paradigm. Rather, it is an offensive policy in the guise of defence and justified by extrapolation 
and unreasonable xpectation for the future. 
Section D: the validity of the invocation of the rit'ht of self-defence against Iraq 
in 2003224 
As previously mentioned, the US claimed that they had the right of self-defence in pre-emptive 
action against threats from Iraq. In his Address to the Nation on Iraq, President Bush 
summarized the threats posed by Iraq in the following terms: "Intelligence gathered by this and 
other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of 
the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction 
against Iraq's neighbours and against Iraq's people. The regime has a history of reckless 
aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, 
trained, and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al Qaeda. The danger is clear: using 
chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists 
could fulfil their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people 
in our country or any other. The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use 
force in assuring its own national security. "us 
220 The view represented in this section is regarding the legality of the justification of self-defence as a legal 
ground for the invasion. It does not, however, extend to the other legal grounds invoked by the US and the UK presented in the preceding chapters. 
225 President Bush's Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 Weekly Comp. Press. Doc. 338-39 
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Thus, Saddam Hussein's government allegedly posed two kinds of threats towards the US: first, 
the possibility of Iraq's sponsoring, supporting, or harbouring terrorists, possibility even 
providing them with WMDs; second, the prospect of a direct attack, by one of Iraq's official 
organs, against the US (whether on its homeland or abroad, i. e. the US troops stationed in the 
Middle East). The credibility of these two possibilities will be assessed respectively. 
D. 1 The use of force against Iraq's threats of terrorism 
The USA in its letter to the Security Council under Article 51 at the start of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, having asserted its right to act in self-defence in response to 9/11, went on to say 
"There is much we do not know. Our inquiry is still in its early stages. We may find that our self- 
defence requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other States. "226 
President Bush also on several occasions broadened the focus of the war against terrorism 
beyond Afghanistan. 227 It is not entirely clear whether the USA anticipated military action only 
against those directly responsible for the attacks of 9/11 or whether it was extending the scope of 
the right of self-defence in the war against terrorism, to pre-empt potential future threats. 228 In 
neither case, however, would the use of force in self-defence be legitimate. 
If the US contemplated action against general threats of terrorism not related to the atrocities of 
9/11, its claim of self-defence is clearly unacceptable and illegal. As mentioned above, although 
it is admitted that the right of self-defence has been broadened to include terrorists and States 
that support and harbour them, this right is subject to certain conditions, importantly, that an act 
of terrorism has already occurred and that there are more acts to be expected from the same 
source, in the sense that the action cannot be anticipatory or without precedent. No terrorist 
attack has occurred against the US since the 9/11 attacks. 
226 UN Doc. S/2001/946 
227 See, for example, President Bush's State of the Union Address, January 2002.; see also President Bush News Conference on 6 March 2003,39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 295,296 (6 March 2003) 228 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 175 
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As regards States claimed to harbour and protect Al"Qaeda, which perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, 
again the US justification of self-defence is not valid. Neither the US nor the UK has ever 
disclosed any evidence of links between Al Qaeda and President Saddam Hussein, nor was any 
such link known to the international community. Furthermore, as mentioned above, Iraq was not 
mentioned in the findings of the massive investigations carried out by the US and the UK 
intelligent agencies. Even after the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom against 
Afghanistan, in August 2002, when the US Commander of the Operation Enduring Freedom 
announced the possibility of further operations in neighbouring countries where Taliban and Al- 
Qaeda fighters were thought to be hiding, 229 Pakistan was singled out, but it was not suggested 
that Al-Qaeda operators may have fled to Iraq. 
The repeated assertions made by the US and the UK of ongoing links between Al-Qaeda and 
President Saddam Hussein and the prospects of future attacks, were made unilaterally and 
appeared immediately before the invasion. They were obviously intended to bring any attack on 
Iraq within the scope of the war against terrorism and to enhance the case for war, 230 especially, 
among the American and British publics. It seems reasonable to suggest that if there had been 
was any significant link, at all, between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, the US and the UK 
would have disclosed their evidence in order to enhance their legal grounds for action against 
Iraq. Notably, in the run up to the war, when the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in his 
presentation in the Security Council disclosed evidence based on U. S. intelligence information 
regarding Iraq's efforts to pursue WMD and missile programmes and conceal them from UN 
inspectors, 231 it could be asked why he did not reveal the intelligence information regarding 
Iraq's links with the Al-Qaeda to strengthen the case for the use of force. 
229 Ibid, p 169 
"0 Ibid, p 180 
231 UNDocs S/PV 4701 and SIPV 4714 (2003) 
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Even if there was evidence for this link, the action would again be unacceptable if not approved 
(explicitly or implicitly) by the Security Council. 232 For the US to further select a third State as 
target of its military action in response for the 9/11 attacks is contrary to the seemingly 
acceptable pre-conditions of the right of self-defence against terrorists and States that harbour. 
As shown in the case of the Israeli attack against Syria in 2003, the action was condemned 
because the targeted State was a third State not the main State of residence of Hezbollah 
(Lebanon). If the US had been attacked by five or six States, it might legitimately have claimed a 
right to respond with force against all States which participated in the aggression. However, this 
was not the case. The 9/11 events were committed by a non-state organization, which might 
operate from several countries, which could be difficult to identify, and could be involved to 
varying degrees. 3 The Iraqi case was not like that of Afghanistan, where there was convincing 
evidence that it was the base of the terrorist organization responsible for the attacks. 
Afghanistan's long history of harbouring the Al-Qaeda on its territory, tolerating their activities 
and refusing to cooperate with the international community to apprehend the terrorists could be 
considered to make it a legitimate target 234 
D. 2 Threats of attack by JVl%1Ds 
Although the US National Security Strategy is focused primarily on the disruption and 
destruction of terrorist organizations before they carried out attacks against the US, this goal has 
been connected with another one, which is to eliminate the threats posed by possession of 
weapons of mass destruction by its enemies 235 In other words, the US broadened its goal to 
include States that possess or develop weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration 
232 The argument here is regarding the use of force against Iraq as a State that supported Al-Qaeda, not in 
relation to Iraq's non-compliance with its disarmament obligations 233 Falk, "What Future of the UN Charter System of War Prevention", note 159 supra, p 592; Cassese, A. 
"Terrorism is also Disrupting some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law", note 66 supra, p 999- 1000 
234 Ibid, p 999 
235 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, note 15 supra, p 176 
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created such linkage between States developing weapons of mass destruction, Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea being specifically mentioned in this regard, and terrorists, in order to justify an 
extension of the right of self-defence to include the concept of "preventive self-defence" against 
enemy States. Indeed, he seems to have extended the `war against terrorism' and the legitimacy 
conferred by the world community and the Security Council for that war, beyond its original 
goal 236 
Supporters of the American argument of self-defence contend that, from the perspective of the 
new understanding of anticipatory self-defence, use of force against Iraq was justified by the 
threat of a WMD attack by Iraq, either directly or through Iraq's support for terrorism. They 
characterize the threat as "sufficiently imminent" to necessitate military action. r In this 
connection it has been argued that since there is no specific definition of the term "imminent" in 
international law to provide a clear criterion for the legitimate use of force in anticipatory self- 
defence, it is necessary to consider also the likelihood that the threat 'Mll materialize and the 
severity of the harm likely to result. With the development of nuclear and other sophisticated 
weapons, the potential magnitude of the danger is greatly increased, while the relevance of 
timing is reduced. 238 Furthermore, proponents of this view argue that Operation Iraqi Freedom 
must be read in the context in which it took place, including Iraq's open aggression against 
neighbouring States, its possession of weapons of mass destruction, its record of deployment of 
such weapons, the Security Council action under Chapter VII, and Iraqi intransigence in the face 
of the Council's requirements 239 In light of this background of the Iraqi regime, the force used 
was proportionate to the threat posed by Iraq, since it was limited to what Evas necessary to 
236 Ibid, p 176-7 
23' Yoo, J. "International Law and the War in Iraq", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 574; see also Sapiro, note 159 supra, p 604 
238 Yoo, ibid, p 572-4 
239 Taft, W. & Buchwald, T. "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 557-8 
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remove the threat, including the destruction of Iraq's WMD capability and the removal of 
Saddam Hussein, the originator of the Iraqi threat. 
Even if it agreed that the concept of imminence must include an analysis beyond the temporal 
proximity of a threat, to include the probability that the threat will occur, however, it is 
questionable whether the facts of the situation that existed in March 2003 correspond to any 
reasonable theory of imminence or probability of occurrence. Regardless the fact of Iraq's non- 
compliance with its disarmament obligation and the shortcomings in Iraqi cooperation which 
justifies the invasion on other legal grounds, at the time of the invasion, UN and International 
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors were deployed in Iraq, undertaking search for WMDs240 In a 
meeting of the Security Council on 14 February 2003, Hans Blix pointed out the shortcomings in 
Iraq's cooperation, but also admitted that inspectors had conducted several inspections in the 
previous three months241 Their reports provide no evidence to support the assertion that Iraq 
intended imminent aggression against anyone. As correctly expressed by Franck, "Whatever the 
inspectors did or did not learn about Iraqi WMDs, nothing in their reports lends any credibility to 
the claim of an imminent threat of armed aggression against anyone. "242 In sum, the facts of 
situation at the time of the invasion definitely did not support the case of preemption, as there 
was neither imminence nor necessity. 243 President Bush seemed to acknowledge that the alleged 
threats posed by Iraq WMDs were not imminent. In his ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein 
on 17 March 2003, he stated "In 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free 
nations would be multiplied many times over... We choose to meet that threat now, where it 
240 Franck, T. "What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 611 241 Murphy, S. "Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq", 97 AJIL, 2003, p 422 242 Franck, note 240 supra, p 611 243 Falk, "What Future of the UN Charter System of War Prevention", note 159 supra, p 598 
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arises, before it can appear suddenly in our shies and cities. " This statement implies that there 
was no immediate threat to justify the use of force in a preemptive strike. 
In fact, the US frankly adopted a policy similar to the one adopted by Israel in 1981. Despite the 
overwhelming condemnations for the Israeli missile strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the 
Bush administration referred to this incident as a precedent to support the legitimacy of the 
preventive doctrine. The legal Advisor of the US Department of State argued that "the 
President's National Security Strategy relies upon the same legal framework applied to the 
British in Carolina and to Israel in 1981 
... 
After the exhaustion of peaceful remedies and a 
careful, deliberate consideration of the consequences, in the face of overwhelming evidence of 
an imminent threat, a nation may take preemptive action to defend its nationals from 
unimaginable harm. "245 
The UK, however, was more cautious in its formal justification of the invasion. The UK took the 
position that the legal basis of the Operation Iraqi Freedom was a revival of the Coalition's right 
to use force against Iraq's material breach of the cease-fire Resolution 687.246 Remarkably, in his 
memorandum to British Government over the possible legal basis for the use of force, the 
Attorney General of the United Kingdom, while supporting the right to use force, rejected the US 
doctrine of "preventive self-defence. " Lord Goldsmith wrote, "I am aware that the USA has been 
arguing for recognition of a broad doctrine of a right to use force to pre-empt danger in the 
future. If this means more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent attack (and I 
understand that the doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not a doctrine which, in 
244 President Bush Address to the Nation on Iraq 17 March, 2003,39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 338,340 (24 
March 2003) 
245 Taft, W. Legal Advisor of the US Department of State, "The Legal Basis for Preemption", 18 November 
2002, available at <http: //www. cfr. org/pubication. php? id=5250> 
246 "Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Iraq: Legal Basis for the Use of Force", 17 March 2003,521CLQ, p 812-4; available also at <httpJ/%-ww. ico. gov. uktcros/documentuploads/annex> 
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my opinion, exists or is recognized in international law. "247 Thus, even the leading partner of the 
US in the Coalition against Iraq refused to rely on such a doctrine. 
It seems that later, the US realized that its argument of preemptive self-defence was untenable 
under international law and the UN Charter. In its letter to the Security Council after the 
beginning of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US relied solely on the basis of Security Council 
Resolutions 678 and 687 and no mention was made of the right of preemptive self-defence. The 
US stated, "The actions being taken are authorized under existing Council resolutions, including 
its Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991). Resolution 687 (1991) imposed a series of 
obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive disarmament obligations, that were 
conditions of the cease-fire established under it. It has been long recognized and understood that 
a material breach of these obligations removes the basis of the cease-fire and revives the 
authority to use force under Resolution 678 (1990). This has been the basis for the coalition use 
of force in the past and has been accepted by the Council, as evidenced, for example, by the 
Secretary-General's public announcement in January 1993 following Iraq's material breach of 
Resolution 687 (1991) that coalition forces had received a mandate from the Council to use force 
according to Resolution 678 (1990). -), 248 
In fact, the argument of preemptive self-defence is not only unacceptable, but also contradicts the 
argument that the use of force was in response to Iraq's violations of the cease-fire. To argue that 
the US and the UK undertook pre-emptive self-defence against threats from Iraq in 2003 implies 
that this episode was a fresh war, not a resumption of the hostilities as a result of Iraq's non- 
compliance with its disarmament obligations under the cease-fire Resolution 687. As Dinstein 
correctly observed, "There is absolutely nothing preemptive about the resumption of hostilities 
247 Lord Goldsmith, the UK Attorney General, "Memorandum on the legality of military action against Iraq", 
available at <http: //www. ico. gov. uk/upload/documents/library/> 248 Letter dated 20 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/35I 
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when a cease-fire disintegrates. "249 Furthermore, the state of war between the Iraq and the 
Coalition continued notwithstanding suspension of the major operations in 1991. Finally, even 
the US Legal Advisor for the Department of State, who previously supported the doctrine of 
preventive war, after the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, conceded that this justification 
cannot be a valid justification for the invasion of Iraq on its own, but must be seen in the context 
of Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687. He commented: "Vas Operation Iraqi Freedom an 
example of preemptive use of force? Viewed as the final episode in a conflict initiated more than 
a dozen years earlier by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it may not seem so. "25° 
Conclusion 
The events of 9/11 and their aftermath have brought a fundamental reappraisal of the legal rules 
governing the use of force in self-defence, and broken new ground in international law as to the 
use of force against terrorism. The almost universal support of the world community for a US 
right of self-defence in response to 9/11, coupled with the Security Council's new legislation on 
terrorism may be seen as broadening the right of self-defence to include non-State actors and 
States that support or harbour terrorists. Indeed, today, the world has reached a situation where 
there is general consensus among the international community that terrorism must be absolutely 
condemned. Many international conventions and Security Council resolutions indicate that not 
only the terrorist networks themselves have to be suppressed, but also all actors, including State 
actors, which support the infrastructure or the financing of these organisations or even, provide 
them safe havens. This general consensus among most of the world States is "weighted with the 
terminology of opinion juris" and "deliberately norm creating. " However, there are many 
problems associated with this extension of the right of self-defence, regarding its exact scope and 
249 Dinstein, Y. War, Aggression and Self-Defence, fourth edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005 p 297 
250 Taft and Buchwald, "Preemption, Iraq, and International Law", note 239 supra, p 563 
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the pre-conditions for exercising it. Therefore, the example of the case of 9/11 and the war on 
Afghanistan should be narrowly interpreted. The world States' reactions to the cases in the post- 
9/11 period indicate that they accept the application of this right only under certain conditions, 
essentially, when there is large-scale terrorist attack, the target State has an obvious link with the 
terrorist group, and there is tangible evidence that future attacks from the same source of 
aggression are almost certain. Furthermore, States' reactions to the Israeli attacks on Syria in 
2003 clearly show a general reluctance to accept military action against terrorist camps in a third 
State. 
The Bush administration, however, exploited the rhetoric of the `war against terrorism' and the 
legitimacy conferred on it by the world community and the Security Council, far beyond its 
original goal, to adopt a doctrine of preventive self-defence, indicating that force may be used 
even where there has been no actual attack-contrary to all State practices in this regard before 
and after the 9/11 events. Furthermore, the US administration extended the scope of this alleged 
right beyond the original goal of combating terrorism, to include States that possess or develop 
weapons of mass destruction and the US administration perceived them as growing enemies. 
That doctrine, obviously, cannot be contained within any legal theory of self-defence including 
anticipatory self-defence and had previously, in 1981, been vigorously rejected by the 
overwhelming majority of States. Again, the "Bush Doctrine" has been rejected by the majority 
of States and commentators, even those who supported the use of force against Iraq in 2003, 
including the UK, the leading partner of the US. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq cannot be 
justified on the ground of this controversial and dangerous concept, which would allow a 
virtually unfettered right of self-defence. Indeed, taking a wider view, it is not in the interest of 
the world community, including the US itself, to develop a doctrine that permits every nation to 
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act in prevention against its own definition of threats to its security. 5' The US policymakers 
appear not to have considered that acceptance of such doctrine could justify the use of force 
against its own interests, for example, by China against Taiwan, North Korea against South 
Korea, Russia against the former USSR countries in Eastern Europe and beyond. 
251 Kissinger, H. "Consult and Control: Bywords for Battling the New Enemy", Washington post, 16 September 2002 
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Chapter 8 
The `RiL'ht' of Pro-Democratic Intervention 
Introduction 
The last justification put forward for the invasion of Iraq is to relieve the Iraqi people of vast and 
continuing human rights violations by the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. President Bush, 
in his justification of the invasion, asserted the need for regime change in Iraq. He promised to 
"free the Iraqi people"' by replacing Saddam Hussein's vicious regime with a democratic one. 
This justification characterized the invasion, partly, as pro-democratic. Indeed, it is a well- 
documented fact that Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who committed serious violations of 
human rights and remained in power against the will of the Iraqi people. However, the question 
is to be considered whether any international legal instrument permits intervention to maintain or 
impose a democratic form of government in another State. 
In recent years, there has been considerable literature arguing that there is a newly emerging 
`law' which permits States to use force unilaterally to overthrow despotic regimes in other 
countries, notwithstanding their sovereignty. 2 It has been argued that modem international law 
has installed a major imperative for pro-democratic intervention: internationally guaranteed 
human rights 
.3 It was also suggested that pro-democratic intervention is legally justified under 
the UN Charter and Article 2(4) must be interpreted in a way legitimizes such an action. On the 
President Bush's Radio Address at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gove/news/releases/2003/03/20030322. html> 2 See Reisman, M. "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2 (4)", 78 AJIL, 1984; 
D'Amato, A. "The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny", 84 AJIL, 1990; Halberstam, M. 
"Copenhagen Document: Intervention in Support of Democracy", 34 Harvard 1LJ, 1993; and Kirkpatrick, J. 
and Gerson, A. "The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law", in Louis Henkin (ed), Right v. 
Might, International Law and the Use of Force, Council on Foreign Relations Press, London, 1989 3 Reisman, M. "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", 98 AJIL, 2004, p 516 4 Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2 (4)", note 2 supra, p 643-4; see 
also D'Amato, note 2 supra, p 520 
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other hand, that alleged right of pro-democratic intervention was rigorously rejected by some 
writers on the ground that it is a clear violation of well-established norms of international law, 
such as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and prohibition of 
the use of force in international relations. 5 
This chapter will first consider the right of democratic governance and its legal basis. The second 
section will examine the theories of international law that have been said to support a doctrine of 
unilateral pro-democratic intervention. The third will highlight the major cases which have been 
held by some as models of a new era of pro-democratic intervention, either unilateral actions 
taken by individual States or multilateral actions taken under the authority of Security Council to 
restore democracy. Finally, the chapter will examine the invasion of Iraq, to find out whether it 
can be characterized and justified as a `pro-democratic' war. 
s See Schachter, 0. "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", 78 AJIL, 1984; Farer, T. "Panama: Beyond 
the Charter Paradigm", 84 AJIL; Nanda, V. "The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama under International Law", 84 AJIL, 1990 
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I, 
Section A: The right to democratic governance 
Many writers have discussed "the emerging right to democratic governance, "6 basically arguing 
that the democratic rights referred to in human rights treaties are not merely urged or 
recommended. This newly emerging right, that governance should be legitimized by democracy, 
is not confined to a particular State that has set out such a requirement for national governance, 
but is acquiring the status of an international, universally applicable legal norm. 7 From this 
perspective, a government cannot rule solely by force; effective governance requires the habitual, 
voluntary compliance of citizens, and cannot depend on the despotic power of a ruler to compel 
obedience. 8 Consequently, governments are moving away from totalitarian rhetoric, seeking to 
legitimize themselves so as to secure people's support for and compliance with their rule. 
For much of the twentieth century, there were a relatively small number of actual democracies in 
the world; most of the world's States were, if not inherently undemocratic, at least susceptible to 
application in deeply undemocratic ways 
.9 In fact, there was no requirement for a State to have a 
democratically elected government, or one that enjoyed the general support of its people. 1° As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, civil war or military coup were typical ways of changing governments 
in many States. General endorsement of a principle of democracy was rendered difficult by the 
confusion as to exactly what such a right might entail. " In other words, there was no agreement 
of the contents or standards for democracy. 
6 Franck, T. "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance", 86 AJIL, 1992. See also Crawford, J. 
"Democracy and International Law", 44 BYIL, 1993. Fox, G. "The Right to Political Participation in 
International Law", 17 Yale JIL, 1992. 
7 Franck, ibid, p 47 
a [bid, p 48 
Crawford argues that until the 1980s only "a third of all the countries of the world could be described as democratic. " Crawford, note 6 supra. p 116-7 10 lbid, p 117 
11 Ibid, p 113 
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During the 1980s, however, the tendency for democracy accelerated and democracy came to 
assume far greater importance. 12 By the end of 1991, according to Franck, more than 110 
governments were legally committed to open, multiparty, secret-ballot elections with universal 
franchise. 13 Many commentators have viewed this trend as a new discourse in international law 
and international relations, marked by growing emphasis on democracy as a value and greater 
willingness by the international community to interest themselves in the matter by mounting 
pressure for elections, monitoring them, or recognizing the outcomes. 14 
Indeed, in the last two decades democratic rights gradually became an international legal 
obligation upon States rather than merely a moral requirement that governments may choose to 
abide by or not. This status of democracy clearly appears in many international legal instruments 
which urge States to mould their foreign and domestic policies in a democratic way, as will be 
shown below. Furthermore, the enormous political pressure by the world community upon 
oppressive regimes and undemocratic governments who are reluctant to abandon these regimes 
and transform their policies into ones that approximate the international human rights standards 
is a clear indication that democracy today is not only an optional way of governing but an 
international obligation. 
A. 1 The right of self-determination 
The legal basis for the right of democratic governance in international law 
-as a prerequisite for 
the legitimacy for the government-stems from the traditional right of peoples to self- 
determination. Tomas Franck portrayed self-determination as the historic foundation of the 
"democratic entitlement, "' 5 being its longest and best-established aspect. 16 The principle of self- 
12 Ibid, p 121-2 
" Franck, note 6 supra. p 47 
14 Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p 88-9; see also Crawford, note 6 supra. p122-6; Franck, note 6 supra. p 47-8. 15 Franck, ibid, p 52 
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determination entitles people organized in an established territory to decide its government 
democratically and is therefore essential to democratic rights. '7 
In modem history, since 1945, many international treaties emphasize peoples' right of self- 
determination. Article 1 of the UN Charter established the right of self-determination as one of 
the purposes of the United Nations, to develop friendly relations between States, not on any 
terms, but "based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples. "18 Article 73(b) of the UN Charter imposes a clear obligation upon members 
responsible for administrating non-self-government territories "to develop self-government, to 
take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions. "' 9 Furthermore, Article 76(b) requires that 
inhabitants of the territories placed under the "International Trusteeship System", should be 
allowed "to promote 
... 
their progressive development towards self-government or 
independence" in accordance with "the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned 
. 
-)920 The 
principle of self-determination was further enunciated in the annex to the General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 of December 15,1960.21 The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations elaborated 
the Charter "principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"22 by reiterating the duty 
to end colonialism and to permit each colonial territory to assume a "political status freely 
determined by"23 the inhabitants. More broadly, the Declaration attributes to "all peoples"-not 
16 Ibid 
'7 lbid 
'8 Article 1 of the UN Charter 
"Article 73(b) of the UN Charter 20 Article 76(b) of the UN Charter 21 Principle VII of the Resolution states that the political destiny of the non-self-governing territory "should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. " General Assembly Resolution 1541 of 15 December, 1960. u Declaration on Friendly Relations adopted in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970 
23 Ibid 
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only the inhabitants of colonies= `the right freely to determine, without external interference, 
their political status. "24 
Significantly, the concept of a universal right of self-determination was included in the legally 
binding International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article I of the Covenant declared 
that "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. "25 Again, it is clear from this binding treaty that the right of self-determination is 
intended to be applicable to the citizens of all nations, giving them the right to decide their 
collective political status through democratic means. This treaty is currently ratified or acceded 
to by 160 States and a further 5 signatories (pending ratification). 6 It can safely be argued, 
therefore, that it is binding on all States as customary law rule?? Indeed, the signature and 
ratification of a Convention by a large number of States confirms the widespread acceptance of 
its provisions among the international community, and provides clear evidence of an opiniojuris 
as to the acceptability of these provisions, and that indeed they have been generally accepted. 
The same principle applies to declaration which passed without a vote or with overwhelming 
majority. 28 
The essential measure to ensure people's right of self-determination has been specified clearly in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration expressly elaborates that all people 
are entitled to choose their governments through a free and democratic voting system was. 
Article 21(3) of the Declaration states that "The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
24 Ibid 
u International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by General Assembly resolution 220A (XXI) 
of 16 December, 1966 
26 A country-by-country list of declarations and reservations made upon ratification, accession or succession 
can be seen at <http: //www. unhchr. clVhtmL'menu3/b/treaty5 asp. htm> 
27 Meron, T. Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Clarendon Press, oxford, 1989, p 
80-1 
28 Sohn, L. "Generally Accepted International Rules", 61 Washington Law Review, 1986, p 1077-78 
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authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures. "29 Although this Declaration, as a mere General Assembly resolution, was 
initially a non-binding "standard of achievement, " yet it was passed with overwhelming 
support 30 and its provisions were incorporated into many national constitutions, statutes and 
judicial decisions. 1 In this way, the Declaration has become so influential that some of its 
provisions may be regarded as customary international rules 32 
To conclude, in contemporary international law, as in the UN Charter, the policy adopted has 
been to maintain the political independence of territorial communities so that they can continue 
to adopt whatever form of political community they consider appropriate to them. 3 This is the 
essential principle of political legitimacy. Thus, democratic governance became the one of the 
strongest and most flourishing concepts in international relations after the Second World War, to 
the extent that the refusal to permit demonstrably free elections is increasingly becoming 
recognized as a breach of international law. Successive resolutions, decisions and international 
declarations and treaties setting out the political rights and freedoms embraced by the Charter 
provisions, are testimony to their imperative character. The crucial question to be considered 
now, however, is how such a right of democratic governance is to be enforced and whether this 
right authorizes one State to intervene and if necessary to use force to enforce this right in 
another country. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of December 10,1948 
30 Franck, note 6 supra. p 61 31 Schachter, 0. "International Law Implications of US Human Rights Policies", 24 New York Law School Law Review, 1978, p 68 32 Franck, note 6 supra. p 61 33 Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article'2 (4)", note 2 supra, p 643 
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Section B: Legal theories of the doctrine of pro-democratic intervention 
With this growing concern for democracy, some theories of international law have developed, 
that are claimed to support a doctrine of unilateral pro-democratic intervention. This section will 
review and analyse these theories in light of the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter. 
B 
-I Interpreting Article 
2(4) to enhance the rieht of self-determination 
Some writers have adopted an extreme view of the right to democratic governance. Professor 
Reisman, for example, strongly asserts the right of a State to use military intervention to 
overthrow a despotic government in another country. He argues that it would be a "rape of 
common sense"34 to oppose forcible intervention in such cases, while supporting, through 
foreign aid, repressive regimes that govern despotically, without the will of the people. In his 
view, though all interventions are regrettable, "the fact is that some may serve, in terms of 
aggregate consequences, to increase the probability of free choice of peoples about their 
government and political structure. 05 Therefore, Article 2(4) must be interpreted in a way 
legitimizes the unilateral use of force to "enhance opportunities for ongoing self- 
determination °06 In other words, Article 2(4) must be applied in a way that people's opportunity 
for free choice of government and political structure is increased. If such choice is prevented by 
34 Ibid, p 645 
35 Ibid. p 644. Reisman argues that "There is neither need nor justification for treating in a mechanically 
equally fashion Tanzania's intervention in Uganda to overthrow Amin's despotism, on the one hand, and 
Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1966 to overthrow popular governments and to 
impose an undesired regime on a coerced population, on the other. " Ibid. 
36 Ibid, p 643. Reisman criticizes the traditional interpretation of Article 2(4) as it conforms to the letter, 
rather than the spirit and principles of the Charter and therefore, is not in line with the contemporary political 
reality. He argues that the traditional interpretation of Article 2(4), to prohibit all forms of the use of force in 
international relations, was based on the political context and technological environment that prevailed at the 
end of the 19th century, when the only threat to the right of political independence of a people within a 
particular territorial community came from external, overt invasion. That context, however, has been 
gradually changing. The current reality is that in some communities, if there are no established, firmly 
embedded procedures for the transfer of power, the way is open for a group of military officers to seize 
power, irrespective of a lack of popular support; an internal threat to the right of political independence. 
Therefore, Article 2(4) must be reconsidered in the context of the modem political environment in order to 
safeguard the basic principle of political legitimacy and support the right of people to determine their own 
political destinies, in the face of internal as well as external threat. Ibid. p 643-5 
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a repressive government, a foreign State should have the right to use force to bring about a 
desirable end of "ongoing self-determination. " 
Certainly, this extreme view of the right of self-determination and the expansive interpretation of 
Article 2(4) to allow foreign power to intervene and overthrow despotic regimes are implausible 
and problematic. Such a broad interpretation of Article 2(4) is a clear violation of the plain 
language of the Charter and the interpretations that States have given Article 2(4) since the 
creation of the UN Charter. 37 In addition, although the principle of self-determination is an 
important principle of international law, it does not automatically take precedence over other 
well-established and important norms of international law, 38 such as non-interference in internal 
affairs and the prohibition of use of force in international relations. In other words, there are no 
legal grounds to suggest that democracy has priority over other important international legal 
principles. 
In contrast, the opposite conclusion is the preferable one because. Peace that was the primary 
concern of the founders of the UN Charter and has priority over any other principle of the UN 
Charter. As Henkin has rightly observed, in modem international law and the law of the United 
Nations Charter, peace is the paramount value, taking precedence over progress and even justice. 
This is because war, except in self-defence, inflects such damage and injustice that the purposes 
of the UN could not be achieved where war prevails 39 This view finds support in the ICJ's 
judgment in the Corfu Channel case. In that case, the Court rejected the defence of the United 
Kingdom that it had used armed force in the cause of international justice. The Court stated that 
it "cannot accept such a line of defence. The Court can only regard the alleged right of 
intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most 
37 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p106 38 Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", note 5 supra, p 647-8 39 Henkin, L. "The Use of Force; Law and U. S. Policy" in Louis Henkin (ed), note 2 supra, p 38-9 
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serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, 
find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissible in the particular 
form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most 
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice 
itself. "40 
Another argument in favour of intervention to bring down tyrannical regimes has been put 
forward by D'Amato. He argues that such intervention does not violate Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter; as the prohibition of the use of military force expressed in that article applies only to 
"territorial aggrandizement or colonialism"-41 Thus, action to overthrow tyranny and to protect 
the freedom of the people, with no territorial claim on any part of that country, does not 
constitute a violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of the State concerned, 
since the forces of intervention will withdraw, leaving the State concerned as an independent 
nation. 42 
This argument, however, is clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent of those States who, 
during San Francisco Conference, proposed and supported the inclusion of the phrase "against 
the territorial integrity and political independence of any member State" The true intention 
behind this clause was to strengthen Article 2(4) against any intervention by a foreign State, 
whatever minor or temporary this intervention is; exactly opposite to what D'Amato is 
suggesting. 3 The plausible and preferable view, in accordance to the Purposes and Principles of 
the UN Charter, is that any incursion, however short-lived, violates the essence of territorial 
integrity. This view was held by the ICJ in Corfu Channel case. In that case, Britain argued that 
40 Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p 35 
41 D'Amato, note 2 supra, p 520 
42 Ibid. Similar argument was expressed by Jean Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, arguing that "the protection 
of territorial integrity provided in Article 2(4) is not the same thing as territorial inviolability. Territorial 
integrity is preserved so long as none of a State's territory is taken from it. " Kirkpatrick & Gerson, note 2 
supra, p 32 
43 See Chapter 1, section B. 1 
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it had not violated Albania's territorial integrity when the Royal Navy temporarily encroached on 
Albanian territorial waters to remove a minefield. 4 The Court, however, unanimously rejected 
this argument stating that "Between independent States, respect for territorial integrity is an 
essential foundation of international relations. 
.. 
to ensure respect for international law... the Court 
must declare that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian 
sovereignty. "45 
Moreover, indubitably intervention by one State to remove the government of another State is a 
violation of the political independence of the later, whatever its internal policies. 6 Furthermore, 
one of the overriding Principles of the Charter is to prohibit interference in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the member States. Indeed, Article 2(7) expressed such a 
prohibition with respect to the organs of the UN itself; this prohibition, a fortiori, applies for 
individual States. 
The US administration, during the US invasion of Grenada in 1983, adopted a view similar, but 
not identical, to D'Amato's view. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, the US representative to the UN, 
argued in the Security Council that the language used in Article 2(4), "or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, " provides "ample justification" for the use 
of force "in pursuit of the other values also inscribed in the Charter-freedom, democracy, 
peace. "47 This argument is misleading because the foremost purpose of the Charter, as expressed 
in Article 2(4), was to absolutely prohibit unilateral use of force by States, except in the case of 
self-defence. Intervening in another country's internal affaires is forbidden and "inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations, " as stated by Article 2(7). In addition, the right of self- 
44 Statement by Sir Eric Beckett (UK) on November 11,1948 in Pleadings (3 Corfu Channel), Corfu Channel 
case, ICJ Reports, 1950, p 264 19 Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports, 1949, p 4,35 46 Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", note 5 supra, p 649 47 Dep't St. Bull., No. 2081, December 1983, p 74 
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determination, which is the alleged reason for intervention, was designed for the people of the 
country, not for foreign powers. 
Overall, in reality, the arguments advanced in favour of forcible intervention to topple despotic 
regimes and to promote democracy would offer a new justification for the resort to force that 
would allow powerful States, virtually unconstrained, to overthrow governments allegedly not 
representative of the popular will, or opposed to the goal of self-determination. Such a right has 
worrying implications. While invasions may sometimes support democratic values, there is also 
a danger of legitimizing armed attacks against peaceful governments. 48 Furthermore, it is highly 
questionable whether military intervention can be an effective means of safeguarding democratic 
values, since it prevents the genuine development of democracy. If democratic norms are well 
established in the target State, they will probably prevail without outside intervention. If they are 
underdeveloped or nonexistent, they are likely to be imposed through the tutelage of the 
intervening State, contrary to the concept of self-determination. 49 In other cases, as the case of 
Iraq demonstrates, the target State will descend into prolonged chaos and the action, eventually, 
will cause more harm to those whom the acting State desires to protect. In fact, none of the 
changes proved dazzlingly successful, in the sense of establishing a reasonable and decent 
internal system of public order, as will be shown below. 
Moreover, on a careful reading of the human rights instruments, especially the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, one can safely argue that, while these instruments emphasis 
citizens' right of democratic governance and establish international standards to this effect, they 
are couched in very general terms and open to a wide margin of appreciation. Hence, the way a 
particular regime is perceived may vary from one foreign State to another. Whose standards are 
to be used to make that judgment? Who is entitled to decide whether a given government has met 
48 Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", note 5 supra. p 649 
49 Nanda, note 5 supra, p 499 
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these standards? These problems make Reisman's and D'Amato's criteria difficult to apply 
uniformly and create the danger of permitting justification of intervention in almost any case. 
The important point, however, is that the right of self-determination which is the cornerstone of 
the "democratic entitlement" is vested in `the people', and that it is they who must decide their 
own political structure-not a foreign power who is no more elected, 50 by the target people, than 
those they accuse and seek to overthrow. For a foreign power to seek to impose its blueprint 
nation building is an arrogant usurpation of the right of self-determination. 
For these reasons, arguments in support of military intervention for the sake of the institution of 
democracy could not be accepted. The right of self-determination was designed for and is only 
exercisable by the people of the country and, in no plausible way, can be interpreted to imply 
that a foreign State may intervene unilaterally in another country to remove an oppressive 
government and institute a desirable status of "ongoing self-determination". 
B. 2 Changing in the concept ofsovereijntV 
A similar theory based on people's right of self-determination and the freedom to choose their 
political destinies, which has also been said to support the doctrine of unilateral pro-democratic 
intervention, is the concept of "popular sovereignty". Reisman argued that since the end of 
World War II, the traditional concept of sovereignty was being replaced by the sovereignty of the 
people (popular sovereignty). 51 He argued that this conception of sovereignty had become 
established as the "critical new constitutive policy"52 of international law and was one of the 
essential prerequisites of political legitimacy. Accordingly, it is, in fact, the sovereignty of 
50 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 110 s' Reisman, W. "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", 84 AJIL, 1990, p 867 52 Ibid. p 874 
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peoples rather than that of the sovereign, which is safeguarded by contemporary international 
law. 53 
The basic idea of popular sovereignty is that political legitimacy stems from popular support; a 
government rules with the consent of the people in the territory over which claims power. 
Consequently, the term `sovereignty' constituted an anachronism when applied to undemocratic 
governments or leaders. 4 Following his argument to its conclusion, Reisman suggested that 
unilateral intervention to maintain or restore democracy, far from violating sovereignty and, 
hence, international law, actually supports and sustains it 53 From another perspective, it has been 
argued that the contemporary international human rights programme is based on the notion that 
human beings take priority over States, and that the internal political structure and government of 
every State must now conform to certain prescribed international norms or be liable to 
intervention, regardless of sovereignty. 56 
A similar view was put forward by D'Amato, who rejects assertions of the principle of non- 
intervention as nothing more than examples of "the rhetoric of statism. "57 He argued that the idea 
of non-intervention is so influenced by the statist view of international law that its proponents 
appear to be incapable of seeing beyond the notion of `the State' to the reality of human beings 
53 Ibid. p 869 
54 Reisman argues that "the unilateral declaration of independence by Smith Government in Rhodesia was 
not an exercise of national sovereignty but a violation of the sovereignty of the people of Zimbabwe. The 
Chinese Government's massacre in Tiananmen Square to maintain an oligarchy against the wishes of the 
people was a violation of Chinese sovereignty. The Ceausescu dictatorship was a violation of Romanian 
sovereignty. President Marcos violated Philippine sovereignty, General Noriega violated Panamanian 
sovereignty, and the Soviet blockade of Lithuania violated its sovereignty. Fidel Castro violates Cuban 
sovereignty by mock elections that insult the people whose fundamental human rights are being denied.... " 
Ibid, p 872 
ssIbid, p876 
56 Reisman, W. "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 517 57 D'Amato, note 2 supra. p 518 
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striving for basic freedom. 58 D'Amato concluded that unilateral intervention against tyranny "is 
not only legally justified but morally required. 59 
This justification of the use of force to promote democracy is based on a radically new 
understanding of sovereignty, 60 which challenges the traditional, well-settled and accepted 
presumption, expressed by Moore in the early twentieth century, that "the origin and 
organization of government are questions generally of internal discussion and decision 
. 
', 61 As a 
corollary, foreign States are banned from interfering in the domestic affairs of another State. 
They "deal with the existing de facto government, when sufficiently established to give reason- 
able assurance of its permanence, and of the acquiescence of those who constitute the State in its 
ability to maintain itself, and discharge its internal duties and its external obligations. "62 Thus, 
one can conclude that the usurpation of power in one country or the illegitimacy of a government 
does not affect its sovereignty as a sovereign on the international arena as long as that 
government has effective control and can fulfil its responsibilities. 
This understanding of the notion of sovereignty was asserted by Chief Justice Taft in the Tinoco 
case and later by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. In the Tinoco case (Great Britain v. Costa Rica), 
Costa Rica argued that the Tinoco government was not a de facto or de jure government [of 
Costa Rica] according to the rules of international law, on the ground that Tinoco (the Secretary 
of War under President Alfredo Gonzalez of Costa Rica, in 1917) had used the army and navy to 
seize the government and overthrow President Gonzalez in violation of the Constitution and 
against the popular sovereignty of the Costa Rican people. Therefore, the subsequent Costa 
Rican Government denied its liability for the acts or obligations of the Tinoco government on the 
S8Ibid. p516 59 Ibid, p 519 
60 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 91 61 Moore, J. Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, Washington, 1906, p 249 62 Ibid 
303 
basis that his actions could not be deemed to have bound Costa Rica. 63 On the other hand, Great. 
Britain contended that "the Tinoco government was the only government of Costa Rica de facto 
and de jure for two years and nine months; that during that time there is no other government 
disputing its sovereignty. "TM Chief Justice Taft decided that by virtue of his effective control, 
Tinoco had represented the legitimate government as long as he enjoyed that control and "[n]o 
other government of any kind asserted power in the country. "65 
Reisman, while acknowledging that the Tinoco decision "was consistent with the law of its 
time"66 suggested that it was no longer applicable, being contrary to what he called "the new 
constitutive, human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty. This argument, however, 
can be challenged, since the same principle was upheld by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case some 
seventy years later, after the establishment of the concept of "popular sovereignty". The Court 
held that, regardless of what the United States thought of Nicaragua's Sandinista regime, 
"Adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary 
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State 
sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the 
political, social, economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua's domestic 
policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the description given of them by the 
Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the various actions of the Respondent 
complained of. "68 In further affirmation of Nicaragua's sovereignty despite its internal political 
structure or policies, the Court stated that "The right to sovereignty and to political independence 
possessed by the Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or world, should be 
63 Arbitration Award of Tinoco case between Great Britain and Cost Rica, reprinted in 18 AJIL, 1924, p 148- 
9 
64 Ibid. p 149 
63 Ibid. p 151 
66 Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", note 51 supra, p 870 67 Ibid 
68 Nicaragua Judgement (Merits), ICJ Reports, 1986, p 133, para 263 
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fully respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any military and paramilitary 
activities which are prohibited by the principles of international law, in particular the principle 
that States should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, and the principle concerning the 
duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, principles embodied 
in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States. "69 Thus, 
the Court affirmed the principle of sovereignty as established in its traditional meaning. The 
illegitimacy of a government is essentially an internal affair which does not affect its 
sovereignty. 
It could be admitted, however, that contemporary international law, as enunciated in many 
international treaties and legal instruments, emphasizes that the political legitimacy of a 
government is based on the consent of the people in the territory. 70 This principle has become 
one of the fundamental principles of modem international law. It can also be agreed that the 
concept of sovereignty has, to some extent, been changed in the sense that the internal 
organization and modes of governance of each State must meet the international human rights 
standards. States are no longer free to employ policies that violate the universal human rights 
standards. As expressed by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his important 
Statement, "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined. 
.. 
States are now 
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. 9M 
Nonetheless, it does not follow that a regime that violates these standards has to be subject to 
forcible change by unilateral foreign power. Furthermore, the illegitimacy of a government 
would not mean that this nation has lost its sovereignty in the international arena and become a 
69 Ibid, (1984), p187 70 See, for example, note 29 supra 71 Kofi A. Two Concepts of Sovereignty, Economist, September 18,1999, at 49, available at <httpJ/www. un. org/Newslossg/stories/kaecon. htm> 
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legitimate target of foreign intervention. Neither any international treaty nor the UN Secretary- 
General has suggested such a claim. To hold otherwise would mean, as a political reality, that a 
substantial number of the world States, whose political system is perceived to be undemocratic, 
especially in the third world, have lost their sovereignty and, therefore, are legitimate targets for 
intervention by foreign powers. Moreover, the crucial question with this formula is who is 
competent to decide whether the existing government has the popular support and, as a 
consequent, still holds its sovereignty? 
It is insufficient to allege a violation of the rights of people in a given State and to prioritize this 
over a conflicting international norm that prohibits the unilateral use of force in international 
relations. Despite the importance given to democracy in many international legal instruments, 
this is not to set it above peace as the chief concern of the international legal system. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that irrespective of the part played by the concept of popular sovereignty in 
modem international law, this does not entitle a foreign State, on the ground of the alleged 
illegitimacy of one regime, to take military action to install a more legitimate alternative. 
Furthermore, in reality, there is nothing called benign use of force on behalf of the people of 
another country. War is awful, and force cannot be benign. 
B. 3 The Reagan Doctrine 
The Reagan doctrine is the nearest approach to a foreign policy consistent with a right of pro- 
democratic intervention, expressed by a State administration. 2 According to that doctrine, it is 
not necessarily wrong to help in overthrowing an existing government. Such actions have to be 
judged in terms of the political and moral context: the kind of government, the role played by the 
interveners, and whether there is resistance. 73 The Reagan Doctrine has been described as relying 
on the traditional American doctrine that the legitimacy of a regime depends on its respect for 
72 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 93 
73 Kirkpatrick & Gerson, note 2 supra. p 22 
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individual rights and the consent of the governed. If it violates these rights, citizens are entitled 
to engage in armed revolt and foreign support, including the use of force, can be justified as a 
last resort 74 
In defending the Reagan Doctrine, Jean Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson argued that "A 
government is not legitimate merely because it exists, nor merely because it has independent 
rules. Nazi Germany had a de facto government headed by Germans; that did not make it 
legitimate. Nicaragua today [in 1989] has a de facto government headed by Nicaraguans who 
were not elected in any competitive sense, who came to power by armed force.... s75 The Reagan 
Doctrine is, thus, like Reisman's argument in that it does not accept that any government must be 
necessarily respected; in other words, it challenges the inviolability of sovereignty. As to the 
present case, it seems that the Bush Administration adopted the same view in regard to Iraq; that 
is, although Saddam's regime was the de facto government of Iraq, however, it was illegitimate 
because it lacked popular support. Subsequently, its sovereignty was not inviolable. 
The Reagan Doctrine, in fact, linked the people's right of self-determination to the US right of 
self-defence against threats from the Soviet Union. It evolved initially, mainly as a response to 
Brezhnev's policies, and was intended to oppose what the US saw as Soviet empire-building. 76 
As such, the legal basis for the "support-including military support-for insurgencies"77 was 
justified on the grounds of self-defence. This was made clear by President Reagan when he 
declared that "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives-on every 
74 Ibid. p 20-1 
7s Ibid. p 23 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid, p 20 
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continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure 
rights which have been ours from birth.... Support for freedom fighters is self-defence. "78 
Supporters of the Reagan Doctrine argued that it is a misconstrual of international law and the 
law of the UN Charter to say that Reagan Doctrine violates the Charter's requirement of non-use 
of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of others. International law, they argue, does 
not totally forbid assistance to indigenous groups striving for democratic self-determination. 79 
They suggest that the prohibition of the use or threat of force Stated in Article 2(4) should not be 
viewed in isolation, but interpreted in the light of the Charter as a whole, as complementary to 
Article 51 and the various articles on human rights. The Charter espouses a commitment to 
human rights, which necessarily include democratic freedom. It was not intended, and should not 
be interpreted, to protect the expansion of repressive dictatorships or empires. 80 
In short, the Reagan administration saw nothing in the words of the UN Charter or the principle 
of sovereignty that would prevent the rendering of support, even including use of force, to 
groups trying to secure their right of democratic self-determination against oppressive regimes. 
Rather, they saw it as in keeping with the philosophy underlying the UN Charter, that encourages 
the promotion of human rights, liberties, and self-determination of peoples. This argument, 
however, is implausible and the Reagan Doctrine was rejected by most of the world community. 
It was strongly criticized and US action in Grenada under the Doctrine was condemned by the 
General Assembly; " the Security Council had considered a resolution deploring the intervention 
as a violation of international law but this was vetoed by the US 82 
78 President Ronald Reagan, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 
Feburary 6,1985", Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985, Book I, 
Washington D. C: US Government Printing Office, 1988, p 135 
79 Kirkpatrick & Gerson, note 2 supra, p 32 
80 Ibid. p 25-6 
81 General Assembly Resolution 38/7 of 2 November, 1983 
82 UNYB, 1983, p 211 
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It is admitted that the UN Charter requires all member States to promote democracy and respect 
for human rights, including the right of self-determination. But the Charter and the international 
system have been and are still adamant that those essential goals are not to be pursued by force. 
As to the use of force, the Charter is neutral between democracy and totalitarianism. 83 As 
expressed by Henkin: "international law provides no more bases for permitting the export of 
democracy by force than for permitting the export of socialism by force. "84 He further added 
that, from a legal perspective, it is inconsistent to justify the US action in Grenada or support for 
the Contras and condemn the Soviet Union's interference in Czechoslovakia; all are violations of 
the intention of the Charter. 85 Indeed, as illustrated in Chapter 1,86 the clear intention of the 
drafters of the UN Charter was that the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) is to be 
applied generally, irrespective of the kind of regime being supported or the purpose of 
intervention. The use of force in support of a freely elected government, or of people trying to 
establish a freely elected government, is no more acceptable than that in support of a dictatorship 
or a totalitarian regime. 
Apart from its illegality, one can observe a clear distinction between the Reagan Doctrine and the 
other theories for unilateral right of pro-democratic intervention. It is suggested that although the 
Reagan Doctrine shares some aspects of the above-mentioned theories justifying unilateral 
intervention to promote democracy, it is much narrower in scope. While these theories are 
concerned with the universal promotion of democracy wherever peoples' right of self- 
determination is violated, the Reagan Doctrine seeks to defend with the moral legitimacy of US 
action-including the use of force, in support of insurgencies under certain circumstances: where 
there is resistance that is being maintained by force; and where the regime in question is a client 
83 Henkin, note 39 supra, p 62-3 
sa Ibid. p 56 
ss Ibid 
86 See chapter 1, section B. 2 
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of the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. In other words, the Reagan Doctrine was not intended to 
legitimize intervention to assist all freedom fighters worldwide, but only specifically to oppose 
regimes that were influenced by socialist ideology and governed with the support of the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, it could be safely concluded that Reagan Doctrine and its application in 
Grenada, 87 in fact, cannot be held as a model for the right of unilateral pro-democratic 
intervention. It was a part of the Cold War and ended with the end of that war. Hence, it is not 
appropriate to be invoked as a general theory supporting the right of pro-democratic intervention. 
B. 4 The Copenhagen Document 
Malvina Halberstam claims to find support for the democratic intervention theory in the 
Copenhagen Document of 1990, adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE), as one of several instruments elaborating the non-binding Final Act of Helsinki. 
The Copenhagen Document contains general principles related to respect of human and minority 
rights, especially Article 6 which links human rights with representative government, and 
maintaining the responsibility of States to defend and protect these institutions. Under that article 
"[t]he participating States declare that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government. "88 
And, as quoted by Halberstam, the signatories "recognize their responsibility to defend and 
protect... 
. 
the democratic order freely established through the will of the people against the 
activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or 
violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or of that of another participating State. "89 
In Halberstam's view, this is strong evidence that the Copenhagen Document authorizes 
intervention, even militarily, by one State to protect a freely elected government in another State, 
97 See section C. 1.1 infra 
88 Article 6 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), June 29,1990, reprinted in 29 ILM. 1305,1990 
89 Halberstam, note 2 supra, p 165 
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if it is prevented from taking office or overthrown by violent means. She asserts that it is not 
only the right but also the responsibility of other States to restore the freely elected government 
to power, by the use of force if necessary-90 On the latter point, she argued that "[w]hile 
paragraph 6 does not specifically authorize the use of force, neither does it prohibit the use of 
force. "91 
One cannot, however, accept this argument, first and foremost because Halberstam misquoted 
Article 6 in order to support her view; her ellipsis omitted an important clause which undermined 
her argument. 92 The full words of Article 6 are that the participating States "recognize their 
responsibility to defend and protect, in accordance with their laws, their international human 
rights obligations and their international commitments, the democratic order freely established. " 
Thus, Article 6 while urging participating States to uphold their responsibilities of defending and 
protecting democracy in other countries, emphasises that this responsibility should be carried out 
in a lawful way that does not violate other principles of international law. The language and 
construction of words in the article clearly indicate that the responsibility to "defend and protect 
the democratic order" is not and cannot be a pretext to violate other international obligations 
such as the prohibition of use of force in international relations and the principle of non- 
interference. As properly pointed out by Simon Chesterman, "by implication, [the omitted words 
in Halberstam's extract] would make such defence and protection subject to Articles 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. 193 
There are, indeed, some circumstances when assistance is called for by a freely elected 
government in danger of deposition, when intervention would not constitute a violation of article 
2(4). Presumably this is the situation envisaged by the Copenhagen Document. Halberstam, 
90 Ibid. p 167 
91 Ibid 
92 A similar observation has been made by Simon Chesterman, note 14 supra. p 94-5 93 Ibid. p 95 
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however, extends this to situations where no such request has been made. 4 Her justification for 
this is that it is possible that the freely elected government may be unable to communicate with 
foreign governments or prevented from so doing by fear of jeopardizing the lives of the elected 
Therefore, she argued that, irrespective whether assistance has actually officials or of others 95 
been called for, foreign States are entitled to intervene in support of the freely elected 
government. 
Halberstam goes so far as to claim that the Copenhagen Document, though not a treaty, reflects a 
new or emerging right of intervention supported by customary law, independent of Article 2(4). 
She takes the Document to represent the views of most of the major world powers, and cites 
Franck's analysis of the United Nations Charter, to claim that the provisions of the Copenhagen 
Document are "weighted with the terminology of opinion juris and deliberately norm creating. , 96 
However, Simon Chesterman rightly noted that the extent to which GSCE documents can be 
taken as evidence of customary international law is controversial. Though not enforceable in 
themselves, it can be suggested that they provide evidence of customary international law or, at 
least, will influence its development, but that Halberstam's claim in this respect is exaggerated. 7 
To conclude, Halberstam's reading of the Copenhagen Document does not bear scrutiny. On the 
contrary, the proper interpretation, based on the full words of Article 6, gives defence and 
protection to the well-established norms and principles of international law, especially to 
prohibition of use of force in international relations enunciated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, with the sole exception of the United States, there is no State practice to support 
94 Ibid 
95 Halberstam, note 2 supra, p 167 
96 Ibid. p 175 
97 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 95 
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her interpretation. Finally, the status of the Copenhagen Document per se would undermine any 
claim to representing opiniojuris or creating a new rule of customary international law. 98 
Section C: Pro-democratic intervention in practice 
Following the discussion of the arguments and theories put forward by those who advocate a 
unilateral right of pro-democratic intervention, the present section analyses two major examples 
of unilateral intervention which have sometimes been justified on this pro-democratic basis: the 
US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). It also examines two cases where the 
Security Council has authorized actions to restore democracy and which also have been held a 
major contribution to the notion democratic governance and, hence, as a support for the doctrine 
of unilateral pro-democratic intervention: the intervention in Haiti (1994) and Sierra Leone 
(1997) 
Cl Unilateral intervention in State practice 
C. 1.1 The invasion of Granada 1983 
On 25 October 1983, following a violent coup d'etat in Grenada by radical Marxist opponents of 
the leftist Maurice Bishop regime, US forces invaded the island, in "Operation Urgent Fury. " 
Within three days, the self-appointed Revolutionary Military Council had been overthrown. By 
15 December, the US had withdrawn, leaving behind a small number of US and Caribbean 
support personnel. 9 The US government sought to justify its intervention in Grenada on three 
grounds. Firstly, they claimed, they had been requested to assist by the Governor-General of 
Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, whose legal authorities "remained the sole source of governmental 
98 Ibid. p 96 
" Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1984,32614-18; see also Levitin, M. "The Law of Force and the Force 
of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention", 27 Harvard ILJ, No 2,1986, p 642-5 
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legitimacy on the island in the wake of the tragic events. "°° Secondly, they tried to characterize 
the action as one of lawful collective security under Articles 3,4, and 8 of the Treaty of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, whereby member States are authorized to take action 
to maintain peace and security in the region and to "deal with local as well as external threats to 
peace and security. "101 Thirdly, the Reagan Administration invoked the right of States to take 
military action to protect their nationals abroad. 102 These justifications were not accepted by the 
world community and, as mentioned above, 103 a Security Council resolution deploring the 
intervention as a violation of international law was proposed by members of the Council but was 
vetoed by the United States. 104 The General Assembly did, however, pass a resolution that 
"[d]eeply deplore[d] the [US] armed intervention in Grenada" as "a flagrant violation of 
international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State. "' °5 
Interestingly, although some writers have cited the intervention in Grenada as an example of the 
right of pro-democratic intervention, the United States itself did not seek to raise this 
justification, or any justification that could be seen to imply a right of pro-democratic 
intervention. Indeed, such a justification was expressly denied by a State Department Legal 
Adviser in correspondence with the American Bar Association. He clearly announced that the 
Reagan administration had not adopted an expanded view of self-defence, "new interpretations 
of the language of Article 2(4), " or "assert a broad doctrine of "humanitarian intervention. "06 
100 American Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, "Statement before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 2 November 1983", in Leich, M. "Contemproary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law", 78 AJIL, 1984, p 203 
101 Ibid 
102 Rebinson, D. "Letter Dated 10 February 1984, addressed to Professor Edward Gordon, Chairman of the Committee on Grenada of the American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice", in 
Leich, M" "Contemproary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", 78 AJIL, No 3,1984, 
661; see also Levitin, note 99 supra, p 645 
03 See notes 81 & 82 supra 
104 UNYB, 1983, p 211 
105 General Assembly Resolution 38/7 of 2 November, 1983 
106 Rebinson, note 102 supra, p 665 
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However, even if it had done so, the negative reaction to the Grenada invasion clearly indicates 
that the opinio juris at the time did not support such a doctrine. '07 
Therefore, Grenada does not provide strong evidence to support a unilateral right of pro- 
democratic intervention, even at regional level. On the contrary, the Grenada case, in fact, 
signifies the weakness of the theory of pro-democratic intervention as a legal ground for the use 
of force. The American administration's deliberate evasion to invoke such a theory for its action, 
and actually its rejection for such claim, per se designates the flaw of this doctrine as States 
usually attempt to justify their military actions on solid legal grounds with a high probability of 
being accepted in the international community. 
C. 1.2 The invasion of Panama 1989 
Paramount among the instances cited by supporters of a unilateral right of pro-democratic 
intervention, as evidence of their theory, is the US invasion of Panama. The Panama crisis 
unfolded in 1989 when its President, General Manuel Noriega, agreed to hold an election in 
which, in the view of all international observers, he was heavily defeated by U. S. 
-favoured 
opposition candidate, Guillermo Endara. Noriega, however, refused to accept the election 
outcome and continued to rule Panama through the Panamanian Defence Force (PDF), which 
suppressed Endara and other political opponents. ' 08 The Noriega regime was openly hostile to 
the US personnel and nationals present in Panama, but the deterioration in relations culminating 
in an announcement by the Noriega's National Assembly that "the Republic of Panama is in a 
State of war for the duration of the aggression unleashed against the Panamanian people by the 
US government "109 
107 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 102 108 Sofaer, A. "The Legality of the United States Action in Panama", 29 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1991, p 288-9 109 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-LAT-89-241, December 18,1989, at 20 
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On 20 December 1989, President Bush (senior) initiated Operation Just Cause to depose Noriega 
and arrest him for alleged drug-trafficking into the US. In his Address to the Nation on 
December 20,1989, President Bush put forward four grounds for Operation Just Cause: "to 
safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking 
and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty. "110 After Noriega turned himself in to 
the US military authorities in Panama on January 3,1990, President Bush declared that the US 
has accomplished all its objectives and that the use of force against Panama was "consistent with 
political, diplomatic and moral principles""" 
Analysis of the legal basis for the action shows that what most closely resembled a legal 
argument for the invasion was the exercise of an inherent right of self defence protected under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter and, arguably, extending to the protection of nationals abroad. This 
ground was the chief justification for the invasion and the one most emphasised by the US. 
President Bush stated that General Manuel Noriega had declared "a State of war with the United 
States and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama. A 12 Following this declaration, 
he claimed, an unarmed American serviceman had been murdered by Noriega's forces and others 
had been beaten and harassed. 113 General Noriega's "reckless threats and attacks upon 
Americans in Panama, "' 14 he argued, had created an "imminent danger to the 35,000 American 
citizens in Panama, " 5 placing an obligation on him, as President, "to safeguard the lives of 
American citizens. "116 
110 Statement by President Bush (senior), "Address to the Nation Announcing United States Action in 
Panama", December 20,1989, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House [Hereinafter Bush Address] 
I" Statement by President Bush of January 3,1990, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House 
112 Bush Address, note 110 supra 
13 Ibid 
114 Ibid 
115 Ibid 
116 Ibid 
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Although President Bush invoked protection of American citizens as his main legal justification 
for the Panama operation, legal commentators, who advocate the right of pro-democratic 
intervention, were more favourably inclined towards the claim that intervention may be justified 
in support of democracy. They regarded the American intervention in Panama as a significant 
and positive development of international law. D'Amato, for example, argued that "the US 
interventions in Panama and, previously, Grenada are milestones along the path to a new non- 
statist conception of international law that changes previous non-intervention formulas.,, " 7 He 
suggested that these interventions were "a major customary law development"118 and a "new 
customary rule"119 which permit unilateral use of force to overthrow tyrannical regimes. 120 
Reisman similarly, quoting the remark of Thomas Pickering (the US Permanent Representative 
to the UN at the time of Panama invasion), heralded a new era in which "the people, not 
governments, are sovereign. "121 He argued that to say that "Panama's sovereignty is violated by 
the removal of the usurper and the establishment of conditions for the assumption of power by 
the legitimate government, this is an anachronism. "122 Taking it to the extreme, Sir Elihu 
Lauterpacht argued that the only justification offered by the United States with any merit was 
that it had "acted in support of the democratic process-a concept of internationally recognized 
relevance. s123 Nevertheless, the action was widely condemned by the international community. 
As in the case of Grenada, a Security Council resolution was blocked by the US veto124 and, 
117 D'Amato, note 2 supra, p 517 
"g Ibid. p 523 119 Ibid 
120 Ibid. p 524 121 Reisman, W. "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", note 51 supra, p 874; 
see also Thomas Pickering remarks of 23 December, 1989, UN Doc. S/P 2902, p8 
'u Reisman, ibid 
'23 Lauterpacht, E. "Letter to the Editor: Legal Aspects of Panama Invasion", The Times, 23 December, 1989 124 UNYB, 1989, p 175 
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again as with Grenada, the General Assembly condemned the action as "a flagrant violation of 
international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. "125 
Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the US Department of State at the time of the invasion, argues 
that "President Bush's authorization of the US action in Panama Evas founded upon Noriega's 
illegitimacy, as well as upon President Endara's approval and cooperation. " 126 There were, thus, 
two foundations to the US claim of pro-democratic intervention: the exercise of a right to act 
unilaterally to promote democracy in another State, and as legitimate support for a 
democratically elected head of State, Guillermo Endara, who, the Bush Administration claimed, 
had consented to the operation. 
The first of these justifications appears to be in line with Reisman's suggestion that the concept 
of sovereignty has been replaced by "popular sovereignty" and also consistent with the Reagan 
Doctrine that assistance to indigenous groups striving for democratic self-determination is not 
forbidden in international law. If Reisman's suggestion and the Reagan Doctrine are accepted, 
"Operation Just Cause" might be held legitimate, since it overturned Noriega's denial of the 
Panamanian people's right of self-determination and reinstated their democratically elected 
president. Accordingly, such intervention would not violate the sovereignty of Panama and 
therefore international law; instead it upheld and vindicated the "popular sovereignty" of the 
Panamanian people. However, as argued previously, self-determination is not automatically 
prioritised over other deep-rooted and important international legal principles, and irrespective of 
the part played by the concept of popular sovereignty in modern international law, this is not to 
say that the illegitimacy of one regime entitles a foreign State to intervene militarily to install a 
new and more legitimate regime. The rejection of the action by most of the world community, 
despite their awareness of the situation in Panama, supports this view. 
125 General Assembly Resolution 44/240 of 29 December, 1989 
126 Sofaer, note 108 supra, p 288 
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The second line of the argument is that the intervention was legitimate assistance to a 
democratically elected head of State, President Guillermo Endara. Sofaer argued that Endara was 
informed of the impending arrival of US troops on 19 December 1989, and he decided to be 
sworn in as president. He welcomed the American intervention and called on the Panamanian 
forces not to resist it, saying that the US operation was unavoidable and was intended to end the 
Noriega dictatorship and re-establish democracy, justice and freedom. '27 The Permanent 
Representative of the US to the UN, in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 
December 20,1989, argued that Endara was consulted prior to the action: "the United States 
undertook this action after consultation with the democratically-elected leaders of Panama. "128 
Sofaer concluded that "the cooperation and support of President Endara lends substantial weight 
to the legitimacy of the U. S. action in Panama. "129 
The facts of the case were, however, that Endara was sworn in at Fort Clayton, a US military 
base in the Canal Zone, less than an hour before the invasion began, and was not told of the plans 
for deployment of US forces until troops were already in the air. 130 These facts seem to weaken 
the argument that the invasion was pending upon Endara's approval and, in fact, eviscerate that 
consent of any substantial weight. In other words, the US intended to carry out the invasion with 
or without Endara's approval. Significantly, the United States never claimed that the invasion 
was actually requested by Endara. 
Even if it is accepted that Endara was consulted prior to the invasion, Endara was not entitled to 
invite the US troops into the Panamanian territories. As Tom Farer rightly pointed out, "Noriega 
and his associates were, for the purpose of international law, the legitimate government of 
127 Ibid. p 289 
128 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States, Thomas Pickering, to the President of the Security Council dated December 20,1989. UN Doc. S/21035 
129 Sofaer, note 108 supra, p 290 
'30 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 104; see also Woodward, B. The Commanders, Simon &Schuster, New 
York, 1991, p 182 
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Panama. "131 Sofear disputed this argument, suggesting that the fact "that [Endara] lacked such 
clear control, however, does not deprive his consent of legal significance. "32 Sofear's argument 
is groundless. As mentioned above, 133 the legitimate government of a given State is the one that 
enjoys effective control over its territories or the de facto government. As David Wippman 
rightly pointed out, "under a conventional reading of international law, effective control is an 
essential (perhaps the only) component of a government's authority to represent a State in 
international affairs. "134 Therefore, one can argue that even if there was consent on the part of 
Endara and his associates, this approval does not legitimize the invasion. 
Furthermore, even after the invasion and the installation of Endara's government, most States of 
the region refused to recognize the Endara administration as the legitimate government of 
Panama and withdrew their ambassadors from Panama. 135 Also, the Permanent Council of the 
OAS did not, at first, accept the credentials of the ambassador sent by Endara to represent 
Panama. Noriega's ambassador emained and took part in the vote criticizing the invasion. 
Gradually, however, over a period of several months, most governments came round to 
recognizing the Endara regime. 136 The stance of OAS and the Latin American States further 
supports the argument that Noriega's government was the legitimate government of Panama and 
can be seen as an indirect expression of their rejection of the forcible regime change in Panama,, 
notwithstanding the unpopularity of the ousted regime. 
The fact that General Noriega had attained his position by the use of force and intimidation, and 
that his continuation in power was contrary to the expressed will the Panamanian people is well- 
attested, exactly as was the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This does not, however, constitute a 
131 Farer, note 5 supra, p 510 
132 Sofaer, note 108 supra, p 290 
133 See section B. 2 above 
134 Wippman, D. "Pro-democratic intervention by Invitation", in Fox, G& Roth, Brad (ed. ), Democratic 
Governance and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 309 
135 Chesterman, note 14 supra. p 106 
136 Farer, note 5 supra. p 510 
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legal basis for unilateral external intervention to replace that rule with a more democratic one. 
There is no authorization, in any international legal instrument, for intervention to maintain or 
impose a democratic form of government in another State, and no such widened understanding 
of Article 2(4) is supported by State practice. Analysis of the Panama case, including the UN, 
OAS, and the Latin American States' reactions, therefore, confirms and supports the well- 
established accepted principle of non-intervention and confutes arguments that Panama invasion 
should be held as a model of a new era of pro-democratic intervention. 
C2 Pro-democratic intervention under the authority of the Security Council 
Before examining the cases of Haiti and Sierra Leone-as examples for the Security Council 
authorization for military actions to restore democracy, it is important to distinguish between a 
unilateral right of pro-democratic intervention, and situations where the Security Council 
concludes that disruption to democracy constitutes a threat to international peace and security, in 
line with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The fact that the Security Council has authorized action 
in such circumstances contributes to the notion that democratic governance is coming to be 
regarded as significant right, but the determination that absence of such governance may be a 
threat to peace does not mean there is a unilateral right of intervention. 
Proponents of a unilateral right of pro-democratic intervention, however, rely on the fact that the 
Security Council in some circumstances, in recent years, made a determination that disruption to 
democracy constituted a threat to international peace, to support their argument. They extended 
this determination to argue that all situations of disruption to democracy constitute a threat to 
international peace and security and, hence, justify the unilateral use of force to restore 
democracy, even in the absence of Security Council authorization. It has been argued, also, that 
the purposes of international law and of the Charter itself cannot always be served solely through 
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the Security Council and Charter procedures. 137 Halberstam is one of those who refuse to limit 
enforcement actions to restore democracy to measures authorized by the Security Council. In her 
view, the possible risk of abuse brought by permitting unilateral enforcement is offset by the risk 
of nothing being done, if enforcement measures are limited to those taken under UN auspices. 
She cites as a case in point the Idi Amin regime in Uganda, where the UN failed to act and 
eventually Tanzania intervened unilaterally. She went further to argue that "Whatever abuses 
resulted from unilateral intervention by democracies would pale by comparison to the horrors 
perpetrated by totalitarian regimes that were permitted to continue in the name of non- 
intervention. "138 
Indeed, in some circumstances, the Security Council appeared to be impotent. It is also true that 
the UN per se does not have the capability to stop human rights violations in every spot around 
the globe. In 1995, in the Supplement o the Agenda for Peace, then Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali observed: "One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to 
empower the Organization to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the 
peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. However, neither the Security Council nor the 
Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations 
for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale. "139 Boutros-Ghali went on to say that 
"[t]he United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments. All can be, 
and most of them have been, employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or 
"Iao by individual States 
... 
137 Reisman, "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 521 138 Halberstam, note 2 supra, p 173 
139 Supplement o an Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 
January 3,1995, UN Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, para. 77, available at 
<http: //www. un. org/Docs/SG/agsupp. html > [Hereinafter Boutros-Ghali statement] 
140 Ibid, para 24 
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The Secretary-General's statement has been understood as encouragement to individual States to 
replace the UN or to share with it in its responsibilities, because the values of international law 
and the Charter cannot always be achieved through the UN. '4' However, it is suggested this 
statement was an acknowledgement of the political reality that the UN per se does not possess 
the means to carry out fully its responsibilities and it always relies on powerful States to do so. It 
can also be inferred that the Secretary-General was urging powerful States and regional 
organizations to provide more help and assistance for the UN in its operations. However, the 
statement, at any rate, cannot to be interpreted to permit unilateral use of force outside the 
framework of the Security Council. This understanding is enhanced when reading the remainder 
of Boutros-Ghali statement: "... or by individual States, but the United Nations has unparalleled 
experience of them and it is to the United Nations that the international community has turned 
increasingly since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations system is also better equipped 
than regional organizations or individual Member States to develop and apply the 
comprehensive, long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of conflicts. "142 
It is clear, thus, that the Secretary-General did not intend to encourage unilateral action by 
individual States, but through the framework or the organization. In fact, unilateral pro- 
democratic intervention poses a threat to the Article 2(4) ban on the use of force and, hence, to 
the UN as the body mainly responsible for issues of peace and security in the context of 
increasingly entwined international relations. 143 Furthermore, as a political reality, to permit 
individual use of force for any reason, except in self-defence, is to give a dubious legitimacy to 
the arbitrary use of force by the only remaining superpower and a few other powerful States. 
'4' Reisman, "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 521 12 Boutros-Ghali Statement, note 139 supra, pars 24 143 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 110 
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Above all, most States and writers take the stance that the only acceptable form of pro- 
democratic intervention is pursuant to a Security Council determination that disruption to 
democracy in a given State constitutes a threat to international peace and security within the 
meaning of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and subsequent authorization to Member States to 
intervene to restore democracy. Franck, for example, whilst strongly advocating the peoples' 
"democratic entitlement, " argued that "enforcement measures such as sanction, blockade, or 
military intervention" to promote the right of self-determination and democratic governance can 
be permitted "in limited circumstances, " and only if authorized by the UN Security Council "not 
by individual members" of the UN. '44 This section examines two major examples of intervention 
to restore democracy which have been authorized by the Security Council. 
C. 2.1 Haiti (1994) 
In 1990, following several years of international pressure, internationally monitored democratic 
elections were held in Haiti, and Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President. '45 However, in 
September of the following year, President Aristide was overthrown by a coup d'etat. '46 The 
Organization of American States (OAS) was quick to condemn the coup and urged that 
diplomatic and, later, economic sanctions be instituted by its members. 147 The Security Council 
failed to adopt a resolution on the issue, apparently because of lack support from China and 
certain non-aligned States, who opposed increased Security Council involvement in areas 
traditionally considered to fall within the jurisdiction of the individual State. 148 The General 
144 Franck, note 6 supra, p 85 
145 On international monitoring of the Haitian election of December 16,1990, see Fauriol, G. "inventing 
Democracy: the Elections of 1990", in Fauriol, G. and Oberstar, J. (ed), The Haitian Challenge: US Policy 
Considerations, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D. C, 1993, p 57 
'46 Wippman, note 134 supra, p 301 
147 See MRE/RES. 1/91, MRE/RES. 2/91 and MRE/RES. 3/92 adopted on 3 and 8 October 1991 and 17 May 
1992, respectively, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the Organization of 
American States. See also Wippman, D. "Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention", 19 Houston 
Journal of International Law, 1997, p 661 
148 Chesterman, note 14 supra. p 152 
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Assembly, by contrast, strongly condemned the "illegal replacement of the constitutional 
President of Haiti, "149 affirming that "any entity resulting from that illegal situation" 5° was 
unacceptable and demanded "the immediate restoration of the legitimate government of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide" 5' 
However, Haiti's military dictators steadfastly refused to reinstate the Aristide government, and, 
moreover, kept up its persecution of Aristide's supporters. This situation prompted the Security 
Council eventually to adopt Resolution 841 of (1993). In that resolution the Council determined 
that "the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and security in the region, " 52 
and therefore, acting explicitly under Chapter VII, the Council announced a mandatory economic 
embargo, in June 1993. This action, however, failed to secure Aristide's reinstatement. On 29 
July 1994, nearly three years after his deposition, the Aristide's government-in-exile formally 
requested "prompt and decisive action" 53 by the international community. The Security Council 
promptly responded, under Chapter VII, by passing Resolution 940 (1994), which "authorizes 
Member States to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this 
framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and 
stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. "54 
Military action, however, was rendered unnecessary by the agreement brokered by the US 
former President Jimmy Carter with the Haitian military on September 18,1994, for Aristide's 
'49 General Assemble Resolution 46/7 of 11 October 1991 
'50 Ibid 
's' Ibid 
152 Security Council Resolution 841 of 16 June, 1993 153 Letter dated 29 July 1994 form Aristide Government (in-exile) to the United Nations, UN Doc. S/1994/905, annex; see also letter dated 30 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the UN, UN Doc. S/1994/910. 
'54 Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July, 1994 
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restoration. '55 In general, States reacted favourably, with only a small number voicing serious 
concerns. 
156 
The Haiti operation has been seen as the peak of Council activism in the 1990s. 157 Certainly, the 
authorization of forcible removal of one regime and reinstatement of another was unprecedented. 
A number of Council resolutions had recognized internal strife as "threats to the peace" 
warranting a Chapter VII response, 158 but never before could the Council be said to have autho- 
rized the use of force in support of democracy. Some commentators, nevertheless, have 
expressed concern about the legality of the Security Council's action. 159 They expressed doubt as 
to the threat to peace posed by events in Haiti, and although the flow of refugees might be 
considered ground for a determination that a situation threatens international peace and security, 
this is hardly applicable in the case of Haiti, as relatively few refugees were caused by the 
conflict compared to the millions displaced by the events in Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda. 160 In 
Teson's words, "no one can seriously argue that the Haitian situation posed a threat to 
international peace and security in the region. "161 Others considered that the main factor 
influencing some Council members was the request for assistance from the Aristide government- 
in-exile. 162 This view finds supporting evidence in the preamble of resolution 841 (1993), where 
iss President Carter Leads Delegation to Negotiate Peace with Haiti, the Cater Center. See in 
<http: //www. cartercenter. org/news/documents/doc218. html> 
156 Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 155 
'57 Ibid. p 151 
158 For example, Resolution 221 of 9 April 1966 regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia, Resolution 
418 of 4 November, 1977 concerning the apartheid regime in South Africa and Resolution 688 of 5 April 
1991 in the case of Iraq's dissident minorities. See Chapter 1, section C. 1.1 
159 Donoho, D. "Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy", 
29 Cornell LI, 1996, p359 
160 Ibid, p 362-3 
161 Teson, F. Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, second edition, Transnational 
Publishers, New York, 1997, p 254 
162 Donoho, note 159 supra. p 347 
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it is stated explicitly that the mandatory "trade embargo" was linked to the request from "the 
legitimate government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide" of Haiti. 163 
Overall, it seems that the unprecedented action by the Security Council marked a new era of 
support for the legitimacy both of an international principle of democratic rule and of collective 
humanitarian intervention. This new trend can be seen as an expansion of Council 
responsibilities based on a new interpretation of the UN Charter. As indicated in Chapter 1,164 
despite the restriction imposed on the UN organs in Article 2(7) not to intervene in internal 
situations, the Security Council evidently linked international peace and security to internal 
conditions such as massive violations of human rights and disruption of democracy. Today, it 
seems acceptable that the Council could have declared the unconstitutional overthrow of an 
elected government as a threat to international peace and security necessitates its interference. 
The Council seemingly views its interference in these situations as not to impinge the 
sovereignty of the State. This new trend was best described by the Secretary-General Javier 
Perez de Cuellar: "It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the 
essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity... We need not impale 
ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the protection of 
human rights 
... 
What is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of 
States to bring relief and redress in human rights emergencies. " 165 
163 Security Council Resolution 841 of 16 June, 1993 164 See chapter 1, section C. 1.1 
163 Secretary-General of the United Nations Report on the Work of the Organization, UN Doc. A/4611, September 1991, pp. 10-11. This theme was also prominent in an earlier speech, "Secretary-General's Address at University of Bordeaux, " UNDPI Press Release, SG/SM/4560 of April 24,1991 
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C. 2.2 Sierra Leone 1997 
The Security Council's response to Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) 
intervention in Sierra Leone is another event cited as an example of collective pro-democratic 
intervention. In February 1996, after a long period of military rule and internal conflict, Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah came to power in Sierra Leone, through internationally monitored elections that 
were generally considered to be free and fair. 166 After little more than a year, however, he was 
deposed in a coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Committee (AFRC). The overthrow of 
Kabbah's government was widely condemned by the world community and the AFRC failed to 
win recognition from any government. 167 The Security Council, in a Presidential Statement, 
"strongly deplore[d] this attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government and 
call [cd] for an immediate restoration of constitutional order. i168 
In June 1997 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) implicitly authorized ECOWAS to take 
military action to restore the elected government, urging Sierra Leone's neighbours "to take all 
necessary measures"169 to return President Kabbah to office. Immediately after the coup, Nigeria 
reinforced the troops it already had stationed in Sierra Leone under a pre-existing mutual defence 
treaty and attacked several military targets in Freetown, the capital city, with the aim of 
intimidating the coup leaders. 170 
The Security Council, knowing that the ECOWAS had already authorized (and taken) militarily 
action against the coup, "strongly supported" the OAU's appeal to ECOWAS to help restore the 
deposed leader, although it indicated its preference for peaceful measures. 17' On October 8, 
1997, the Council, acting under Chapter VII, unanimously adopted Resolution 1132, determining 
'66 Wippman, D. "Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation", note 134 supra, p 303 
167 Ibid. p 303-5 
168 Statement by the President of the Security Council on 29 May, 1997, UN Doc. S/PRST/1997/29 
169 Decission of the 33rd Summit of the Organization of African Unity on 2 June, 1997 
170 Wippman, D. "Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation", note 134 supra, p 303 
171 Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October, 1997 
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that the "situation in Sierra Leone constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the 
region"' 72 and demanding "that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in 
Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected government and a 
return to constitutional order. "' 73 For that purpose, the Council decided to impose mandatory 
economic sanctions, to weaken the AFRC by cutting off from foreign supplies of war material. 174 
The resolution expressly "authorized ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected 
government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation" 175 of these sanctions. The Council, 
in reality, was purporting to give retrospective validation to actions that had already occurred. 
The embargo had been in place since August 1997, and there had been periodic attacks by 
ECOWAS forces in the ensuing period. 176 
After the failure of these diplomatic efforts, in February 1998, Nigerian-led forces mounted a 
major attack and after a week of intense fighting, captured Freetown. The leaders of the junta 
fled the country and President Kabbah was reinstated. '77 In after-the-fact authorization (as the 
Security Council's mandate only permitted the use of force to ensure the implementation of the 
economic embargo not to remove the junta), 178 the Security Council welcomed the fact "that the 
rule of the military junta has been brought to an end... -)A79 and "commend[ed] the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) 
... 
for the important role they are plying in support of the objectives related to the restoration of 
peace and security" in Sierra Leone. 180 Although the Council did not explicitly refer to the use of 
172 lbid 
173 Ibid 
174 Ibid 
'7s Ibid 
176 Wippman, "Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation", note 134 supra, p 305-7 ýn Ibid, p 307 ýn For the theory of post-hoc authorization, see Chapter 4, section C. 3.1 179 Statement by the President of the Security Council on 26 February 1998, UN Doc. S/PRST/ 1998/5 
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force, it seems to have been sufficiently satisfied with the outcome, to accept the means by which 
it was secured. 
The events in Sierra Leone certainly constituted a significant precedent for proponents of pro- 
democratic intervention. Roth suggested that "[t]he argument can be made, with at least a 
modicum of plausibility, that coups against elected governments are now, per se, violations of 
international law, and that regional organizations are now licensed to use force to reverse such 
coups in member States. "181 However, even if the case of Sierra Leone is accepted as to some 
degree supporting claims of a right of pro-democratic intervention by regional organizations, 
such a right should be restrictively interpreted and confined to exceptional circumstances. More 
importantly, it should be born in mind that the military actions taken in the cases of Haiti and 
Sierra Leone were based first and foremost on determinations made by the Council under Article 
39 that the disruption of democracy and the overthrow of the legitimate governments in those 
countries constituted threats to international peace and security. Thus, the undemocratic 
governance per se was not the main factor that provoked the Council's authorizations. Even in 
the case of Haiti, the Council did not rely solely on the request of Aristide's government-in-exile. 
In other words, the Council did not consider this request as a sufficient basis to authorize military 
action. 182 Had the Council considered that Aristide's request per se constituted sufficient legal 
grounds for authorizing the use of force, it would not have emphasized that the situation in Haiti 
was "unique" and constituted "a threat to peace and security in the region. "' 83 Similarly, in Sierra 
Leone, the Council determined that the military coup threatened peace and security in the region 
and, in particular, expressed concerns regarding "the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in 
181 Fox, G and Nolte, G. "Intolerant Democracies", in Fox, G& Roth, Brad (ed. ), note 134 supra, p 407 182 Wippman, "Pro-Democratic Intervention by Invitation', note 134 supra, p 302; see also Wippman, 
"Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention", note 147 supra, p 677 
193 Security Council Resolution 940 of 31 July, 1994 
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that country, and the consequences for neighbouring countries. "184 The South Korea's 
Representative gave a remarkable explanation that the "coup had had a destabilizing effect on the 
whole region by reversing a new wave of democracy which was spreading across the African 
continent "185 Thus, it appears clear that there must be a link between the disruption of 
democracy in one country and the status of peace in order for the Council to authorize military 
action. Conversely, there might be a disruption of democracy in one country, which does not 
reach the threshold of threat to international peace. Certainly, such a determination is exclusively 
for the Security Council to make. 
Section D: Iraq: "the Mother ofAll Regime Changes "'86 
It is a well-documented fact that Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who wreaked irreparable 
damage on Iraqi civil society, destroying independent organizations and breaking the social 
solidarity among citizens. He remained in power against the clear expression of the will of the 
Iraqi people by use of force and strong-arm tactics. However, as explained in the previous 
sections, there is no accepted principle of international law that legitimizes unilateral foreign 
military interference (without Security Council authorization) to replace his regime by a more 
democratic government whose methods of operation approximate human rights standards. This 
section reviews the facts of the Iraqi case and the humanitarian aspects involved. 
D. 1 Humanitarian objectives as basis for the invasion of Iraq 
To recall the facts of the Iraqi case, ever since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, the U. S. 
government has focused its attention on Saddam Hussein himself. Both the American and British 
heads of government were concerned that a large proportion of the world's oil was in the hands 
of a volatile, violent dictator pursuing WMD. Initially, they expected that Saddam's regime 
194 Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October, 1997 
'as UN Press Release, SC/6425,8 October, 1997 
186 Reisman, "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 519 
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would be toppled by the combination of military defeat and internal unrest. 
'87 However, Saddam 
held on to his position and pursued regional domination, the crushing defeat in the first Gulf War 
notwithstanding. The continuation in power of Saddam Hussein was unacceptable to the US, 
who saw his removal as vital to US policy concerns in the region and tried by various means to 
remove Saddam from power. 188 For many years, efforts were pursued to instigate a coup in 
Baghdad. 189 In addition, among the goals of the US attacks on Iraq after the formal cease-fire in 
1991, was to undermine Saddam and to weaken his regime. Washington also hoped that 
sanctions would trigger unrest among the Iraqis themselves further destabilizing the regime. In 
particular, efforts were made to strengthen the Iraqi opposition, in order to enhance its potential 
role as an instrument for the overthrow of Saddam. 190 US support for the Iraqi opposition 
included assistance to form the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as an umbrella group. 191 The US 
Congress in 1998 passed the "Iraq Liberation Act" authorizing, amongst other aid, the transfer of 
97 million Dollars in military equipment to opposition groups. 192 
Regime change in Iraq became a formal stated goal of United States foreign policy when former 
US President Bill Clinton signed the "Iraq Liberation Act" into law on October 31,1998. The 
act declared: "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime 
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
government to replace that regime. "193 Washington hoped to remove Saddam from power and 
replace him with the opposition, as President Bill Clinton indicated in November 1998, when he 
187 Byman, D. "After the Storm: U. S. Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991", 115 Political Science Quarterly, 
2000-2001, p 497 
188 Byman, D. Pollack, K. and Rose, G. "The Rollback Fantasy", 78 Foreign Affaires, 1999, p 25 
189 Katzman, K. "Report for Congress, Iraq: US Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance", 2003, p 
1, available at <http: //fpc. state. gov/documents/organization/I9708. pdf> 
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192 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, sect. 4, Article A(2)(B), available at 
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promised to work for "a new government" in Baghdad. 194 However, these efforts were fruitless. 
Removing Saddam and the Baath regime from power appeared to be far more difficult than 
expected and the opposition groups did little to change the regime in Baghdad. 
The rationale for the U. S. policy was to avert Iraqi regional aggression towards both the Gulf 
States and Israel; to remove the threat posed by Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical and 
missile programmes: and, above all, to preserve stability in the Gulf region which produces and 
reserves most of the world's oil. 195 As pointed out by Under Secretary of Defence, Paul 
Wolfowitz, "Toppling Saddam is the only outcome that can satisfy the vital US interest in a 
stable and secure Gulf region, because, to a degree unique among contemporary tyrannies, the 
Iraqi regime is Saddam Hussein. "196 
By the advent of the Bush administration, the US policy makers were committed to forcible 
removal of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This proposal was enhanced further by the 
atrocities of September 11. Of course, these events provided an excellent opportunity to the Bush 
administration to publicize that despotic regime in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq result 
in producing terrorists who represent a vital danger to the United States citizens and interests. 
Hence, changing these regimes for democratic governments would reduce, or even eliminate, the 
danger to the United States. The shift towards a more assertive policy against Saddam Hussein's 
regime in Baghdad first became clear in President Bush' State of the Union message on January 
29,2002, when he characterized Iraq as part of an "axis of evil, " along with Iran, Syria and 
North Korea. 197 Thus, it could be argued that, similar to Reagan Doctrine, humanitarian grounds 
194 Cited in Byman, note 187 supra, p 512, footnote omitted 195 Ibid. p 495 196 Wolfowitz, P. "Bring Saddam Down", The Ottawa Citizen, November 25,1998, Quoted in Mchargue, R. 
"Neo-conservatism and Iraq", Florida State University, 2005, p 103, available at 
<http //etd. lib. fsu. edu/theses/available/etd-07092005-000303/unrestricted/Binder1. pdf> 197 President Bush' State of the Union message on January 29,2002, available at 
<http: //www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11. html> 
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and democratization were, in the first place, to serve US vital security and economic interests 
rather than the people of the targeted country. 
This argument may appear as unfair to the US which had expressed concern about the human 
rights violations in Iraq and backed Security Council Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq 
respect the human rights of its communities, and has been enforcing a no-fly zone in northern 
and southern Iraq in part to protect Iraq's communities. However, in fact, the US administration 
has never made any explicit formal commitment to either the Kurds or to the Shiites. As Daniel 
Byman correctly pointed out, "Although the United States and its allies have taken steps to 
protect Iraqi Shiites and Kurds from the depredations of Saddam's regime, these steps were 
limited and evince a weak commitment to humanitarian objectives. "98 More importantly, the 
economic sanction imposed on Iraq by the Security Council following its invasion of Kuwait had 
a severe humanitarian impact on Iraq's population rather than the regime itself. The oil-for-food 
programme authorized by Security Council Resolution 986,199 which allowed Iraq to sell oil to 
purchase food, medicine, and other exigencies resulted in humanitarian crisis among ordinary 
Iraqis as the elites of Saddam Hussein's regime has manipulated the programme for their own 
benefits at the expense of the well-being of the Iraqi population. Surely, most of the blame lies 
with the Iraqi regime. However, the US support for the sanctions and its constant refusal to 
alleviate the sanctions in the hope that they would cause unrest among the Iraqis and destabilize 
the regime, despite its awareness of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, enhance the argument that the 
198 Byman, note 187 supra, p 499 
199 Security Council Resolution 986 of 14 April, 1995 
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humanitarian aspects were the least of the US concerns. 200 As Gause pointed out, "American 
policymakers need to recognize that the only `box' into which sanctions put Iraqis is coffins. "201 
The inevitable conclusion reached from reviewing the facts of the matter is that, despite the 
invocation of human rights abuses as ground for the removal of Saddam, humanitarian objectives 
were, at best, the least important. The American administration's view was simply that Saddam 
Hussein must go, fundamentally for the sake of the American security and economic interests, 
not to democratize Iraq or liberate its people from the rule of a brutal dictator. In other words, 
similar to the US actions against its southern neighbours, the removal of Saddam Hussein's 
regime had other important priorities rather than establishing democratic governance or 
liberating the people of those countries from tyrannical rule. Furthermore, despite his well- 
known despotic rule in Iraq, the US, for a long time, maintained good relations with Saddam 
Hussein's government and even supported him in his aggressive war against Iran. 202 Ironically, 
even the same US administration today still maintains good relations with States in the Middle 
East that make no pretence to be democratic. This double-standard reduces the credibility of the 
US and weakens the argument that the 2003 invasion was essentially for humanitarian purposes. 
For these reasons, the action in Iraq does not bear scrutiny as a model of pro-democratic 
intervention. The claim that it is, takes no account of the history of invasion that has 
characterized the relationship between the United States and Saddam Hussein's regime and the 
major US interests which have guided the action. As for international law on the use of force, 
Iraq is further evidence that there is no unilateral intervention for merely humanitarian purposes; 
unilateral intervention essentially involves vital self-interests for the intervening State. Finally, it 
200 On the subject of sanctions, see generally Haass, R. Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998; Mueller, J and Mueller, K. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction", 78 Foreign Affairs, airs, 1999, p48-53 201 Gause, G. "Getting It Backward on Iraq", 78 Foreign Affairs, airs, 1999, p 56 202 See Chapter 2, section B. 2 
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seems that because Washington was aware of the weakness of that argument and that it would 
not be persuasive for the world community, therefore, it did not rely heavily on humanitarian 
grounds to justify its action. Even where the United States or the UK had invoked promoting 
democracy or boosting human rights as a legal ground for the invasion, they did not assert the 
existence of such established rule in international law. 
D. 2 Regime change not pro-democratic intervention 
It is interesting that the US did not use the language "pro-democratic intervention" or "defend 
democracy" in Iraq, as President Bush (senior) did in the case of Panama. Instead, the American 
administration used the term "regime change" in the case of Iraq. This language seems to be 
carefully chosen. Although there are common policy imperatives underlying the two theories, 
regime change seems to be a more radical claim than "pro-democratic intervention. " Pro- 
democratic intervention is a short-term action, 203 confined to restoring the democratically-elected 
government which has been overthrown by an illegal coup d'etat. Once the legitimate 
government has been reinstated and the usurpers removed, it is no longer justified. Thus, the 
intervening State does not involve itself in regime construction or nation building; it has only a 
limited and specified mission aimed at restoring the already existing legitimate government. 
State practice, as shown in the cases discussed above, 204 confirms this approach. 
In contrast, regime change is a long-term plan, a future-oriented initiative and a much broader 
concept. It seems that the regime changer is determined to change the structure and the personnel 
of the government of the target State, 205 whether or not there is a democratically-elected 
government available or even a coherent internal political process that can produce an effective 
and acceptable candidate. This, by implication, necessitates that the regime changer meddles in 
203 Reisman, W. "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 517 204 See section C supra 
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the politics of the target State to conduct a regime reconstruction. Therefore, unlike the case of 
pro-democratic intervention, when the existing regime has been ejected and the territory 
controlled, the regime changer cannot say "mission accomplished" and fly off. It must supervise 
a transformation and, to a large extent, be involved in the political process in order to produce an 
alternative. As a matter of fact, the intervening State always installs a government of its own 
liking, which promises to serve the interests of the invading State. 
While the existence of a popular and legitimate government readily available is not a 
fundamental factor for the legality of the action, it seems that it is one of the decisive elements 
for the success of the operation. 206 Otherwise, a government created by the regime changer will 
always be seen by the indigenous population as a puppet of the intervening State, and is unlikely 
to be accepted by them. This is exemplified by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, in an 
attempt to install Bashir Gemayel in power, whom it expected to be friendly to Israeli interests 
and possibly dependent. However, only a few days later, Gemayel was killed by a massive bomb 
and the Israeli plan was destroyed. 207 Although it is not confirmed who was behind the 
assassination, it was certain that Gemayel's government had no popular support in Lebanon. By 
contrast, in the case of Panama, aside from its illegality, Guillermo Endara was not a puppet of 
the U. S., but had been freely elected by the people of Panama. Support for Endara among the 
Panamanian people was reflected in his lasting in power for about 5 years until May 1994, when 
Panama held its first effective democratic election, monitored by international observers. Thus, 
one may conclude that regime change where there is no popular and accepted alternative readily 
available is far more difficult than in the case of pro-democratic intervention where this 
condition is met. 
206 Ibid, p 524 
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Regarding the case of Iraq, although there was no significant domestic and internal support for 
Saddam Hussein and the Baath party regime in Iraq, nor there was any popular consent among 
Iraqis for the opposition. Prior to the invasion, the US had tried to create an acceptable 
alternative to Saddam Hussein. 208 As mentioned above, 209 it helped the opposition to create the 
INC and heavily supported it. However, the opposition groups who formed the INC, although 
they appeared to be united in the anti-Saddam front, in fact, were internally divided by region, 
religion, and ethnicity: Massud Barzani's Democratic Party of Kurdistan and Jalal Talabani's 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and one Shiite militia operating in the south, the Supreme 
Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Each group had its own agenda, and all distanced 
themselves from the INC210 Most importantly, none had any real support among the Iraqi 
people. As the Middle East Institute's Andrew Parasiliti has rightly observed, "the INC enjoys 
more support along the Potomac than the Euphrates. '211 In addition, the oppositions did not 
enjoy support on the regional level. Other Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait feared 
any possible increase in Shiah influence in Iraq, which might strengthen its ties with Iran and, 
hence, further destabilize the region. Turkey, too, had concerns that opposition success might 
strengthen the military capabilities and political aspirations of the region's Kurds212 In this 
situation, the success of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was rendered enormously difficult to 
achieve. 
D. 3 "Operation Iraqi Freedom" under the authority of the Security Council 
As illustrated in the preceding section, it is accepted that in exceptional circumstances, where 
there is broad consensus that some form of enforcement action to support or restore democracy is 
208 See generally Katzman, note 189 supra 
209 Notes 191-2 supra 
210 Byman, D, Pollack, K. and Rose, G. note 188 supra, p 30 
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required, collective action through the Security Council provides the only appropriate and legal 
alternative, as in the case of Haiti. Only thereby can assurance be provided that force will be 
used only in pursuit of promoting human rights and democracy. Accordingly, apart from the 
other justifications of the war, and as far as humanitarian purposes are concerned, any action to 
change the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which was perceived by most of the world 
community as tyrannical, should have been conducted through a collective action under the 
authority of the Security Council. This would be the only legal and appropriate alternative. 
Professor Reisman, however, has questioned whether the outcome would have been different if 
the action against Iraq had been an international operation, authorized or even directed by the 
United Nations, rather than effectively unilateral. 213 He argues that "the blue helmet, by itself, 
provides no protection against individuals and groups who calculate that a UN action is going to 
oust them from, or severely reduce, their power. There is no reason to assume that those in or 
entering Iraq who are opposed to the regime change, this mysterious "counter coalition of the 
willing, " would be acting otherwise than they are now. '214 However, although it cannot be 
guaranteed that the regime change in Iraq would have been dazzlingly successful, it is highly 
likely that the resistance would have been much lower. The blue helmet is a sign of impartiality 
and presumably a UN force would be seen by Iraqi people as a helping hand not as an occupation 
force. Furthermore, the authorization of the Security Council would have imbue given the 
operation with legality needed to incite other States to provide help and assistance which, in turn, 
would have helped to bring stability to Iraq and the region. 
Setting aside the issues of legal principle in relation to a unilateral right of pro-democratic 
intervention, the current situation in Iraq is such as to cast doubt on the desirability of any such 
right. The chaos in Iraq shows that the forcible overthrow of a dictator by foreign troops brings 
213 Reisman, "Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea", note 3 supra, p 522 214 Ibid 
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serious problems, since the intervening powers are an always outsiders, part of the problem 
rather than of its solution. Once the dictator is ousted, army of liberation becomes an army of 
occupation, and as such, faces resentment and resistance greater than were shown to the 
overthrown regime itself. 215 It is suggested, therefore, that the disastrous outcomes of the outside 
intervention in Iraq are likely to have lasting implications for claims to a right of pro-democratic 
intervention or regime change. Even if the Iraqi fiasco is eventually satisfactorily resolved, States 
are unlikely to be willing to embark on further adventures of this kind. Ultimately, therefore, the 
doctrine claming a right of unilateral pro-democratic intervention will collapse. In this sense, the 
Iraqi crisis dilemma will have a positive outcome. 
Conclusion 
In the legal literature, some commentators argue the existence of a newly emerging `law' 
allowing States to take unilateral military measures to overthrow tyrannical regimes in other 
countries, irrespective of sovereignty. They uphold the US interventions in Grenada, Panama and 
lately in Iraq as evidences of that new right. They seek to justify such intervention with reference 
to the UN Charter, claming that Article 2(4) should be viewed as legitimizing the unilateral use 
of force to "enhance opportunities for ongoing self-determination. "216 The main legal ground for 
this argument is the principle of self-determination and modem international human rights law, 
in general. Proponents of the alleged new `law' argue that in modern international human rights 
law, an essential concern is how to replace regimes that rule by violence, oppression and torture, 
with those that conform in an acceptable degree with human rights standards. 
However, a major obstacle to this approach is that it is so far rejected by the overwhelming 
majority of States. 217 Although the United States and perhaps the United Kingdom have shown 
215 Ibid, p 523 
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some inclination to cite upholding or restoring democracy as an argument for intervention, 
Tanzania made no such claim when it deposed Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, nor did Vietnam 
when it deposed the mass murderer Pol Pot in 1978, nor by France when it helped to oust 
`Emperor' Bokassa in the Central African Republic in 1979.218 Even, in the cases in which the 
pro-democratic argument was invoked by the United States in support of its operations in 
Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama (whether explicitly, or implicitly) the action has been 
condemned by the international community and- when the issue came before it-by the ICJ. 
A basic norm of international law, stated clearly in the United Nations Charter and many other 
authoritative instruments, is the principle of sovereign equality of States. In essence, sovereignty 
is the right of each territorial community, irrespective of size, power and internal political 
structure, to self-government, free from interference by larger or more powerful States. This 
concept is fundamental to the international legal system, and it is difficult to reconcile the idea 
with a general legitimization of pro-democratic intervention or regime change. Even more 
important, is that the right of self-determination, which is the cornerstone of democratic rights, is 
vested in the people of the country, and only they, not on external power acting without their 
voluntarily will, should decide their own destiny. For a foreign power to attempt to direct and 
manipulate the political structure of another State is an arrogant usurpation of the right of self- 
determination. 
This view is simply supported by evidence. The Declaration on Intervention adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1965 states that "[n]o State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, 
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. "219 The Declaration 
on Friendly Relations, adopted without a vote by the General Assembly in 1970, affirms that 
21$ Chesterman, note 14 supra, p 107 219 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2131(XX), 21 
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"every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, without interference in any form by another State. "220 General Assembly Resolution 
45/150 (1990), adopted by a large majority, recognizes that "the efforts of the international 
community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections should 
not call into question each State's sovereign right freely to choose and develop its political, 
social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other 
States. "22' Significantly, the ICJ in Nicaragua case declared that it "cannot contemplate the 
creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one state against another on the 
ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system. "222 The court 
added that while a State might "form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human 
rights"223 in another state, "the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or 
ensure such respect. "224 
Indeed, it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-intervention in 
international law if intervention were to be justified by mere allegations of human rights abuses 
or undemocratic governance. Such a doctrine would loosen the regulations of the use of force in 
international relations and would permit powerful States to use force against any regime that 
does not hold their ideologies. This certainly would have disastrous outcome. Of course, there is 
an apparent antinomy caused by two contradictory norms; a fundamental contradiction between 
the right to self-determination and preserving human rights, on the one hand, and the principles 
of non-interference in internal affairs, the prohibition of use of force in international relations 
and State sovereignty, on the other hand. However, it can be argued that this contradiction was 
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finally resolved by the recent activism of the Security Council. Obviously, State sovereignty 
prevails in all but the most egregious instances of widespread human rights violations, in which 
case multilateral action to secure an immediate remedy or even to change a regime-if need be, 
forcibly-may be taken. Thus, governments are no longer completely shielded by principles of 
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction when they engage in egregious violations of human rights 
or otherwise expose their populations to widespread or systematic abuse. The constraints on 
forcible means do not demand that a concerned international community sit on its hands in the 
face of great human suffering, only that its response must be limited to peaceful means; 
otherwise they can pursue the Security Council to intervene or authorize intervention under the 
auspice of the UN. It is also disingenuous to cite the US invasions in Grenada, Panama or Iraq as 
models of new era of pro-democratic intervention. To do so, is to ignore the genuine reasons that 
motivated these actions. 
To conclude, the invasion of Iraq, obviously, cannot be justified on humanitarian grounds or as a 
war to promote democracy and to liberate Iraqis from the tyrannical rule of Saddam. There is no 
principle of international law that legitimizes intervention for regime change, even in the interest 
of democracy. Moreover, apart from the legal question, the chaos in Iraq demonstrates that 
forcible removal of a dictator, especially in the absence of an acceptable alternative or a coherent 
internal political process, in fact, causes more harm to those whom the acting State desires to 
protect. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the legality of the use of force against Iraq in 2003 and 
whether Operation Iraqi Freedom can be justified in accordance with the contemporary 
regulations of the use of force or was consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN 
Charter in general. Such an assessment necessitated first highlighting the facts and circumstances 
which leading to the action, including the background of Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad. 
The UN was established "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to 
maintain international peace and security, to that end: to take effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to peace. In order to achieve this goal, the Charter in 
Article 2 (4) prohibits all forms of use of force by States. The article appears to set up a model of 
State behaviour, with an emphasis on peace as the fundamental aim of the UN. Certainly, Iraq 
under the regime of Saddam Hussein did not fit within this model of State behaviour. 
Iraq's record of violence and flouting of international law and Security Council decisions are 
undisputed. Saddam Hussein was a leader who posed a major threat to international peace and 
stability. Only one year after coming to power in Iraq, he blatantly violated the prohibition of the 
use of force under the UN Charter by commencing a large-scale armed attack against 
neighbouring Iran. Although the Iraqi government attempted to ground its action on the basis of 
self-defence, Iraq's justifications for the use of force on such large scale do not withstand close 
scrutiny. Iraq's attack on Iran and its occupation of a large part of Iran's Eastern Provinces was a 
clear example of a war of aggression motivated by territorial ambitions and Saddam's personal 
desire to spread his hegemony over the Gulf region. During the eight years of hostilities, it was 
evidenced that Iraq, in breach of the Geneva Protocols and the rules of ius in bello, frequently 
deployed chemical weapons against Iranian military personnel and civilians. Although Iran 
reciprocated in using such a prohibited means of warfare towards the end of the war, Iraq was the 
344 
first, and for a long time the only belligerent to have recourse to such weapons; therefore, most 
of the blame for using such weapons was directed at Iraq. 
Iraq's culpability was well acknowledged by the world community at the time. In his report to 
the Security Council, the Secretary-General unequivocally stated that the war was begun in 
contravention of international law through the illegal use of force and disregard for a State's 
territorial integrity; Iraq was responsible for the conflict. However, political considerations 
prevailing at the time, including the Cold War and the deterioration in the standing of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the international community after the Tehran hostages events, were such that 
Iraq's aggression was never condemned by the Security Council. On the contrary, the majority of 
the Western powers were clearly biased to the Iraqi side, especially during the Tanker War. 
The toleration of Iraq's aggression against Iran by the world major powers and the poor showing 
of the Security Council seem to have contributed to further aggression by Iraq. In August 1990, 
only two years after the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared its annexation as 
Iraq's 19th province. Iraq's action was an act of aggression unprecedented in modern history, 
challenging the global stability of the post-Cold War era and threatening international peace and 
security in the already turbulent Middle East. It was a further confirmation of the aggressive and 
hostile attitude of the regime in Baghdad and its ambitions for territorial expansionism, 
demonstrated beforehand in the case of Iran. This time, however, the reaction of the world 
community and the Security Council was completely different. From the onset of the crisis, the 
Security Council took a firm and vigorous stance, marking the revival of the collective security 
system established by the UN Charter after the end of the Cold War. The unanimity among the 
five Permanent Members of the Security Council in 1990/1991 enabled the Council to adopt 
swift and effective measures in face of Iraq's aggression. Immediately after the invasion, the 
Council activated its powers and authorities under Chapter VII, imposing economic sanctions 
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and a naval blockade against Iraq. Soon after, when these sanctions appeared to be ineffective to 
secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the use of force was deemed to be necessary, the 
Council authorized its first ever enforcement action. 
There has been intensive debate in the legal literature regarding whether Operation Desert Storm 
was an act of collective self-defence on behalf of the legitimate government of Kuwait under 
Article 51 or a Security Council enforcement action. The compelling view is that Operation 
Desert Storm was an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This view is 
more compatible with language of Article 51 which clearly evinces that the right of self-defence 
ceases once the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security. The fact that the original model of enforcement action envisaged by the drafters- 
that member States, through special agreements, will place military forces at the disposal of the 
Security Council and that the Council will control and direct these forces through a Military Staff 
Committee--was not implemented in Operation Desert Storm does not undermine this view. 
Faced with the reality that no special agreements had been concluded, the Council adopted a 
practical method of achieving international action where collective force is politically or 
financially feasible, that is, by delegating the mission to member States who are willing to act on 
its behalf. A careful reading of the provisions of Chapter VII and Article 106 of Chapter XVII 
demonstrates that the original formula for forcible action, although it was the principal method 
the drafters had in mind, was not exclusive. The Security Council can legitimately authorize or 
call upon a particular State or group of States to execute a specific mission. 
After the liberation of Kuwait and in the face of Iraq's reckless behaviour and contempt for the 
international world order, the Security Council imposed disarmament measures on Iraq in order 
to eliminate its war-making power and, hence, ensure its peaceful intentions in the future. The 
cease-fire terms applied to Iraq are unprecedented in UN practice and world history; they 
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demonstrate the extent to which the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, may intervene in 
matters traditionally within the exclusive province of national sovereignty. Its ability to do so 
reflected an unusual degree of agreement within the international community as to the threat 
posed by Iraq, as well as the outcome of an annihilating military defeat which left Iraq in no 
position to bargain or resist. From a legal point of view, the Charter has vested the Security 
Council with wide range of authorities in order to execute the responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security. It is certainly within the scope of the Council's authority to 
impose sanctions such as a disarmament regime on the defeated aggressor, as long as they can be 
reasonably be said to fall within the broad aim of restoring international peace and security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Indeed, a State with a long history of 
aggression and a revealed propensity to continue such an attitude in the future could reasonably 
have some limitations imposed on its capability to use force, in order to modify its behaviour. 
Iraq, while accepting the terms and conditions of the cease-fire Resolution 687, protested that the 
sanctions imposed in this resolution were illegal and unfair. In this connection some concerns 
have been raised regarding some disarmament measures which seemingly encroach Iraq's right 
of self-defence; a right which is guaranteed in Article 51 and remains exercisable, however 
serious Iraq's past violations have been. Examination of the contemporary rules of international 
law, however, leads to the firm conclusion that, under the current rules of the law of international 
organizations, Iraq has no right to reject or to defy the disarmament measures, even if they were 
unconstitutional or ultra vires. These measures remain enforceable upon Iraq unless lifted or 
modified by the Security Council itself. Apart from the law of international organizations, Iraq 
was actually estopped from protesting the illegality of those decisions or defying their 
implementation by the operational rule of equitable estoppel. Thus, while the legality of some 
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disarmament obligations stipulated in Resolution 687 were doubtful, Iraq was legally bound by 
them. 
Nevertheless, Iraq unremittingly disrupted the inspection process and sometimes completely 
halted all cooperation with the UNSCOM and the IAEA, leading the Council on several 
occasions to decide that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations and to warn of severe 
consequences. In fact, throughout the 12 years between 1991 and 2003, Iraq never complied with 
its obligations without political, diplomatic and, sometimes military pressure. This constant 
defiance led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1441 in which it gave Iraq a "final 
opportunity" to comply immediately and unconditionally with the terms of Resolution 687. 
Unfortunately, Iraq's decision-makers did not take this last chance for peaceful disarmament and 
continued their provocation of the world community. As the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC 
stated before the Council less than two months prior to the invasion, Iraq had not come "to 
genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.,, ' It was 
against this background that the American and British administrations decided to invade Iraq in 
2003 in order to enforce the international will and to remove Saddam Hussein, the originator of 
the Iraqi threats and defiance, and his government. 
Three legal grounds were at various times put forward by either the US or the UK for their use of 
force against Iraq in 2003: i) the Security Council authorization for the use of force; ii) the right 
of self-defence in pre-emptive action against threats from Iraq; iii) the right of pro-democratic 
intervention in Iraq in order to relieve the Iraqi people of vast and continuing human rights 
violations by the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein. 
The first legal justification was based on two interrelated Security Council resolutions which 
were claimed to provide authority to use force against Iraq after the liberation of Kuwait. The 
' The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, briefing of the Security Council on 27 January 
2003, available at <http: //www. unmovic. org> 
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first was Resolution 678. It was argued that its mandate still governed the situation and had not 
been terminated after Iraq had been driven out of Kuwait. Specifically, the argument was based 
on the language of the resolution which, according to the US and the UK approach, permitted the 
Council allies to "use all necessary means" not only to oust the Iraqi troops from Kuwait, but 
also to "restore international peace and security in the area. " The second was Resolution 687, 
which laid down the conditions of cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition forces. The US and 
the UK maintained that any violation of these conditions gave the other party the right to resume 
fighting. These arguments, however, were rejected by some leading States such as China, France 
and Russia who argued that the mandate for force established by Resolution 678 was 
extinguished and that any resumption of fighting required a new explicit authorization from the 
Security Council. This counterargument implies two propositions; first, that the language of 
Resolution 678 cannot be interpreted to cover the situation after the liberation of Kuwait has 
been achieved; second, that a material breach by Iraq for its obligations under Resolution 687 did 
not necessarily "automatically" give rise to the right of the coalition forces to suspend or 
terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities without new explicit authorization of use of force 
by the Council. In fact, these counterarguments are unfounded on any factual or legal grounds 
but merely on the diplomatic and political interests of those who opposed the action. 
If the text of Resolution 678 is interpreted according to the principle of the natural and ordinary 
meaning, it can be concluded from the words "and to restore international peace and security in 
the area" that the Council's intention was broader than merely driving the Iraqi troops out of the 
Kuwaiti territory and consequently, the mandate of Resolution 678 was not terminated by 
achieving this goal. The drafters of this resolution were presumably willing to accomplish some 
other goal or goals alongside the manifest one; hence their adoption of such broad language. 
Although this additional goal was not specified in the text of Resolution 678, the Council 
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elucidated its object in the subsequent Resolution 687 when it determined that "international 
peace and security in the area" would be achieved by disarming Iraq and eliminating its war- 
making power. Thus, when reading Resolution 678 in light of Resolution 687, according to the 
systematic rule of interpretation, it becomes clear that the authorization of force can be used to 
liberate Kuwait "and to restore international peace and security" by enforcing the disarmament 
regime upon Iraq by forcible means, if necessary. As a result, no fresh authorization was needed. 
This approach to Resolution 678 is supported by the practice of member States during the period 
between 1991 and 2003. After the cease-fire the US, the UK and France (until 1996) used force 
to secure Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations. They also used force to establish 
enclaves to protect Iraq's dissenting minorities against the repression of the Saddam Hussein 
regime. This approach to the mandate of Resolution 678, although rejected by some member 
States, reaffirmed the understanding that the authorization of force in Resolution 678 had not 
expired and could be used to force disarmament upon Iraq, especially as these practices were not 
condemned by the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
Furthermore, the practice of the Security Council (as a body) in terminating its authorization of 
force shows that the Council has been consistent in terminating the mandate of force either by 
expressly declaring the end of the prior authorization or by setting an up-front time limit on the 
authorization. Since neither of those explicit expressions was articulated regarding Resolution 
678, the mandate of that resolution remains valid. 
As to the rules governing the armistice agreements in international law, examination of the 
customary rules on armistice agreements shows that a party to an armistice is entitled to 
denounce the agreement and resume fighting if the other party has seriously violated the terms of 
the agreement. Although some scholars suggest that this rule has been affected by the law of the 
UN Charter and that a party to UN-sponsored cease-fire is not allowed to resume hostilities on 
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the grounds of a violation by the other party, this view is unrealistic and contrary to State 
practice. Furthermore, the weight and legal authority of the documents on which this view rests 
cannot be taken to replace a well-established customary rule. Thus, it could be concluded that the 
customary rule regarding the violation of an armistice agreement remains unchanged and still 
governs international conflicts. This rule is enhanced further by Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is also applicable to cease-fire agreements. 
In the present case, Resolution 687 clearly linked the cease-fire between the coalition forces and 
Iraq to the later "unconditional acceptance" of two vital terms: that Iraq eliminates weapons of 
mass destruction and that it allows verification by a Special Commission. This link between the 
cease-fire and Iraq's compliance with the terms and conditions of Resolution 687 was confirmed 
in many Security Council Resolutions and statements by UN officials. The fact of the matter, 
however, is that Iraq was unremittingly in violation for its disarmament obligations established in 
Resolution 687. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the finding that Iraq was in 
material breach of its obligation under the cease-fire agreement (Resolution 687) gave rise to the 
right of the coalition forces to suspend or terminate the cease-fire and resume hostilities without 
new authorization of use of force. 
Regarding the second proposed legal ground for the 2003 action, the claim that the use of force 
against Iraq was based on the right of self-defence seems to be the least satisfactory justification 
for the invasion. Indeed, this claim was not only invalid as a legal basis for the action but also 
undesirable as it intensified the rejection of the action among States and writers, for fear of a 
possible development of a new doctrine on preventive self-defence, which could be used to 
justify virtually any use of force. 
The UN Charter is explicit in its aim of bringing in a new global era in which State's recourse to 
force as an instrument of State's policy is abolished, in favour of a system of collective security. 
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Therefore, as mentioned above, the Charter in Article 2(4) prohibited all forms of unilateral use 
of force. The only exception to this general ban is the right of individual or collective self- 
defence enunciated in Article 51. Even that right has been regulated under the Charter system. 
Article 51 permits a State to use force to defend itself if it is subjected to an armed attack (not 
any act of aggression short of an armed attack) and only until the Security Council has taken 
"measures necessary" to maintain international peace and security. Since the creation of the 
Charter, the most divisive question on the subject of self-defence is whether anticipatory self- 
defence is permitted under Article 51. While some States and writers took the view that self- 
defence is only permitted after the occurrence of an armed attack in conformity with the exact 
text of Article 51, others argued that self-defence is also allowed in case of imminent danger and 
a State does not have to suffer an attack before it can defend itself. A strong argument, however, 
can be made in support of the latter view. Indeed, the travaux preparatoires of Article 51 suggest 
that the intention of the drafters was to preserve the right of self-defence intact as it was before 
the adoption of the Charter, including the right of anticipatory self defence. This view finds 
support in States' views and reactions expressed in situations where force has been used pre- 
emptively (whether the acting State explicitly invoked this right or the action was widely 
perceived as anticipatory self-defence. ) However, the essential and inescapable condition for 
exercising this right is that the danger must be imminent, such that it can be identified credibly 
with a high degree of certainty and the State claiming self-defence has no time to seek any other 
alternative. 
The right of anticipatory self-defence has acquired further prominence in relation to the issue of 
terrorism. Some States, chiefly the US and Israel, have adopted the view that anticipatory self- 
defence against terrorism and States that support and harbour terrorists, to deter the occurrence 
of similar attacks in the future, is permissible under the UN Charter. Prior to the September 11 
4 
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attacks on Washington and New York, this view was contentious. For most States and 
commentators, the concept of self-defence against non-State actors was problematic. There was 
little overt support for a right to use force against a State where the terrorists operated or were 
present, unless the State was clearly complicit in the terrorist acts. In this connection it has been 
argued that the use of force in response to past attacks seems more like punitive than defensive 
action, because the harm is already done; consequently, such an action is prohibited under the 
UN Charter as the Charter absolutely prohibits armed reprisals. These controversial issues, 
however, came to end after the events of September 11. 
The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath have brought a fundamental reappraisal of the legal rules 
governing the use of force in self-defence, and broken new ground in the international law as to 
the use of force against terrorism. The almost unanimous support by the world community for a 
US right of self-defence against those responsible for these atrocities, coupled with the Security 
Council's new legislation on terrorism, have broadened the right of self-defence to include non- 
State actors and States that support or harbour terrorists. Indeed, this reaction indicates that the 
overwhelming majority of the world States today believes that military action against terrorists 
and States that support and harbour them is permissible. In other words, this consensus is 
"weighted with the terminology of opinion juris" and "deliberately norm creating. " Nevertheless, 
despite it is admitted that the events of 9/11 and their aftermath may have brought about an 
expansion of the scope of the right of self-defence to include terrorists and States that support 
and harbour them, there are many problems associated with this new extension. The exact scope 
and pre-conditions for exercising this right are still vague. Therefore, the example of the case of 
9/11 and the war on Afghanistan should be narrowly interpreted. The world States' reactions to 
the cases in the post-9/11 period indicate that they accept the application of this new right only 
under certain conditions, essentially, when a large-scale terrorist attack of substantial effect has 
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taken place and where there is tangible evidence of the likelihood of further attacks from the 
same source at some unspecified time in the future. In addition, the State target for the defensive 
measures should have an obvious link with the terrorist group and not be merely a third State. 
In relation to the present case, the events of 9/11 had a substantial impact on the situation in Iraq. 
After the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, in 2002, the USA adopted a new National 
Security Strategy. The Strategy included a doctrine of preventive self-defence, indicating that 
force may be used even where there is no actual or even imminent attack. The US claimed that in 
light of the new circumstances, the condition of `imminence' should be interpreted to mean the 
elimination of the "emerging threats before they are fully formed. " Thus, the US administration 
appears to extend the much-debated doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, to encompass the 
preclusion of any potential danger, even if the threats are uncertain and unidentified. 
Furthermore, in an obvious exploitation of the rhetoric of the `war against terrorism' and the 
legitimacy conferred on it by the world community and the Security Council, the US 
administration extended the scope of its new Strategy beyond the original goal of combating 
terrorism to include States that possess or develop weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that 
the US has invented such a linkage to bring Iraq and other countries whom it perceives as 
growing enemies within the scope of its military operations. 
This concept of preventive self-defence (known as the Bush Doctrine), however, cannot be 
contained within the boundaries of self-defence under the UN Charter. It is a dangerous notion, 
virtually unfettered of any limitations and, for that reason, had previously been overwhelmingly 
condemned by the world community in the case of the Israeli attack of the Iraqi nuclear reactor 
in 1981. Indeed, in the absence of actual attack or an identified imminent attack, the use of force 
cannot be described as defensive. Rather, it is an offensive policy based on extrapolation for the 
future. In sum, the Bush Doctrine goes far beyond the limits of any theory of self-defence, 
354 
including the concept of preemptive itself; therefore, any application of this doctrine will 
certainly be viewed as illegal. 
Despite this apparent illegality of the Bush Doctrine, the US administration attempted to rely on 
it to justify the use of force against Iraq in 2003. It claimed that it had the right to use force pre- 
emptively against threats posed by the Iraqi regime. These threats, claimed the USA, were 
twofold: (i) the threat of Iraqi links with terrorism; (ii) the threats likely to emerge in the future 
as a result of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. However, no evidence has been 
disclosed to support these claims. On the contrary, the factual circumstances at the time of the 
invasion refute this line of argument. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq cannot be legally grounded 
on any theory of self-defence. To do so, is to confer the legality upon the Bush Doctrine and, 
hence, to develop a doctrine that would grant every nation an unfettered right of prevention 
against its own definition of threats to its security. 2 
As to the third justification put forward for the invasion, which is to relieve the Iraqi people of 
vast and continuing human rights violations by the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein, despite 
the morality of such a claim, it too cannot fit within the Charter paradigm for the use of force. 
A few commentators have asserted the existence of a newly emerging `law' allowing States to 
take unilateral military measures to overthrow tyrannical regimes in other countries, irrespective 
of sovereignty. They seek to justify such intervention with reference to the UN Charter, claiming 
that Article 2(4) should be viewed as legitimizing the unilateral use of force to "enhance 
opportunities for ongoing self-determination °'3 The main legal ground for this argument is the 
principle of self-determination and modem international human rights law which has been 
claimed to provide authority for replacing regimes that rule by violence, oppression and torture, 
2 Kissinger, H. "Consult and Control: Bywords for Battling the New Enemy", Washington Post, 16 September 2002 
3 Reisman, "Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2 (4)", 78 AJIL, p 643 
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with those that conform in an acceptable degree with human rights standards. Finally, proponents 
of this view uphold the US interventions in Grenada and Panama as evidences of that new 
`right'. 
The major obstacle to this approach, however, is that it is so far rejected by the overwhelming 
majority of States. Although the United States and perhaps the United Kingdom have shown 
some inclination to cite upholding or restoring democracy as an argument for intervention, 
Tanzania made no such claim when it deposed Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, nor did Vietnam 
when it deposed the mass murderer Pol Pot in 1978, nor France when it helped to oust `Emperor' 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic in 1979.5 Even, in the cases in which the pro- 
democratic argument was invoked by the United States in support of its operations in Grenada, 
Nicaragua, and Panama (whether explicitly, or implicitly) the action was condemned by the 
international community and- when the issue came before it by the ICJ. Indeed, the basic 
norm of international law, stated clearly in the Charter and many other authoritative instruments, 
is the principle of sovereign equality of States. In essence, sovereignty is the right of each 
territorial community, irrespective of size, power and internal political structure, to self- 
government, free from interference by larger or more powerful States. This concept is 
fundamental to the international legal system, and it is difficult to reconcile with a general 
legitimization of pro-democratic intervention or regime change. Even more important, is that the 
right of self-determination, which is the cornerstone of democratic rights, is vested in the people 
of the country, and only they, not on external power acting without their will, should decide their 
own destiny. For a foreign power to attempt to direct and manipulate the political structure of 
another State is an arrogant usurpation of the right of self-determination. This view is amply 
4 Schachter, "The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion", 78 AJIL, 1984, p 649 
s Chesterman, S. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Lax., Oxford 
University Press, 2001, p 107 
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supported by a wealth of evidence, including Declarations and Resolutions by the General 
Assembly and international jurisprudences. Certainly, it is difficult to see what would remain of 
the principle of non-intervention in international law if intervention were to be justified by mere 
allegations of human rights abuses or undemocratic governance. Such a doctrine would loosen 
the regulation of the use of force in international relations and would permit powerful States to 
use force against any regime that does not share their ideology. This undoubtedly would have 
disastrous outcomes. 
The invasion of Iraq, therefore, cannot be justified on humanitarian grounds or as a war to 
promote democracy and to liberate Iraqis from the tyrannical rule of Saddam. There is no 
accepted principle of international law that legitimizes intervention for regime change, even in 
the interest of democracy. In addition, as the merits of the Iraqi case show, throughout the years 
from 1991 to 2003, the US has shown little interest in regard to the humanitarian conditions of 
the Iraqi people. The inevitable conclusion to be reached from reviewing the facts of the matter 
is that, despite the invocation of human rights abuses as grounds for the removal of Saddam, 
humanitarian objectives were, at best, the least important. Similar to the US actions against its 
southern neighbours, the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime had other important priorities 
rather than establishing democratic governance or liberating the people of those countries from 
tyrannical rule. Therefore, it is disingenuous to claim that the invasion was undertaken for 
humanitarian purposes or to characterize it as a pro-democratic intervention. To do so, is to 
ignore the real reasons that motivated the action. 
To conclude, assessment of the three justifications advanced by the US and UK for the use of 
force against Iraq in 2003 in accordance with the regulations on the use of force under the UN 
Charter and customary international law reveals that the only valid legal ground to justify this 
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action is the authority provided by the Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687. The other two 
grounds are untenable and cannot justify such an action under the Charter system. 
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